ML19274G128
| ML19274G128 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 05/02/1979 |
| From: | Janouski M METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7908290709 | |
| Download: ML19274G128 (92) | |
Text
., 4s 1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA y
l i
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION I
i I
In the Matter of:
(
2!
IE TMI INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW l
31 of Mi'hael A. Janouski c
l Radiation Chemistry Technician Nuclear 4!
Si Ei I
7 8l t
Trailer #203 9)
NRC Investigation Site TMI Nuclear Pcwer Plant i
10j Middletown, Pennsylvania 11!
Mav 2, 1979 12l (Date of Interview) t 13!
June 22, 1979 (Date Transcript Typea) 1 41 100, 101 15!
(Tape Numoer(s))
16i l
17!
181 191 6
20l O
i.
21I NRC PERSONNEL:
22 C
Mr. Gregory P. Yuhas i
23,I Mr. Robert Marsh 24l 25l 2003 037 i
, !0 4
4 l
MARSH:
The time s 11:41 p m.
date is May 2, 1979.
This is i
I Robert Marsh, and I'117' :nvestigM.ar eith the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissign assigned to 6he 1gion III office, Chicago, Illinois.
This 3
evening wt cra at the h.ee Mile Island site and we are here to conduct l
an interview of Mike Janouski, an employee cf Metropolitan Edison. And Sl before we start that interview, I would like the other NRC member in 6i i
the room to identify himself and spell his last name, if you would.
7l I
al YUHAS:
This is Gregory P. Yuhas.
I'm a Radiation Specialist with Region I.
10 11!
MARSH:
OK Mike, if you would, to begin the interview, if you would 12$
give us your last name again and indicate your exact position with 13i Metropolitan Edison.
14!
15; JAN00 SKI:
My name is Mike Janouski. I'm a radiation chemistry technician, 16i i
nuclear.
17l 18l MARSH:
OK, fine.
Mike, just before we turned the tape on here we had 19i discussed this lctter that I have in front of me for a few moments.
20' If you'd take a look at the copy I gave you there, it's a two page 21{
letter in which we discuss the purpose of the investiagation, the 22' scope of what we hope to do and some of the authority under which 23 we' re working.
In addition, you've noted, on the second page there 24l 25 6
l 2003 038 i
1s 2
are a series of questions which just for the record I'd like to repeat 7,
at this time on the tape. F'rst question read, do you understand the 2
above, makir.g reference to the two page letter?
31 I
4i JANOUSKI:
Yes.
Si Gi MARSH:
The second question reads, do we have your permission to tape 7
the interview?
9I JAN0USKI:
Yes.
10!
ll!
i MARSH:
Third question reads, do you want a copy of the tape?
12{
l 13!
JAN00 SKI:
Yes.
14!
15i MARSH:
There is a fourth question which does, is not listed at the 16i end of the letter but is included in the body and this is addressed, 17i i
~ ddresses your rights if you so desire to have either company represen-a 18I tative or union representative present with you.
20f i
JANOUSKI:
No, I don't need one.
21l l
22' l
MARSH:
OK, fine.
I will proivde you a copy of this evening's tape at 23l the conclusion of this session, I'll duplicate it and have it for you 2 41 l
251 i
2003 039 t
s l
3 1
at that time and I will also be sure insure that you get a copy cf the transcript as that's done.
There may be a delay in getting it typed 2
f a week or two weeks but at least you'll have the copy of the tape 3
for both this meeting and, as we discussed earlier, from your previous meeting, I'll give you both of those tonight.
g i
6i JANOUSKI:
OK.
I 8'
l MARSH:
One other thing before we get going, Mike, which I, from the 9
investigative end of it have an interest in and would like your feelings on, and that regards the preparation for this interview. : would be interested in knowing have you been contacted by any company represen-12!
tatives about this in'.erview?
13 l
14!
JAN0USKI;
- o.
Other than to inform me of 15l r
16!
i MARSH:
That it was here?
17!
18{
JAN0USKI:
Right.
19i 20!
j MARSH:
There has been no coaching or no guidance at all for ycu?
21; i
22I JAN0USKI:
No.
23 24j 2sj 2003 040 i
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MARSH:
Ok, fine.
OK, in order to get going before I turn it over to y
Greg, Mike 1 would like you to once again, I know we've done it on the f
first tape but briefly Could you go over some of your background, your 4l history in health physics, what basically, your education was and what y ur history has been with Met Ed here.
5 6i JAN0USKI:
Basically, I don't have any previous background in health l
physics.
I have a year of college.
I was a academic major in high 81 school which gave me most of my educational background for the job and 9l l
the qualifications.
I've been with Metropolitan Edison Company for 10l seven years, a little over seven years.
Basic training and education l
11:
that Metropolican Edison Company has given me is basic entry level 121 type mathematics, and the general employee training type information.
13l Mostly my t)- ining in health physics has been on the job type training.
141 Major training that I've had, as far as actual training goes, mostly i
15!
in the chemistry field.
I've been through the B&W radiochemistry 16i course, the B&W lithium germanium detector course but other than that 1 71 l
mostly it's, basically 0JT training.
18:
19i YUHAS:
Mike, I've listened to your first tape and I understand that i
20t you want to clarify some times 21{
i 22 JAN0USKI:
Right.
23 1
2 41 25!
2003 041
i.
5 l
1l YUHAS:
... relative times as we go through, so what I going to do is 2
I'm going to ask you initially to, in your own words, describe your 3
chronology of involvement in the incidents that occurred on the 28th.
After you've gone through it in your own words, I'll come back and ask 5l y u some specific questions related to amplifying information. At the 6l conclusion of that, we'll talk about the general health physics program here at TMI and then I'll give your the opportunity if you have any U*" *
"Y "9'
8 the general format.
Now it is midnight and you've worked a full shift n
I and I understand you hava to be in tomorrow morning so if anytime 10l 11;l during the interview you feel fatigued, we'll just reschedule it at a later date.
Okay, so would you please begin by telling us where you I
were, let's start with midnight on, or 0000 on the 28th.
13) 14!
JAN0USKI:
At midnight we were in the health physics lab going through our routine health physics procedure that we do, it's a routine that i
we go through every night.
We run the backgrounds and efficiencies on 17!
our counting equipment, we run our energy calibration on the Ge(Li) 18; detector, the chemistry people mark their charts and our normal routine 19l procedure is really what it amounts to.
We did Pat Donnachie and 20' myself, the other senior tecli who was assigned to the job that night 21 to replace a vacancy we have in the department on my shift, we did the 22l RM2 samples which are the Unit i radiation or reactor building monitor t
23 samples that we do routinely and this carried through approximately, I 24 25 i
<?003 042 i
i.
6 1l would say till maybe 2, 3:00 in the morning, probably closer to 3:00.
We did a few odds and ends type things that we normally get called 2
i 3j up n to do.
I don't remember the exact actions that occurred that g
night as far as routine type things. 'Appro'ximately 4:00 in the morning we heard an ann uncement over the page that Unit 2 had had a turbine 5
trip.
Within a few minutes of that they announced over the page that Qi our Unit 2 had had a reactor trip.
We have, in the health physics 7
I department here at tha island, we've been trained to go through a 8!
l routine trip type procedure that we do.
We're required to draw our 91 l
condenser vacuum samples off of the gas vent in Unit 2 and we also 10l I
draw a reactor coolant isotopic iodine sample.
So we started our 11l l
procedure in hcw we go about o ;ng this.
We purged from our Marinelli, 12!
i the 1640 Marinelli that we use for our unit vent or for the condenser 13i vacuum sample for approximately a half hour in the Unit 1 primary 14!
sample room or in the primary chem lab, and Pat Donnachie went to Unit 15; 2 and drew this sample.
It showed nothing out of the ordinary at that 16 time. This was somewhere between, somewhere close to 5:00.
Dave i
17!
Zeiter and Tom Davis were the two technicians in chemistry at that 18{
time and they were in the process of drawing the primary coolant 19f sample for isotopic iodine and this was on recirc during this period.
201 j
Really between 5:00 and 6:30 to clarify on the other tape that I had, 21:
you know, there was some mix up in my times you know because I was 22 confused accordingly, but after the discussion with Pat, the other 23 senior tech, in laying out the format of what acte lly occurred that 24 25, 2003 043 6
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7 i
llj night to clarify it ourselves, you know, it was approximately 6:30 2
before we really got into any type, emergency type situation.
But what I would say is, somewhere around 6:00, Dick Dubiel, our radiation 3
protection supervisor, came in.
It occurred to Pat and I, this was
[
rather strange at this time of the morning for Dick to be there but he
-l i
said that they were having some problems and he wanted me to change,
.4 Of this was closer to 6:30, he wanted.?e to change the iodine and the particulates on HPR 227. I explained to Dick that I had just drawn the i
samples earlier in the shift, which I had done.
I had drawn the i
9l samples somewhere around between 2 and 3:00, I don't remember exactly what they were and they showed nothing out of the ordinary, at that 11:
time.
And this was also for the Unit 2 reactor building entry, just 12!
like we do RMA2 in Unit 1.
It's a routine type thing done every 13l nignt.
In the process of drawing, of taking the charcoal, ok.?y, off i
14i the HPR 227, I closed the, I shut the pump down which I normally do, 15i to change the filters, the iodine particulate filter on 227, well when 16i I cracked the thumb screws on the charcoal holder, the holder flew out i
into my hand under an extreme amount of pre'ssure and actually blew 18; water out all over my arm and my pantlegs.
I jammed the filter 19:
holder right back into the monitor and observed that the ga;ges, that 20!
they were full of water.
So I said to Dick, I said you know about 21i this problem.
Dick said well, you know, he wanted us to prepare, you 22I know, prepare some respirators or some Scott airpacks and wet suits to 23 go into the reactor building that they felt they had blew the rupture 21 25l l
i 2003 044 i
1
8 disc on the RC drain tank.
And we were going to make an entry into lj 2
check what the problem was and how, you know, how bad the situation was in there.
Ok.
Well there was some discrepancy in what Pat and I, 3
4 and we were more or less trying to delay the action because it was getting close to quitting time, and you know, it's a situation where 5
it's 6:30 in the morning and you don't want to get too involved with 6,
g ing into the reactor building and ending up staying till 7:30 or 7
8:00 in the morning, you know.
But I said to Dick at that time, you 8
I know, I said Dick, you know, that building is full of steam.
This was 9
somewhere right around 6:30.
So we went over to Unit 1.
We were walking back over to Unit 1, and we were coming through the model room area into the Unit 1 fuel handling area, and we got just about to the 12l catwalk that crosses over the railroad tracks in the fuel handling area.
An RMG 4 went off.
There was a security guard sitting in front 14!
of RMG 4.
Tne room is locked.
It's a, it's the hot machine shop in Unit 1.
16!
17 MARSH:
Excuse me, that was RMG.
1St 19i JANOUSKI:
Right, RMG-4, its the area monitor for that area.
20i 21 MARSH:
OK Mike, one thing I would ask is that if we get into initials 22l or get into abbreviations or acronyms, for the girls that have to type 23I this, could we define it as we go along?
24 25l 2003 045 1
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JAN0USKI:
OK, sure.
She monitor went off, and it was rather unusual l{
2{
because the area that the monitor's in is a low radiation area, generally, i
background area.
The... at that point I chased the security guard, 3l j
told the security guard to leave, and demanded that he leave the area.
I said to Pat for him to go get an instrument, and I knew there was a 5
set of bolt cutters in the decon room which is right next to the hot 6
machine shop and so I ran in and got the bolt cutters.
Pat came out just about that time.
I cut the bolt or cut the lock off the bolt ana 8
9;:
threw it on the floor, stepped inside the area with,... Pat had come out with two R02's at that time.
Radiation levels at that point were 10t somewhere between 500 mR and 1 and one half R.
OK.
We weren't fully 11:
aware of what the situation was at that point expect that, you know, 12l I
it was unusual in that area.
First reaction in my mind was taat there 13!
was a problem in the Unit 1 building, because of the accessway directly beside the machine shop back to the reactor building hatch.
But upon i
15i investigation with the instruments, it just seemed that when we walked 16i away from underneath the sample lines in Unit 1, you know, the Unit 2 17!
sample lines where they come through the access area, that the levels 18!
dropped, which indicated that, you know, there was something in samples 191 lines.
Anyway, to jump back and refer back, somewhere during this 20!
period, because of my involvement in the Auxiliary Building with Pat 21l and Dick Dubiel, Tom Davis aend Dave Ziter were in the process of I
22l running a boron.
There was some question why they were asked to run 23l l
this boron, you know.
It's sort of out of the routine for this sort 2dl 25j i
2003 046 I
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{
10 li f thing, but somebody had called them and asked them to run a boron.
