ML19275A483
| ML19275A483 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 07/31/1979 |
| From: | Shapar H NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR (OELD) |
| To: | Gilinsky V, Hendrie J, Kennedy R NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| References | |
| RULE-RM-50-7 NUDOCS 7910040517 | |
| Download: ML19275A483 (29) | |
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'o UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION gg
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MEMORAliDL31 FOR:
Chairman Hendrie 4
Commissioner Gilinsky y
Commissioner Kennedy Commissioner Bradford Commissioner Ahearne FROM:
Howard K. Shapar Executive Legal Director THRU:
Lee V. Gossick M M L*L Executive Director for 'Dperations
SUBJECT:
- SECY 79-319: RESPONSE TO COMMISSION REQumJ.S IN CLEARANCE RULE PROCEEDING The Secretary's =emorandum of June 12, 1979 requested that the Staff provide an opinion on alternative clearance programs based on authority othez-than section 1611(2) cf the Act and a discussion of reliability sts:ndards. Sec:: ion 161i(2) authorizes the Commission t.5 investigate certain individuals' character.
. lopalty, and associations and to grant access to such individuals provided such access would not be inimical to the common defense md security. The other authorities considered in preparing the enclosed response (Enclosure A) are sections 161b and 1611(3) of the Act which provide general authority for ag safeguard program. The alternative programs considered are based upon the views of th-Cince of Standards Development, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 1-and Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.
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In additica the Secretary's memorandum requested the Staff to prenare n draft.,.
fuel _ycle clearance rule. Enclosure B provides a clearance rule for fuel cycle f aci'.ities and ad:iresses,the concerns of Commissioner Ahearne.
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Contact:
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The enclosures have been coordinated with the Offices of Nuclaw M=+-dal hk
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and Safeguards, Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Standards Developme:at and Adm4Mstration, (Division of Secunty) and, insofar as policy matters are concemed reflect the views of those offices.
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D_oward K. Shapar y; -' ; 5 ~.
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Executive Legal Director..
Enclosures:
A.
Alternative Access Clearance Programs.
- 3. Draft fuel cycle facility clearance rule.
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umsce ALTERNATIVE ACCESS CLEARANCE PROGRAMS _
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j The access clearance program under proposed Part 11 is a program thaDrovide'~ T
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s fcr an investigation that, among other things, collects infbrmation concernino an -
individual's exercise of first amendment richts, including an individual's beliefs and associations.
Section 16ki(2) of the Act proviEfes the express statu-~
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tory authority necessary for the proposed program which may have a chilling.-.' ~... -
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effect on an individual's exercise of first amendment rights because ~of employ ment in selected licensed facilities. / However, section T61b and 1611(3) of the Act which provide the Cocmission with general authority to promulgate safeguard requirements ould be utilized to support an access program which would not chill an individual's exercise of first amendment rights.
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Schneider vs. Smith,390 U.S.17 (1968), S. Rpt. g3-99 at 9 (1974), see also Privacy Act 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(7).
Primarily involved are rights of politica L association.
- / A clearance program under the general authority provision of the Act would not necessarily have to be run by the Conmission.
The Hear-ing Board has reco:rmended that industry run the clearance program under the Conmission's guide Sines. The -
Staff does not support an industry-run program as it questions whether manage-ment should be delegated the extraordinary authority beyond the -normal e:r. ploy:cer.
screening to investigate, assess, and make decisions c:mcerning an employee's suitability for access and whether such employee might steal, divert or cc:: nit sabotage with special nuclear material. 'In any event, an industry conducted program would require establishing the following elemerits:
(1)
Investigator qualifications, training and certification would have to be established.
(2)
Investigation content, scope, management, and cuality assurance would have 'a be established.
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(3)
Inspection criteria would have to be establishea.
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be developed.
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(5)
Adjudication criteria and an acceptable adjudication process \\
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4; would have to be developed.
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An acceptable appeals procedure wculd have to be c'eveloped.
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The question of whether the general authority is sufficient to suppo[r-t a program different frem the proposed Part 11 access authorization program is dependent
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.on the extent that the investigational ele:nents of the alter native considered ~ -
infringe on first amendment righti.U Therefore, an examination of the specific ~
features of each alternative and the nature of the inquiries (i.e., ategories of,
the infomation reviewed) associ-ted with the alternative is required.
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Any alternative that involves some form of an investigation -into a person's
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loyalty and associations may be difficult to support under the general authority.**/
On the other hand, whether a clearance program which is not based in some part on an investigation of a person's loyalty and associations would meet the needs of the Comission is dependent on the purpose of the program and the criteria usec to deny access.
As indicated below, the Offices of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Standards Development and Nuclear Material Safety and Safe 5::ards do not believe that alternatives which do not include some fom of a backgr.aund investigation into associations would meet the current objectives of the access authorization program.
