ML19276E449
| ML19276E449 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 02/14/1979 |
| From: | James Shea NRC OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS (OIP) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19276E450 | List: |
| References | |
| SECY-79-121, NUDOCS 7903140107 | |
| Download: ML19276E449 (8) | |
Text
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t February 14, 1979 SECY-79-121 COMMISSIONER ACTION gr:
The Comissioners From:
James R. Shea, Director Office of International Programs Thru:
Executive Director for Operations
Subject:
PROPOSED LICENSE TO EXPORT LOW-ENRICHED URANIUM TO MEXICO (X5NM-1194)
Review Dates:
60-day period expires on Feburuary 27, 1979 120-day period expires on April 28, 1979 Discussion:
In August 1977, General Electric Company applied for a license to export 377,600 kilograms of uranium as uranium dioxide enriched to a maximum of 4 percent U-235, to be used as the initial cores and 5 subse-quent reloads each for the Laguna Verde Reactors Units I and II. General Electric will fabricate the material.
The Laguna Verde Reactors, Units I and II are 1,931 megawatt thermal, boiling water reactors scheduled to begin regular power operation in 1981 and 1982, respectively.
Folicwing a request from the Executive Branch that the
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NRC give prompt consideration to this proposed licerse, Executive Branch views of Decenber 29, 1978 on this proposed export were forwarded to the Comission by the Director, Office of Policy Evaluation on December 29, 1978 and January 4,1979.
- The Executive Branch has expressed concern that any significant delay in consideration of this export beyond December 31, 1978 could adversely affect US-Mexican relations and Mexican support for shared nonproliferation goals.
It also advises that the Mexican Comission Federal de Electricidad is liable for leased space storage charges after December 31 at the rate of
$30,000 to $40,000 per month. The applicant has also expressed strong urgency for this export.
Contact:
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W. Upshaw (492-8155)
- SECY NOTE:
Ref. IP memoranda to Commissioners
. Oplinger (492-7866) of same dates 7903140107
e s
. Since Mexico and the United States do not have a bilateral Agreement for Cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy, this material would be provided pursuant to the US-IAEA Agreement for Cooperation, the Project Agreement between the Agency and Mexico, and the IAEA-Mexico-U.S. Supply Agreements'(Appendix B). Confirmation of the applicability of the U.S.-IAEA bilateral to the proposed export was provided in a December 7, 1978 cable by the IAEA Secretariat [IAEA Vienna cable 11104].
Further, applicability of the IAEA-Mexico Project and Supply Agreements was con-firmed by Note No. 2065 from the Permanent Mission of Mexico to the IAEA dated November 17,1978 (Appendix B). As the Executive Branch has advised, the Project Agreement between the Agency and Mexico, in the preamble cites the U.S.-IAEA Agreement for Cooperation as the authority under which the Project Agreement and the Supply Agreements with Mexico are concluded.
The staff has reviewed the subject application in light of the considerations below.
Safeguards. The export will be subject to IAEA safeguards. As a party to the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), Mexico has undertaken an obligation to accept IAEA safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of Mexico, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.
The Department of State memorandum of December 29, 1978 notes that(the IAEA-Mexico safeguards agreement has come into force.
By letter of December 29, 1978 the Department of State, in response to an NRC request, advised that the IAEA, through the U.S. Mission in Vienna, has been requested to provide information concerning the status of IAEA safeguards Facility Attachments for the Laguna Verde Units I and II.
Further, the Department of State has stated that the IAEA Secretariat has noted in its Special Safeguards
. Implementation Report that with regard to nuclear material subject to IAEA safeguards, while some deficiencies exist in the system, no diversion of a significant quantity of nuclear material was detected in any of the 45 states in which inspections were carried out.
Although recognizing the need to correct existing deficiencies in safeguards implementation, the Executive Branch has no reason to believe that the IAEA Secretariat's report is not valid.
In light of this and other facters associated with the proposed export, the Executive Branch believes the framework of comnitments, assurances, and safeguards is adequate for the purpose of this export.
No Nuclear Explosive Use. As a party to the NPT, Mexico has pledged not to manufacture or otherwise acquire any nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive devices.
Further, under the Safegua_rds_ Agreement,_______
Mexico is precluded from engaging in any research and.
development on any nuclear explosive device involving any US-supplied material or facilities or any special nuclear material derived therefrom.