2 Dave Zeiter ran the boron and it came out in the 400 ppm range, which 3
is drasti ally low.
In a normal probably I don't know, 2000 ppm range, normal boron.
They did a backup sample just to be sure that gj there wasn't a problem there and the second analysis showed the same thing.
So there was an indication that there was some major problems 5
as far as in the core itself at that point.
Nobody came right out and 7
said, " hey, you know, we've got a reactor problem" you know.
It was g
I more or less, " hey we got a problem, we got high radiation levels in, g
you know, we don't know where they are coming from."
So Pat and I traced the sample lines back and its just, it was kind of unique that 9
everyplace you walked under the sample lines the rad levels were l
extremely high. We followed the sample lines back through the model
, 31 i
room the whole way through and back through the penetrations where 14 they went back in where we left them.
OK. So we ran over and I called 15i the Unit I shift foreman at that time, and I don't to be honest with 16!
you I don't truthfully remember who it was.
There's confusion in my mind because shift foremen at that time were on odd shifts.
I told the shift foreman that we had a high radiation problem in Unit 1, 19!
didn't exactly know for sure where.it was coming from but that they 20!
were extremely high.
At that point he announced that we had an emergency, 21 or somewhere right in with that span.
He sent the emergency teams to I
22l the ECS point, which is the Unit 1 HP lab at that point.
I took over 23 the HP area until one of my supervisors got there and replaced me.
24 2 55 l
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Establishing the phones and all that stuff, getting the communications 2
system set up for the ECS point.
At that point, after I was relieved, 3j I was relieved by Joe DeMan, one of my HP foreman.
On the control 4
point I proceeded to Unit 2, through the model room area down through Si the Unit 2 Auxiliary Building.
I got down there and by this time the 6
uylight shift had come in and there was no turnover or nobody even 7
thought about leaving at that point, but I went to Unit 2 and Karl Myers was the senior tech who had assumed the Unit 2 HP area, at that 8
point.
He at that time was counting an air sample that they had g
proceeded to take.
And just sitting there after he stuck it on the 10 detector, the particulate alone fu t stuck that en the detector.
I Somewhere around 30,000 counts, and it wasn't done counting, I told 121 I
Karl that, " hey it's time to get eve *ybody out of the Auxiliary Building."
131 14l:
At that point, I went back through the Auxiliary Building informed I
everybody in the Auxiliary Building to get out, and cleared the entire 15; Auxiliary Building, informed the Unit 2 controi room that we were 16;i evacuating the Auxiliary Building that we had a high activity problem 17!
and I. at that point went back over into Unit 1 and assumed my normal ISi duties again at Unit 1 as part of the emergency team.
And that's 19j basically what occurred, I wnuld say from midnight until approximately 20:
8:00 in the morning.
211 I
22l MARSH: When you going back and forth between Unit 1 and Unit 2, do 23l l
you recall coming across the some of the people working on the radwaste 241 l
panel down tnere?
25j 2003 048 I
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i 1l JAN0USKI:
The operators were there, yes.
l 2!
l 3f Do you recall any discussion about one of their monitors going MARSH:
4l i
5 JAN00 SKI:
No, there was no discussion at all.
I just told the operators to leave.
There was no discussion what soever.
I got to that point, 7
I told the operators that were there, there was Terry Daugherty and, g
y if I'm not mistaken, I can't. swear to it, it was either Dale Laudermilch
{
or George Cvijic, were the two auxiliary workers that were with him.
And I, I just told them, you know, to get out of the uxiliary Building, I
and run out of the Auxiliary Building, and which they did.
There was 12!
no discussion at all.
I wasn't there to pass the time of day with 131 them.
I wanted them out.
14!
l 15' MARSH:
I'm looking, going the other way that Daugherty had,... we 16i had some discussions with him and he had apparently had a monitor go 17j i
off a little bit prior to this.
18j 19f JANOUSKI:
He very well easily could have, I didn't take notice to 20; j
that monitor.
At that point, I wasn't worried about monitors.
21l 22l MARSH:
Yes, I was looking, whether he had called anything to your 23 attention, more than you calling it, discussing your findings with 2a him.
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2003 049 I'
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JAN0USq:
No.
He may have tried at that point, but because of the activity that was going on, it really never occurred to us to even 2
w try about that, at that point.
Our concern at that point was to try 3
to get everybody that we knew was in the Auxiliary Building out.
i Si j
YUHAS:
Let's go back now.
You were talking about tne standard procedure 01 I
on a reactor trip.
Does the standard procedure involve putting the RC 7l letdown sample on recirc?
9 JANOUSKI:
Y~es, it does.
I 11{
l YUHAS:
OK.
12:
I 131 JANOUSKI:
Oh, let me clarify that.
If we have a trip or any run back 14!
or increase in power of greater than 15 percent, we do routinely an 15!
isotopic iodine in both Units, and it's done in a time period of 2 to 16i 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> after the trip.
Condant.cr vacuu.n is done, it has to be done 17 within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of a trip by out lech Specs.
So it's a routine type 18!
thing as far as a gamma scan goes, it's not routine for a baron, 191 l
somebody must have requested a boron.
But under normal conditions, we 20' don't do a boron on a trip.
21f i
22 YUHAS:
So as far as you know, Davis and Zeiter put an RC letdown 23 sample on recirc right?
24 25 2003 050 i
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JAN0USKI:
Right.
They put...
1.f 2;
3 YUHAS:
How long do you normally let a recirc?
4
_i JAN0USKI:
Ah, 40 minutes to 60 minutes.
- I 61 4
YUHAS:
So you wouldn't have expected they would have drawn a sample 7l before 5:00 then, is that true?
8l si i
JAN0USKI:
No.
That's right.
10j t
11:
YUHAS:
OK.
Did they tell you, you stated that the sample to be drawn 12; i
was for gross iodine.
14i JAN0USKI:
Right.
15; 16i i
YUHAS:
O k.
Did they give you any results of the initial gross iodine?
17l i
18!
JANOUSKI:
Ah, not to my recollection.
191 20i l
YUHAS:
OK, fine.
21!
22 JANOUSKI:
... Which isn't out of the ordinary anyway.
23 24l 25!
2003 nSi i,
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YUHAS:
OK.
1 l
2!
JAN0USKI:
I mean, unless, you know, it had been...
Well, the problem 3
4j with that is, see, you draw it for iodine okay, you recirc it for an 5l hour, you draw the sample.
Just to count the sample and get it through ur Ge(Li) unit takes another hour or better.
So you're really talking 6
J in the range of 6 to 6:30 before you get any rest.ts at all, OK.
And
/l the situation here was that Donnachie had already counted, had already g
started counting the condenser vacuum sample on the, off the gas 91 monitor OK.
And so there you're really your talking in the range of 11l 7, 7:30 before we would have gotten it anyway.
l 12l 13l YUHAS:
OK.
Apparently Dubiel was with you when you went to change I
out the sample on HPR 227 14:
15; JANOUSKI:
He was in the lab area, he wasn't directly right with me at the time.
17i 18; YUHAS:
OK.
I lJt 20{!
JANGUSKI:
But he was right around the corner in the HP lab.
21l I
22l YUHAS:
That sample is located on the 305 elevation of the Auxiliary 23 Building, correct?
24 25i
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16 1l JAN0USKI:
Right, south end.
2, YUHAS:
OK.
Did you have a survey meter with you when you went?
3, 4!
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JANOUSKI:
No I didn't.
-l 61 YUHAS:
... To pull that off.
I 8i JAN0USKI:
No I didn't.
Because the area that it's in normally is a g
Very ICW radiation level.
l 1 11 YUHAS:
OK.
12:
i 13!
14l1 JAN0USKI:
It's not, you know, its not normally high.
15; YUHAS:
Can you give us an idea of relative force when you opened the lo_!
thumb screw on the charcoal cartridge.
Did you, did it blow it out ten feet or 2 feet or...
18!
19l JANOUSKI:
No no.
Well, I was standing in front of it.
I,... more 20j or less you know, it was... I,... on the tape I can' t really describe 21i i t.
You know, it was like my hand was approximately 8 to 10 inches 22,'
j away.
OK.
I more or less, I thumb screwed it and it came out and I 23 caught it.
It was like it just "phenmed" right out on my hand.
And 24!
I 25!
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2003 053
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i lj then the water came ou with it.
My hand was contaminated and my arm 2
was contaminated and or:2 pantleg was contaminated very slightly.
3!
YUHAS:
OK.
Now, did you jam...
4; Si I
JANOUSKI:
I just threw it right back in and threw the thumb screws Si 7l right back on.
I didn't change the the charcoal or anything at that point, because th-air was really blowing out of the monitor.
g 9!
YUHAS:
Has this ever happened to you before?
10, 11; JAN0USKI:
No (sigh).
No.
13j YUHAS:
OK.
And you informed Dubiel?
14 15:
JAN0USKI:
Right, I informed Dick at that point.
17!
i YUHAS:
Did you inform the Unit 2 control room?
l 18i 19i JAN0USKI:
No I didn't.
Because they were already aware at this point q
that there was a problem.
21P i
22l YUHAS:
OK, time wise this is somewhere around 6:30 in the morning?
24j 25!
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lj JANOUSKI:
Yes, I would say somewhere between, yeah, quarter after 6, 2
6:30, somewhere around there.
31 i
4j YUHAS:
Ok, did you go anywhere else in the Auxiliary Building at that i
gj time?
6l JAN0USKI:
No, not between, not between the hours of 0001 and I would 7
say probably 0800 o' clock somewhere around there.
8j 9I YUHAS:
OK.
Are the reactor coolant letdown line or sample lines, are O
these shielded as they pass through the model room and through the --
i 121 l
JAN00 SKI:
No.
13i 14!
YUHAS:
fuel handling area before they go to tha hot machine shcp?
16i i
JAN0USKI:
No.
17l 1Si YUHAS:
OK.
Are they shielded in the Unit 2 Auxiliary Building?
23t JAN0USKI:
No.
22 YUHAS:
Ok, so those lines are 3/8 inch stainless steel?
23 24 25!
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19 JAN00 SKI:
Right.
1; l
2l 1
YUHAS:
Unshielded?
3 4!
3j I
JAN0USKI:
Right.
6!.
YUHAS:
Ok, and they sit in the header, essentially?
/
8:
JANGUSKI:
Right.
91 4
10i YUHAS:
Was there an air monitor operating in the nuclear sample room?
11:
i 12l f
JAN0V$KI:
No, there wasn't.
13) t 14i YUHAS:
Is there supposed to be an air monitor?
15:
16:
i JANOUSKI:
Yes.
17!
ISI YUHAS:
Can you tell us why it,asn't cperating?
19i l
20!
JANOUSKI:
21l No.
22 YUHAS:
Has --
23 1
24!
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20 1.
JAN0USM:
It normally hasn't been for some reason, don't ask me why.
2; We have, I know why we don't like it running.
Because for one thing 3
they had been persistent about set points on it.
When we draw a 4!
primary sample in Unit 1.
OK, Unit 2's coelant,... of course the gl activity in it was so low prior to the incident that there was no, i
6l there was no xenon buildup or anything like that.
The only really thing we were seeing in the Unit 2, in the Unit 2 primary sample was 4
sodium-24.
But in Unit I we have a pretty high xenon, OK 'cause of e!
9l the life of the core.
And when we recirc the sample, and draw the h
4 liquid sample in Unit 1, the xenon builds up in the room, or in the 10h hood area and in the room, and the monitor goes off, and it continually
.q 12,j goes and it goes and it goes and it's sitting 6 feet 7.way you, it's blowing you out of the rocm.
Ok.
Why it's turned off, or who turns i
it off, I couldn't tell you that, 'cause I ieally don't know.
I know 14!
I've aever turned it off, I know I've wanted to turn it off many times
'cause its sitting there blowing my eardrums out.
But who actually 16::
-arns it off or why it was turned off, I couldn't tell you.
i 1Si YUHAS:
Do you know the exact sample point for that monitor?
Is it 19!
off the exhaust duct from the hood?
20 f
21f i
JAN005KI:
No, its a room sample, it draws it directly out of the 221 room.
23 24l l
25!
2003 057 i
{l.
i
(
21 i
l{
YUHAS:
OK, can you explain then why that, the monitor would go off, g
is it because the flow through the hood is inadequate or is it due to direct radiation from the building?
3 l
4j 5l JANOUSKI:
No, it's just that the, I would say more that the hood is i
6l inadequate for what we do, to be honest with you.
I 7!
YUHAS:
Have there been any other problems associated with the ventila-8 tion from that hood system from the nuclear sample?
g 10j JAN0USKI:
Well, it, you know, it if you let it go long enough it'll, 12;!
it sets every monitor in the place off in the fuel handling area, the i
Auxiliary Building.
And also in the control tower, 'cause it acts 13!
for, you know, it recircs through the controlled area there and then 14!
the next thing you know its up and its in the control room and its up 15:
to the control tower stack, the vents.
16i i
17!
l YUHAS:
Is this, has this problem been evaluated or worked on or 181 cured?
191 20!
JANOUSKI:
It's been discussed (laughter).
21l l
22l YUHAS:
How long has it been discussed?
23 24 l
JANGUSKI:
Two years maybe.
25; 2003 058 1
L I
i 22 1{
YUHAS:
Two years?
I 2(
3{
JAN0USKI:
Yeah.
4!
5!
YUHAS:
OK.
So the sample's still in recirc, you're coming back --
t 6i JANGUSKI:
Ah, you were saying, which sample is...?
8 YUHAS:
Unit 2 sample.
Unit 2 reactor coolant sample is still in recirc.
10i 11!
JAN0USKI:
Right.
12; I
13l YUHAS:
You're coming back with Donnachie?
14!
15i JAN0USKI:
Right, Donnachie and Dick Dubiel.
16i 17,'
YUHAS:
And you hear the local remote area alarm --
18:
19i JANOUSKI:
Right.
21!
YUHAS:
Go off.
Did you hear the shift supervisor from Unit 1 declare 22
a local radiation emergency?
23 24!
i 25!
2003 059 i
{
23 JAN0USKI:
He said something, Greg, and I really don't remember what 1
2 he said. You know, at that point I was just more concerned about 3
telling him that there was a major problem and, you know, to get get my teams down there at that point.
What he said over the announcement 4
gj I really didn't hear, I know there was an announcement but the verbatum w rds that came out of him I don't remember.
It was some emergency 6
[
that he said and I would assume that it was a, you know, site type of emergency or local,..
really it was a local emergency type situation.
9 YUHAS:
After you surveyed the area and reported these readings between 500 and 1.5 R/hr, were those reported to the Unit 1 control room?
11; 12 JAN0USKI:
Yes.
14!
YUHAS:
Or Unit 2?
15i l
164 JAN0USKI:
Unit 1.
17l 18!
YUHAS:
1.
Did you know it was Unit 2 sample lines?
19' 20!'
JAN0USKI:
At that point we weren't,
. we didn't know for sure until 21l
[
we started tracing them back through the model room.
Then we know it 22 was a sample point, but it really hadn't occurred to us, to Pat nor 23 myself, in dicussions that we've had that, hey, you know, it'r a 24!
j primary coolant sample.
25j I
l 2003 060 l
- l
f 24 1
YUHAS:
Yeah.
l 2!
JAN0USKI:
You know, we knew it was comming from someplace and we knew 3
4j it was a sample line but we weren't positive which one.
Because it 5
really didn't occur to us that this was on, that it was on recirc at 6l the time, we knew, you know, I mean, routinely we know its on but when 7
you get to that situation and you see something that's so out of the rdinary, you know, you're more concerned with where's it coming from, 8
why is it here, rather than, hey, you know, I've got a primary coolant g
sample on recirc and that's what's causing it, you know.
10 l
11l l
YUHAS:
Did you hear the site emergency declared or did you hear the 12:
radiation emergency signal sounded?
14i JAN0USKI:
I don't remember, Greg.
15!
16; YUHAS:
OK.
17 18; l
JANOUSKI:
I'll be honest, you know, I can't remember either one.
19!
20l
- 21l, YUHAS:
OK.
You apparently got the message somehow because you went to the ECS which is --
22f 23l JANOUSKI:
Oh, well, you see, I informed the shift foreman that, hey, 24f you know, here it was, and we've got a major problem here be m se 25!
2003 061 1
l
i i
i
(
25 1
1 we've got high rad level in Unit 1 and we don't know why. And at that 2
p int he made some announcement.
OK.
And at point I stayed at the 3
ECS getting my equipment ready to go for the, you know, for the teams, i
4l you know.
So there was some type of an emergency announced.
Ok.
l
'S YUHAS:
What is your normal responsbility in the ECS system?
g 7l 1
JAN0USKI:
In the ECS system, since I'm the senior, senior on shift, I 8
assume the position, actually my normal position would have been in g
the control room until Dick Dubiel or my immediate supervisor replaced 10 me.
Ok.
Dick was there at the time.
Ok.
So I just stayed at the l
ECS and, as I remember correctly, Dick did go to the control room.
13l YUHAS:
That would be Unit 2 Control Room, right?
14!
f IS!
JAN00 SKI:
No, the Unit 1 Control Rocm.
He assumes, because it was declared in Unit 1, because of the high rad levels, to be totally 17!
i honest with you, there was nothing as far as I know declared in Unit 2 ISi i
for quite a while.
I can't, I'm not... you know, I can't sit here 19i and quote a time or who made the announcement or why they made the 20!
i announcement because I don't know.
And I don't remember the time.
21!
OK.
What I do know, is that it was declared in Unit 1 because that's 22l l
where the high rad levels were found.
And as far as we were concerned, 23l at that point when it was declared the problem was a Unit 1 problem, 24l which very quickly from that point, it turned out that it wasn't, OK.
25j 2003 062
.1 e
26 f
g YUHAS:
So about how long before DeMan showed up?
2' i
JAN0USKI:
It was pretty close to 7:00.
3l 4!
YUHAS:
And what were DeMan's actions when he showed?
gj 6i JAN00 SKI:
He finished making sure that the people were there.
He 7
actually assumed control of the ECS.
8l 9i YUHAS:
Was Mulleavy there?
I 11; i
JANOUSKI:
Tom came in later on.
Now I, I can't remember the exact 12l l
time. Tom did come in.
131 14!
YUHAS:
When did ah Fred Hewe show up?
15i 16i i
JANOUSKI:
In Unit 1, I don't know when Fred showed up.
He was, I, 17:
... the first time I saw Fred he was in Unit 2, and then again I can't 18!
quote times.
191 20j YUHAS:
GK.
As you were standing in the Unit 1 ECS.
Was there more 21!
talk among people about getting another reactor coolant sample or 22 taking another sample since this one was apparently very lcw on boron 23 l
at this time?
24l 25' t
2003 063 i
r i
a 27 JANOUSKI:
No.
I didn't hear any talk of it.
y I
2' YUHAS:
Didn't hear any talk of it?
4l
_l JAN0USKI:
No.
- l 0
YUHAS:
Did you suit up shortly thereafter and go to Unit 2 Auxiliary 7
8l Building? Sometime around 6:30 to 7:30 to conduct a survey of the Aux Building?
9l 101 JAN0USKI:
Well, I didn't suit up.
I put a respirator on, and went to 11:
the Auxiliary Building, Ok, went back through the Auxiliary Building 12, to Unit 2.
This was sometime after 8:00.
Somebody, and I can't...
13 l
there was somebody that had gone through prior to me getting there and 14!
I don't remember who it was 15i i
16!
l YUHAS:
Would that have been DeMan?
17, t
191 JAN0USKI:
No, it wasn't DeMan.
It was one of the teu nicians.
It i
191 was either a technician or an operator who came through and said that 20l the, this was after 8:00.
Now the time periods here again, after 21f 8:00, its, you know, zoomey time, you know, and there was no times, 22I you know, I never locked at my watch, to be honest with you until by, 23 I don't think I looked at my watch again until 3:00 in the afternoon.
24i i
But somewhere after, between, I would guess between 8 and 9, but then 25 2003 064
28 1
again I can't be sure, I made probably, the initial trip into the 2l Auxiliary Building, into the basement.
Somebody mentioned to us that 3
the water was coming up in the Auxiliary Building basement drains, and that the floor was flooded. Who that individual was, I can't remember.
4 5
I tried to remember at the last interview, and I just, the name just doesn't come.
I made the, what I would guess, the initial run through 6
the basement, and there was significant amount of water at that point 7
n the floor.
8}
i 9!
YUHAS:
So when you made this initial run, were you wearing a cartridge type respirator?
11; i
121 l
JAN0USKI: Yes.
131 i
14:
YUHAS:
Okay, was that the iodine absorbing cartridge or just the 15!
standard particulate cartridge?
17!!
i JANOUSKI:
It was just the standard particulate cartridge.
18!
19!
YUHAS:
Okay, what type of survey instrument did you have with you?
20l 21l JANOUSKI:
A telector.
I 2 31 l
YUHAS:
Okay.
Can you briefly describe the type of radiation levels 24i l
that you found as you toured?
2 51-e i
l 2003 065 l
e l
l 29 JAN0USKI:
No.
It was no different.
1 2;
i 3j TUHAS:
Okay, so at 8:00 o' clock, or approximately 8:00 o' clock in the 4
morning...
5l 6l JAN00 SKI:
There was no significant change in the rad levels.
7 YUHAS:
Okay.
g 91 1gl JAN00 SKI:
.. Which, you know, in fact, it struck me odd when I went 11,;
down through there because I didn't put bcots on, you know.
Because I didn't, you know, they said the floor drains are backing up.
In Unit j
2 the floor drains back up every time they dump the boric acid mixed 13 i tank or the one tank that they use upstairs on the second floor.
When 14!
it drains out, it drains to the floor and for some reason it backs up on the first floor and the floor drains.
So really when the statement was made that the floor drains were backing up, it really didn't surprise me, at that point.
It didn't really mean anything to me.
18l When I got down there, it did, because there was a lot of water on the 19!
floor, but the water on the floor, at that point, wasn't hot.
20i i
21l YUHAS:
This was the 281 elevation?
22' l
23l JANOUSKI:
Right.
This is the basement level, right.
I mean, it was 24l around the drains.
It was mostly around the drains where the water 25; 2003 0%
i l
I
{
30 1l was laying.
But the water was up to a point already that it was on i
2 the floor pretty significantly.
In fact, I was walking on equipment 3
nd high areas to get by it, just to see approximately you know, dose 41 r te levels that I could see, and I really,... there was no change.
5:
I put a telector down against the water, almost had it in the water and the water wasn't hot.
6 7
YUHAS:
Okay.
After touring the Auxiliary Building and not finding g
any out of the oridinary re adings, what did you do?
g 10l t
JANOUSKI:
I returned back to Unit 1.
11!
12; j
YUHAS:
Okay.
And what was your next course of action?
13:
i 14!
JAN0USKI:
This is getting difficult now.
16!
i YUHAS:
Okay, let me try to refresh you.
About this time, someone was 17:
attempting to take a reactor coolant sample in the Unit 1.
This 181 caused an increase in radiation level, as first noted by the hand and 19t foot counters and the frisker.
Okay.
And then the Unit 1 ECS was 20!
l evacuated to Unit 2...
21l i
22 JANCUSKI:
Yes, that was quite a bit later in the morning.
23 24!
25l 2h 4
f 31 YUHAS:
Okay.
What did you do between your return from the Auxiliary 1
Building when this fiasco developed?
2 i
iil I
JAN0VSKI:
More or less just...
4 i
l Si YLHAS:
Werked at the ECS?
61 7
JAN0US4I:
Yeah.
Really.
g 9{
i YUHAS:
Were there any observations that stand out into your mind as 10,;
far as what was going on at the ECS at that period of time?
12l l
JANOUSKI:
Nothing really except the muster list and that sort of 131 thing.
Sometime later in the morning I know, I made the, I guess it 14!
was the initial, the very initial entry into the Auxiliary Building.
15i And by this time, you know, the airborne activity levels were extremely 16i high.
ISj YUHAS:
Okay. Who directed you to make that survey of the Auxiliary 19!
Building?
20[
21l JAN00 SKI:
Really nobody.
22l l
23 l
YUHAS:
Just decided to make it on your own?
24!
25!
QQO f
6 e
r 32 t
l 1{
JAN0USKI:
Yes.
2.
YUHAS:
Were you alone when you made that decision?
3 4l JAN00 SKI:
Yes.
5 Si I
YUHAS:
Okay.
Did you have a radio with you to communicate to?
7l 8
JAN0USKI:
No, I didn't.
91 1
10!
YUHAS:
What were you wearing?
11!
12' JAN0USKI:
Ah, I was in PC's and a Scott airpack.
f 14!
YUHAS:
Ok.
What type of dosimetry?
?
16:
i JAN0USKI:
I was carrying 3 ranges.
I carried a lcw range, 0-200mR, a 17!
medium range, 0-500mR, and high range of 0-5R.
18i 19i YUHAS:
OK.
And the type of instrument that you took?
20!
21l l
JAN0USKI:
Teletector.
22' 23l i
YUHAS:
OK.
If you would, describe that trip and what you found.
24!
First off, about what time, do you remember? Approximately what time 25 It was.
l 2003 "69 0
N 1
33 JAN0USKI:
Greg, it was some, it was before noon.
li 2
YUHAS:
Before they evacuated the ECS.
Or after they evacuated the 3
i 4l ECS?
l Si JANOUSKI:
I don't remember.
el 7!
YUHAS:
Ok, fine, go ahead.
8 9!
10l n
e asemen areas, h was in the ranges of one and a half to 2 R in the hallways.
11!
12!,
YUHAS:
What do they normally run?
13l 14!
l JANOUSKI:
Less than.1.
15l 15:
YUHAS:
O k.
So very dynamic increase.
18l JAN0USKI:
Oh yes, oh yes, oh yes.
In fact it was a very hurry type 19!
survey, it was, you know, very quick.
I didn't spend very little time at all in there.
Up on the 305 elevation, there wasn't a drastic 21{
change anywhere with the exception of the area near the makeup filters 22lI in the makeup tank cubicle, or the, I shouldn't say makeup filters, 23i j
... the purification demins (demineralizers) :nd the makeup tank.
24' This area was reading.. contact with the door was somewhere around 25i O
2 l
I
{
34 1!
3R or 4R at that point.
The hallway general area was about 1 and one 2l half R, 2 R, somewhere along there.
Back near the seal injection, or i
3j in the ah HPR-227, which is the reactor building monitor, Unit 2, the i
4 general area back in there had risen to just somewhere between 1 and Sj 2R.
It was kind of, it struck me kind of odd because the areas were basically rising at the same rate.
The high areas were all about the 6
same rate.
The 328 level really hadn't changed that significantly at 7
this point.
I mean, they were up but it was, I would say less than g
g; 100 mR in most of the areas that I checked.
It was a very quick
'Y'
^
'Y "9' /
10 11; 12l YUHAS:
To whom did you report your findings of this inspection tour?
13 JAN0USKI:
Ah, boy... I don't remember, Greg.
14!
15 YUHAS:
CK.
16:
17!
JANGUSKI:
It was one of the suoervisors.
181 19l YUHAS:
OK.
Did you fill out a survey report, write the numbers down 20l i
somewhere?
21l I
22l JAN0USKI:
I wrote them down on a piece of scratch paper that was 23l i
there in the HP area.
As far as an actual survey form, no.
I l
25l l
ali 9gQ3 l
a 35
(
y 00 you have any idea what happened to that survey note?
YUHAS:
2 JAN0USKI:
No I don't.
3 4!
gl YUHAS:
OK.
All right, so you returned,..
Did you find that you were crapped up after you got out of your PC's and frisked yourself?
6i I
7l JANOUSKI:
No.
No.
No.
8; 9f i
YUHAS:
OK, fine.
So you're back at the Unit 1 ECS station now, do 10l you remember what was going on there at that time?
11:
I 12l JANOUSKI:
Still just trying to get everything organized.
We were on the radios keeping track of what the air monitors were doing in Unit 1
(
and Unit 2.
Trying to get more or less some teams out on the site at 15:
specific areas.
Ok, we had, I know, I remember distinctly sending one 16i of the technicians, Dean Keesler, out to survey around the reactor 17' I
building in Unit 2, the outside perimeter of the reactor building and 18l certain fence locations.
We had a technician go to RML 7, which is 19t the liquid discharge point, and draw a sample there.
We had quite a 20l few guys just taking fence perimeter readings at that point.
OK.
21j j
Other than that, that's really, you know...
22l 23l YUHAS:
0o you remember supporting,.. it must have been Tom Thompson 24i in the collection of reactor coolant sample?
25!
30 "]
O
,1 i
I
l 1
36 lj JAN0USKI:
Yes I did.
Yeah, I that was time sometime in the morning, 2l somewhere around 10:00 we drew that sample.
3 1
j YUHAS:
Could you describe your recollections when you went to take 4
y that sample?
6i JAN00$KI:
Yeah, I was scared as hell!
(laughter) We had no idea at I
that point, we knew the levels were high.
Tom Thompson and myself 8!
discussed what we were going to do prior to entering the room.
We 9
knew the dose rates were high in the room because of, you know, what 6
10!
I we were seeing in the Auxiliary Building.
And I told Tom, I explained 11:
to Tom how I wanted the sample drawn.
We had some discussion as to 12!,
I what type of bottle we were going to use and how long we were going 13}
to, how much sample we were going to draw and this sort of thing.
And 14!
I finally what I t'ald Tom was look, you know, he wanted to set the hose 15:
down in the t.o'.tle and go through, flush it and all this stuff, and I j
told Tom, now "look, you know, let's turn this thing on, get it running, 17l and just take it and stick it in the bottle and just let it run in the 18[
bottle and just turn the valve off.
At that point, I put the teletector, 191 Tom held the sample line in the bottle and I held the teletector I 20; would scy within a foot of the actuai sample itself. The reading I got 21\\
was approximately, maybe a 50 or 100 m1 sample I can't remember 22l j
exactly the amount that we got it was it was significant, you know, it 23j l
was a couple of inches in the in a 250 ml poly bottle.
It was somewhere 24!l around 200R at that time, 6 inches away.
25:
2003 "13 n
i
I j
37 YUHAS:
Was Tom Thompson wearing extremity monitoring?
1.
2l' 3j JAN00 SKI:
I believe he was, Greg.
I can't swear to it but it seems to me that he was.
Sj
,I YUHAS:
OK, but y'ou do remember a dose rate of 200R per hour at six el
., i inches?
'l 8
JAN0USKI:
Yeah, I definitely remember that.
10 YUHAS:
Go ahead.
lli l
12l MARSH:
All right, we're at a break point here.
I'm going to break.
l The time is 12:26 and I'm reading 717 on the meter.
We'll take a 1M brief break.vhile I turn the cassette over.
Reading 718 on the meter 15.,
yet.
The time has turned to 12:27, that will be ah 0027 am.
And we 16!
are now in March, in May 3rd.
Greg you were asking a question I think 171 l
when we finished up.
18i 19!
YUHAS:
About how long did Thompson have his hands in close proximity 20:
to the sample or sample line?
21l l
22 JANGUSKI:
Two, three seconds.
23 e
241 25l l
qqch
'l 4 n
i
i l
l i
f 38 I
i gj YUHAS:
A short period of time.
I 2;
JAN0USKI:
Yeah, a very short period of time.
In fact, the only thing 3
he really touched was just enough to get the hose in the bottle and set it in the sink.
5 I
6!
YUHAS:
About how much exposure did Tompson occur?
/
I a!
JAN0USKI:
It was very,... we were very low.
9l 10[
YUHAS:
Ok, both of you?
11 i
12!
j JANOUSKI:
Yes.
131 14i YUHAS:
OK.
What did you do after you collected the sample in the 15i bottle?
16!
17!
l JANOUSKI:
We got out.
I ISI 19i YUHAS:
You did not carry tee sample?
20j 21, i
JANOUSKI:
No.
The sample bottle,... I that's one thing that we I
22l specifically, I specifically told Ten.
He wanted to get the bottle 23!
j out of the sink and, you know, put it someplace where it would be 24i' easil) accessible.
We decided, hey look, you know, we are not going 25i i
39 lj to do that, you know.
I mean this thing's got to be extremely hot.
2 Just let it sit in the sink, it's not gonna hurt it to sit in the sink with the hose at.4 everything right in it.
And so, and alls we really 3
I 4
did was we stuck it in the cattle, he sat it in the sink, it was a matter of 2 or 3 seconds.
I reached around, I took the dose rate and 5
what we had.
We turned around and I said "let's go Tom."
We threw 6i the valve shut on the panel, the motor operai.or valve on the panel, 7
and we got out.
Just left it sit in the sink In fact, it sat in g
gj there for 2 or 3 days.
[
10l YUHAS:
Well, that sample was not analyzed for 2 or 3 days?
11:
l 12!
l JAN0USKI:
Oh, it was at least 2 or 3 days.
I can't, I don't know, I 13!.
14l2 can't remember, if I'm not mistaken, it may have been one of the first i
samples that Ed Houser ran, if that's the one that he ran.
I'm even 15 completely positive if that's the one that he ran.
17!
YUHAS:
OK.
When you came out, was either yourself or Tom Thompson 18l contaminated?
19i 20; i
JAN00 SKI:
No.
21!
22 l
YUHAS:
Were you able to frisk yourselves?
231 l
24j 25i
[h I
P
1 I
l 40 I
lj JAN00 SKI:
Yea, there was no problem at all contamination wise.
l 2t YUHAS:
To your recollection, at what stage of the game did you start 3
4 lo sing control in Unit 1 ECS?
i 51 JANOUSKI:
Oh, boy.
It wasn't, it was somewhere I would guess around 6
11:00.
7 81 l
YUHAS:
Do you know what it was due to?
91 l
10[.
JAN0USKI:
High activity.
High airborne.
11:
1 121 YUHAS:
Do you know the source of the high airborne?
13l i
14!
JAN0USKI:
15:
16l I
YUHAS:
From Where?
17l 18l JANGUSKI:
Seemed like it was xenon anyway.
I'm not positive cause 191 you know the background on the Ge(Li) and everything went haywire.
20j 21 YUHAS:
From where, what was the source of xenon?
22 23 JAN0VSKI:
The conclusion we came to was it came from Cait 1, uh, from 24l Unit 2 because the model room was still open at that point.
Ok.
Of 25l 700 qN t
(
I i
t
{
41 l
ilj course the Auxiliary Building door was closed, the Fuel Handling door 2j was closed, so it, you know, the only place it could have been coming i
3j from was from Unit 2.
i 4!
YUHAS:
Did the Unit I control room advise you of of high radiations 5
n RMA 8 or RNA 4?
6 7
JANOUSKI:
Well, we were we were checking that constantly the whole 8
way through the morning.
That is, that's the way most of us, as g
senior tech,s use the monitors.
In other words, if I'm looking for a problem in Unit l's Auxiliary Building, I go to RMA 4 or RMA 6, RMA 8, and RMA 9.
And I check the trends on those monitors, the same way on RMA 13, which is a portable monitor in the Fuel Handling area on the 13l 3rd floor of the Auxiliary Building.
141 15i YUHAS:
Did you do that that morning? Check 13, or go to the panel and check them all?
17!
181 JAN00 SKI:
I called, well I was in constant contact with the control 19!
room, with the readout in the control room.
20?
21!
j YUHAS:
Ok.
What'd they tell you?
22l 23
_JAN0USKI:
That they were increasing.
24, 25!
90 0
'I
~
'l
l l
42 YUHAS:
Ok.
Do you know if this increase was coincident with the 1.
i securing of ventilation from Unit 2?
2; I
3 JAN0USKI:
No, I don't.
4l Si YUHAS:
You don't, you weren't aware that they secured ventilation 6i from Unit 2 Aux Building?
7 SI JAN0USKI:
No. We were never notified if they did, or when they did.
g 10l YUHAS:
O k.
During this period of several hours, are you aware that j
operators were making entries into the Unit 2 Auxiliary Buildir.g?
131 JAN0USKI:
They were told not to.
14!
i 15, YUHAS:
Ok.
Who were they told not to by?
17' I
JAN0USKI:
Me.
18!
19i YUHAS:
20l t
21l l
JANGUSKI:
I told the people at the control point cver in the 8, Unit 22l i
2 HP lab not to allow anybody to go in.
23 24!
l 25l 0'9 M
i 9
i I'.
43 YUHAS:
O k.
Was that contr.ol point in continuous attendance?
1.
i 2!
JAN0USKI:
Yes, it was.
3 4l sj YuHAS:
O k.
Gi 7l JAN0USKI:
Karl Meyers was the senior tech over there that day.
And i
he was there everytime that I was there, he was there.
8l 9!
YUHAS:
So when you evacuated the Unit 1 ECS, where did you move to?
10I I
1 11 i
JANOUSKI:
Unit 2 Control Room.
12l t
13i YUHAS:
Ok, about what time dic you get to the Unit 2 Control Room?
14!
15; JANOUSKI:
Oh boy, I don't remember, Greg.
15i 17l YUHAS:
Ok.
Can you describe the conditions in the Unit 2 control 18i room when you arrived there?
191 20!
JAN0USKI:
Busy (laughter).
Very busy.
21j l
22' YUHAS:
Two people working hard, or twenty people, or fourty people?
23 l
24!
i 25i
)
I 200')
^
f
}
i[
44 i
y{
JAN0USKI:
There was people everywhere.
2; YUHAS:
People everywhere?
3 4
JAN0USKI:
Yes.
5 l
6!
YUHAS:
Could you establish who was in control of the situation?
I 8!
JAN0USKI:
No, no, I couldn't.
I really was more concerned about gj 10l setting up the HP's, the HP area.
11!
YUHAS:
O k.
Why don't you tell us what you set up then?
Aq 13!
JAN0USKI: We set up the friskers, the RM 14 s.
We got our radios, we picked up our radios.
Myself and Tom Mulleavy I'm trying, I can't remember who the other foreman was there with us.
We were checking the Unit 2 charts and stuff like that.
I don' t know, Greg, it was i
pretty hectic.
IS{
19!
YUHAS:
When you when you went over to check the Unit 2 ARM panels, l
20 and effluent monitor panels, what was the condition of those at that 21l time?
22l i
23 JAN0USKI:
Th y were all either high or increasing very rapidly.
25!
QQb i
Ili I
i j
I f
j 45 YUHAS:
Ok.
Did you look at the containment dome monitor at that y
time?
2 3l i
JAN00 SKI:
No I didn't.
4 5l YUHAS:
OK, so you had several high alarms, some which may be pegged.
6 7
9 8
9l YUHAS:
Ok.
Now you set up a table and some friskers by the south 10 i
door?
+
11; I
12l i
JANOUSKI:
Right, it was there, when you ccme through the door it was 13l on the left-hand side as soon as you come in the control room.
14!
~
15i YUHAS:
Ok.
About how many HP types were around that table or estab-lished in that area?
171 18!
JAN0VSKI.
I would say probably 5 or 6.
19!
20l t
YUHAS:
O k.
What was Dubiel doing in the control room when you got 21!
i there?
22 23 JANOUSKI:
I don't...
24 25j "1 001 200q3
~
i
l
{
46 i
1l YUHAS:
Did you see him?
i 2l 1
3l JANOUSKI.
I didn't see him.
4l 5l YUHAS:
Ok.
About how long were you in the control room before you i
6j were required to go on respiratory protection?
7 8l JAN0USKI:
Quite a while.
In fact, I'm just trying to think, it gl vaguely seems to me but I wouldn't, I can't swear to it that,... Unit i
1 went into a respirators, Unit 1 control room entered respirators i
,0l 1
before Unit 2, as I remember.
I, you know,...
12f I
YUHAS:
I think that's correct.
13l 14!
JANOUSKI:
Yeah.
It'..
you know, it struck everybody kind of odd
'cause the problem's in Unit 2 and Unit I was in respirators.
17i YUHAS:
Yeah.
After you esta'blished the table there, did you establish a method of keeping track of who was going out to Aux Building or 19; anything like that? Was there a log created or...?
20j 21 JAMOUSKI:
Not really, because what they did was, if I'm not mistaken, 22 I vaguely remember them not tillowing anybody to go into the Auxiliary 23 Building at that point, except for some of the HP's.
Now I know I 24:
entered the Auxiliary Building a couple of times that day.
I don't 25l remember numbers and how long I was in or anything like that.
l 00 083 t
J 47
{
l YUHAS:
When you went in, did you go in alone?
l,i l
2' JAN0USKI:
Yas.
4; YUHAS:
Ok, were you, did you havs a. adic for contact?
i sh i
ei; f
JAN00 SKI:
No, no.
/d l
8
/
YUHAS:
Were you wearing a Scott airpack?
9 10l I
JAN0USKI:
Yes.
11:
i 12l YUHAS:
Ok.
Were you carrying two instruments or one?
131 14' JAN0USKI:
One.
15i f'
15j YUHAS:
Ok.
That was a teletactor?
i 17!
('
18j JAN00 SKI:
Right.
13f 20t YdHAS:
What di.d you fi'od_on these trips? Did conditions get progress-
'21 l
ively worse throughout the dry?
I 22l
. t. i s
I 2 *'
JAN04 SKI:
Yeah, yeah.
They were' increasing constantly 24}
25l l
003 n@
j L
^
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g
,]
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it l
48 YUHAS:
Ok, did you see doses which you had considered to be hazardous I
to health?
2l' 3!
4l JANOUSKI:
The first day?
i Sj I
YUHAS:
Yeah.
Si 7
i JAN00 SKI:
I would say yeah, I can say they were, yeah.
8' 91 i
YUHAS:
Do you know where basically where those were?
10 11' JAN0USKI:
Mostly around the the makeup tank area.
In the bleed tank 12l drea.
They were extremely high, the seal injection filter area.
13 14i Y !HAS:
Ok.
Who directed you to gc into the Auxiliary Building?
15; 16; JAN0USKI:
Nobody.
IS!
YUHAS:
Ok, Dubiel didn't or OPS guys didn't?
19' 20:
j JAN0USKI:
No, no.
21l l
I 22l YU:!AS:
Were there other HP te:hs that went in to run surveys?
23l 24; 25j i
I f
49 I
JANOUSKI:
Yeah, there wr.s another tech that was in with me every so i
l!
2:!
often and I can't remember who it is.
i f
3ij YUHAS:
Ok.
Did you make a survey form out when you came back?
9 l
Si i
JANOUSKI:
Yes I did.
Si i
7 YUHAS:
Ok, do you know what happened to those surveys?
9f
{
JAN0USKI:
They should have been in the files.
They should have been lo in the HP files.
11!
12l
[
YUHAS:
Ok.
We haven't been successful in locating those surveys.
131 l
14i JAN00 SKI:
I know, well the first day, now, you know, this is where I 15.'
get, this is where I get fuzzy, you know, the first day I spent so 16:
much time there, and then the second day I was there just as long or 17i l
longer.
Now I know, I myself did the first real, and that was the
, oi
^*
second day, I'm sure of that, because I lost my, I left my dosimeter ici
~~'
someplace.
And as it turned out, it was in my locker out in the
'0r 9
front.
And I really never thought to look for it because it's always 21 there, you know, and I didn't think to look at.
So I used my dosimeter i
i 2 28 l
reading.
But, I did the first, the initial hot survey of the Auxiliary 23[;
Building on the second day, myself.
I spend approximately, better
'4 9
i than an hour and a half in there, probaoly almost 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
I knew I 2"0 went through 5 air bottles on that trip.
l 20h
I i
[
50 l
YUHAS:
How much exposure did you incur?
7; 2;
3l JAN0USKI:
270 mR cn my dosimeter.
I i
4j YUHAS:
O k.
Let me clarify now, you said dosimeter twice.
Did you m
mean that you forget to wear your TLD badge?
Si i
7 JANOUSKI:
I meant my TLD badge.
g 9l
[
YUHAS:
Ok, right.
10i i
11.
l JAN0USKI:
That was in my locker in the front.
121 r
13i YUHAS:
Ok.
The 270 mR by pocket dosimeter end up on the exposure 14 printout?
15; 15:
JAN0USKI:
Yes it did.
17l 18:
YUHAS:
Ok.
19t 20I JANOUSKI:
Yeah, a few days later, like 20 days or something like 21l l
that, but it did show up finally 'cause I yelled out enough to get it 22l on there. They were showing 235 mR, a..d on my own, I kept a running 23' record of my own which I usually do when we run into outages and that 2 41 sort of thing because I want to know, you know, I take my dosimeter 25i 200')
r
51 1;
readings myself and keep track of them.
And I was up near 800 on my calculations and they were showing 235.
Then it went to 445 and I was 2
still showing almost 800 and something.
And finally Fred F got it 3
i straightened out and my exposure now, as far as I can tell, is correct.
i 5!
4 YUHAS:
Ok.
Did someone direct you to go in on Thursday to make those 6f
[
comprehensive surveys in the Auxiliary Building?
8}
JANOUSKI:
Well, nobody directed me to.
? made the statement to Tom Mulleavy that, hey look, you know, we've got a problem in here and we 10i dont' know what we got.
The longer we sit and wait to find out what 11!
we have in here, it's going to be longer till we go in.
It's time 12j j
somebody gets in there and gets a survey and I'm going to do it. So, 13 it was more or less my decision and he said, "well, you' re right, ok i
let's do it."
So what I did was, I took a survey sheet of each floor 15 and I took it with me.
I taped a pen to me and I took a teletector 1Gi with me.
There is a small operator's desk in the basement and I took, 17!
... what I did was, initially as I started, I came down the ladder on 181 the south end of the Auxiliary Building the stairwell.
I started at 19:
the south end of the basement and worked to the center, to where this 20t j
desk was.
At that point, I laid my paper, my servey sheet down, and I I
21i transcribed all my numbers that I can remember in my head, and the 22!
areas I couldn't remember or hadn't had a chance to check, I went and 23 l
checked leaving the sheet laying on this desk.
At that point, I 24i
[
kicked doors open, stayed behind the doors and walls and just poked 25i 2003
- I
52 the teletector around corners, and I really didn't do what I would y
f consider a very delicate type survey.
It was, I wanted to know what 2
was, when I opened the doors, what was there.
Ok, you know, I wasn't 3
about to step in and walk over to a pump and see, ok this pump is gl reading 100R, you know, it's time to leave.
You know, it was kick a door open, stay behind the wall and receive as little bit of exposure 6j as I could possibly receive.
And, then I went to the other end and I j
worked the opposite way back to the center, until I got the whole Auxiliary Building done; 101 LUjj S:
About how,... you said it took you 5 bottles?
12, JAN00 SKI:
Five bottles of air.
13 14i i
YUHAS:
So that was, ummmmmm, roughly 100 minutes?
151 16I JAN0USKI:
Somewhere around there.
17!
i 18l YUHAS:
OK.
All this good survey data, where did it end up?
19[
201 JAN0USKI:
It was in the Unit 2 HP lab, because I used'it for, like, 2 21!
l days after that.
221 23 YUHAS:
Did this get thrown in a box on the floor, the infamous 24 survey box which no one seems to be able to locate?
25i l
I f
2003 t
8
.l l
[
53 JAN0USKI:
I don't know, it could have.
y i
2l YUHAS:
Ok.
3!
4l
[
JANOUSKI:
I know it was in the HP lab because I used it for, in fact, it wasn't left in the HP lab, it was there the first day for a couple 6i of hours and then... I'm sorry, the day I did the survey.
Then I took it to the Unit 1,
...er, to the Unit 2 control room and transcribed it on to sheat'. that we applied to the desks up there.
And I know i
91 i
those results were written on that sheet because I wrote most of them 10l on myself.
And I know the data sheets, the survey sheets, were in the 11; control room the following day, the third day.
I 13l l
YUHAS:
O k.
Could you briefly describe the magnitude of the findings?
14i f
15, JAN0USKI:
Oh...
16:
17l l
YUHAS:
Was it, for instance, let's start off in the basement, was the IS{
281 still flooded?
19i 20!
JANOUSKI:
Yes.
Well, there was water on the floor.
It wasn't flooded, 21l I can't say that the floor was completely flooded.
There were walkable 22l areas.
23 l f
24!
2~d 090 2003
i 54 i
I YUHAS:
O k.
What was the dose rate oa the water this time?
2:
i JAN0USKI:
Just guessing, I would say 50 to 60 mR.
31 l
4; YUHAS:
Ok, and like doors to the bleed tank?
g 6i JAN00 SKI:
(chuckle)...
Door to the bleed tank 'directly walking through the hallway to the bleed tank door, before the door was open, was 35 to 40R.
Kicked the door open...
Directly inside the door 9l without going around the wall shield, it was 300R.
10!
11!
YUHAS:
Ok.
Were there ar.y other very hot spots in the 281?
12l i
13l JANOUSKI:
Yeah, the seal injection filter was up around 5, 600 R 141 range.
15, 16i YUHAS:
Ok.
17!
1Si JANOUSKI:
The Makeup pumps, the 8 makeup pump was 100R inside the 19' door.
201
?
21!
YUHAS:
Ok.
22l t
23I JAN0USKI:
The reactor building spray Vault B,
.. this is south 24i l
vault, was 100 R for, some unknown reason.
I still haven't figured 25i
,aT nns e
t
55 l
that one out.
I think there's a pipe or something in there.
I found 1
2 quite a few streaming areas.
The A bleed tank was a couple hundred R i
3l inside the door.
The... up around the makeup tank it was contact i
with the door.
It was 40, 50 R or something like that.
4 5
YUHAS:
Now we're up to the 305?
6l l
7l eve.
ee as sueaming, I know, I found a sueamer 8l that was a 1000R.
g 10l 11;!
YUHAS:
Did you take any dose rate measurements by the letdown monitor, i
MUR 720? Or the cubicle that it's in?
12' l
13!
JAN0USKI:
No, not that I reme.aber.
14{
15l YUHAS:
Ok, was there anything else very impressive on the 305?
17; JAN0USKI:
Not really.
The thing that,... the one spot that really 18!
truly amazed me though, and I remember it distinctly more than any other area though I saw, in the next two days I saw four or 'ive other 20j 1000 R areas, was in the 281 level on the north end where the pit hole 21l is from the 305 level.
Ok.
For some unexplained reason that area, 22 the general hallways, ok, were relatively, what I what I call relatively 23l low, you know.
They were in 3 to 400 mR general area type range.
But 24 that area was up around 1,and a half to 2 and half R just in that Q3
'OI n
I
l l
l 56 I
area.
And, you know, I looked everyplace, everywhere around, and I 1
2j don't know why, I still don't know why.
It still amazes me, you know.
3 YUHAS:
Could you feel an air flow coming through that hole?
4' 5
JANGUSKI:
No, not anything unusual, no.
61 7
YUHAS:
It wouldn't be like an offgas path?
g i
91, JANOUSKI:
No.
No, I wouldn't think so.
Because there was nothing 10' significant on the 305 level where it was drawing from, you know.
That area up there was relatively, you know, it was like 100 mR or l
something like that.
But the basement, you know, I went over that 13!
I area extremely well, you know.
I spent more time in that area than I 14:
did anywhere.
That's what bothered me about that area, but yet, that Fea was hot.
And there's nothing there.
You know, I checked,... I put the open,... pulled the probe as far out, 13 foot.
I checked the I.
pipes all over the ceiling.
I checked penetrations in the walls.
You 18i know, everyplace but, you know, I still don't understand it.
19l 20!
YUHAS:
Did you take any readings around the makeup purification valve 21{
room outside?
22 23 JANOUSKI:
Makeup purification valve roon, let me clarify where that's 24!
at, is that the one on the 305 level?
i 25; l
2003
h.
{
57 i
l!
YUHAS:
Yes, the 305.
2 JAN0USKI:
Back behind the elevator?
3l 4l YUHAS:
Yes.
5l I
61 JANGUSKI:
Terry Dorrey and I, sometime on the second day, second or 7j 8j third day, I can't remember which day it was, we were asked to go back I
and check a door, or check a valve.
I don't remember what that valve i
9l l
number was,... MUV 105, seems to me like the valve number was...
10i l
1 11 YUHAS:
This is a bypass around...
12!
13l l
JAN0USKI:
Right, that's what it was, it was the bypass for the letdown.
14!
We were asked to do the job, ok, not knowing what the survey was at t
15i that point, you know, I was a little scared again and awful scared 16; those first couple days, let me tell ya (chuckle).
We went back, ok, 17!
walking back through the hallway, general area through the hallways, 181 is 15R.
19!
20!
YUHAS:
This is the chained area outside the makeup purification valve 21 l
room?
22l 23 JANOUSKI:
Well, through the hallway itself, back in through toward 24 the valve area.
25 l
t t
l l
ng tg 2bn3 I
l.
58 YUHAS:
Is the doors on the far end of that?
1 i
21 JAN0USKI:
Right.
The door read somewhere between 50 and 70 R at that 3
point and the door, in front of the door area.
Now I didn't take the q
gj contact reading right on the door at that point, but what we did do though is we tried to open that door.
Fortunately it was locked,..
i because we'd probably went in there,... Or at least started in if it 7!
had been unlocked 'cause Terry thought it was unlocked.
We checked 8l the valve, we opened the valve up I helped him open the valve and we got out.
That area wasn't as hot as some other o eas that I saw.
As it turned out it did get that hot though eventual'y.
11!
t 12!
YUHAS:
Yeah, did you find anything hot up on the 327?
13l i
14:
JAN0USK_I:
The only place that I found a hot spot was back near 15i HPR, in the area near HPR 219.
OK.
And I just dont remember off the 16:
I ha'd what that reading was.
I know there was a hot spot there.
It 17!
was a pipe, and it was pretty hot.
181 19 YUHAS:
Was it causing a 20, 30 mR/hr general area around the other 20 l
monitors there?
21l 22!
JAN0USKI:
Oh yeah, yeah.
General area around those monitors was up 23;j i
pretty high.
24!
25i e
3 1
1
t
{
59 YUHAS:
1.
So that could have caused those monitors to peg, say...
2!
l 3
JAN0USKI:
Oh yeah.
I 4!
5l YUHAS:
Via rather than just the air that they were monitoring?
61 I
JAN0USKI:
Yeah, oh yeah.
7 8l YUHAS:
OK, that, we're still on the 29th, which was Thursday, right?
g 101 1l JAN0USKI:
Right.
1 12',
YUHAS:
About how long did you work on Thursday?
I 141 JANOUSKI:
Oh...
I think, if I'm not mistaken, I only worked 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> 15ll that day.
It might have been 16 but I think it was only 12 that day.
le, i i
17!
YUHAS: Yuhas:
Ouring that tour did did you note that other persons ISI l
had gone into the Auxiliary Building?
19i 20!
l JAN0USKI:
No there was nobody in the Auxiliary Building at that 2 11 point.
22l 23 YUHAS:
Nobody had gone in there?
24l 25;'
l i
I i
n9 Q 2003
{
60 1!
JAN0USKI:
No.
I was the only person that had gone in since the first i
2l day, that I know of.
I 3
4l YUHAS:
You sure that Fuhrer, and ah
...?
5l 1
6j JAN0USKI:
Now, oh I'm sorry,..
7 Y'J"At J hn Felder, or...
8l 9l JAN0USKI:
I'm sorry, I might be wrong there.
Greg Hitz and Karl 10l gl Myers made an entry sometime.
I'm not sure if it was right after I
]
did that survey or right before I did that survey.
Sometime right before or after the night after I did that survey they made an entry 3
to take a sample of the floor water.
O k.
I don't remember exactly
- 8' 15 16:
YUHAS:
Was the doors to the Auxiliary Building blocked during these
,7l 1
first couple days?
18!
191 JANCUSKI:
No. no.
20[
i 21l YUHAS:
So, such that an individual could have gone in without you 22, I'
knowing about it?
23l i
24!
25i 4
t
1 V.
{
61 i.
li JAN0USKI:
They wouldn't have gotten by.
- Well,
'o because there was 2
somebody on the control point or right in that area all the time.
i 3i y
YUHAS:
O k.
On Friday the 30th what time did you come to work?
I 5;
_l JANOUSKI:
11:00 o' clock.
bl 7\\
YUHAS:
Ok, and what did you do on Friday?
g i
9j JAN00 SKI:
Here again I made a couple of entries in the Auxiliary
-l Building.
I changed a couple of monitors that day.
Tem Pyke and I 1
l made two or three trips in to change the filters and charcoals on the 12!
monitors.
It was 221A and 2228 we tried to change,... 228, 225, we 13i fixed something with 226, we were going to change 219... we changed the iodine and we went to change the particul' ate on 219 and the screen, 15.
the filter screen, the support screen wasn't there.
And the reason 16; that support screen wasn't there was that I had gone the first day, 17!
Dick Dubiel had said to me about changing.
227 particulate in 18:
tre charcoal and the day that the filter blew out in my hand.
And I 19!
re'iember going in upstairs that day because I said to him "well, we 20l need a screen, you know, I just want to get a sample of what's in the 21l l
building."
So I said to hi;7. "this thing doesn' t work", and we've 22l been,... this was another example were we had complained for months 23l l
about a problem with the monitor and it went totally ingnored.
24l i
25' 6
pon3 '98 l
t
[
62 i
1l YUHAS:
What monitor?
2 JANOUSKI:
227.
3!
4l YUHAS:
And what was the problem with it?
5 61 1
JAN00SK :
The filter holder, OK, on the monitor, the one that we 7
install and replace... the coupling where it fits together, the 6
filter sat on nothing.
In other words, I truthfully believe all along gg that we were getting bad numbers off of that, but it's a situation i
where you keep complaining, you keep complaining, yr,u keep complaining, 111 i
you get ignored all the time.
You know, it's like it costing them 10 12j I
cents to fix a, you know, what they consider a four dollar thing, but 13l it's only ten cents but you know it's the hassle of finally getting it done.
But all it is is a little screen that the filter sits on to 15!
keep it from sucking, you know.
There was time when we draw a 227 gas sample or a particulate sample, the filter'd be laying, like, upright in the holder or it would be sucked down in and only half the 18i filter would have been touched by air, you know,... but what do you, 19i do you...
20l 21l YUHAS:
Did you put in a machine or repair request?
22(
i 23l l
JANGUSKI:
Oh yeah, there was many work requests put in for..
24!
i 9h 2003 i
I l
t j
[
63 1
YUHAS:
Nc one seem interested in fixing it?
2' l
3-JAN0USKI:
You know, we told Tom Mulleavy and Fred about it a couple 4
of times a week, and you know, it's like..
I Sj
.f YUHAS:
OK, you were talking about going up to try to change 19 and 7
you found out the wire was missing or something...
8l JAN0USKI:
Right.
So all's I did was just change the iodine on it at g
that time.
And basically that's,... I made a couple more entries for 10l different things.
I don't remember what they were.
I made approximately
]
9 entries in the first 5 days, or something like that.
I 13l 14;i vuHAS:
What was your total exposure for the first few days?
15j JAN0USKI:
If I am not mistaken it was up near 1200, something like 16!
i that.
17l 4
18!
l YUHAS:
At any period of time were you appraised of 'the condition of 19l the Unit 2 reactor plant?
20!
l 21l JANOUSKI:
Was I appraised of it?
22!
I 23i YUHAS:
Did somebody make you aware, brief the people that work there 24j as to what was going on in the plant?
25i l
2003 100 I
a a
i
l 64 JAN0USKI:
No, no.
We had an idea of what was going on.
I knew we lj 2
had a real problem.
I knew tnat building was full of steam the first 3f day, you know, and those gages on 227 filled up with water and I 4{
wasn't about to go in that building for no money in the world.
I told ~
gj Dick that, you know.
Bob Marshall came down the first day and wanted.
6 a RWP to go in and check the RC drain tank rupture disk ano I said you 7
might as well take that thing and throw it away, you know, t,ecause i
g there wasn't enough money in the world to make me go in that building.
YUHAS:
OK.
10j I
11; JAN0USKJ:
I, you know, it scares me now.
I said to, I say to Pat i
every so often "it scares me now to think of how close I was to being 131 in there."
14l 15l YUHAS:
Before you had made an entry into the reactor I assumed you
, 6,!
1 I
would have looked at the ARM panels?
17!
18l JANOUSKI:
Oh yeah.
20' YUHAS:
And I think they would of probably clued you in that that 21i 22{,
would not have been an advisable thing to do.
231 JANGUSKI:
Well, the problem is, when it was intially menticned to us 2al l
l about going in, there was no indication of a problem except that they 25!
l 2003 101 l
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had blown the rupture disc, and for some reason the building pressure 2
had gone up.
OK.
We've blown the rupture disc in Unit 'I and we've 3
gone in and, of course, never found, had a problem.
And blowing a i
4j ruptured disc in the RC drain ta;1k isn't as scarey as a lot of people 5l think it is to us, you know, 'cause we've seen it happen and we've 6l been involved with a happening in Unit 1 and it's not that big of a 7
deal.
8!
gl YUHAS:
But wouldn't you consider a sticky electromatic relief to be 10, somewhat of a threat to your health and safety in a confined atmosphere?
lli h
JAN0USKI:
Well, I've sort of grown use to it, you know, it doesn't scare me.
(laughter)
~!
14!
YUHAS:
How long has the electromatic relief been leaking? More than a day, more than a week, more than a year?
17l JANOUSKI:
I don't know.
It's been awhile, I guess.
IS!
19!
YUHAS:
So you're aware that the plant has had a leaking, electromatic l
relief for sometime?
2D 1
22k JANOUSKI:
- Yeah, t's been mentioned.
I don't know that much about 22j it.
24!
25h
,B s
I
66 i
1l YUHAS:
OK.
How did the, your knowledge of what was happening in the 2:
plant compare to what you heard on the television, in the newspapers I
3l when you went home at night?
4!
Sj JAN00 SKI:
Well, it upset me, it really upset me.
6i 7l YUHAS:
Because you felt that the papers had more information than you i
8l did?
9I JAN0USKI:
No.
10l I
11; YUHAS:
Because they were all wrong, or what?
I 131 JANOUSKI:
They were wrong, you know, they were so blown out of parpor-
]
tion that, you know, it actually disgusted me.
You know, I was inter-viewed five or six times by reporters, or triad to be interviewed, you know.
And it just to a point where I got so,.. I didn't even want to listen to it.
I'd go for breakfast over in Middletown and just sitting in the bench ana not even be in a conversation, be sitting 19!
20l there eating and have it so disgust me to listen to the people who t
were sitting in the bench next to me not knowing a thing about what 22;;
they were talking about, sitting there, you know, cutting us down, and I
I just got to a point where I just started getting up and leaving, you 23l know I wouldn't even finish my breakfast.
You know, if the bureaucracy 24 and the politics would of stayed out of this thing it would have been, l
23!
i
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2M 4
9
j i
67 l
1l it v)uidn't been as blowed out of porportion as it really was, and I 2
still think it's blowed out of proportion.
I think, sure, we,...
l 3f like I told some of these people, we have a major problem here.
There 4j is no ifs, ands and bitt:, about it, it's no joking matter.
And I'm 5
scared somebody's going to get killed one of these days in there.
Si YUHAS:
7 Why would you say something like that?
8 JAN0USKI:
Just,.. the inexperience of the people, scme of the g
1 pe pie that we have here.
10 lli
'YUHAS:
Can you amplify,... are these inexperienced people in positions i
of authority, such that a bad decision could injure or affect someone 13t else?
14!
15 JANOUSKI:
Well, not so much, I should clarify that.
Not so much that they.are inexperienced.
I am afraid they're... certain people are to
- /l rammy.
19j YUHAS:.I don't understand the word.
20' 21!
JAN0USKI:
They get over-anxious.
They're more concerned with something i
that's sort of meaningless that they are something that's significantly 23l I
worthwhile.
24j i Olk 25;'
2003 t
8
i
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68 1-YUHAS:
Can you give us an example of what you are talking about?
l 2!
i 3
JAN0USKI:
Yeah, continuously drawing the primary c;olant sample that 4l we've been drawing, i
5' i
YUHAS:
OK, your talking since the event.
6i I
7 8l JAN00 SKI:
Yes.
9!
YUHAS:
Who is requesting these primary coolant samples?
10 1L JAN0USKI:
I wish I knew, I liked to kick his teeth in.
I 13l YUHAS:
A nebulous "they want a primary coolant sample, you do it" 1m,,
"9 15i 16i JAN0USKI:
Yeah.
17l 181 YUHAS:
OK.
Are you given adequate time to take reasonable precautions 19!
when you collect the sampi.es?
20:
21l JAN0USKI:
Oh yeah, oh yeah.
And they've got it down to an art now, I
but, you know, it's just...
23l l
2 41 l
25; QOO
[
i f
69 1
JAN0USKI:
Honestly? Are you referring to our general employee training?
i 2l t
3{
YUHAS:
No, No, I am not referring to your general employee training i
4f at all, that's a 10 CFR 19 training.
I am talking Health Physics 3l training for Health Physics technicians in responsible positions l i
Gi 7!
JANOUSKI:
2 years?
... try 7.
8 YUHAS:
g How many formal classroom lectures in Health Physics relative 10l matters have been provided to you in the last 5 years?
i 11!
JANOUSKI:
5 years? None.
l 131 YUHAS:
How many times does the licensee given you either a written or 14;:
an ral examination to establish the viability of your Health Physics 15 knowledge?
lo,.
17' i
JAN00 SKI: When I got my job.
,8!
1 191 YUHAS:
That was seven years ago?
,0 !
4 i
21l JAN0USKI:
Five years ago.
I 23l l
YUHAS:
Five years ago.
Does the licensee give you a written examina-24:
tion or a demonstration of practical factors shen you're advanced from 25i 1
a junior to a senior?
I 7003
'Q3 s
i h
i
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70 l
11 JAN0USKI:
Yeah.
I 2t t
3' YUHAS:
Rad Chem Tech 4i
~
5l JAN0USKI:
Yeah.
Si 7l YUHAS:
How long have you been a senior Rad Chem Tech?
8 gj JAN0USKI:
Four years.
10J 11!
YUHAS:
Four years, so that was the last time that you hac any formal 12' i
13l 3;
JAN00 SKI:
Yeah, in fact I didn't have the test then.
15i YUHAS:
You did not have the test then, why not?
6i 17l JAN0USKI:
Because I was one of the orignal Techs.
g 19!
YUHAS:
Oh, okay and you were granfather claused at the time.
i 21l JANGUSKI:
Yeah...
Let me clarify something to you, OK if I may.
You 22' know, like I said, you know, I've learned more from contractors coming on this site and working with these guys, just like the use of beta 24l dose, the use of the MPC hours, the MPC hours were nonexistent'before
- 25i, 2003
'O
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I
t 71 i
1 this happened for us.
I didn't know what an MPC hour was.
I had 2
heard of it.
We have a procedure to use it, but, you know, we were 3
never really taught to use it.
I requested many times, you know, 4
" hey, give us the opportunity to go to another plant, you know, let gj three or four of us go, one to one, maybe to Oyster Creek, or and the.n i
6 the next three or four guys go to, you know, one of the others, whatever, i
7l you know.
Give us the opportunity to go and see what other places are 8
during and let us learn something about." And it always came down to gj one thing, they didn't want to spend the money.
10l YUHAS:
Let me ask a couple of questions then.
Please don't feel
'embarrased I'm going to ask you just a few technical questions to get an idea f understanding of Health Physics.
You appear to use the 3
teletector more than other instrument. Were you aware of the major is topes that would of been expected to be present during the early 15 phases of this incident? Do you know what isotopes were the major 6i ones?
17!
i 18; JAN0USKI:
Yeah.
19i 20j YUHAS:
Ok, what were they?
22 l
JAN0USKI:
23l 24 i
2S t
i
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{
72 i
I 1:
YUHAS:
Do you know what isotope of xenon?
2!
i 3l JAN0USKI:
Xenon 133.
4l Sj YUHAS:
Do you know the energy of admission is from that?
Si
,f JAN0USKI:
Yes, it's about 80 Kev.
/
i al YUHAS:
OK, how does your teletector respond?
g 10I i
JANOUSKI-
,1::
On any beta it's low, it's probably only got a 15% efficiency a.
on a low energy beta.
13 YUHAS:
OK.
81 Kev, is that a beta or a gamma?
15!
JAN0USKI:
It's a beta.
Xenon does have a gamma, it's a very weak gamma though.
171 181 YUHAS:
OK.
I am a little concerned about your comments about training.
191 I think that...
20 21l JAN0USKI:
I've been a little concerned about them for a long time.
22' We have a training week, we went to a six shift rotation and we've 23 l
been, the senior techs have been on anywhere from a eight shift rotation 24j to a six shift rotation.
Our sixth week of our rotation is a training 2sj 1003 zgg i
I I
1 I
I f
73 l
11 shift, is a training week and we're scheduled, and you look at our 2{
schedules and you can go back over the last three years and look at i
3 our schedules and it says training.
You know... I haven't seen a 4l lick of training in three years.
Si l
YUriAS: What do you do in that training week?
6 7!
JAN0USKI:
We work.
g 9i YUHAS:
Let me ask you a qu3stion.
When was the last time you actually O!
collected an air sample and counted it on a SAM 2 instrument?
i 12!
l JANOUSKI:
I don't know how to run a SAM 2 instrument, I have never 131 been formerly trained on a SAM 2 instrument.
15, YUHAS:
Aren't you part of the emergency team?
le,,:
17!
e'n.<0 V S KI :
Yes, I am.
181 19!
YUHAS:
Isn't the SAM 2 instrument an integral part of the emergency 20t l
i team?
21i 22 JAN0USKI:
I had,... I had, prior to our last emerger.cy drill practice, 23l j
our last emergency drill, which was back in Octcber, November, somewhere, 24l i
I had probably a fifteen minute course on the use of a SAM 2.
25l 2003 \\O l
Q
f
(
74 YUHAS:
Did that course afford you the opportunity to actcally count a li 2
sample yourself?
I 3i JAN00 SKI:
No.
4 51 YUHAS:
So that was a demonstration watching someone else do it.
6 7l 9
8 91 y ur e ng me y u n
ave any conf Mence that you 10 could use a SAM 2 in a brief case...
11; 12!
JAN0USKI:
If I didn't have a procedure sitting there and staring me 13l in the face, I couldn't run a SAM 2.
I'm still,... you know, I could j
go up there and push a start button and a stop button and set the time 1a:
on it, and that's the only thing I know about.
17:
i YUHAS:
Are you familiar with the Eberline Pic 6A?
ISl 19l JAN0USKI:
Yes.
20; 2 11 YUHAS:
Tell me a little bit how to take a beta dose with that instru-22l ment.
23l 24!
i 25!
2003 '1\\
4 i
t
{
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l lj JAN00 SKI:
A beta. dose?
- I 2!
YUHAS:
Yeah.
3 41 JAN00 SKI:
Well, you've got a beta windowf 9nM ycu do is you take',3 5l reading with the window open, a reading witb tne winda closed, and e\\
6
_s 1
you do something with it to come uo with a factor.
'I, you know, I 7
have,... thera again I use procedure for it, you nnob.
I can not sit 5ere,... I'll be totally honest with you, i can't sit here and tell yc u,.
That doesn't embarrass me, because I've been telling people for a long time.
You kn w, I sat here in the inst interview with this l
gentlemen and the cthar gentlemen that,'as with him and they asked me 12t I
on a scale of 1 to 10 what do I feel I.im ac '.d f.echnician and I told 13l them a 1, as I renember.
I can be totally horief*. with you.
I cz.n be 14!>
the best tech, the Dest practica~l technician in this piant, but 15; because of the lack of training that I've had since I've been with 16i this company I'm probably the worst, or me of t:1e wo, s' thery wise.
17[
s il
.18 r j
YUHAS:
Let me ask you, is tdis a chroaic problem?
It %st the Rad 19!
Chem Techs training?
EW o
c 21l s
I JANGUSKI:
Mcs no it'5 thegwhole plant.
Our operators have been 22l l
screaming for years about' tr aining.
23l 1
24l.
I
,s 251 j
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76 YUHAS:
These are your licansed operators.
g I
2l JANOUSKI:
No, not the licensed operators.
4l MARSH:
If I wanted to find an operator who would be typical of that, 5
who would I look to?
61 7l 8
i 91 i
MARSH:
Yeah...
Your saying the operator have been screaming for 101 years. Who comes to mind? Who should I talk to to discuss this from 11l l
their point of view, without mentioning your name?
12i l
131 YUHAS:
How about Terry Daugherty?
i 15 JAN0USXI:
Well, the thing about,.. Terry is a good operator to talk 16' to, and he is a good operator.
But Terry shows an awful lot of initia-17l tive on his own.
Terry learns about his jcb because he wants to know 18i his job.
There is alot of guys like that.
I would like to be that j
191 but I don't have the time.
You know, like I told you, when I'm on 20; shift I work by myself, I am a man short.
I don't have the time to go 21!
and sit and look at procedures and read procedures and learn about the 9 91 instruments that I have and that sort of thing.
23 i
25l n
1 I
i
77 1
Mike, do you have any reason to believe that the training may YUHAS:
2l have been resonable for the problems on the secondary,.
the cause i
,1 for the turbines loss of heat, the turbine trip and everything? Do you think that the auxiliary rperators are not sufficiently trained that are over there running the plant, running the TOWDEX (polishing a
demineralizers) units?
i 7l JAN0USKI:
I really can't comment on that, Greg.
To be honest with i
you and fair to these people, I can't comment on that because I don't 9l l
know.
I don't how, what training those operators got on that system.
101 I know they had alot of problem.
11!
12; YUH\\S:
Were they on the same 6 shift?
1L JANOUSKI:
No, they just went to a six sh;ift rotation, they were on a 15; five shift rotation.
1 16l 17]
Yl'HAS:
Do you know that, during your training week, did they get 18!
trainino?
19i 20i j
JAN0USKI:
They didn't.have a training wees.
They just, until recently, 21l got a training week.
No, the operators have not had any formal training 22l for a long time.
23 24j 25!
y\\ h i
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t
(
78 l
If YUHAS:
These are the Auxiliary Operators?
2f i
31 JAN0USKI:
The Auxiliary Operators.
Right.
4!
YUHAS:
OK.
You mentioned just briefly that they've been having 5
6i problems on the secondary side.
Could you elaborate on that a little
,I bit?
'l al JAN0USKI:
Well, I know they've been having trouble with the TOWDEX or g
10l he alley wa er rea en system, ok.
And we Ne had ue chem techs r
from GPU Systems Lab up here overseeing and actually teaching these
]
guys how to regenerate this system.
When the system is running, in other words, when we had to plant up at 98% and running, the system 13 worked.
As far as I could tell it worked well, but how much work the 14i operators had to do to keep it running that well I couldn't tell you.
I really don't know.
I know that the GPU people were here 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a 17;j day for quite a long time trying to get it straighted out.
181 YUHAS:
Is that a system faul+, or the fact that the operators weren' t totally familiar with the systc..
20I 1
21l JANOUSKI:
No, I think, you know, I think that it is a design 22l problem as much as it is a lack of training.
You know, we haven't had 23 the problem in Unit I with the paldex that we have.
You know, that 24!
l system runs better than any system I've ever seen.
And Unit 2 system 7
251 i\\)
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79 l
1!
is just not designed to do what they want it to do as quickly as it should be.
2 3!
YUHAS: We are going to break the tape here.
~
Si i
MARSH:
The time is 1:10 and I'm reading 386 on the tape.
I'm going O!
to break at this point to put a new tape on.
The time is 1:11.
The 7
date is May 3.
And we are resuming the interview of Mike Janouski.
g 1
9!
"9 * "
"# " "9 #"
- 'PP* ""
10 11!
lack of training and its implications on the plant.
Let's switch now just briefly to supervision.
Could you give me your comments on both the supervision of rad chem techs and supervision of in the form of 13l upper level management.
15!
JANOUSKI:
Well, foreman wise, with good health physics background, we lo,,:
have a couple of nice guys HP wise, but nice guys don't make good foremen.
Tom Mulleavy, who is a second level foreman in our department, 18l is probably the most qualified HP that we have.
He knows his job, he 19' kncws health physics, he can rels.te to the guys and make them understand 20; l
what has to be done.
But, he is so bogged down at this point with 21!
paper work, that he's nothing more than a paper pusher now, and we 22l don't receive his expertise.
And really, letting him teach, you know, 23 having him teach us some of the gcod practical HP type work, we have 24l alot of guys who are who are glory hunters.
OK.
They have some 25; l
i l
%h j
I p
i 80 l
lj common sense of, you know, they have good common sense but, you know, 2
they don't trust people.
You know, th4y put on a good show but when 1
3j it comes down for me to actually go to those people and say, " hey 4l look, you know, I've got a problem, this is the problem such and such, Sf such and such, what do I do or what do you really recommend as far as such and such." Well, they give me their opinions.
They don't give 6
7j me a good health physics knowledge.
They give me their opinions, you know, and I don't trust them, I'll be totally honest with you.
That's g
why the jobs that I've done since the incident in that auxiliary building, I've done on my own.
You know, I don't ask, I don't ask my 10 HP foreman.
lli If I want to ask somebody, I ask Tom Mulleavy.
12' YUHAS:
Is Mulleavy involved in your training program at all?
131 i
14!
JAN00 SKI:
He's supposed to be.
He's supposed to be.
15; 16' YUHAS:
Well, from that I get the inference that he's not involved?
17; f
18!
JAN0USKI:
Not as much as he should be, because he's so bogged with 191 everything else.
20' 21 YUHAS:
N ahen you say bogged down, is this prior to the incident or 22!
l after the incident?
23 241
.5;
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l
i 1
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{
81 i
6 1
JAN0USKI:
No, this is prior to the incident.
This is since, oh I 1
2:
w uld say in the last year and a half, two years, a year and a half I would say that, you know, its become almost like he really isn't a 1
4j part of our department anymore.
I mean, we see him and we hear him once in a while, we see a memo from him but, he is not really involved 6l with what we do.
He comes back and he's one of the guys that discusses scheduling with us.
He's one of the guys that just sits down with mutual problems meeting with us.
He sits in the the grievance meetings 8!
l with us but he doesn't sit down and teach us HP.
91 10i f
YUHAS:
And you feel that the foreman aren't qualified teach HP?
1 11 12!
JANOUSKI:
I don't think the foreman are qualified to teach HP.
13l i
14l YUHAS:
OK.
What about Dubiel?
15; 16; JANGUSKI:
Dick doesn't know health physics.
He might theory-know it 17l t
i but he can't teach it.
l 181 l
19i YUHAS:
Is this because he's an inept teacher or bet m e he doesn't l
20' have a working understanding of practical health physics?
21l 6
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22' JAN00 SKI:
I don't think he has practical health physics experience.
23 24:
9
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25j QQO i
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(,
82 i
1 YUHAS:
Do you know if Mr. Dubiel worked at at power plant before l
here?
2 i
3!
JANOUSKI:
Dick Dubiel worked, in a shipyard someplace, as far as I 4
gj know.
I know he went to, I'm not even positive about that.
I don't 6
know Dick, I don't know Dick Dubiel's background that well.
7 YUHAS:
Does he interface with the* troops much?
8 9l 1gl JAN0VSKI:
Very little.
Very little other than to give us hell, you know.
11:
12!
YUHAS:
OK, so he's not involved in the training program either?
- 13l, 14!
JAN0USKI:
No.
15i 16; i
YUHAS:
OK.
17; 181 JANGUSKI:
OK, I don't think, during the Unit I refueling outage this 191 last time, I don't think in the six weeks we were down he was in the 20 reactor building, him or Tom, more than maybe twice.
21, 22'l YUHAS:
OK.
Do have any other comments that you want to relay relative 23!
i to the health physics?
24l6 25I I
l 2003 110
i l
1 1
l l
83 i
l l!
JANGUSKI:
No. not really.
l 2:
3j YUHAS:
OK, let's move on to general Met Ed management.
Do you have l
4j anything you'd like to say about that?
5!
JAN00 SKI:
Other than the fact that I think they're cheap.
I think 6
7j that they're more concerned, they're more concerned with, their stock holders than.
g 9l YUHAS:
OK.
Could you give me some specific examples of where for 10j instance, needed instrumentation like, Ge(Li) detector, has not got shields or something like this, something specific?
I 13!
14l JAN0USKI:
Well the fact that we have, we've been requesting instruments
,5.l for two years.
We've been telling these people that " hey we've got 1
inadequate instruments." The numbers are inadequate.
We have inadequate air samplers.
We've been r.aning with two impactors that, impactors 27 air samplers that are totally worthless for three years now.
18(.
19i YUHAS:.That's all you had was two?
21!
JAN0USKI:
Until, until I would say within the last seven or eight 22l l
months.
I mean that two operated, you know, I mean we had four or 23l i
five of them but they never operated right.
We would, at the time of 24i the Unit 1 outage, if I'm not mistaken, we had 50 some instruments i.n i
25!
4 2003 '20 1
l i
l 84 i
llj our stock, in our stock pile.
Forty some of them were in the shop for 2
repair, that didn't work.
Hey, there was many times, Greg, when we 1
3j had one instrument in the HP lab. Many times.
4!
Sj YUHAS:
Why weren't the instruments repairables? Because untrained people broke them or untrained people couldn't repair them?
5 71 JAN00 SKI:
No. They were, they had, we have qualified instrument men, g
OK? But, they have them doing so much that they never got to them.
g They just don't have the time.
It's not that they weren't experienced 10 enough and they don't know enough about them, it's just that they're i
spread so thin they don't have the time to work on them.
12!
131 14{
YUHAS:
Did you ever have to stop work because of unavailability of i
health physics instrumentation?
15, 16:
JANOUSKI:
Yeah, yeah.
Or held up a job until an instrument came i
17i back.
Not really stopped work.
Hey, there was many, there was a 18!
cc'aple times where we didn't do a survey or two because we couldn't 19' find an instrument that was not calibrated, cause we, as far as calibra-20l j
tion goes, our calibration have always been up to date, but we couldn't 21i i
find an instrument that worked.
In fact, during the Unit 1 refueling 22' outage we so were 50 short on instruments that we had some that were 23l bad on the times 100 scale, the high range scale.
Tom Mulleavy had 24I j
sacebody, and this really upset me, had them marked like six on seven 25j OnnT
'21 l
t i
I i
t 85 l
ilj f them, you know, the high range out of service on an E-520, so which i
2j means you're reading a maximum of 200 mR.
200 mR won't do ycu much 3
good when you're standing in a 1R field.
And, you know, how can I I
4l operate with an instrument like this? Oor take a teletector... and 3
go to, you know, I'm not to concerned when I'm standing on a 2R range.
Now I'm pretty, I'm still fairly confident when, you know, my own 6
.l basic common sense on a 2R range.
But when I flip from 2R range to
'l 50R range, and it doesn't do nothing, I get a little bit concerned.
g Or I go from a 50 range to a 1000 range and I don't see nothing, you g
know.
Those are the levels that I worry about, you know, they're the 101 levels that are going to cook me if I stay there to long and not
, 11 I
knowing what I'm doing, you know.
There been many times when came out 12(
of the field and I pulled guys out of a job because I had a teletector didn't work.
141 15i YUHAS:
Does that haopen frequently?
i 17!
JAN0USKI:
Oh yeah.
Alot.
IS!
19!
YUHAS:
Are you familiar with the exposures around, or Mr. Fuhrer's 20i i
exposure where his teletector crapped out when he and the other fellow 21; went in to make a tour of the aux building?
22 i
23!
JANOUSKI:
No I didn't hear the basics on that.
24!
25l 2003 122 4
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86 YUHAS:
Same situation?
2l JANOUSR:
Same situation.
4i
,y YUHAS:
They went in with an E520 teletector until it crapped out
-l i
61 l
7l JAN0USKI:
I could give you the best examples, OK.
For six months now or so, even prior to the incident, the Unit 2 reactor building, we 9f i
don't have an instrument that we can take in there that doesn't crap 10!
i out because of the humidity.
11:
I 12l YUHAS:
Is this for at power entries, right?
13!
1rj JANOUSKI:
Yeah, and we were doing it once a week.
15i 16; YUHAS:
How did you serve it?
17!
i 1S[
JANOUSKI:
Well, you know, if you lucked out and they had a decent, if 198 the humidity was decent in there I should say, you didn't have too 20' I
much trouble, you know, you'd find something that wouldn' t work..
21!
22 YUHAS:
Let me ask you a question?
23i l
24!
i 2s!
2003 '23 I
i
'l
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~
87 JAN0USKI:
An E520 would work most of the time.
lj 2!
i 3j YUHAS:
On the 28th they were preparing to send you into the reactor i
4j compartment when you know the humidity was definitely high.
What g
would you have used? Would you have gone in?
Si p
JAN0VSKI:
I don't really know.
You know, cause I, the last three time I went in I complained to these guys that " hey I don't, we don't 8
have an instrument that withstands the humidity."
I don't know.
I'd g
have probably taken a teletector with me knowing that, you know, not 10l thinking really, which is partially my fault, and get in there probably and as soon as I'd get in side dcor it would have crapped out and I'd have probably come out.
13l 14!
YUHAS:
What about the availability of pocket dosimeters and their 15:
f calibration? Do you have enough available
., are they nroperly
, D; J.
calibrated?
17!
1 13l JANOUSKI:
Under normal conditions, yean, we haven't had a problem.
19 In this type of a situation, yeah, we've had a real problem with it.
20l 21l YUHAS:
Let me ask you, how does your pocket dosimeter results, would 22l l
you care to keep track of, compare with your TLD badge results at the 23l l
end of the day?
24i 25l i2k 2003 i
i
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88 I
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JANOUSKI:
They read a little high which is what they're supposed to.
2f I would say they're within 20 percent.
I 31 4
4j YUHAS:
You're saying that the pocket dosimeter read higher than the Sj RDs?
j 6i 7{
JAN0USKI:
Yeah, yeah.
8 YUHAS:
OK, why do you think they should read high?
g l
10!
JAN0USKI:
Well, I don't know why they do, but they do.
I don't, like 12l I said, I don't understand the system on them and how they really, you know, what they're designed to do.
i 14' YUHAS:
Have you been given any training in the theory of operation of 15 either the thermoluminescent dosimetry or pocket ion chambers?
17!
I JANOUSKI:
No.
No, other than running the machine that counts them.
18i 19!
YUHAS:
OK.
One last series of questions.
Could you briefly describe 20i your interface with the NRC during the first three days and your 21 impressions of what they were doing and whether it helped or hindered 22' you?
23 1
24j 0003
'25 s
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89 i
lj JAN0USKI:
The first three days?
2!
l YUHAS:
Yeah.
3{
i 4!
cl JANGUSKI:
Not now.
I'd rather not comment now.
t i
6i 7j YUHAS:
Just the first three days is where?
8l gj JAN0USKI:
The first three days, the first couple times when I first i
didn't really understand what they were looking for, it upset me a 10, little l'it.
I thought they were trying to hound me into my work, you know, because I was, I felt, you know, I was as concerned with the
,,lj people on the outside of this place and also the people I work with as j
I was myself and, you know, I was concerned about when I had a job to do I didn't need the bullshit, you know.
I wanted to get in, get the job done and get out.
You know, it's an uncomfortable situation as it lo_.
was and it, and at first I had scme hard feelings but, like yourself l
17l and Ron Nimitz and, there was a couple other guys, