ML19282A062
| ML19282A062 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 01/26/1979 |
| From: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| References | |
| ACRS-1610, NUDOCS 7905100090 | |
| Download: ML19282A062 (16) | |
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C f !!'UTES OF THE ACRS ARCHITECT-Ef;GIflEER EALA! ICE OF PLAfJT SUBC0"JIITTEE f'.EETIfiG January 26, 1979 Washington, D.C.
/'s a Y/'/*/ry On January 26, 1979, the ACRS Architect-Engineer Balance of Plant Sub-comittee held a meeting in Washington, D. C. to review the Fluor Power Services, Inc. Balance of Plant Standard Safety Analysis Report (BOPSSAR) and its relationship to the Babcock and Wilcox Standard Reference System BSAR-205 for a preliminary design approval.
tiotice of this meeting appeared in the Federal Register; a copy of the notice is attachment A.
A list of attendees and participar.ts is attachment B.
fio requests to submit oral or written statements were received from members of the public, and none were made at the meeting. This meeting was entirely open to the public.
Richard ttajor was the designated federal employee.
Executive Session Dr. Siess noted that both the full Comittee and Subcommittee had already reviewed the BOPSSAR Standard Design for a balance of plant in connection with the Westinghouse RESAR-41 fluclear Steam Supply System.
The present application for a preliminary design approval is a modification of the previous design to interface with the BSAR-205 fiSSS.
The changes to the plant design required are mostly associated with interfaces.
Dr. Siess listed those items which were mentioned in the previous ACRS report on B0PSSAR/RESAR-41.
The physical separation of critical safety related equipment in connection with common mode failures associated with fires or other operational contingencies was mentioned. The Committee mentioned that safety-related interface requirements were satisfactory for a PDA, but expected the Staff to look at it in greater detail for a construction permit. On sabotage, the letter mentioned that both B0PSSAR and the fiSSS had provisions in their desions to make sabotace mnro dif#icult The Comittee said it thought more could be done, and went on to say that a utility-applicant should be required to demonstrate that acceptable pro-
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bi dL visions to preclude or mitigate the consequences of industrial sabotage will be incorporated into the plant design before a construction permit referencing the combination is issued.
Finally, decontamination and decommissioning were mentioned as having some provisicns included in B0FSSAR. However, the B0PSSAR/RESAR-41 ACRS report went on to say that when BOPSSAR is used as a part of a license application, the Staff and applicant should further review methods and procedures for removing accumulated contamination whereby maintenance and inspection programs and ultimate decommissioning can be more effectively and safely accom-plished.
Dr. Siess mentioned that the Subcommittee would want an update on these items to see if Fluor had given additional thought to them.
Staff's Status Reoort and Status of Outstanding Issues
- James Snell,tiRC Staff Mr. Snell noted that the Staff did not re-review the complete application.
The Staff reviewed only those changes which were required by the change of the nuclear steam system supplier (from the Westinghouse, RESAR-41 to the B&W BSAR-205).
Those portions of the, " Report to the ACRS" with asterisks are the only sections the staff re-reviewed.
There are two open items. The design analysis for the containment sliding under earthquake loads is one.
Fluor has a report on testing which has been performed by the Portland Cement Association. The Staff still hopes to have this item resolved before issuance of a PDA, however, the Staff has not currently reached a position.
The second outstanding issue is the starting voltage for the B&W scope of supply motors.
B&W intended to supply motors which required 80 percent starting voltagei now B&W has informed Fluor by letter that they will supply motors having a 70 percent requirement for starting.
Fluor has already committed to the Staffs requirement for 75% starting voltage.
Once the Staff receives the documentation from Fluor, this item will be considered resolved.
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.u-It was noted that item #1 in Table 1-3, page 1-12 of the Reprt to the ACRS, concerning the coefficient of friction used in the design of the containment against sliding under earthquake loading, is an outstanding item and not a matter to be addressed by a utility-applicant as stated in the table.
It was suggested that the title of Table 1-4 of the Report to the ACRS, " Matters to be Reviewed at Final Design Approval Stage" might be more appropriately titled...." Reviewed at Final Design Approval or Operating License Stage." We items in Table 1.4 apply to either Fluor or a utility applicant.
Table 1-2 addresses major items to be addressed by a utility appli-cant. %ese items are strictly utility items thich can not be re-viewed at this stage for a standard design. % e final three items of the Table (27, 28, and 29) have been added since the RESAR re-view. Item 27 concerns loose parts monitoring equipnent.
Item 28 deals with inservice inspection and relates to Section XI of the ASME code.
Item 29, Containment Leakage Testing program,is con-corned with the requirements specified in Appendix J to 10CFR Part 50.
Mr. Roell of Fluor Power Services resporded to the Staff's report.
lie noted that, with respect to the coefficient of friction test program, Fluor has a preliminary report from PCA. We three participants in the test program have not yet approved the report, so PCA has not
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We report should be finalized in a couple of weeks and will then be transmitted to the Staff. Although a final value for the coefficient of friction is not available; the range is higher than what Fluor agreed to use as a minimum value.
Introduction by Applicant: Fluor Power Services
- Tom Roell Mr. Roell showed a series of slides to orient the subcommittee with the design (Slides 1, 2, and 3 attached give the plant layout and an artist's conception of the finished plant.)
The standard plant uses a spherical containment of a multi-barrier design; steel shell is enclosed by a concrete shield building.
Dr. Siess noted that the question of containment sliding under earth-quake loads and the coefficient of friction between the steel of the spherical containment and the concrete arises if the center of gravity of the mass inside the sphere is below the center of the sphere.
Seismic forces to rotate the sphere, which is resisted by friction be-tween the steel sphere and the concrete base.
Mr. Roell remarked that there are three surfaces of concern, the internal concrete, the steel shell, and the external concrete. We two interfaces created were studied.
Mr. Roell described the lower level of the nuclear island. 'Ine " active annulus area" contains most of the safeguards equipnent. W e lower level of the nuclear island is divided by a concrete wall which separates the two safety-related trains.
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At zero elevation (which corresponds to the finished grade) the active annulus contains major pieces of ventilation and filtrat-ion equipnent and the majority of the waste gas treat:nent equip-ment.
At the +25 foot elevation, the reactor coolant system begins.
Por-tions of the two steam generators, four reactor coolant pumps, and the pressurizer are located here. %e steamlines are located at this level. We fuel paol starts at this elevation in the fuel building.
We +59 foot elevation in the containment is the operating floor.
Some containment and auxiliary building ventilation equipnent is located at this level. B e top of the fuel paol in the fuel building is located at this elevation.
% e +75 foot elevation in the containment is free space. At this ele-vation additional ventilation equipnent is located in the auxiliary building.
The control complex is a three story building. The center floor (+25 foot elevation) contains the control boards and the safety related racks and panels.
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- t. LJ BOPSSAR/BSAR-205 is a two-train plant, as opposed to the three-train design previously reviewed for the RESAR-41 combination.
On the floor below the control panels is the train B cable spreading room and the train B switch gear. We f1>or above the control room contains the train A spreading room and the train A switch gear room. %e general philosophy followed for separation in the design of the standard plant for separation is alwasys to maintain a wall or floor between the redundant trains.
The fuel pool will be able to hold two full cores with the standard (B&W) rack design. We standard plant has been designed to acenm-modate the high density racks. We spent fuel pool is totally above grade; below the spent fuel pool is the spent fuel pool clean-up system. One side of the fuel pool is an exterior wall; the other three walls are interior structures to the fuel building.
The Fluor design approach to systems interaction was presented to the full Committee during the RESAR case.
Fluor relies on two mechanisms to review for systems intere; tion in the plant design process.
One is the procedureally required reviews, and the other is a tool de-veloped by Fluor called the integrated logic diagram. % ese diagrams cover all interactions except those which would occur from spatial or physical location.
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It was noted that there are four safety related DC battery systems.
Relating to the ACRS concern questioning the desirability of locking out IrCS valves, it was noted that all such valves are part of the NSSS. %ey are all in the B&W system. Dr. Siess requested the Staff explain why some plants have two DC sources versus four DC sources in stet other plants. A note referencing the reason (a guide, standard, or interface requirement) would suffice.
Dr. Siess noted there were no objections to having four DC source.
Regarding fire protection, the Staff has not completed its review Basically, the Staff is looking at the changes that have taken place in going from a three train design (RESAR-41) to a two train (B&W) design. We Staff has completed the BOPSSAR/RESAR-41 fire protection review.
