ML19284C531
| ML19284C531 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 12/15/1980 |
| From: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | LAW ENGINEERING TESTING CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8101190241 | |
| Download: ML19284C531 (1) | |
Text
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Gentlemen:
Subject:
IE BULLETIN 80-22:
AUTOMATION INDUSTRIES, MODEL 200-520-008 SEALED SOURCE CONNECTORS The above bulletin was sent to all radiography licensees on September 24, 1980.
The bulletin may not have clearly stated that a response was required of all recipients whether or not they were using the above mentioned connectors.
If you have not responded to this bulletin as yet, please do so immediately.
Sincerely,
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Jame Director
Enclosure:
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SSINS No:
6820 Accession No.:
8006190050 IEB 80-22 UNITED STATES s\\
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT (2/,pC WASHINGTON, D.C.
20555 September 11, 1980 IE Bulletin No. 80-22: AUTOMATION INDUSTRIES, MODEL 200-520-008 SEALED-SOURCE CONNECTORS Description of Circumstances:
An accident recently occurred in the State of California (an Agreemant State) that resulted in several se.ious overexposures (see enclosed Circular 79-16).
The accident involved the use of an Automation Industries (AI) Model 200-520-008 source pigtail to drive cable connection.
The connector is identified by the manufacturer as its " quick disconnect" type of connector and is used with several models of cobalt-60 and iridium-192 source assemblies distributed by the manufacturer. The connection is a simple hook and eye connection (see Fig.
- 1) that will permit separation of the eye from the book when they are criented at right angles to each other without any further positive action.
As a result of the design, a disconnection may occur any time the source assembly is cranked out of the exposure device without the guide tube being attached.
Since the Automation Industries Model 200-520-008 sealed-source assembly is authorized to contain up to 120 curies of iridium-192, a source disconnection creates a potential for a serious exposure.
A disconnect is very unlikely to occur if proper procedures are followed by users of Automation Industries sealed sources containing the " quick disconnect".
However, due to.the large number of overexposures that occur in the radio-graphy industry due to the failure to follow proper procedures, the NRC has determined that continued use of the Automation Industries " quick disconnect" connector with its Model 200-520-008 sealed-source assembly or other assemblies can constitute a hazard to the public health, safety or interest.
As a result, the NRL has ordered Automation Industries to discontinue distribution of the AI Model 200-520-008 sealed-source assembly or any other sealed-source assembly that uses the " quick disconnect" type of connector.
Additionally, the NRC will not accept new applications for authorization to use the AI Model 200-520-008 or other sealed-source assemblies using the
" quick disconnect".
In effect, this will recove cuch iridium-192 source and pigtail assemblies from service as licensces exchange their diminished activity Special arrangements should be made for renoving from service, those sources.
connectors that are attached to longer lived sources such as cobalt-60.
The removal from service of the "qu'.ck disconnect" type of connector will require that those drive cables having the matching open hook connector be modified.
Actions To Be Taken by Licenseis To assure the safe operatica of radiography equipment in which the AI " quick disconnect" connector in used, all licensees authorized to use byproduct materials under 10 CFR Part 34 shall perform the following:
IEB 80-22 September 11, 1980 Page 2 of 2 (1) Determine the number of AI Model 200-520-008 and other assemblies in your inventory that have the " quick disconnect" connector and establish a disposal schedule.
Your schedule for iridium-192 sources should be no longer than your usual exchange schedule for diminished activity sources.
Your exchange schedule for connector modification for cobalt-60 sources should be accomplished as soon as is conveniently possible.
However, you should complete your disposal or modification by September 1, 1981.
(2)
In the interim, a warning mark or tag should be placed on each radio-graphic device in which AI " quick disconnect" type assemblies are being used.
(3) This matter should be reviewed with all radiographers.
They should be cautioned of the disconnect possibility and be informed of the method used to identify equipment as marked in accordance w'th Item (2) above.
(4) Review and modify operating, maintenance, inspection and handling procedures as appropriate to preclude this type of accidental disconnect.
You may want to contact t'e manufacturer for assistance in NOTE:
h determining appropriate procedural changes or fixes to preclude a disconnect.
(5)
Discuss with the radiographers the importance of making adequate surveys and the need for following procedures.
A report of your actions for each of the above numbered items shall be submitted to the director of the appropriate regional office within 30 days from the date of this Bulletin.