In addition, pursuant to Article IV of the Project Agreement, Mexico has guaranteed that no material or equipment transferred thereunder and no special nuclear material produced therefrom, will be used in such a way as to further any military purpose.
Therefore, the staff believes Criterion (2) of the NNPA is met.
Physical Security. Mexico has established physical security measures which, as a minimum, meet the require-ments recommended in the IAEA's INFCIRC/225/Rev.1.
Mexico has further advised in its note of November 17, 1978, that the Government of Mexico, in carrying out its nuclear program, will ensure that means of physical protection providing a level of protection comparable to that laid down in IAEA document INFCIRC/225/Rev. I will be maintained for all nuclear materials and installations under its jurisdiction.
f
. In view of this, the staff believes that Criterion (3) of the NNPA is met.
Retransfer and Reorocessing Retransfer.
Criterion @) of the NNPA requires, among other things, that prior approval of the United States be obtained for the retransfer of US-supplied material, facilities or sensitive technology, and special nuclear material.
Reprocessing. Criterion (5) of the NNPA requires that tne U.S. be given the right of prior approval over the reprocessing of US-supplied material and SNM produced through the use of such material.
Under the terms and conditions of the U.S.-IAEA Agree-ment for Cooperation the United States does not have the right of prior approval for such retransfers.
Such rights were granted to the United States as one of the subscribing parties by the Note dated November 17, 1978 from the Permanent Mission of Mexico which states:
"The Government of Mexico wishes to inform you that it does not for the moment contemplate the transfer to another country of any of the equipment or materials supplied under said agreements.
If in the national interest, the Government of Mexico wishes to make a transfer in accordance with these Agreements, such transfer will be made on the basis of agreements subscribed to by the parties concerned (the Government of Mexico, the IAEA, and the United States of America)."
Mexico also advised that with regard to any nuclear fuel provided under the Supply Agreements and irradiated in the Laguna Verde Reactor Units I and II, plans would be made to enlarge its temporary installations for irradiated fuel storage so that Mexico may temporarily store the fuel for an adequate period for possible sub-sequent use. After this temporary storage, the irradiated fuel would be disposed of in one of the following possible ways:
"(A) Storage in Mexico.
_ _.... _ _ "(B)
Storage in another country concerned; under agreements subscribed to by the parties.
"(C)
Processing or other utilization under agreements subscribed to by the parties concerned."
Since U.S. agreement is required, as a subscribing party, either for retransfer of the proposed export or for SNM produced through its use, it is the staff's view that Criterion (4) is met.
As discussed in Criterion (4), the Government of Mexico plans to store irradiated fuel in Mexico and does not plan to store spent fuel abroad or to process in any way spent fuel except through agreements to which other parties (i.e. the IAEA and the U.S.) subscribe. There-fore, it's the staff's view that Criterion (5) is met.
Sensitive Technolocy. The proposed export does not involve sensitive technology.
The staff is of the opinion that Mexico meets Criteria (1),
(2),(3),(4),and(5) of Section 17 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended by the NNPA, or their equivalent.
With regard to Section 128a(1), Mexico as a party to the NPT, has agreed to accept IAEA safeguards with respect to all its peaceful nuclear activities. All peaceful nuclear activities in Mexico are currently subject to IAEA safe-guards.
The staff, therefore, believes this Criterion is met.
In iight of the above, the staff concludes that issuance of the proposed license would be consistent with the NNPA.
In view of all the considerations above, and as required by Section 57 of the Atemic Energy Act and 10 CFR 110.44 the staff has concluded tnat the export to be made pursuant to the proposed license (1) would be subject to the tenns and conditions of the U.S.-IAEA Agreement for Cooperation and the Project Agreement between the IAEA and Mexico and the IAEA-Mexico-U.S. Supply Agreements, and (2) would not be inimical to the common defense and security of the United States or constitute an unreasonable risk to the public health and safety.
, As the Comission is aware, the Executive Branch is presently considering guidelines for the provision of multiple reloads. The instant case involves the transfer
_ of__an ini_tfa_1 co_re_ loading and five reloads each for Laguna Verde Units I and II. This transfer would meet statutory requirements in that all peaceful nuclear activities in Mexico are subject to IAEA safeguards.
Further, as a party to the NPT, Mexico meets the most stringent conditions presently under consideration for multiple reload approval by the Executive Branch. The staff therefore believes it is appropriate to provide this material, i.e., the initial core loadings and multiple reloads, as requested.