Fluor has looked at replacing a steam generator in the B&W plant de-sign.
Mr. Roell said that a steam generator could be removed through the equipment hatch. He also said that the B&W once-through steam generators now have the ability to be picked up between the upper and lower tube support sheets. %is ability solved a clearance problen for removing a steam generator in the finished plant.
Fluor also noted they were looking at ways to make certain shield walls removable to facilitate equipaent removal.
Dr. Siess noted that, in view of the similarity between the interaction between Westinghouse-Fluor which was already reported and to the ACRS
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L in connection with the B&W - Fluor interaction, this item would be reserved as a backup item for the full Committee meeting should the question wise.
Fluor has adopted a position regarding instrumentation to follow the course of an accident consintant with that of the AIF.
Bere are two major objections to the applicable regulatory guide (1.97).
The first objection is a philosophical opposition to providing equip-ment for Class 9 accidents, which industry considers incredible.
A second argument relates to the measurement of radioactivity and the difficulty of obtaining instruments with a high enough range.
Mr. Snell noted that the review of interface requirements has become formalized. Eis was done in Reg. Guide 1.~70, Appendix A, Revision 3 which is incorporated by reference in the Standard Review Plan.
Physical Separtion - Dan Cole, F.P.S.
Mr. Cole noted that the physical separation of electrical comp >nents in the plant is designed to IEEE-384 and augmented by Regulatory Guide 1.75.
Mr. Cole said that the ECCS equipnent is predominantly located at the minus 25 foot elevation, the lowest level of the containment, in two physically separated compartments, one compartment for each of the two safety trains. We controls for all of the enginecered e
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safeguards are located within the control complex in the con-trol building.
'Ae floor below the control room contains the train B clectrical cable-spreading room and the associated Class I-E switchgear and motor control centers.
In a like manner, the train A spreading room and associated electrical equipnent is located on the floor above the control room. 'Ihe two trains were traced around most of the plant to demonstrate their separation.
Decontamination / Decommissioning - Dennis Smiley Fluor Power Services Two design considerations are used by Fluor to minimize exposure problems. One involves equipent selection, design and fabrication.
The second requires the system to be amenable to decontamination.
As an example, Mr. Smiley noted that passive tanks containing large inventories of radioactive materials are not placed in shielded cubicles with other equipent requiring maintenance.
" Canned" pumps are used in the radioactive waste system to minimize leakage in the cubicle itself. Care is tagen not to run piping containing radioactive materials through zones designated at a lower radiation level than the material in the pipe. Steam generator cubicles are designed with main-tenance and inspection in mind to reduc'e exposures. Such items as quick-release insulation and permanent work surface gratings around steam generators will be installed to minimize future work and exposure.
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his is done for several reasons. Generally, it is a tank that must be deconta.tinated. Once the tank is cleaned, the residue is flushed down the rest of the system through a series of pipes, valves, and additional tanks. Fluor wants to minimize this redistribution of radioactive crud. We localized decontamination capability allows them to accomplish this. Additionally, problems with material compatibility are redaced by using a localized decontamination concept, hhen dealing with a maller part of the system, the variety of alloys encountered is smaller. %is allows the decontamination solution to be tailored to a specific part of the system.
Mr. Smiley stated that he believes the technology is in place for the ultimate dismantling of a plant. He noted that it had been done in the past on several plants. He thought some techniques may require some improve-ment, such as, plasma torch welding, but believes iniustry can be relied on to provide the appropriate equipnent, as needed. hhat Fluor has tried to do is provide a plant with the maximum flexibility, so that known prob-lems can be addressed, as w11 as, those that may conceivably develop.
Design Analysis for Containment Sliding Under Earthquake Loads -
A. Setlur, F.P.S.
Dr. Setlur discussed the analysis for the safety of the containment against sliding during an earthquake. He also described the test set-up and the various initial test conditions, including wet and dry inter-face conditions, r
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d b' c h E Ulhu During an earthquake, the free standing containment internal structures and the containment shell and its contents will be sub-jected to vertical and horizontal inertia forces. W e centroid of the seismic force distribution is not necessarily coincidental with the center of the sphere. %is eccentricity will give rise to ro-tational forces at the interior and exterior concrete-steel inter-faces of the spherical shape (steel s@crical containment). % e static friction developed at the interior and exterior concrete-steel inter-faces of the spherical shape is relied on to resist this tendency for rotation.
The tests have been completed. We final report prepared by the Portland Cement Association, is in a draft state. Results of this program in-dicate that the coefficient of friction is greater than 0.525 (the value requested and considered acceptably conservative by the Staff) under wet and dry conditions.
Final values will be established after the report is submitted to the NRC and the Staff's review is complete.
Conclusion _
The Subcommittee decided to refer this preliminary design approval case to the full ACRS for review. W e meeting was adjourned at 11:20 A.M.
NOTE:
A complete transcript of the meeting is on file at the NRC Public Document Room at 1717 H Street. N.W., Washington, D.C.
or can be obtained from ACE Federal Reports, Inc.,415 Second St.
N.E., Washington, D.C. (202-547-6222).
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the project is ready for review by the P0.0Pi. QUAUTY PAGES f ull Committee.
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In addition. it may be neerssary for the Subcommittee to hold one or more
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inforrnation. I hate determined. In ac-cordance with subsection 10td) of
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sessions be required, it is necessary to t. v, cl se these sessions to protect propri.
-- (7510-01-M]
etary information (5
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552 b(c)( 4 )).
ADvisotf CoMumit oti rt Ag102 5AFE.
Further information regarding GU A s D5; A t Chit CLE NG.Nt tit B ALANCE topics to be discussed shether the of M ANT SLBCOMM!1llt meeting has been cancelied or r<sened.
uled the Chairman's ruling on re-quests for the opportunity to present Awng oral statements and the time allotted f
7' The ACRS Architect Engineer Dal.
therefor can be obtained by a prepaid ante of Plant Subcommittee will hold telephone call to the Designated Fed-a meeting on January 2G.19~9. tre.
eral Employee for this meetmg. Mr.
schedaled from December 18.1978) in Richard K. Major. (telephone 202/
Room 1046, 1717 11 Street.
N.W.,
G34-1414 ) between L15 a_m. and 5.00
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Washmeton. DC 20555 to review the p m.. EST.
Fluor Power Services. Inc. Balance of Background information concerning Plant Standard Safety Anaylsis items to be considered at this meeting Report (BOPESAR) and its relation-can be found in documents on file and ship to the Babcock and Wilcox Stand
- available for public inspection at the c
2 ard Reference System B-SAR-205 for NRC Public Document Room. 1717 11 s
a preliminary design approsal. Notice Street. N.W Washington. DC 20555.
of this meeting was published on No-Dated January 8.19'29.
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vember 20 and December 20. 1978 (43 FR 51147 and 50443. respectisely).
JonN C. Ifom.
In accordance with the procedures Adef sory Committet outlined in the FEarr.at RtersTr.R on Managemenf O//teer.
October 4.1078 (43 FR 4592G). oral or tyn poe sg.gcc ymed 130 79; 8 45 aml written statements may be presented g;
by members of the public. recordmgs
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will be permitted only during those tw. -.- q.s -e -
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portions of the meeting %htn a tran-ry, script is being kept and questions rnay.h; g
committee, its consultants, and Staff. (*.-
'L be asked only by members of the Sub-,-
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Persons desiring to make oral state. M y'.. ments should notify the Designated [f.
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The' agenda for subject meeting 'tu'*I
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shall be u follows: Tridcy, Jouary 26. Fj Y
c.m. untn! the conclusson of Q '.
1979. 8:30 The Sobeommittee may meet in Ex. Q'.
business.
,'e eeuthc Session. sith any of its consul p..
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tants who may be present, to explore r4
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At the conclusion of the Executive
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- Fluor l'ower Serviers. Inc.. and their ;-
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The subcommittec may then caucus
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8 MINUTES OF THE ACRS ARCHITECT-ENGINEER BALANCE OF PLANT SUBC0f'.MITTEE January 26, 1979 Washington, D.C.
ATTENDEELI_ET ACRS FLUOR POWER SERVICES C. P. Siess, Chairman T. L. Roell W. M. Mathis W. Larkin J. J. Ray J. Derdiger R. K. Major, Designated R. Berzins Federal Employee A. V. Setlur D. E. Cole M. T. Lin NRC STAFF D. Smiley J. Snell J. Heltemes W. P. Gammill P. T. Kuo D. C. Jeng P. O'Reilly T. Cox J. Angelo B&W H. P. Langer r
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