ML19276H650
| ML19276H650 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 11/28/1979 |
| From: | Ross D NRC - TMI-2 BULLETINS & ORDERS TASK FORCE |
| To: | Keenan T GENERAL ELECTRIC OPERATING PLANT OWNERS GROUP |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7912180022 | |
| Download: ML19276H650 (24) | |
Text
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u;iTC TATES h,
NUCLE AR.EGULATORY COMMISS.~ '.
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. OING TO'. D. C ;5 55
. 'l T'
r. Thomas D. Keenan, Chaiman General Electric Boiling Water Reactors Owner's Group Vemont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation Seventy-Seven Grove Street Rutland, Vermont 05701
Dear fir. Keenan:
SUBJECT:
EVALVATI0li 0F SMALL-BREAK LCIS-OF-:::LA'!T ACCIDENT GUIDELillES By letter dated October 26, 1979, subject as abcie, v.e a: vised you that the small-break loss-of-coolant accident operator.:uidelines contained in Section 3.1.1.2 of General Electric Company Rspor-f;EC3-24708 as modified in accordance with your letters dated 0:teber 15,1979 and October 23, 1979 were acceptable. We requested, however, -hat ycu submit for our confimation the modified guidelines by November 16, 1979.
We further -
advised you that upon our receipt of these guidelines, we would acknowledge by letter that the guidelines had been modified in accordance with our agreements.
By letter dated November 16, 1979, you submitted fcr our confimation the modified guidelines, a copy of which is enciesed.
.ie have completed our review of these guidelines, have detemined -hat they have been modified in accordance with our agreements and conclude, therefore, that they are acceptable. As indicated on Page 5 of Enclosure 6 to Darrell G. Eisenhut's September 13, 1979 letter to all operating nuclear power plants, implementation of the small-break loss-of-coolant accident emergency procedures and operator retraining based on these guidelines must be completed by December 31, 1979.
Sincerely, A
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D. F.
ois, '
T,$irector Bulletins and Orders Task Force
Enclosure:
.s stated
- See attacred list for Nners Grouc Reps.
OR C-n121so
NED0-24708 Revision 1 3.1.1.2 Operator Guidelines
- ntroduction Based on the Analyses discussed in Sections 3.1.1.1 and the design of the various reactor systems, a set of operator guidelines has been developed. These guidelines define operator actio:.a following a loss of coolant accident at rates large enough to cause one or both of two auto =atic actions: a) reactor scram on high drywell pressure, and/or * ', initiation of the primary containment isolation syctem.
It should be noted that a small pipe break inside the pri=ary contain-ment will cause a reactor scram from high drywell pressure. Losses of coolant at lesser rates are considered leaks, instead of breaks, and are not ccvered in these guidelines. Technical Specifications and existing utility procedutas require the operator to shut down the plant whenever: a) total leakage exceeds (25
- gpm, and b), unidentified leakage exceeds (j5] spm.
(A 25 gym leak corre-sponds to a liquid break size of 0.0005 ft2, or a circular hole of dia eter 0.3 inch.)
Af ter the break occurs, plant protective instrenentation will sense the break, and cause either a scram and/or an isolation.
If the operator sees the break sy=pta=s before automatic scram and/or isolation, and =anually initiates scram and/or isolation, so much the better. These guidelines would not be written differently, except perhaps to note that the scram and/or isolation was nanual 4.nstead of automatic.
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- .~.: vin; se::.:- has three guidelines, cr;&ni:ed is f:'1: s:
P"IM A A v REAC 04SCAAM CONraiNVENT C N =lG.a 3 R YW E L.
ISOL.ATICN EVENT sa ESSUA E SMALL SAE AK AC010ENT GulOELINE NQ. I SB A 1 PIPE S AEAK OIAGNCSIS SMALL SREAK AC010ENT SMALL S AE AK AC010ENT Gut 0E LINE No. 3 GUIDELIN ES NO. 2 SSA3 SBA 2 P1PE S A EAK C'JTSICE PlPE SAEAK !M P9tMARY CONTAINMENT PRIMARY CONT AINMENT he firs: guideline, 53A-1, is dias cs:10 and provides an en:rj pei:.: for :he see nd and :hird guidelines, 53A-2 and $3A-3.
Ocidelines 53A-and 53A-3 cen:ain specific ree==enda: ions. They each have - najor headings:
1.
Purpose a
2.