The options considered by the staff in SECY 76-508 as alternatives to the propcsed Part 11 access authorization program were psychological (behavioral) assess:aent
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and structured interviews.
The nature of the inquiries associated with each of these alternatives is described below:
Psycholooical (Behavioral) Assessment Three foms of psychological or behavioral assessment have been used extensively by other organizations.
They include on-the-job behavioral cbservation, psychological testing (using standardized tests), and
- / Schneider v. Smith, suora.
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"*/ In SECY 75-503 the staff assumed a' backcround investication would be cenducted as part of either alternative.
The HeeIing Board also included backgrcund investigation as an element of its recommended access program.
(p. 61, F.erort of Hearing Board, April 1979).
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1 clinical evalua' tion. It should be noted that they are not mutually
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exclusive, and are normally used in combination with 6ne another or ~~
in combination with investigative options.
Behavioral observation does' not require obtaining information concerning a person's icyalty and_
associations. Whi'.e the question of intrusiveness-is present, ag,
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access clearance program based upon this option could prcibably be "--
. ; -- 3 4 justified'under the Commission's general safeguards authority to the extent that question of loyalty and association protected by the first amendment were considered not relevant to granting access.
Clinica? evaluation and standardized testing may also be supported under the Ccesiission's general authority although solicitation of background nformation concerning loyalty, political and religious associations by a clinician, and the use of like questions on standardized tests, would likely be viewed as inf~ ringing on first amendment rights.
Questions in such areas would-need to be removed to support an access program based on clinical evaluation or s-tandardized testing under the general authority.
Structured Interview A structured interview utilizes informrtion obtained frca the interviewee in the form of a personal history itatement.
Its effectiveness may rely upon the threat of a background investigation being condu:::ted if the interviewer believes the subject is not candid.
Inquiry = lade during the interview would normally involve issues infringing on first a:mendment rights and, therefore, the alternative would not be supportable under the general au-hority.
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Reliability Standard vs Clearance Program *
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The proposed Part 11 access authorization program consists of an investigation of a c'.
person's background.
A full field background investigation cay.obtain inforure. tion about a person's past reliability and stability which might be used to predict future
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behavior. As such the' backgrocnd investigation is one method to obtain information -
to measure a person's future reliability.
Programs which involve reliability vary according to the emphasis as to what is to be measured and the purpose of the program.
For example, standards used in reliability programs; include general ployment criteria, such as past employment performance, mental or physical health standards, as they relate to the ability to maintain some job perfomance level, and basic skills or human characteristics which' bear on reliable perfomance.
In the staff's (SD, TW.SS, HRR) opinion, any standard (whether called a clearance, screening process, or seme other name) ought to be based on the*following process:
1.
Co'ncerns to be addressed must be identified.
These may be to prevent individual malevolence, to protect against individual incompetence, or to insure that individuals can function adequately in high stress situations.
2.
Specific kinds of human characteristics or facts about an individual must be identified which bear on the target concerns, such as character, trustworthiness, or emotional stability.
3.
Indicators of the heman characteristics must be ident-ified which will serve as decision criteria, such as lack of certain felony convictions,or absence of emotional instability. /
4 Lastly, guidelines as to what kind of infor.ation wil 1 be collected, and by what means, must be established so that appropriate infor ation is obtained relevant to the decision criteria.
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- / The efficacy of emotional instability assessment and reliability programs
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The Office of St.andards Develop =ent 6..
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.The clearance program under ' proposed Part 11 explicitly covers these' Tour areasD.. ~..
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sabotage of facilities. The characteristics of concern are identified in 161i(2) as character, associations and loyalty.
Decision criteria are those contained in 10 CFR Part 10.11.
Information pertaining to the criteria is collected through a
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. background investigation according to guidelines which specify " investigative leads" to be followed.
A material access authorization program based upon a reliability standard could be expected to consider broader areas than the proposed Part li clearance program such as general employment suitability, mental health, aptitude, and behavior.
The primary concern would renain protection against malevolent acts such as theft, diversion and sabotage, the elements under the section 161i(2) program,. but also characteristics such as mental capacity, stability and judgment under stress.
Decision criteria could also differ by including the additional character-istics.
Information collected relevant to the decision criteria could include identifi-cation of past behavior by investigation, and also assessment of personalit.)
characteristics and observation of on-the-job behavior.
An access program emphasizing reliability criteria would serve purposes in anttion to safeguards.
For example, the use of psychological assessment might not only serve the purpose of identifying individuals who could comit malevolent acts, but also might identify those who are error prone, or who could not perform a critical task or function.
Hence, the option deals not only with saf~eguards goals bu: also with safety goals and possible general job performance er suit-ability.
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300TORGINAL e-0NMSS, ONRR, and OSD continue to believe that a program based on reliability for
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nuclear facilities would have to have an investigative element to be effective as past behavior is still in their view the best indicator of certain kinds of char-acteristics which should.be used for the basis of excicding individuals from sensitive positions.
