ML19275A501
| ML19275A501 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 09/18/1979 |
| From: | Kane W NRC - TMI-2 BULLETINS & ORDERS TASK FORCE |
| To: | NRC - TMI-2 BULLETINS & ORDERS TASK FORCE |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7910040559 | |
| Download: ML19275A501 (21) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES o
y $*e, *(gg NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION E
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 5*ch s..u j SEP 181979 OWNERS GROUP:
GENERAL ELECTRIC OPERATING PLANT OWNERS' GROUP
.NSSS VENDOR:
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPAriY
SUBJECT:
SUMMARY
OF SEPTEMBER 6, 1979 MEETING TO DISCUSS BULLETINS AND ORDERS TASK FORCE ACTIVITIES On September 6, 1979 representatives of the General Electric Operating Plant Onwers Group and the General Electric Company met with representatives of the NRC staff's Bulletins and Orders Task Force.
The meeting was held at the NRC staff's offices in Bethesda, Maryland. The primary purpose of the meeting was to discuss the NRC staff requests for additional information whose responses are due beyond November 1, 1979. A secondary purpose of the meeting was to discuss the staff's initial reaction to the August 17, 1979 submittal by the Owners Group of the responses to the shorter-term requests for additional infor-mation.
A list of attendees for each of these meetings is contained in Enclosure 1.
The major points discussed at the meeting are summarized below, l.
Review of Requests for Additional Information Due Beyond November 1, 1979 The Owners' Group presentation on additional analyses consisted of the vugraphs in Enclosure 2.
The staff was in general agreement with the approach outlined by the Owners Group but had the following comments:
a)
Before a great deal of effort is expended in performing the specific analyses of transients and accidents (Lessons Learned Item 2.1.9), it would be beneficial for the staff to review the specific cases to be run. Our review of the cases to be run could be completed in a few days.
b) The focus of the presentation was on hardware failures as opposed to operator errors. More attention appears to be needed in this area.
c) The system for accounting for operator et-ors should be done in a systematic way. We suggested the flow chart approach. The Owners Group stated that they were reluctant to follow this approach because of the amount of work involved.
d) For the inadequate core cooling analyses, the Owners Group should consider both the cases of the reactor at power, and shutdown.
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1101 046 ggp 181979 e) He are looking for completeness in the Chapter 15 analyses and guidelines.
These should be extended out to cold shutdown.
In the systems area, the Owners Group presented the vugraphs in Enclosure 3 to identify the infomation to be submitted in November 1979. The staff agreed that this was the extent of the infomation required in the systems area.
2.
Review of Recent Additional Staff Requests for Info mation
'The first set of requests discussed was that contained in the August 23, 1979 letter from D. Ross to T. Keenan. The Owners' Group approach to respond to those requests related to the direct current power source failure was presented in the vugraphs contained in Enclosure 4.
It is the Owners' Group opinion that these concerns are addressed adequately in the August 17, 1979 report. With regard to 'he ACRS concern' the Owners Group believes these are also addressed in the August 17, 1975 report. However, they expressed problems with interpreting the ACRS concern related to leak detection.
We told them we would have to get back to them to clarify the manner in which this is to be handled by the B&O Task Force.
We noted that request number 8 in the August 23 letter had not been addressed by the Owners' Group. They agreed they could provide responses to all requests except for the ACRS' second concern by September 28, 1979.
We agreed that this would be acceptable. We also discussed the requests contained in the letter from D. Ross to T. Keenan dated September 2, 1979. The Owners Group interprets these requests as no additional change in scope beyond the B&O Task Force Analysis Group's initial requests 13 thru 16. We agteed that the September 2 letter did not change the scope of our initial requests b'ut did change the response date on the Analysis Group's initial rec;uests 15 and 16 from November 1,1979 to January 1,1980.
With regard to the audit calculations E. Throm of the staff w;11 contact GE to get any additional infomation needed.
R. Hill was designated as the GE contact.
3.
Preliminary Staff Review of Auaust 17 Report The staff presented its initial questions on the report in both the systems and analysis areas. We pointed out that this did not reflect a complete list of questions since the review is not complete.
The specific infomation needs in the analyses area included the following:
a)
Curves to substantiate chronological events presented in the transient an alyses. The Owners' Group agreed to provide a complete set of curves for BWR/4.
b)
Justification for the use of the SAFE code for the transient analyses.
c) A set of input parameters used in the transient analysis for the BWR/4 in order for the staff to do an audit calculation d) Explanation of wide band dscillations of certain parameters on several small break cases.
l101 047 F: '
- 1979 s
During the course of this discussion the Analysis Group noted that the staff generic report on BWRs must address the Michelson concerns in his report on B&W and CE plants. Copies of these reports were given to the Owners Group.
In addition we noted that the concerns in the memorandum from Michelson to Okrent dated June 4,1979 (Enclosure 5) must also.be addressed.
We agreed to a conference call the week of 9/10/79 tc go over the concerns to agree on those that are applicable to BWRs. We agreed to fonnalize this request in a letter to the Owners Group.
-The Systems Group presented a number of coments on the operator guidelines presente:
in the August 17 Owners' Group report. These included the following:
- 1) The s petoms and automatic actions.are mixed.
It was suggested that these be separated to avoid confusion.
~
2)
It is not clear as to what time frame is contemplated for immediate actions.
In addition, discussion is needed to explain why these actions are necessary.
3)
A direct statement of caution is needed in the guidelines for operators to not override engineered safety features unless unsafe plant conditions will occur.
- 4) A definition is required for the term " safe stable condition."
- 5) The automatic reset of the Automatic Depressurization System should be addressed.
We also noted that a number of other systems comments had been discussed with P. McGuire of the Owners Group in the week prior to the meeting. We plan to document our information needs in the systems area in a letter.
4.
Commitments and Agreements a) A telephone conversation will be held the week of 9/10/79 between the staff and the Owners Group to agree on the Michelson concerns applicable to BWRs.
This will be followed by a formal staff request for information the week of 9/17/79, b) The Owners Group will provide a list of cases to the staff for the degraded plant conditions to be analyzed. This will be done the week of 9/17/79.
c) The Owners Group will respond to our information request of 8/23/79 by 9/30/79.
d) The Owners Group will respond to the list of 15 B&O prospective requirements for BWRs the week of 9/17/79.
e) The Owners Group will respond to the Analysis Group concerns in Section 3 of this treeting summary the week of 9/17/79.
W.
Kane Bulletins & Orders Task Force 1101 048
4 ENCLOSURE 1 J 61979 LIST OF ATTENDEES Utility Representatives T. Rogers Pacific Gas and Electric Company H. Abercrombie Tennessee Valley Authority J. Domer Tennessee Valley Authority R. Rajaran Power Authority of the State of New York L. Matthews Southern Company Services P. Francisco riiagara Mohawk Corporation R. Furia General Public Utilities Service Corporation B. Sliter Yankee Atomic Company D. Waters Carolina Power & Light Company J. Greene Georgia Power Company NRC Staff Z. Rosztoczy B&O W. Hodges B&O B. Siegel B&O R. Frahm B&O W. Kane B&O J. Joyce B&O K. Mahan B&O P. Norian B&O E. Throm B&O T. Ippolito D0R C. DeBevec I&E General Electric P. Marriott A. Buchholz W. DeLome G. Scatena J. Duncan A. Rao R. Hill S. Stark Others D. Jaffe - flus Corporation 1101 049
ENCLOSURE 2 INADEQUATE CORE COOLING (ICC)
ANALYSIS / GUIDELINES 03JECTIVE 1)
SWTOMSOFICC 2)
MITIGATIONOFICC 3)
EXTENSION OF IRANSIENT/ACCIDa a GUIDELINES NRC EQUEST
- DESCRIBE ICC
- EFFECT OF RECIRCULATION Pues ON/0FF
- CONSIDER VARIOUS SYSTEM FAILURES AND OPER TOR ERRORS
- provide GUIDELINES E0R ICC ASR - 1 9/6/79 1101 050
JCC CATEGORIES
,MM' ax w es "j _sct,,lJde "
CORE Ui1 COVERED/ /W, utt.
