ML19281A856
| ML19281A856 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07002756 |
| Issue date: | 03/12/1979 |
| From: | James Shea NRC OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS (OIP) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19281A857 | List: |
| References | |
| SECY-78-640A, NUDOCS 7904160027 | |
| Download: ML19281A856 (29) | |
Text
.
f' arch 12,1979 set COMMISSIONER ACTION F_o r :
ine tcmmissioners From:
James R. Shea, Director Office of International Programs Thru:
Executive Director for Operations s fM
.yy
Subject:
APPROVALCFAFRCPOSEDLICENSETOEkPCRTHIGH-ENRICHEa URANIUM TO FRANCE (LICENSE APPLICATIC11 NO. XSN?'01232, SECY 73-640)
Pur::ose:
Ccmmission review of procosed issuance of subject license to Transnuclear Incorporated.
Review Dates:
60-day period expired on February 6,1979 120-day period expires on April 7,1979 Discussion:
In November 1977, Transnuclear filed an application for a license to export 23.058 kilograms of uranium, enriched to 93.3'; U-235 to France.
The material, in the form of UF, will be shipced to NUKEM g
(FRG) for convers1cn and then to CERCA (France) for fabrication into fuel elecents for the High Flux Reactor at Grenoble, France (Application at Appendix A).
The High Flux Reactor, which is jointly owned by France, the FRG, and the United Kingdcm, is one of the highest performance research and test reactors in the world.
The hign perfor ance is obi.:iried through the use of the most advanced fuel fabrication tech-nology available.
The US has furnished HEU for this facility since it became operational in Decemoer 1971.
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS I i response to our cecember 20, 1977 request for POOR QUALITY PAGES y ews, the Executive Branch has (1) concluded that
- suance of the proposed license would not be inimical to the interests of the United States, including the cormon defense and security; (2) confirmed that *he material will be subject to all the terms and concitions of the US-EURATOM Additional Agreement for Cooperation; J..
Contact:
G.G. Cplinger (492-7866) a 1.n. Lee (492-7980 g
g rgg041 p-i
, Discussion:
and (3) noted that the members of EURATOM have adhered (continued) to the provisions of the Additional Agreement for Cooperation with the United States (State memorandum at Appendix 3).
Among other things, the Executive Branch memorandum notes that:
o The President has approved the proposed expert application. Since it involves a project or facility with which the US has previously supplied HEU, no new US commitment to supply HEU has been created by approval of this case.
o In conformance with policy direction to minimize unirradiated HEU inventory, the quantity under this export request is limited to that expected to be sufficient for not more than two and ene-half years of reactor operation from the time of the export.
This is considered a reasonable period to allow for expert, transportation, and fabrication of fuel and maintenance of a fresh fuel reserve sufficient to assure the continuous and econcmic operation of the reactor.
The written assurances (as required by 10 CFR 110.13(a))
that physical security measures providing as a minimum protection comparable to those set forth in INFCIRC/225/
Rev.
1., will be maintained have not been obtained frcm the Governments of France and the FRG.
Instead, France and the FRG have provided written assurances based on the Suppliers Group physical security. guidelines which the Commission determined to be accectable on February 16.
With regard to Commissioner Ahearne's Decemcer 21, 1973 memorandun, ouestions 2, 3, and 4 (namely: (a) whether written physical security assurances have been obtained End the effect of the European Court of Justice decision cn these assurances; (b) the current status of IAEA-EURATCM negotiations; and (c) findings regarding Section 127 criteria for all EURATCM recipients) nave been addressed in a separate pacer (SECY-79-126, classified, dated February 16,1979). The staff believes this execr should be exemoted frcm the written ;;hysical security assurance letter requirement of 10 CFR 110.43 concerning all of EURATCM in light of the consideraticns in that paper and the Commission's cecision of Fecruary 23 on this matter.
3-In particular, this decision noted that the staff would forward any urgent EURATCM HEU caser to the Commission for consideration pending receipt of physical security assurance letters from all the EURATOM states.
In a 25, 1979 letter (attached at Accendix 0), t.UKEM, January the fuel fabricator, expressed urgency for material covered by the proposed license and several other HEU They advised that a constant flow of material is cases.
necessary in order to meet the requirements of the European reactor operators. Furthermore, NUKEM is experiencing material shortages which will soon threaten continuous cperation of production unless these cases are approved.
In light of Commission guidance on SECY-79-126, the urgency expressed for this license,and the fact that, as noted in SECY-79-167, written physical security assurance letters have now been received from all the EURATCM states except Italy (and this is near completien), the staff believes an exemption from the requirement for such letters from all the EURATOM states should be granted for this export.
In addition to the general ccmments on facility attach-mencs in EURATOM discussec in the State Department memorandum of December 8, 1978, the Executive Branch recently informed the staff that there are no facility attachments for facilities in France.
At such timo that France designates a facility to be safeguarded by the IAEA, pursuant to the Agreement which recently came into force, a facility attachment will be deveinged. With regard to NUKEM, the staff notes that a facility attachment has been completed.
With respect to axacrt licensing rc;uircments of the Atcmic Energy Act, application XSNM01232 does not differ in its merits from previous exports to France apcroved by the Ccmmission. Upon review of the Executive Branch analysis and the suoportive documentation, and based upon analyses in SECY-78-199 and SECY-78-199A (classified) which forwarded the assessment of the physical security program in France, tne staff ccccurs in the Executive Erarch's determination that the requirements of the Atomic Energy Act and the NNPA of 1973 have :een me and that the Or;;osed export wcule not be inimical to tne ccamon defense anc security of the US.
The staff has also examined tne questier, of whetner it wouic ce possicle to operate tne Hign Flux Reactor on uranium of lower enrichment.
Argonne National Laboratory has completed an independent assessment of the need for HEU in fueling this reactor.
The assessment concluded, on the basis of currently available information, that it would not be possible to convert the reactor to less than fully enr.iched uranium fuel without significantly affecting reactor performance and fuel cycle costs.
In addition, as not-d above, the fuel for the High Flux Reactor is of a sophisticated design utilizing currently available advanced fuel fabrication technology.
However, if the current COE fuel development program is successful, it is possible that a highly advanced fuel fabrication technology wculd allcw at least scme reduction in enrichment level of fuel suitable for maintai ing the high performance n
level of this reactor at some future date.
The Commission will note that processing of this case, and several other EURATOM HEU exports,has been delayed due to the complexities and workload involved in the analysis and staff coordination of a large number of major export applications during the past three months. For example, Executive Branch views were received on mcre than 20 such applications during December. These and other difficult cases processed during this time period have been complicated by the need to resolve a number of questions concerning whether NNPA criteria and NRC regulations are satisfied and by the need to address other matters recuested by the Commission. The resolution of the physical security questions noted in this paper will enable the staff to expedite processing of future ELRATOM exports.
The following documents are forwarded for Commission review of the subject application: (1) application of November 23, 1977 (Appendix A); (2) Executive Branch views of December 8, 1978 (Appendix 3); (3) copy of proposed license (Apoendix C); and letter of January 25, 1979 (Appendix D).
N"SS Technical Review:
1c inf:rmati0r has been receive:
concerning tne Frencn and the FRG state systems of accounting and centrol.
' lith respect to France, NMSS has received no information covering the status of implementation of EURATCM and IAEA safeguards.
5-No information has been receivec by NMSS concerning IAEA imclementation activities and pecblems in the FF.G cther than from the source which was the basis for N:!SS conclusions reflected in Table IV of the November 29, 1973 memorandum to Commissioner Gilinsky. The principal conclusion of the NMSS examination is that the available information on IAEA implementation is not sufficient to permit NMSS to evaluate the effectiveness of IAEA safe-guards in the above mentioned countries.
NMSS has reviewed the physical security programs in France and the FRG and found them adequate for the purpose of this export.
Recommendation:
That the Commission authorize the issuance of the proposed license to Transnuclear, Incorporated, with an exemption from the written physical security assurance letter requirement in conformance with the Ccmmission's position on SECY-79-126 (classified).
Cccrdination:
CELD has no legal objection.
NMSS views on the adequacy of the accounting and control system, the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards imolementation, and the adecuacy of the physical security program in France and the FRG are as stated above.
, -Oh-Ja#es R. Shea, Director Office of International Programs
Enclosures:
As stated NOTE:
Commissioner ccaments should be provided directly to the Office of the Secretary, by c.o.b. T,mes s ;,
v,--s on_ 1c7o Ccmmission staff office ccmments, if any, should be submitted to the Commissioners NLT v=r-s 18. Te7o with an information cecy to the Office of the Secretary. If :ne paper is of such a nature that it requires additional time for analytical review and comment, the Commissioners and the Secretariat should be apprised of when comments may be excected.
DISTRIBUTION:
Commissioners Commission Staff Offices Exec. Di. For Caers.
Secretariat
6 o
APPENDIX A