ML19276F277
| ML19276F277 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 03/05/1979 |
| From: | Hendrie J NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | Beck J VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORP. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19276F278 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7903280185 | |
| Download: ML19276F277 (6) | |
Text
A
- *%,?
UNITED STATES
,,g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
( omm G Og(
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
%, ' '. /
March 5, 1979
+...
CHAIRMAN Mr. John W. Beck Executive Vice President Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation Rutland, Vermont 05701
Dear Mr. Beck:
This responds to your letter of January 30 concerning release of the Commission's policy statement on the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400) and the review of that study by Dr. Harold Lewis' Risk Assessment Review Group.
I would note that, so far as I know, the text of the policy statement was not " leaked" to anyone on January 18.
It was released to the press here in Washington about 1:00 p.m. on January 19, and was made available at the same time both to industry organizations and to public interest groups.
Copies were handed out at the Public Document Room on January 19.
Copies of the statement also were available on Saturday and Sunday, January 20 and 21, at our Washington office on the lith floor.
Nevertheless, I can understand your dilema in not being able to find out in a timely way precisely what the Commission said in its policy statement.
In retrospect, I believe we may not have given sufficient notice that this statement was imminent.
We probably should have given some notification to allow the news media cnd interested organizations time to study it carefully.
I am enclosing an excerpt from my February 5 testimony before the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works which discusses the Safety Study, the Risk Assessment Review Group Report and the Commisson's policy statement, and their relationship to the health and safety regulatory system for nuclear power plants.
I hope you will find this hel pful.
Sincerely, A
Joseph M. Hendrie
Enclosure:
As stated 790328018'S
u get - 7 Excerpt from Chairman Hendrie's 2/5/79 testimony J'
The Risk Assessment Review Group Report As you know, the NRC established the Risk Assessment Revicu Group in July 1977, under the leadership of Dr. Harold Lewis, Chairmn of the American Physical Society's Study Group on Light b'ater Reactors, with four elements to its charter:
- clarify the achievements and limitations of WASH-1400;
-- assess the peer comments thereon, and responses to these comments;
-- study the present state of risk assessment methodology;
-- recommend to the Commission how (and whether) such methodology can be used in the regulatory and licensing process.
'Ihe Review Group published its report last September, and it was
(
provided to the Congress at that time.
', }
After consideration of the Review Group's findings, the Ca= mission.
issued a policy statement on January 18th summarizing its response to the Report.
In the Statement, the Commission accepted the Report's r
findings and noted its actions as follows, and I quote:
" Executive Summary:
The Commission withdraws any explicit or implicit past endorsement of the Executive Summary.
'The Peer Review Process:
The Commissinn agrecs that the peer review process followed in publishing NASH-1400 was inadequate and that proper peer review is fundamental to making sound technical decisions. The Commission will take whatever corrective action is necessary to assure that effective peer review is an. integral feature of the NRC's risk assessment program.
I e
vs
~-,
D
" Accident Probabilities:
The Commission accepts the Review Group Report's conclusion that absolute values of the risks presented should not be used uncritically either in the regulatory process or for public policy purposes and has taken and will continue to take steps to assure that any such use in the past will be corrected as appropriate.
In particular, in light of the Review Group conclusions on accident probabilities, the Commission does not regard as reliable the Reactor Safety Study's numerical estimate of the overall risk of reactor accident.
"Conmunication with the Congress and the Public:
Canmissioner correspondence and statements involving WASH-1400 are being reviewed and corrective t.
action as necessary will be taken."
/
'i "With respect to the component parts of the Reactor Safety Study
, the-Commission expects the staff to make use of them as appropriate, that is, where the data base is adcquate and analytical techniques permit Taking due account of the reservations expressed in the Review Group
- Report, and in its presentation to the Commission, the Commission supports the extended use of probabilistic risk assessment in regulatory decisionma' ng."
The Commission has provided additional detailed instructions to the NRC staff concerning continued use of risk assessment techniques and results
~
in response to the specific comments of the Risk Assessment Review Group and has asked the staff to submit by June 30, 1979, detailed procedures
.to ensure the proper and effective use of risk assessment theory, methods, data development, and statistical analyses.
Eudget - 8a INSERT TO PREPARED TESTIhDNY OF JOSEPH M. HENDRIE; 'ID BE INSERTED AFTER P. 8 I would note that a primary goal of the Reactor Safety Study, as s
established in 1972, was to obtain a '" quantitative evaluation of the risk from the operation of a nuclear plant." Tne Safety Study was, in effect, a " measurement," made by analyzing two typical plant designs, l
of the effectiveness of an existing system of nuclear regulation.
.~
i L
That regulatory system depends on having nuclear plants sited, t
designed, constructed, and operated on the basis of conservative applica-t
. tion of sound and accepted engineering principles, on req'uirements for multiple and redundant safety systems, and on a set of regulatory requirements that are updated to reflect operating experience. 'Ihe t
dd. signers, builders, and operators of these plants are required to have effective quality assurance ' programs and their work is subjected to a continuing licensing and inspection process by the NRC. The results of the licensing and inspection process are, in turn, subject to independent review by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards and often to examination in.public hearings.
This. health and safety regulatory system, much of which evolved long before the Reactor Safety Study was carried out, is unchanged in its basic principles today.
It does not depend on the ability to make precise quantitative estimates of overall risk -- although 'that ability would be highly useful and should be developed..
S e
0
Budget - 8b s
We believe this regulatory system has served us well.
It is an exceptionally rigorous system, and appropriately so in view of the technology we regulate.
It is our job as regulators to make sure that' there is no undue risk from licensed facilities and, while one must acknowledge strongly held views to the contrary, over 400 reactor-years i
of experie'nce to date give us reason to believe that we are on the right i
track.
i What the Lewis group has told us is that the " measurement" of our si re,gulatory system, as reflected in the overall risk estimates of the Reactor Safety Study, is much less precise than had been asserted.
The Lewis group did not conclude that the overall risk estimates were higher or lower than reported in NASH-1400, although they speculated on possible i
factors in both directions, but only that they thought the error bands on those estimates were substantially larger than had been reported.
On that account, they recommended to us that the overall risk estimates of I
KASH-1400 should be used with great' caution -
"should not be used uncritically" were their words -- in the regulatory process or for' public policy purposes. We have accepted and are implementing with.
vigor that recommendation, as well as the other findings and recommenda-I f
tions of the Lewis group. We are also carefully reviewing past regulatory decisions to ascertain whether actions contrary to those, recommendations have been taken.
e
Eudget - Sc To sta up, it is unportant to keep in mind what the Con:nission did and did net do in response to the Lewis Report.
It did reevaluate its I
reliance on, and relationship to, the Reactor Safety Study.
However, it
-[
did not thereby take a new view of reactor safety.
Nor did the Coanission.
i take a new view of past licensing decisions that each licensed plant I
will be so operated as to provide adequate protection to the health and.
safety of the public.
r 9
=
)
'I
~
lt e.
6 I
e e
e O
9 4
e e
9 4
e
__m... _ _ _
- -*~