Q e
CORE COVERED
-AT POWER
-SHUTD0Wil
-N0 CORE COOLING CONSEQUEf1CES e
GUIDELIf1ES FOR 2 CATEGORIES ASR - 1A 9/6/79 0
1101 051
GE [SP0iSE ICC (LOSS OF ITNENTORY) 0 CUALITATIVEDESCRIPTIONOFICC Pvwr TYPES HILL COVER R!R 1 - 5 APPROACH AfD DURATION OF ICC HITIGATION ACTIONS ATO SYSTEMS o QUANTITATIVE DESCRIPTION OF ICC SIMILARTOSBAANALYSIS ADDITIONALCOREIEMPERATUREPLOTS, o EFFECT OF SYSTEM FAILURES RECIRCULATIONPuMPS HIGH Ato Low PRESSURE SYSTEMS PO'ER SOURCES
- 0FFSITE
- DIESELGENERATOR
- BATTERY e OPERATOR GUIDELINES SIMILAR.TOSBAGUIDELINES ASR - 2 9/6/79 1101 052
E APPROACH USE SIMILAR hlALYSIS ASSUFPTIONS AS FOR SPA USE SAMPLE PtAra AMLYSIS fliPHASIS ON SBA no LOF INITIATED ICC INSIDE/OurSIDE c R0uD LEVEL DIFFEREfjCES s
IJETERMINE CAPABILITY OF ALTERNATE LEVEL ltOICATIONS RELIABILITY OF SYSTeis no PROBABILIT( OF FAILURE COMBItMTIONS CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE C0fGIfMTIONS
- ASSUME FEWER NO FEWER SYSTEMS MAILABLh
- SAFETY NO NON SAFETY SYSTU1S
- ASSOCIATE FAILURE COPditMTIONS FIE NMLYSIS PERFORMED.
C0hNEQUENCESOFOPERATORERRORS
- DELAY IN OPERATOR ECTIONS
-FAILUREOFOPERATdRTOTAKEIIAt[UALACTION
~
ASR - 3 9/6/79 1101 053
OPERATOR Gu_IDELINES FROM " STABLE COI1DITION" TO COLD SHUTDOWN CONDITION PURPOSE:
DEVELOP OPERATOR GUIDELINES TO ATTAIN COLD SHUTDOWN FROM A TRANSIENT / ACCIDENT ~ STABLE CONDITION.
STABLE CONDITIONS 1.
HIGH PRESSURE AND SCRAMMED A.
ISOLATED B.
NOT ISOLATED 2.
LOW PRESSURE AND SCRAMMED
" STABLE" CONDITION CRITERIA:
1.
CORE COVERED 2.
LEVEL UNDER CONTROL 1101 054
SMALL BREAK AUDIT CALCULATIdN NRC REQUEST PROVIDE IETAILED OUTPUTS IEEIED FOR i1RC AUDIT CALCULATION GE RESPONSE /APPf0ACH 0
CALCULATION SHOULD BE PERF0ffED FOR STANDARD 218 rip /6
- NRC HAS DETAILED SYSTEM INPUTS COVERING DIMENSIONS ETC.
O E WILL PRDVIDE ANY ADDITIONAL SYSTEM DIIBISIONS/ASSLEFTIONS NEEDED 0
AUGLET 17 FEPORT CONTAINS All OTHER INFORi% TION
-SAMPLECALCULATIONSWImDETAILEDOUTPUTFdR 6 CASES
- ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON FODEL/ SYSTEM ASSUPPTIONS D*FFEREf6 IHAN AFFENDIX K CALCULATIONS
/6R-4 9/6/79 1101 055
'IAULT TPIE ANALYSIS COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEMS OBJECTIVE:
EXAMINE SYSTEMATICALLY, THE EVENTS (EQUIPMENT FAILUPI, OPERATOR ERRORS. TF1J;SIENT RESPONSE) M4D COMBINATIONS THEPIOF WHICH WOULD PISULT IN THE COPI BEING UNCOVEPID FOR A BWR/4 PLCT IN THE PRESENCE OF AN SBA.DETTRMINE PILATIVE PROBABILITY OF E"ENT OCCURRENCE.