Sv=c ces and Au:: cati: Ac: ions "Sy p: ens" are pr: cess variable indica: ices er alar =s which :he Opera:or is expec:ed :o see or hear in :he cenirol rec =.
"Au:c=a:i: Ac:1cus" are ac: ices :aken by :he plan pre:ec:ive ins:ru=en:a:icn and assccia:ed sys:ers vi:hou: assis:ance fr:= :he
- pera:Or.
_ n. -
NEDO-24708 Revision 1 3.
I=nediate Orerater A : ions "In=ediate Operator Actions" are actions the :; era::: :akes as sect as possible to protect the core. Ihe goals of i=ntiiz:a :;erater e.::i: s are to reduce the loss of prt:ary inventory as :uick1/ as possible, and
- o =in4 4ce the i=nediate release of radica::1et:y cu: side the con:ain-ment.
I=nediate Operator Actions include, as first actions, the veri-fication of Auto =atic Actions, and are done bef:re any further =anual actions are taken. Verification means :he operator confirms that the Automatic Actions have been correctly perfor=ed by checking =ultiple indications which should change as a result of :he Auto =atic Action.
For exa=ple, the operator verifies reactor scra= by noting all control rod position lights show rods fully inserted, and :ha: :he neutron flux indicators show decaying flux. As a second example, the operator verifies EPCI initiation by noting indications :n flow, turbine rps, valve positions, pu=p discharge pressure, e:c., in addition to the aanun-ciator that signals HPCI start.
As t third example, the operator =anually initiates RCIC if RCIC de-not auto =acically start on low vessel level.
4.
Subseau it Ooerator Actions
" Subsequent Operator Actions" are actions the operator should take after the L=nediate Operator Actions. The goal of the Subsequent Operator Actions is to bring the plant to a stable condition, where the vessel water level is steady or cycling within a satisfactory range, and containment cooling has been established.
'Jithin these =ajor headings, an effort has been cade to list the more important itens first and the less important itens last, Plant specific values are enclosed in brackets [ J. Utility-prepared procedures should contain the specific alar = window numbers, setpoint values, panel locations, notification instructions, valve nenbers, and reference to other appli:able a::ident or a ergency procedures.
3.1-39
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- . Cauti ns are in:1;ded in :he guide *ines where app::priate.
The guidelines c ::ained wi:hin :his repor: are generic := al' GI-3WR's in tha:
-hey include all sys:e=s which =ay be used :: =i:1 gate :he : nse cences cf a
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f any specific plan: =ay ne: include all of the abeve sys:e=s, care cust be exercised by :he individual plan: opera::: when applying :hese guidelines.
The guidelines vi'.1 he applied :: individual plants by ei:he: ::: ::nsidering s:a:emen:s fr:m :he guidelines which are ne: applicable. :: by subs i:u:ing corresponding systa=s.
Fer exa:ple, plan:s vi:5 no L?C: vi"; n:: censider s:atemen:s referring :: L?CI, and plants vi:h isola:1:n ::ndensers will subs:itu:e
- C f:: RCIC.
In :his anner :he uidelines apply :o all plan:s.
All systems func:ica normally, including f eedva:e: and : ndensa:e sys:e=s, eff-si:e power, ins:ru=en: air, centrol red drive pu=ps, and is:la:icn valves.
Degraded cases (such as. css or. h_,g.n pressure systems :: :a_, ure ::. va_,ves ::
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McVever, i: is expec:ed :ha: the current u:ili:y procedures ::::erning equip-
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There are fcur basic cbjectives :he opera:ct is :o achieve in the even: of a pipe break, vi:h respe : to
- ..a core and con: sin =ent:
a.
Maintain cere :coling :o preven: excessive cladding hea::p and oxidation; b.
Liri: :he release of offsi:e radiati:n by =ain:aining :he integrity of :he primary and secondary cc=:ain=ents;
?' ace the reactor in a safe, stable condition; d.
Keep the pool bulk te=perature belev I
- ?! to prevent excessive leads to the pool boundary and s::ue:ures during saf e -/ relief valve discharges, and =aintain peak allcuable :e:pera:::es within cec'ing equipmen: and cen ain=en: s::ue:ure design *.i=its.
This guideline, SBA-1, prevides :he entry point for :he :vo folleving guidelines, which include specific recc==endaticus depending on the break loca:icn:
S=211 3reak Acciden: Guideline 53A-2: Pipe 3:eak Inside ?:i=ary Cen:ain=ent S=all 3reak Accident Guideline 53A-3: Pipe 3:eak Ou: side ?:isary 0:ntain=en:
Guidance is provided :: he opera:or in diagnosing :he sy=p:::s displayed in
- he ::n:::1 ::c: sc :ha: he =ay distinguish be:veen s all pipe breaks inside
- he pri=ary cen:ain=en: and small pipe breaks cu: side :he ;;izary cen:ain en:,
and :: sele:: :he appr:priate guide'ine.
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I==edia:e Operator Actions include ver-
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i CAUTION d2 Continuousl ::ni:or vessel level and rressure frea =ul:iple indica:icts.
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p : cess indica:icas.
i CAUTION d4 i
be placed in l' CIM' =ede, unless 1) =iscpera-J Au:c=a:1: cen::cis should ne:
- icn in AUTOMA!!C : ode is confirmed by at leas: :Vo independen process I
para e:e: iudica: ices; or 2) core cecling is assured, and these guidelines i
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.! s:a:e specifically to de c:herwise. When =anual Opera:icn is no longer
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any One c : ore of the pri=ary piping s:la:icr. valve g: cups isolates, : hen go to S3A-3, " Pipe 3:eak Cu: side ?:i=ary Contain=ent".
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1.
?"RPOSI The intent of this guideline is to assure that the nor=al water =akeup syste=s, the E=ergency Core Cooling Syste=s (ECCS), and contai =en: coc'ing systems operate as designed :o pro:ect the core and contain=en: in :ht event of a S=all Break Acciden: (S3A) inside the pri=ary contain=ent.
In :he guideline are described even:s to be expec:ed and opera:or actions whi:t are required to bring the reac:or and contaie=en: to a controlled, stab'e :endi ica. Also included in this guideline are the operator actions foll:ving loss of the high pressure water make-up systems.
2.
SYMPTOV.S A';D AUTOMATIC ACTIONS The sy=pte=s and auto =atic actions which are displayed i= the control room in the event of a pipe break inside the primary con:ain=ent are grouped below.
The sy=ptoms observed will depend upon the severity of :he a::ident. For s= aller breaks, only a few sy=pto=s may be observed. For a larger braak, = ore sy=pt==s would be expected.
2.1 Symptoms 2.1.1 Drywell at=osphere sy=ptoms
~
EM drywell pressure alars [1.3 psig,j High temperature High humidity Eigh radiation 2.1.2 Dr,.-acil Su=p Sy=pto=s High or high-high levels High integrator readings 31;b s =p :enperature Ex:essive su=p pu=p opera:i:n
NEDO-24708 Revi'1:n 1 r
2.1.2 Other Sy=pters Generater load decrease 3:eam f1:w/ feed flow mis =atch 1
2.2 Aut :atic Actions ECCSActuations[].0psigj 2.2.1 Emergency diesel-generators-scart HPCI starts and injects into the vessel bhhen vessel pressure is greater than the low pressure isolation setpointof100psif]
LPCI pumps start L?CS pumps start' ADS high dryvell pressure per=1ssive 2.2.2 Other Automatic Actions T.eactorscram(2.0 psi (}
Standby Gas Treatment System initiates ((.G psij]
Valve group [2] isolates @EHL shutdown cooling, dryvell sumps, TIP systemj i_2.0 psig Valve group [ 6] isolates [ primary containment atmospheric control system {] ['2,0 psi []
Containmentspraypermissive_2.0psid 2.1-15
?.r; i : - - - 1 3.
C'"l3.s!E C?I?>.!OR ACTICNS 3.1 Any Aute ati: Actions listed in Section 2. above whi:h shculd have initiated rust be verified, preferably by at least two independent indications, or =anually initiated if the Automatic Action did not :::ur.
Scras is verified by noting that control rod position lights show rods fully inserted, and that neutron flux indicators show decaying flux.
3.2 Take the reactor MODE switch'out of RUN to prevent MSIV fro: closing en icw vessel pressure [850 psig].
3.3 Continuously =enitor vessel water level using all available instrumentation.
3.3.1 Narrow range level control indicators [instru=ent type,#s]
3.3.2 Widerangesafetytripindicators[ instrument type,#s) 3.3.3 Fuelzoneindicators([instru=enttype,#s[}
3.3.4 Refueling zone indicators (instrenent type,#s]
CAUTION #7 l The indicated water level, where provided by Yarway instru=entation utilizing
! ref erence legs in the drywell, is dependent upon drywell te=perature. Very large increases in drywell temperature (an increase frc= 1350F to 3400F) could result in a level inaccuracy (as much as [28] inches depending on drywell te=perature and type of instrument) with indicated level being i
lhigherthanactuallevel.
During rapid reactor depressurization (with ADS operation for exa=ple),
I and particularly below 500 psig, the operator should utill:e the cold refer-ence leg type of level indicators (such as operating range and fuel zone indication) to give backup infor=ation on vessel water level. The operater i'should not turn off any ECCS unless there is sufficient confir=ing inf or=ation fr:: ::ld reference leg level instru=ents that vessel water level has been 2.1 -+
NEDO-24708 D*OD [D'3'Y o Db'u u
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22 res:: ed.
The :pera::: should :: rely en :he Yarvtys if erra:i: behavi:r,
_n:::a:: e :f reference leg flashing, has :::urred. :11 :he Yarvay readin;s are :n scale and in reasenable agree =en: vi:n he:
- d reference leg
- .
types of level ins::u=en:s. The opera::: shculd ter:f; :ha: au::=a:1: I:03 ac: a: ions occur when :he leve*s are a: the ::1p ;:in:s,adjus:ed in ac:: dance-wi:h each plant's individua11v. verified rec:==enda:i:ns).
The opera:or should ;
l be prepared :o =anually actua:e ICCS during a suspe::ed 12 A if au:e=a:i:
i I
E actua:icn is no: achieved.
3.1 Cen::el vessel level with available high pressure sys:e=s (feedva:er, c:nt::1 rod drive pu=ps, HPCI, RCIC). When :he level a pr: aches :he high level (8] ::1p [+5S inches] f:: feedva:er, EPCI, and RC:C, :ake =anual con:rol (if possible) of :he high pressure sys:e=s :e =ain:ain level, and :o preven: ::1ps of feedwa:er, EPCI, and RCIC.
Res:::e :: AUTCMA!!C/ STAND 3Y
- de (if possible) :he sys:e=s which are no: needed :c =aintain level.
Make frequent checks of level when sys:e=s are 1: :he "ANUAL =cde.
- ! _I_f high pressure sys:e=s are unable :o =aintain leve* the go :o CONTINGINCY #1.;*
i CAUTION d8 i
li signals =f high pool level :: low condensa:e s::: age tank ".evel occur,
'. : hen =anually ::ansfer RCIC sue:ica f:c= :he condensa:e s:orage tank to :he i, pool, and verify au:s=a:ic ::ansfer of suction fe: 3?CI.
i CAUTION #o l
Jo no: hro::le H?CI and RCIC syste=s belev :urbine s;eeds which yield l
accep:able con:inucus opera:icn.
I 3.5 !! :he vessel pressure falls belov the shu:off head of :he low pressure sys:e=s (cendensa:e [20C psis]. L?CS [300 psig:. and _?C: ~300 psig]),
- nfir= :ha: :hese syste=s infec: in:: :he vessel. and tha: :he water level responds ac:::dingly.
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! syste=s being used :: :aintain level, then depressuri:e :he vessel in :he t
following order cf preference:
- 1) condenser; ;) ene :: : ore SRVs to :he l pool (rotate use of SR'is to distribute hea: unif:r:1 o the pool); or i 3) :anual A25 ini:ia: ion.
'.2 Continuously noni:or and con:rol poo' :e=pera:::e :: keep :he bulk pool temperature fro = exceeding [
- F].
. 2.1 Re-es:ablish nain condenser as a hea: sink, if possible.
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Assure main staa: lines are drained before opening cain s:ca= isola:icn valves.
4.2.2 As soon as :he pool ta=perature exceeds the service water te=perature, use :he RER pu:ps (if.: hey are not needed in the L. Cl =cde for main-
- aining vessel level) in :he nor=al poci coling code.
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NEDC-24708 M:n ::: and ::::::1 :en:ain=ent pressure :: keep ;; essure ie'ev dar ;-
1.3.1
'I ;cssible spray :he eco; airspace when :'.e d:.ve;* pressure exceeds [2.0 psig].
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_I_f :he dryvell pressure exceeds [35 psigi f:: ::0 =inu:es], -P.en spray :he dryvell un:11 pressure is reduced :s {25 psig].
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4.4 Follow procedures for pos:-LCCA contain=ent venting and hydrogen cen:rol
[ procedure is].
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- iEDO-24708 R+ isten 1 CONTINGENCY :/1 Ir.A3:L:~T TO MAINTA;;i LE7EL *.CTH ?.!OH ?RESSi;3.E STS IMS*
If the coerator determines that vessel level cannot be maintained by the high pressure syste=s, then the operator must verify autenatic operation of the ADS on low level [1 plus 120 seconds preset timedelay], While waitinz for the
~
Aute=atic Actions to occur on decreasin2 vessel level, the coerator should make all atte=ots to start the hi2h oressure systems and recain level before the low level [1 olus 120 seconds creset tt=e delavl is reached.
CAUTION 2114
~
If the ADS does not initiate automatically on low level t 1][-146 inches],
then canually initiate ADS (operator cpens the ss=e valves that the ADS logic would open automatically). Do not manually initiate ADS unless it is confir=ed that at least one low pressure pu=p { condensate, LPCS, LPCI] is running.
I,f_ the operator is unable to =anually initiate ADS, then the operator must manually open other safety / relief valves. As many valves as possible, up to the number used for ADS, should be opened.
The operator should also verify those Aute=atic Actions which occur on decreas-ing level, and hene not already occurred on high drywell pressure.
'4han the low level [13 C-146 inches] is reached, the operator should confirm that the ADS ctser begins and that the proper valves open [120) seconds af ter the ti=er begins, if possible.
CAUTION 915 Do not block er defeat the ADS sec.uence by resetting the ADS tiser, unless vessel level can be =aintained.
After ACS attuates, return to Ocideline 53A-2, Section 4, "Sabsequent Operator Actions".
- includes f ailure of high pressure syste:s 2.1-5:
NIDO-24708 Rerisien.1 SMAL; 3REAK ACCIDC!T G" DIl!';I 72 S3A-3
?!?E 37.EAK OUTSIDE PRDi.GY CO:CA;'DE'C 1.
PL*RPOSE The intent of this guideline is to assure that the pri=ary contain=ent isolation system operates as designed in the event of a S=all 3:eak Accident (SBA) outside the pri=ary contain=ent. If the break occurs in a pipe which can be auto =atically isolated, neither reactor scram nor reactor isolation =ay be netessary. Technical Specifications address how long.the plant can operate before :he isolated syste=
=ust be restored to service.
2.
SYMPTOMS AV.D AUTOMATIC ACTIONS The sympto=s and aute=atic sctions which are displayed in the control room in the event of pipe break outside primary containment are listed below. The specific sympto=s observed will depend upon the location and site of the break.
2.1 Pri=ary Contain=ent Isolation Thereare(7]isolationvalvegroups,eachassociatedwithasystemcon-nected to the pri=ary coolant outside of pri=ary contain=ent. One or more of these valve groups will isolate on syste= signals of high flow, low vessel water level, high radiation, high area te=perature, high drywell press...e, low syst m pressure, etc., which are indicative of a pipe break outside of pri=ary contain=ent. [ Utility =ayprovidemorespecific information on the valve groups and Autc=atic Actions].
2.2 Other Sy=pto=s and Automatic Actions 2.2.1 Sy=pec=s Excess flow check valves actuati:n and ala = [
]
2.1-?;
NED0-21703 Re.i- -- 1 I
e Rea::or bu dding high radiatie 2: enh ust v_at i,,
3 Area radiatien =cnitor alars (,
3 l
1 De:reasing hotwell level or cendensate storage tank level Missatch between steam and feed flov Decrease in generator output CGe)
Increase in reactor power Dfn't) 2.2.2 Auto =atic Actions SBOTS initiation [
-l Reactor building isolation i_
]
3.
r^EDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS 3.1 Any Aute=atic Actions listed in Section 2. above which should have been initiated =ust be verified, preferably by at least two independent indica-tiens, or =anually initiated if the Autenatic Action did not occur.
If scra= occurs, scram is to be verified by noting that all control rod position lights show rods fully inserted, and that neutron flux indicators show decaying jflux.
-CAUTION #16 I
- If an automatic isolation of a particular systes has occurred, do not atte=pt 1,
to de-isolate or restore the systes until all available indications have been i
' checked and are found to be normal.
For auto =atic isolation of a particular valve group, verify all valves in the group are closed by valve position indication and by noting confir=1ng process variables (such as zero flow). When all isolation valves in the suspected broken system are closed, note that area symptoms of high temper-ature and radiation decrease.
r-t* M there is a failure to co=pletely isolate a suspe:ted broken system, then go c: C05-~~NGINC'.' 4 2.
"M raa:t:r scra: ec:urs on '..igh dr'.. ell pressure, -he go to 52A-2 "?ipe
? st? :.eide ? '_2-~
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NEDO-247CS Eevision 1 1.; Continucusly :::itor vessel water level using all avatia':le instru=entation I
lepeat 2.3.1 ::: ugh 3.3.'
in SBA-2.)
3.2 Control vessel level with available high pressure systens (feedvater, con-trol rod drive pu=ps, EPCI, RCIC). When the level approaches the high leve1 [8] trip L+58 inches] for feedwater, EPCI, and RCIC, take nanual control (if possible) of the high pressure syste=s to =aintain level, and to prevent trips of f eedwater, EPCI, and RCI.C.
Restore to Ar!OMATIC/
STANDBY : ode (if possible) the syste=s which are not neaded to =aintain level. Make frequent checks of level when syste=s are in the MAN 1*AL : ode.
I*lIf high pressure syste=s are unable to =aintain level, then go to CONTINGENCY #3.
CAUTION #9
.Do not throttle EPCI and RCIC systens below turbine speeds which yield t
lacceptablecontinuousoperation.
4 SUBSEOUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS 4.1 If,the break is successfully isolated, and reactor operation is unaffected, then continue nor=al operation per the applicable Technical Specification and procedures for equip =ent out of service.
4.2 Ij' the isolation resulted in a reactor isolation and scra=, then follow applicable procedures for scra=/ isolation recovery [ procedure #s].
4.3 If vessel depressurization is necessary, then go to guidelines in SBA-2, Section 4.2.
3.1-53
NIDO-24708
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De net dispa:-h perscnnel :o an area of a suspec:ed pipe break vi:heu:
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NED0-24708 Revisi:n 1 CONTINGENCY #3
- ,.G;;;n* !O MAINTAIN LEVEL *.i!TH HIGH PRISSi!RE SYSTE'S" If the ocerater deter =ines that vessel level cannot be =aintained by the high pressure systa=s, then the operator =ust =anually initiate ADS (operator c; ens the same valves that the ADS logic wculd open auto =atically) when the level reacheslevel[1]**
The ooerator should make all attemots to start the hish pressure syste=s and retain level before manually initiating ADS.
CAUTION #18 I
Do not =anually initiate ADS unless it is confir=ed that at least one low pressurepu=p[ condensate,LPCS,LPCI)isrunning.
If the operator is unable to manually initiate ADS, then the operator =ust
=anually open other safety / relief valves. As many valves as possible, up to the nu=ber used for ADS, should be opened.
After ADS is =anually initiated 3o,to, Guideline SBA-2, Section 4 " Subsequent Operator Actions".
' includes fat hre tf high pressure syste=s
"' The preset ti=e delay should be included for plants whese ADS lerel per=:.ssive is at the sa=e level as the high-pressure ECCS initiatics trips.
[
2.1-33
.I30-24708 V
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Take reac:or XCDE svi::5 Out of R!N 1.
Moni::: va:e: level i.
Con:rol high pressure sys ess :o ;reven overfilling the vessel 5.
Verify low pressure systa= injectica Subsecuen: Ocerator Actions 1.
Cen::al lev pressure systa=s to preven: cverfilling the vessel 2.
Keep the pool cool by using the sain condenser or RER as heat sinks, or if necessary, depressuri:e :he vessel :: preven: la:e 5RV discharge into a he: peci 3.
Con::cl con:ain=ent pressure i.
Follev post-lCCA hydrogen control procedures
?or 3:eaks Outside the ? imarv Con:ain=ent:
- n=ediate 0: era:or A:: ions are :he sa=e as f:r breaks inside :he pri=ary contain=en: except : hat 1) no ac:ien is recuired regarding :he MODE switch, and 2) no lcw pressure sys:e=s are expe :ed :: iniziace.
Subsecuen: 0:erater Acti:ns are either ::::a1 Opera:1:n, is:la: ion recevery, depressuri:ing the vessel for p ol cocling considerations and =aintaining pCol Coeling.
In addi: ion if no high pressure systa=s are available, then the operator
=us: =anually initiate ADS.
These guidelines clearly de=castra:e :ha: :he small break accident does not present a severe challenge to the SWR and :ha: 1: can be aute=a:ically si: iga:ed.
Iven for severely degraded conditions (no high pressure syste=s available) the opera::: has only :o =anually ini:ia:e ADS :: decrease vessel p sssure s: :ha:
- he 1:v pressure sys:ess keep :he :: e ::c'ed.
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