A copy of the report shall also be sent to the Director, Division of Fuel Facility and Materials Safety Inspection, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C.
20555.
Approved by GAO, B180225 (R0072); approval expired July 31, 1980.
(Application for renewal pending before GAC ).
Approval was given under a blanket clearance specifically for identified geleric problems.
Enclosures:
1.
IE Circular No. 79-16 2.
Figure 1
ru.uss ions No.
79080205a2 SSINS:6830 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C.
20555 August 16, 1179 IE Circular No. 79-16 EXCESSIVE RADIATION EXp0SURES TO MEMBERS OF THE GENERAL PUBLIC AND A RADIOGRAPHER Description of Circumstances:
During radiographic operations using 40 curies of iridium-192, the source became disconnected unbexnownst to the radiographer -he did not use his survey instrument. After the radiographer left the facility, an employee of the customer for which radiography was perfonned, saw the source and, He not knowing what it was, picked it up and placed it in his hip pocket.
carried it about for approximately two hours, later giving it to his super-visor to examine. While making a determination that it was something which belonged to the radiographer, and while waiting for the radiographer to pick up the source, nine empicyees of the radiographer's customer were exposed. The source was also left with a secretary who was instructed to contact the radiographer.
The radiographer returned, examined and took the source assurring the customer's employees that there was no problem, stating that the source was a " detector".
On the evening of the event, the employee who had put the source in his At that time pocket became nauseous and went to a hospital for treatment.
a blister was found on his buttock. The initial diagnosis and treatment cras for an insect bite.
Thirty one days after this initial treatment the indi-At that vidual was hospitalized for treatment of the injury to his buttock.
time the individual asked the physicians if there could be any connection of the injury to the radiography that had been performed at his place of work one month previously.
An investigation followed which disclosed the above information.
The individual who had carried the source in his pocket remains under medical The attending physician does not cons.ider the care following surgery.
exposure to be life threatening.
Neither does amputation appear necessary.
The localized dose is estimated to be 1.5 millicn rem at skin surface, Estimated whole body 60,000 rem at I cm depth and 7,000 rem at 3 cm depth.
doses to other individuals ranged from 1 to 60 rem.
Hand doses ranged to The radiographer received estimated doses of 14 rem to the whole 5,000 rem.
body and 50 rem to the hands.
However, another important aspect al effects of the eAposures, is DUPLICATE DOCUMENT he health and safety of the exposed The radiographer's failure to Entire document previously rt the event to responsible entered into system under ANo D g g g g g g g:
's company is a serious disregard ls early medical attention.
No. of pages:
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IEB 80-22 September 11, 1980 RECENTLY ISSUED IE BULLETINS Bulletin No.
Subject Date Issued Issued To 80-22 Automation Industries, Model 9/11/80 All radiography 200-520-008 Sealed-Source licensees Connectors 79-26 Boron loss from BWR 8/29/80 All BWR power Revision 1 control blades facilities with an OL 80-20 Failures of Westinghouse 7/31/80 To each nuclear Type W-2 Spring Return power facility in to Neutral Control Switches your region having an OL or a CP 80-19 Failures of Mercury-7/31/80 All nuclear power Wetted Matrix Relays in facilities having Reactor Protective Systems either an OL or a CP of Operating Nuclear Power Plants Designed by Combus-tion Engineering 80-18 Maintenance of Adequate 7/24/80 All PWR power reactor Minimum Flow Thru Centrifugal facilities holding OLs Charging Pumps Following and to those PWRs Secondary Side High Energy nearing licensing Line Rupture Supplement 2 Failures Revealed by 7/22/80 All BWR power reactor to 80-17 Testing Subsequent to facilities holding OLs Failure of Control Rods to Insert During a Scram at a BWR Supplement 1 Failure of Control Rods 7/18/80 All BWR power reactor to 80-17 to Insert During a Scram facilities holding OLs at a BWR 80-17 Failure of Control Rods 7/3/80 All BWR power reactor to Insert During a Scram facilities holding OLs at a BWR 80-16 Potential Misapplication of 6/27/80 All Power Reactor Rosemount Inc., Models 1151 Frcilities with an and 1152 Pressure Transmitters OL or a CP with Either "A" or "D" Output Codes 80-15 Possible Loss Of Hotline 6/18/80 All nuclear facilities With Loss Of Off-Site Power holding OLs