PL/Ji:
STARTING WITH BASIC FAULT TPIE FOR CORE UNCOVERY EXTEND HFCI, RCIC, ADS, LOW PRESSU, ', AND TEEJWATER SYSTEMS TO FURTHER LEVEL OF DETAIL. ASSIGN PROBABILITIES TO EVENTS (/dD COMBINATIONS) TFST WOULD UNCOVER TEE CORE THROUGH THE PERIOD FROM SCRAM 13 HOT SHUTDOWN CONDITIONS.
o 1101 056
CHAPTER XV REVIEW e
SELECT A TYPICAL BWR 4 FSAR CONSIDER EACH CHAPTER XV EVENT WHICH RESULTS IN A REACTOR TRANSIENT (EXCLUDE ATWS) e, DETERMINE EFFECTS OF BEST-ESTIMATE ASSUMPTIONS ON PREDICTED SYMPTOMS OR ANTICIPATES OPERATOR ACTIONS o
IDENTIFY EVENTS WHERE EFFECTS ARE SIGNIFICAllT REVISE SYMPTOMS & OPERATOR ACTIONS FROM TYPICAL FSAR O
I101 057
TRANSIENT AND ACCIDENT SUBMITTAL (GUIDELINES)
GUIDELINES WRITTEN FOR:
-LOSS OF FEEDWATER
-STUCK OPEN RELIEF VALVE
-COLD SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATIONS CONSIDERED
-FAILURE OF HPCI/RCIC/HPCS/ChD/IC
-STUCK OPEN SRV
-LOSS OF SHUTDOWN COOLING ADDED SYSTEM DEGRADATIONS COVERED BY INADEQUATE CORE COOLING GUIDELINES SCOPE BWR 1-5 ANALYSIS PROVIDED WHERE NECESSARY TO JUSTIFY CRITICAL OPERATOR ACTION I101 058
ENCLOSURE 3
RESPONSE
T0 SUPPLEMENTAL QUESTIONS 0
DC POWER SOURE FAILUE SBA FOR BWR 3/14 ESULTS If1 FAILUE OF HIGH PESSUE ECC #!D SOE QFBIt!ATION OF LO?l PESSUE ECC
- SYSTEFS RB'Alilli!G TYPICAL PLANT - Rt RCIC, CRD, C0i!DBiSATE AIO SOE C0FBIIMTION OF [F ECC
- AUG.17 EPORT ADDESSES THIS C0FBIIIATION
- APPSGIX K #iALYSIS li' CLUES DC POWER SOURE FAILUE A'1D HBiE LEADS TO SELECTIOFl 0F W0iGT SBA
- AUG 37 SBA #1ALYSIS IS A BEST ESTIMATE #1ALYSIS NOT FOR 0100 SING WORST BEAK, BUT FOR GUIDIFlG OPERATOR ACTIONS, AVAll>BILITY OF ONE, TUO OR THREE IP SYSTDE DOES FDT CHANGE OPEPATOR ACTI0rlS fSR - 5 9/6/79 1101 059
ACRS LETTER CONCERNS
- RELIABILITY OF SAFETY FEATURES
- POSSIBILITY OF DETERMINIi1G BREAK LOCATION -
- ADEQUACY OF OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES INCLUDING COMBIf1A OF CIRCUMSTANCES 0
RELIABILITY OF SAFETY FEATURES
- TO BE ADDRESSED IN PHASE 2 iBY 3HOWING PROBABILITY OF FAILURES AND MILD CONSEQUENCES 0
OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES
- AUGUST 17TH REPORT COVERS THIS AND PHASE 2 REPORT ADDS:
- NO OPERATOR ACTIONS
- FOR DEGRADED CASES ONLY ACTION IS MANUAL ADS -
A VERY SIMPLE ACTION ASR - 6 9/6/79 1101 060
CONCLUSIONS O
THE AUGUST 17TH REPORT COVERS THE RESPONSE TO THE TWO OVERALL CONCERNS DC POWER ACRS CONCERNS 0
THE DETAILED QUESTIONS APPEAR TO BE MORE ORIENTED TO APPENDIX K CONCERNS ASR - 7 9/6/79 1101 061
ACRS "OUESTION 2"
" EXAMINE, IN GREATER DEPTH THAN USUAL, THE POSSIBILITY OF DETERMINING THE LOCATION OF A LEAK OR BREAK MORE RAPIDLY AND MORE DIRECTLY THAN IS NOW THE PRACTICE."
e AREAS OF POSSIBLE ACRS INTENT (CLARIFY)
- EXAMINE ORIGINAL DESIGN BASES
- PLANT DESIGN REVIEW AGAINST ORIGINAL DESIGN BASES
- PLANT DESIGN REVIEW AGAINST CONTEMPCRARY DESIGN BASES
- EXAMINE CURRENTLY AVAILABLE TECHNOLOGY FOR POSSIBLE
.BACKFITS
- RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT OF NEW METHODS e WHAT IS MEANT BY " LOCATION"?
- INSIDE VS, OUTSIDE DRYWELL
- SPECIFIC LOCATION INSIDE OR OUTSIDE e WHAT IS MEANT BY " RAPIDLY" AND DIRECTLY"?
- "0N LINE" - TIME SCALE OF MINUTES
- "0FF LINE" - TIME SCALE OF MONTHS 1101 062
ENCLOSURE 4 LONG TERM ss.
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s.
Information Needed for Containmsnt Isolation System 1.
For each fluid line and fluid instrument lines penetrating the containment, provide s table of design infor,ctior regarding the containment isolation provisions which include the f ollowing information:
~
a.
Ccntain=ent penetration number; b.
System name; c.
Fluid contained; d.
Engineered safety feature system (Yes/No);
c.
Figure showing arrangement of contain=ent isolation barriers; c.
f.
Isolation valve number; Location of valve (inside or outside containment);
g.
h.
Valve type and operation;
- i. Primary mode of valve actuation; j.
Secondary mode of valve actuation; k.
Normal valve position) 1.
Shutdown valve position; m.
Postaccident valve postion; n.
Power failure valve position; o.
Containment isolation signals, including parameters sensed and their set point; p.
Valve closure time; o.
Power source; Valve position indication (direct or indirect).
r..
II.
Discuss the design require =ents for the containment isolation barriers regarding:
The extent to which the quality standards and seismic design classification a.
of the containment isolation provisions follow the recommendations of Regulatory Guides 1.26, " Quality Group Classif ftations and Standards for Water, Steam, and Radioactive-Water-Containing Co=ponents of Nuclear Pcwer Plants," and 1.29, " Seismic Design Classification";
Ii0i 063
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I b.
Assurance of the operability of valves and valve operators in the contain=ent ateosphere under normal plant operating conditions and postulated accident condition; Qualification of closed systems inside and outside the containhen't c.
cs isolation barriers; CoStJtED IN d.
Qualification of a valve as an isolation barrier; pgjg g.7 IDEI'd~I e.
Required isolation valve closure times; f.
Mechanical and electrical redundancy to preclude c:== n code failures; g.
Pr*_ mary and secondary modes of valve actuation.
.II.
Discuss the provisions for detecting leakage from a re=ote manually controlled system (such as an engineered saf ety f eature system or essential line) for the purpose of det.ermining when to isolate the affected system or system train.
Specify the parameters sensed, their set point, and procedure for initiation of contain=ent isolation.
IV.
Discuss the design provisions for testing the operability of the isolation valves.,
V.
Identify the codes, standards, and' guides applied in the design of the containment isolation system and system co=ponents.
VI.
Discuss the normal operating modes and contain=ent isolation provision and procedures for lines that transfer potentially radioactive fluids out of the contain=ent.
O Y
1i01 064
um-.
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LONG TERM Table II Information on Systems Capable of prov'iding' pos't-Accident and Transient Core Cooling General System Design Information
- Safety classification and seismic category
- Plant steam by-pass capacity
- Systems and components shared between units k'at er Sources
- Safety classification and seismic classification Instrumentation & Control
- Safety classification and seismic category o
Testing / Technical Specifications
- Frequency of system and component tests 1101 065
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NUCLE AR REGUL ATOP.Y COT.*t.11SSION 5
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ADVISORY Cort.MITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS
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.,1 June 4,1979 h, ti \\ _.- ] "'~
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MEMO T0:
Dr. D. Okrent p /, p FROM:
C. Michelson, ACRS Consultant
SUBJECT:
POSSIBLE INCORRECT OPERATOP, ACTION SUCH AS P:~E BREAK ISOLATION At our May 30 - June 1,1979 Subccmmittee neeting on
.*11 implications, I used the BUP, pipe break isolation concern as an example of a possible incorrect operator action which needs to be identified in emergency operating instruc-tions for all BWR plants.
I am writing this note to be sure that the example was fully understcod and that its implications for PUR plants are also appreciated.
This concern relates to the possibility that an operator may be inclined and perhaps even trained to isolate, where possible, a pipe break LOCA without realizing that it might be an unsafe action leading to high pressure, and
(.
short-term core bakeout.
For example, if a SUR should experience a LOCA from a pressure boundary failure somewhere between the pump suction and discharge valve for either reactor recirculation pump, it would be possible for the operator to close these valves follcuing the reactor blowdown to low pressure and thereby isolate the breck, stop the blowdown, and repressurize the reactor coolant system.
Before such isolation should be permitted, it is first neces-sery to show by an appropriate analysis that the high pressure ECCS is adequate to reflood the uncovered core without assistance from the low pressure ECCS which can no longer deliver flow because of the repressurization.
Otherwise, such isolation action should be explicitly forbidden in the emergency operating ins truc tions.
Similar concern exists for PWR plants which have loop isolation valves and for either BWR or PUR plants using large diameter extension of the primary pressure boundary which may contain normally~open, remotely operable valves which are capable of blowdown interuption.
There is a real possibility that such a misunderstanding concerning isolation of ECS breaks for BUR plants did exist as evidenced by LER 77-16 for Dresden 2 (control number 017514,4/2/77). The NRC computer printout of this event reads, 6
"while isolating U recirculation loop to replace a leaking test flange, the torque switch on the limitorque operator for the recirculatio> pump suction valve opened and prevented the valve from closing. A piping failure between the suction and discharge valve of the recirculation pump would not have been isolated."
It would appear prudent that the NRC should check the full LER r.eport.to see how it really read.
If the misunderstanding concerning break isolation did exist, it u
would be of interest to knc.. the exter.t of regional and headquarters review of this LER ar.d to what corrective action micht have bun taken since then.
.0.66 U-TOS Mers C. Mid ^ r
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s 0WNERS GROUP REPRESENTATIVES 4
K. A. Meyer Jack S. Bitel lowa Electric Light & Power Commonwealth Edison Co.
P. O. Box 351 72 West Adams, Room 2249 Cedar Rapids, Iowa 52406 Chicago, Illinois 60603 J. A. Domer Roger W. Huston Tennessee Valley Authority Consumers Power Company 400 Chestnut Street Tower Nuclear Operations Dept.
Chattanooga, Tennessee 37401 1945 West Parnall Road Jackson, Michigan 49201 Kris K. Chitkara
/
Wayne Shamla Cincinnati Gas & Electric Northern States Power Company P. O. Box 960 Monticello Nuclear Plant Cincinnati. Ohio 45201 Monticello, Minnesota 53602 Peter W. Lyon Paul J. McGuire PASNY Boston Edison Company 10 Columbus Circle cal.jrin Station New York, N. Y.
10019 Rocky Hill Road Plymouth, Mass. 02360 W. R. D'Angelo Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.
300 Erie Boulevard West M. J. Cooney Syracuse, N. Y. 13202 Philadelphia Electric s
2301 Market Street Philadelphia, Penns lvania 191Q1 D. B. Waters Carolina Power & Light Co.
P
- 0. Box 1551 W. A. Widner Raleigh, N. C.
27602 Georgia Power Company y
Power Generation Department Bax 4545 Jay M. Pilant 270 Peachtree Street.
Nebraska Public Power District Atlanta, Georgia 30302 P. O. Box 499 Columbus, Nebraska 68601 Thomas J. Dente i
Northeast Utilities T. D. Keenan P. O. Box 270 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Grp.
Scrticrd, Connecticut 06101 77 Grove Street Rutland, Vermont 05/01 Ed O'Connor Jersey Central Power & Light Co.
Pat Marriott Madison Avenue at Punchbowl Road General Electric Company "0, ristown, New Jersey 07960 175 Curtner Avenue, Mail Code 194
(
San Jose, California 95125 Taggart Rogers 1101 067 eeciric Ges & Eiectric P00 0
NI One Post Street, Suite 2200 San Francisco, California 94104
GE OWNERS GROUP SPECIAL. CONTACTS i.IST rh David Bixel Mr. W. G. Counsil, Vice-President Nxlear Licensing Administrator Nuclear Engineering & Operations 0,nsurers Power Company Northeast Nuclear Energy Company y2 West Michigan Avenue P. O. Box 270
.ckson, Micnigan 49201 Hartford, CN 06101
- 6. Hngh G. Parris Mr. L. O. Mayer, Manager
. nager of Power Northern States Power Company T-nnessee Valley Authority 414 Nicollet Mall - 8th Floor
~
.JA Chestnut Street, Tower II Minneapolis, Minnesota 55401 attanooga, Tennessee 37401 Mr. Donald P. Dise 6. J. A. Jones E ecu:ive Vice-President Vice President - Engineering C5rolina Power & Light Company Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.
300 Erie Boulevard West N o Fayetteville Street Dleigh, N. C.
27602 Syracuse, New Ycrk 13202 MF-l R.Finfrock, Jr.
. J. M. Pilant, Director U
Vice President-Generation icensing & Quality Assurance Ebraska Puclic Power District Jersey Central Power & Light Company Madison Avenue at Punch Bowl Road
. O. Box 499
- lumbus, Nebraska 68601 Morristown, N. J.
07960 Mr. Edward G. Bauer, Jr., Esquire
- r. Cordell Reed Vice-President & General Counsel Assistant Vice President
- mmonwealth Edison Company Fhiladelphia Electric Company 2301 Market Street 2
O. Box 767
19101 Er. Duane Arnold, President Mr. G. Carl Andognini
- cwa Electric Light & Power Company Boston Editin Company 2
O. Box 351 800 Boylstc. Street
- edar Rapids, Iowa 52406 Boston, Massachusetts 02199
. George T. Berry Mr. Robert H. Groce, Licensing Engineer 3eneral Manager & Chief Engineer Yankee Atomic Electric Company
- wer Authority of the State
, 20 Turnpike Road of New York Westboro, Massachusetts 0158,:
10 Columbus Circle es York, New York 10019 Mr. Earl A. Borgmann Vice Presient - Engineering The Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co.
. Charles F. Whitmer P. O. Box 960 "ce President-Engineering Cincinnati, Ohio 45201 5crgia Power Company
. O. Box 4545 Elanta, GA 30302 00 00 0 N
[U U[{ U jiL Mr. Byron Lee, Jr., Vice-President Commonwealth Edison Company P. O. Box 767 A. John C. Morrissey 1101 068 v ;e-President & General Counsel Chicago, Illinois 60690 fo:ific Gas & Electric Company 7 Eeale Street 4 Francisco, CA 94106
s s
Distribution List - for Meeting Summaries, Meeting Notices for BWR-(GE)-Designed Plants E. Case P-404 E. Jordan, I&E R. Mattson P-1100 NRC Meeting Participants D. Eisenhut 530 P. Boehnert D. Ross 278 R. Frahm D. Vassallo 278 J. R. Buchanar, NSIC C Heltemes 242 T. Novak P-ll32 Z. Rosztoczy P-1030 D. Ziemann 314
- 9. Parr 130 J. Stolz 142 S. Israel P-ll32 T. Ippolito 338
+
W.,odges P-1030 W. Kane 242 P. Matthews P-822
.G. Mazetis P-il32 P. Norian P-1030 N. Wagner P-ll32 K. Mahan 357 J. Hannon 338 J. Lee 142 C. DeBevec E/W 359 W. Gammill 266 B. Grimes 340
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NRC PDR 1
01 069
% ocal P bentral Files)
L j/r uccKet ACRS (16)