It would be reasonable to expect that additional elements such as emotional stability assessment might complement the investigative option and provide greater assurance that malevolent or unsafe job behaYict is minimized.
However, a program based solely on reliability that totally excluded loyalties and associations to avoid first amendment questions would not appear to be responsive to legitimate identified concerns relevant to ptdalic health and safety.
For example, a clearance program based upon.cliabi.lity alc=e rr.ay. permit a person access to special nuclear material who is reliable and stab!e. but who advocates acnieving social or political change by use of violence.
Recerendations
';hile ONP.55, OSD, and ONRR staff have been advised of our Tegal opinion of July 16, 1979, which concludes that the NRC is not legally compelled to) follow basic s ar.dards and procedures prcmulgated by the Department of Energy, those offices nenetheless believe that a traditional government clearance program is the best alternative.available at this date. Accordingly, they rewend as follows:.
1.
Tne Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards recomatends that the draft rule as proposed in enclosure B be adoptaI in the area of fuel cycle facilities and transportation invoTving for ula cuantities of special nuclear mate' rial.
2.
Tha Cffice cfl?uclear React:r Regulation recc= ends that the rule be adopted as originally proposed in SECY 76-508 with m
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amendments in the areas of_ grandfathering at power reactors and
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interim access requirements 'as' outlined in the staff's concluding Mi r->
statement to the Board. ' Iri the alternative, and as a second choice "
the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation recommends that for, power reactors the Comission adopt an R access autho ization based on a NAC investigation and adopt dther requirements that
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a-may be necessary for power reactor licensees as appropriate for unescorted access to vital areas.
Non-power reactors would be -
excluded at the present time pending completion of a separate on-going itaff rev1ew of the total safeguards requiremer^ necessary for such facilities.
3.
OELD has no legal objection to any of these recomendations.
4.
Any of the above alternatives is acceptable to the C*fice of Standards Development.
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- DRAFT FUEOCYCLE FACILITY CLEARANCE RULE
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qx-g Attached, as requested. is a draft clearance rule which provides coverage cnly for those Lilities anii activities in the' fuel cycle involving. formula nuantities of SNM wikich are consihred to be significant to tie cixancn efense and..
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security due to the risk' from theft, d'iveision or sabotage.
Facilities and plants in which the licensee possesses or us5s only jrradiated special nuclear material subject to the exemption of 5 73.6(b) have beeh excluded.
The staff cer.cludes that this. irradiated special nuclear mate:-ial offers no significant risk frem the threat of theft or diversion because of its self-protecting radiation level and the fact that material necessary to manunu:ture an exp'osive devic is cifficult to separate frem other constituents in the irradiiated raterial.
It 9euld be noted that:
1)
The 365 day implementation schedule acccunts for esti=:ated application preparation and submission time, license amendment review, when applicable, and average clearance time.
It assumes that Division of Security Office 'of Administratic will be provided additional resources estimated at 6.2 man /pe:rsons for the first year, c*cpping to 2.8 man / persons for succeeding years. (these estimates are subject to Office of the Controller re/iew).
2)
The Office of Administ' ration cannot assure that all imitial applications can be processed in 365 days.
Past experience indicates that a wall number of applica-
-icns can be expected to require additional processing time d:ue to special
'r.vesticative or review considerations.
To account for these cases, the draft-uie previces an excepcion for those individuals who are employed at the time
-he rule beccmes effective, submit ecm31ete applications on schedule, yet do 1098 264
P00lFORBINAL not receive authorization by the 365 day implementation date due to deldys in _..
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governmet processing.' These individuals can continue working at affected Jobs _ i.
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until their applications are ccepleteif. All others must have-access authorization after the 365 day implementation date to be allo'wed to work at; affected jobs.
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This draft rule differs from the rule proposed in SECY 76-503 in this respect so--.
as not to penalize existing industry employees' because of possible go[ernment 2.-
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processing delays, yet it still provides for having the des' ires:i safeguards benefits in place as early as possible.
3)
The original proposal contained in SECY 75-508 was written prior to existing GAO requirements for report justification analysis.
Such anai_ysis is underway, but its completion is dependent upon Cor:nission determination of the form of the final FJ i e.
4)
In light of Connission approval of the Phy:ical Prote=1.ica " Upgrade Rule,"
conforning changes to Part 73 references would be equihed fer this draft if' it
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were a: proved for publicatien.
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Minor uditional records and rcporting requirements wezzid also be required for the craft to bring it in conformance with uodated investicative procedures and requirements and Propose Nrt 25 amendments. -
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Enclosure "5"
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Title 10 - Energy
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CHAPTER I - NUCLEAR. REGUI.ATORY COMMISSION
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PART 11 - CRITERIA AND PR EDURES FOR DETERMINING ACCESS TO OR CONTROL '
OVER SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL PART 50 - DOMESTIC LICENSING OF PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION FACILITIES
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PART 70 - DOMESTIC LICENSE OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL AGENCY:
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cocnission.