The following documents are forwarded for Commission re-view of the subject application:
(1) Executive Branch views of December 29, 1978 recomending issuance of the itcense (Apper. dix A); (2) copies of appropriate agreements and related correspondence (Appendix B); (3) Technical Analysis (Appendix C) CLASSIFIED to be provided under separate cover; (4) application of August 31, 1977 (Appendix D); and (5) copy of the proposed license (Appendix E).
NMSS Technical Review NMSS has received no information concerning IAEA implementa-tion activities and problems other than that included in the
, 1976 SSIR and 1977 SIR. Appendix C provides a technical analysis of that information and relates NMSS conclusions to this particular export application, The primary conclusion of the NMSS examinations is that the available information on IAEA implementation is not sufficient to pemit NMSS to evaluate the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards in Mexico.
However, NitSS believes that it is improbable that the IAEA encountered any major problems that would have seriously impacted on the effectiveness of IAEA verification.
NMSS has received no information concerning the Mexican State System of Accounting and Control.
With respect to physical security, NMSS has reviewed the program in Mexico and found it adequate for the purpose of this export.
Recomendation: That the Comission note the urgency expressed by the Executive Branch and the applicant and that the proposed license be issued to General Electric Company promptly.
Coordination:
OELD has no legal objection. NMSS views on the adequacy of the State's physical protection and material control and accounting programs and the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards in Mexico are as stated above.
Further, NMSS has advised that in October 1978 a US Government physical security review team, under the auspices of the IAEA, visited the Laguna Verde site. The report of the visit indicated that physical security measures employed at Laguna Verde met or exceeded the require-ments of 10 CFR 110.43.
k s
s J. s R. Shea dDirector Office of International Programs Encle:.==:
1.
Appendix A - Executive Branch analysis dtd 12/29/78 2.
Appendix B - agreements and correspondence 3.
Appendix C - Technical Analysis CLASSIFIED (to be provided under separate cover 4
Appendix 0 - application dtd 9/31/77 5.
Appendix E - copy of proposed license
. NOTE:
Commissioner comments should be provided directly to the Office of the Secretary, by c.o.b.
Friday. Fobruary 73. 1079 Commission staff office comments, if any, should be submitted to the Commissioners NLT February 21. 1979
, with an informa-tion copy to the Office of the Secretary.
If the paper is of such a nature that it requires additional time for analytical review and comment, the Commissioners and the Secretariat should be apprised of when comments may be expected.
DISTRIBUTION:
Commissioners Commission Staff Offices Exec. Dir. for Operations Secretariat
O 9
APPENDIX A
E b
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T%m DEPARTMENT OF STATE ryEigEG g// 9 f
- w. ec.a.o.c. msm BUREAU OF OCEANS AND INTERNATIONAC ENVIRCNMENTAL AND SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS g
g6fj GTd DEC 29 M 9 M December 29, 1978 C D CRT/lPJCRT AND
- TET NAT*L SFGROS MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES R. SHEA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Enclosed is an Executive Branch analysis covering a license application for the export of low-enriched uranium to Mexico.
In accordance with P.L.95-242, the analysis explicitly addresses how the requirements of Section 126 a.(1) of the Atomic Energy Act are met, including the speci-fic criteria of Sections 127 and 128, as well as certain additional factors, envisaged by Section 126 a. (1).
The Executive Branch, on the basis of its review of this application has concluded that the requirements of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended, and P.L.95-242 have been met and that the proposed export would not be inimical to the common defense and security of the United States.
Moreover, the terms of the US-IAEA Agreement for Cooperation are met and Mexico has adhered to the provisions of its Supply Agreements with the International Atomic Energy
, Agency and the United States and its project agreement with the Agency.
Therefore, the Executive Branch recommends issuance of the requested export license.
Urgent consideration of this case by the Commission would be appreciated in view of the fact that the Mexican Comision Federal de Electricidad is liable for leased space storage charges for any delay in export beyond December 31, 1978 at the rate of $30,000 to S40,000 per month.
We are concerned that any significant delay in consideration of this export beyond this date could adversely affect US-Mexican relations and Mexican support for our shared non-proliferation goals.
' w h
/44 Louis V. Nosen:o Deputy Assistant Secretary h
Enclosure h
As stated 1
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