ACTION:
Final Rule.
SUFMARY:
In March,1977, the Commission published for p.ublic co=rnent preposed asencments to establish criteria and procedsres for-determining eligibility for access to or centrol over special nu: lear =aterial.
As a result of public and staff ccmments, the record of as2.infor=al Hearing, and the reco=cendations of the Hearing Board,'the sc=pe of the proposed
- a. encments has been narrowed to include only those fuel cycle facilities and transportation activities who use, process, or store for=ula quantities
. cf special nuclear material.
Light water reactors, n=n pcwer reactors, anc facilities possessing only irradiated special nuclear material subject to the exemption of s 73.6(b) are not covered by these revised amendments.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is now publishing these revised amendments f n final fore.
E??ECTIVE DATE:
(Effective 75 days after publication).
R FUF.THER INFCR.".ATION CONTACT:
W. 3. Brown, Office of Standards C ave'. ;::ent, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissi,cn, 'a'ashington, D.C. 20555 Phene:
301.43-5907).
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incl osure "B"
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i SUPPLEMENTARY 'INFORMATION:
Section 1611 of the Atonic Energy Act of 1954,~
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'.;;,,as amended, permits.the)juelear,. Regulatory Co= mission to. prescribe regula;
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tions instituting a cidr~aiceMgram for those individuals Wo hav5 access to or control over special nuclear material.
Specifically, the section
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provides that the Cocmais'sion may issue r,egulations "...- designating' actiE ities involving quantities of special nuclear material which in the opinion of the Commission are important.to the c,ommon defense and security..that may be conducted only by persons whose character, as ociations and loyalty shall have been investigated under standards and spec:ifications estab-lished by the Commission and as to whom the Coc: mission shall have deter-sined that permitting each such person to conduct the activity will not be inimical to the common defense and security...."
Pursuant to this statutory authority, the Commission is issuing regu-lations which would require certain individuals invcilved in the cperation of licensed fuel reprocessing plants, in the licensed use, processing, or storage of certain quantities of special nuclear saterials, and in the transportation by the private sector of certain c;uantities of special nuclear material, to receive authori::ation from the Cmrission 1"or access to or control over special nuclear material.
Nuclear reactors licensed pursuant to 10 CFR Part 50* and facilities possessing only irradiated special nuclear material subject to the exemption of 5 73.6(b) are not covered by these amend:ents.
At this time, the Cocsiission is still con-sidering whether these requirecents shoulc be applied to power reactor facilities.
Additionally, non power reactors and storage of fuel incident thereto, have been excluded from the requirements of these amenc=ents Except for the Fort St. Vrain facility.
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2 Encic iure "B"
P00R OR BML pending completion of a separate ongoing review of tcrtal safeguards
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- requirements adequacy at.such ~ facilities.
When that assessment is ccm--r -'_
plate, consideration of access authorization requirements will be included in the evaluation of overall safeguards. upgrading which may be cosisidered necessary for these facilities.
Finally, facilities ; possessing formula
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quantities of special nuclea r material only in the fo:rn of irradiated
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special nuclear material subject to the exemption of' 3 73.6(b) are also excluded from these requirements as the Commission enricludes that the risk of theft or diversion of such material is minima A.
This is con-sistent with other safeguards requirecents for irradiated special nuclear material.
These regulations utilize a personnel security ;n ogram as a measure to protect against those employed in the affacted nurJear activities who might conspire to steal or divert special nuclear material or coiiduct sabotage which wc'31 d endanger the public by exposure to radiation.
Of course, a clearance program itself does not ent'arely solve the probiem of the " insider," but, in the opinion of the Commission, experience has shown that such progra=s do substantiallv wduce the : risk.
Moreo fer, he proposed program is one of several elements in the Commission" s over-all safeguards program which together protect against. threats, both internal and external.
Two levels of special nuclear material access acthorization are es*h lished.
The higher level, NRC-U, is based upon a full-field background investigation and will apply to (i) all individuals who require u=1escorte d access to special nuclear material or within vital areas, (ii) these jobs in which an individual alone or in conspiracy with ancther individual 1098 268 3
Enclosure "B"
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who does not possess an NRC-U special nuclear material accres.authoriza-
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" tion could act-to stealycr. divert special nuclear material or to commiF9
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sabotage, and (iii) drivers of motor vehicles and pilots of aircraft. F
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transporting certain quantities of spec',a1 nuclear saaterial and those.
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who escort road, rail, air or sea shipments of special nucleat-material.
m-The lower level, NRC-R, is based upon a National Age:ncy Check and will apply to all individuals who require unescorted access to protected areas '
and who are not required to possess an NRC-U special nuclear ca.terial access authortation.
An implementation schedule has been established to account for changed estimates of the time requirect to process access authori:ation applications (180 days for an NRC "U" a:nd 120 days for an
. cr jobs not requiring NRC "R") and for the initial flow of applications.
an amended security plan, affected individuals must have the required access authorization within 365 days of the effective date of the amend-ments.
All others-must have authorization 365 days a1"ter having the amended security plan approved designating those jobs which require access authorizat, ion.
Excepted from the 365 day implementa=cion in all cases are those who initially apply but have not received notif-ication due to Commission processing time.
Both the National Agency Check and the full-fieB:d background investi-gation are conducted by the Office of Personnel Managgement.
The National Agency Check consists of a check of files of the FBI (fingerpr-int and central files), Office of Personnel Management (Secu=-ity-Investigative index), and a check of militar/ records and records of other government agencies, as appropriate.
The full-field backgrounc.: investigation con-sists of interviews of references, conducted by inve.stigative agents of the Office of Personnel Management, in addition to t.de records check.
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Enclosure "B"
j Sources of information developed in the course of the investigation are also interviewed. _The full-field background investigation conducted ty the Office of Personnel Management generally covers the 5 year period of the individual's adult life prior to that investigation.
Licensees and license ~ applicants wi.11 be required to amend their security plans by. identifying and describing jobs at their facilities
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which require authorization.
Affected individuals will be required to obtain authorization according to the schedules set forth in the proposed rule.
Individuals who are newly hired or who change jobs where the new job will require a catarial access authorization must obtain an authoriza-tion before beginning the job.
Authorization will be updated every five ye ars.
The establishment of a material access authorization prograc: in the licensed nuclear industry will affect individuals who are not empicyed by ar.y licensee or contractor of the Commission as well as licensee employees.
It is the Commission's intent to minimize both the in: pact on the rights of privacy and association of individuals affected~, and the number of individuals affet.m, while.providing an effective measure of protection against those who would seek employment with, or use tneir position in, the.welear industry fcr purposes of theft or sabotage.
In preparing these regulations, among the matters considered were the scope of investigations (e.g., whether a full-field background investigation should be required for all individuals), which job functions should require caterial access authorization (e.g., require authorization only for " key" pcsitions or ad; pt a graded system with level of clearance determined by jcb), whether psychological assessment should be required, and the 7 elation of the proposed program to current IGC and 00E personnel security prsgrams.
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Enc'Iosure "B"
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The Commission also considered the question of whether new criteriaf
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.should be developed [agains@ich a decision for authorizatio[would.be]..~
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In its consideration, the Consission has had before it both public cocoents, the record developed in an informal hearirig, and the recommenda-tions of the Hearing Board.
The present NRC'securitiy clearance criteria' (10 CFR Part 10) were developed for access to classified infonnation and,' '
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as such, not all-criteria may be equally significant for questions of accars to special nuclear material, and some may not be per=eived as relevant in specific cases.
Also, there oay be cases in which additional criteria, not now included in 10 CFR Part 10, would be more to the point.
- However, thase critaria do correspond to the Federal Governmemt's genera 1 approach
.o personnel security, and~ specifically, they are presently used for DOE access authori:ation programs.
Furthermore, the criteria are in the nature of guidelines to be used in a decision process characterized by common sense judgments, rp.ther than quantitative criteria.
- Moreover, the Commission is reluctant to devise a new set of criteria without evidence that such new criteria would significantly improve upon those which presently exist.
The Commission notes, however, that the Depart-ment of Energy is currently reviewing the criteria applicable to access to Restricted Data and material and will review Cocmdission criteria in 10 CFR Part 10 in light of any revision made by the Department of Energy in 10 CFR Part 710.
Hence, in light of the above, the Commission is relying on the considerable 'xpertise residing in the broad experience of the federal Government in the area of personnel security prcx; rams by preacsing -he use of the crite.ria contained in 10 CFR Part 10 as guide-lines in deciding questions of access to or controi =ver special nuclear
=aterial.
1098271 6
Enclosure "B"
9 P00R OR G NAL Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as asmended, by the Energy
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Reorganization Act of 1974, and section 553 of title 5 of the United States Code, notice is hereby fiven 'that a new 10 CFR Chapter 1, Part 11, and the following conforming amendments to 10 CFR Chapte- _1, Parts 50 and 70 are published as a document subject to codification 1.
A new Part 11 is added to read as follows:
Part 11 - CRITERIA AND PROCEDURES FOR DETER.54INING ELIGIBILITY FOR ACCESS TO OR CONTROL OVER SPEECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL GENERAL PROVISIONS 11.1 Purpose 11.3 Scope 11.5 Policy 11'.7 Definitions REQUIREMENTS FOR SPECIAL NUCLEAR !W-x_1AL ACCESS AUTHORIZATION 11.11 Requirements at fixed sites 11.13 Requirements in transportation 11.~15 Application for special nucles.r-material access authorization CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING ELIGISILITY FOR SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCESS AUTHORIZATION 11.21 Application of the criteria AUTHCRITY:
Section 7, Pub. L.93-377, 88 Stat. 475; 55ection 1611, Pub. L.83-703, 68 Stat. 948 (42 U.S.C. 2 201).
GENERAL PROVISIONS
! 11.1 Purpose This part establishes the requirements for spec
- al nuclear material access authori:ation, and the criteria and procedures; for resolving cuesticas concerning the eligibility of individuals o receive special nuclear caterial access authorization for conduct of certain acti.vities, 1098 272 7
Enclosure "B"
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licensed or otherwise, whicti involve access to or control over special nuclez
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material.
5 11.3 Scope The requirements, criteria, and procedures of this part apply to the establishment of and eligibility for special nuclear material access authorization for. employees, contractors, consultants of', and applicants for e=ployment with, licensees or contractors of the Nuclear Regulatory Co::nission where such employment, contract, service [ cr consultation involves any job falling within the criteria of Sg I.1.11 or 11.13 of this chapter.
The requirements, criteria, and procedures of this part are in addi-tien to and not in lieu of any requirements, criteria, or procedures for access to or control over classified special nuclear material.
I 11.5 Policy
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It is the policy of the Nuclear Regulatory Co=sissioTi to carry out its authority to establish and administer a personnel security program in the interests of the common defense and security for the purpose of safeguarding special nuclear material and preventing sabotage which would endanger the public by exposure to radiation in a canner consistent with traditional American concepts of justice.
To this end, the Commission has established criteria for determining eligibility for special nuclear material access authorization and will afford affected individuals the opportunity for administrative review of questions concerning their eligibility for special nuclear material access authorization.
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P00R~0%lN?L 5 11.7 Definitions
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10, 50, 70, and 73 of this. chapter have (a) Terms defined in Parts the same meaning when used in,this part.
-y (b)
"Special "nuelear material access authorizaation".means an adminis-..
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, trative determination that an individual (including a contractor or con "
sultant) who is employed by or is an applicant for gloyment.with an affected Commission contractor, licensee of the Comunissfort, or contractor of a licensee of the Commission may work at a feb wW.ich affords access to or control over special nuclear material and that pemitting the indi-vidual to work at that job would not be inimical to the coc: mon defense and security.
(c)
"NRC 'U' special nuclear material access auther-ization" means an administrative determination based upon a nationail agency check, and a full-field backgro,und investigation conducted by the Office of Personnel Management that an individual in the course of e=plo3yment. is eligible to work at a job falling within the criteria of SS 11.1'1(a)(1) or 11.13.
(d)
"NRC 'R' special nuclear material access amthorization" means an administrative determination based upon a nationail agency check that an individual in the course of employment is eligible to work at a job falling within the criterion of S 11.11(a)(2).
REQUIREMENTS FOR SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCESS AUTHORIZATION 5 11.11 Requirements at fixed sites (a)
Each licensee wno after (90 days fcilowing publication in final form) uses, processes, or stores formula quantities of special nuclear Tb b
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material (as defined,in Part.73) subject to the physiical protection require-
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.his facility or, plant (excluding however all non power reactor facilities
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and storage of fuel incident thereto and facilities a:nd plants in which
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the licensee possesses or uses only irradiated special nuclear material
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subject to the exemption of 573.6(b) of. Part 73) and describe to the ~.
Coccission, by amendment to his security plan:.
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(1)' All jobs in which an individual couTd steal or divert special nuclear material, or commit sabotage which wculd endanger the publit. by exposura to radiation, by working. alone or -En cooperation with an individua7 who does not possess an NRC-U special :urclear material accass authorization, or by directing or coercing any -individual to assist in the theft, diversion, or sabotage.
Such jobs incicde but are not limited to:
(i) All positions in the licensee's security force, (ii) Managecent positions with the autturity to:
(A) Direct the actions of members of the security force or alter security procedures, or-(B)
Direct routine movements of s.pecial nuclear oaterial, or (C) Direct the routine status of vital equipment.
(iii) All jobs which require unescorted access within onsite alarm stations.
(iv) All jobs which require unescorted access
- to special nuclear caterial or within vital areas _
AThis does not alter the requirement for methods to observe individuals within material access areas as stated in S '73.60(a)<7) of this chapter.
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(2) All jobs which require unescorted ac=ess within prot =cted
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- areas and which do not fall within the criterion of paragraph (a)(1:
of this section.
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(b)(1) After (365 days following Commission approval of the amended security plan, submitted in accordance with paragrapta (a) of this section) _..,
no individual cay be permitted to work at any job determined by the Commis-sion to fall within the criterion of paragraph (a)(1) of this section without an NRC-U special nuclear material access authorization, and no individual may be permitted unescorted access to any protected area at any site subject to this part without either an NRC-U or :NRC-R special nuclear material access authorization.
Individuals are e::xcepted who were employed on the effective date of these amendments, who scabmitted c: plete applications in accordance with 511.15 of this part, and who have no:.
been disapproved and have not yet received notification of approved :ccess authorization from the Commission.
5 11.13 Requirements in transportation (a)
All individuals who after (365 days following pcablication in final form) tran~ ort, arrange for transport, drive :motoi vehicles in road shipments of special nuclear material, pilot aircraf-t in air shipments of special nuclear material, act as monitors at transfer ; points, or escort road, rail, sea, or air shipments of special nuclear znate rial subject to the appropriate physical protection requirements of 55 73.30, 73.31, 73.35 or 73.36 of this chapter shall have NRC-U special nuclear material access authori:ation.
Individuals are excepted who were em=lcye d on the effective date of these amencments, who submitted complete applicat:, ions in accordance with 511.15 of this part, and who have not been disapproved and have not 11 Enclosure "B"
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yet received notificationlof approveif access authorization from the
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transpo'rt or who deliver to a carrier for transport special nuclear material
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subject to the physical protection rdqui.rements of SS 73.30, 73.33., 73.357.
or 73.36 of this chapter shall confirm and record prior t$ shipment the name w
and special nuclear material access authorization nuczber of -all drivers,."'-
escorts, and monitors assigned to the shipment.
Indi'viduals are excepted who were employed on the effective date of these amentiments, who submitted complete applications in accordance with 511.15 of th-is part, and who have not been disapproved and have not yet received notification of approved access authorization from the Commission.
5 11.15 Application for Special Nuclear Matarial Accsass Authorization (a)
Application for special nuclear material access authorization, renewal, or change in level shall be filed by the empGloyer on behalt' of the applicant with the Director, Office of Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regula*ory Commission, Washington, D.C.
20555.* App'lications for affected individuals empicyed on the effective,date of these a=lendments shall be submitted within 60 days of the effective date or wittiin 60 days ot' notification of Commission approval of the amended security plan.
(b)
Applications for special nuclear material access authorization shall be made on forms supplied by the Ccemission inc luding-(1)
A Personnel Security Questionnaire (P5Q) completed by the individual.
Process times for special nuclear material access authorizations can be expected to be about ISO days for NRC-U and 120 days for NRC-R.
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E-(2) Two standard ;fingerprin+. cards with the individual's finger-
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p'rints (fingerprints may be taken by a local po' alice authority).
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(3) ' Authority to Velease information.
.. 7 (4) Security acknowledgment form.
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(5) Other related i'orms whe're specified irt accompanying NRC
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instructions.
(6) A statement by the employer, prospect-Tve employer,, or con-
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tractor, identifying the job to be assigned to or assumed by the individual and the level of authorization needed.,, justified by appro-priate reference to the licensee's security plarr (c)
Special nuclear material access authorization shall expire 5 years following the date of issue.
If continued spec =al nuclear material access a thori:ation is required, an application for : enewal shat'I be submitte; at least 120 days prior to expiration date.
Failure to make a timely a plication,will result in expiration of special nuclear material access authorization.
Special nuclear material access authorfratTsa for which a timely application for renewal has been made unay be continued beyond the expiration date pending final action on the application.
An application for renewal will consist of the following=
(1) A Personnel Security Questionnaire, co=2pleted by the applicant.
(2)
Two standard fingerprint cards with the individual's fingerprints.
(2) Authority to release information.
(4) Other related for=s where specified ir, accompanying NRC instructions.
1998 278 13 Enclesure "B"
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- s A statement,by the employer or contractor that at the time z-
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of, application _fo(renewal the -individual *s assigned or assumed job
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requirei the.. level of special nucl. ear material. access authorizaton
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which he or she holds, justified'~bk apprc~pria'te reference to the licensee's security plan.M.
(d)
If at any time, du'e to ne[ assignment or assumption of duties,
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a change in special nuclear material access authori::urtion level from NRC "R" to "U" is required, the individual shall apply for a change of level of.special nuclear material access authorization.
S.uch an application shall include a description of the new duties to be assigned or assumed, justified by appropriate reference to the licensee's; security plan.
(e)
Each application for special nuclear caterial: access authori:a-tion, renewal, or change in level shall be acco= pani +ed by the employer's remittance according to the following schedule:
(1) new application, "U" S950 (2) new ap pl i cati o n, " R"....................
S. 30 (3) renewal "U" or "R" S 30 (4) change of level "R" to "U" Sc50 (5) convert existing NRC or DOE "Q" or
" Q ( X ) " to U o r R.........................
No charge (6) convert existing NRC or DOE '"L" or "L(X)" to U.......................,...
5950 (7) convert existing NRC or DOE "Q". "Q(X)",
" L", o r " L( X ) " to R.....................
No: charge
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CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING ELIGIBILITf FOR ACCESS TO, OR CONTROL
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J 5 11.21 Application.of the criteria ei (a)
The decision to grant or deny 'special nuclear material access.
authorization is a comprehensive, co= mon-sense judgment, made after con-
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sideration of all the relevant information, favorable or unfavorable,'
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that to grant. or deny special nuclear material access authorization is or is not inimical to the common defense and security and is or 'is not clearly consistent with the national interest.
(b)
To assist in making these determinations, on the basis of a'il the information in a particular case, there are set forth in 510.11 of this chapter a number of specific types of derogatory informatio:n.
These criteria are not exhaustive but contain the principal types of derogatory information which in the opinion of the Com..ission create a question as to the individual's eligibility for special nuclear material access authorization.
These criteria are subject to continuing review and may be revised from time to time as experience and circu= stances may make desirable.
(c) When the reports of investigation of an individual contain information reasonably falling within one or more of the classes of derogatory information listed in 510.11, the application of 5.he criteria shall be made in light of and with specific regard to wnettwr the existence of such information creates a question as to the indi-vicual's eligibility for special nuclear material access author":ation by raising a reasonable belief that the individual would use his or her 109829 15 Enclosure "B"
access to or control over special nuclear material for theft or diver-y
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g t--=. sion.of special fnuclearhaaterial, or.__ sabotage which would endanger the i.__-~
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C.C3 public by exposure to radiation.
The Director, Division of Security
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conduct of an interview with the individual and, on the basis of such ~. '
. g interview and such other investigation ac he deems appropriate; may j.Z C authorize the' granting of special nuclear material access authorization.
Otherwise, a question concerning the eligibility of an individual for special nuclear material access authorization shall be resolved in
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accordance with the procedures set forth in SS 10.2D through 10.37 of this chapter.
(d)
In resolving a question concerning the eligibility or continued eligibility of an individual for special nuclear material: access authori-zation by action of the Personnel Security Board," the foillowing principle shall be applied by the Board:
Where there are grounds s ufficient to establish a reasonable belief as to the truth'of the infcirmation regarded as substantially derogatory and when the existence of suct information raises a reasonable belief that the individual may use hi's access to or control over special nuclear caterial for theft or diversion of special nuclear material or sabotage which would endanger the public by exposure to radiatica, this shall be the basis for a rece=mendation for denying or revoking special nuclear material access authorization if not satisfac-
.orily rebutted by the individual or shown to be mitigated by circumstance.
Tv. function of the Personnel Security Board is described in Part 10 of tnis chapter.
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2.
Paragraph (c)[of S 50.34 of Part 50 of this cha:pter is amended to
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3 50.34 Content of, applications:
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(c)
Physical security plan.
Each application ffor a license to operate M
a production or utilization facility shall include a physical security C"'3 Part I s; hall address vital C"3 pl an.
The plan shall consist of two parts.,
C3 equipment, vital areas, and isolation zones, and shat 1 demonstrate how the applicant plans to comply with the requirements crf Parts 73 and 11 of this chapter, including the identification and des;:cription of jobs as required by 511.11(a) of Part 11, at the proposed fac:ility, if applicable.4 Part II shall list tests, inspections, and other meams to be used to demon-strate ccmpliance with such requirements, if applicat:le.
3.
Paragraph (h) of 9 70.22 of Part 70 of this chapiter is amended 'a read as follcws:
i 70.22 Contents of applications.
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Each. application for a license to possess c r use at any site or contiguous sites subject to control by the licenseee uraniu=-235 (con-tained in uranium enriched to 20 percent or more in tihe uranium-235 isotope), uranium-233, or plutonium alone or in any crombination in a quantity of 5,000 grams or more computed by the for=uila, grams =(grams contained U-235)+2.5 (grams U-233 grams plutonium), cither than a license for possession or use of such material in the cperati on of a nuclear reactor licensed pursuant to Part 50 of this chapter,, shall include a
- hysical security plan, consisting of two parts.
Par-t I shall addr,ess vital equipment, vital areas, and isolation zones, ar.id shall deEonstrate 1098 28 D 17 cncl osure
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how the applicant plans So'esar. the physical protect. ion requirements of Part 73 of.this' cliapter. in the conduct of the activity to be licensed
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including the identification and description of jobs as required by
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-Kl-C Z l3 5 H.H(a) of this chapter.' 'Part II'shall list tests, inspecticas, and
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g Qg (Authority:
Section 7, Pub. L.93-577, 88 Stat. 475-Section 161i, Pub.
4 L.83-703, 68 Stat. 948 (42 U.S.C. 2201))
Dated at Washington, D.C. this day of For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Secretary of the Cocmission
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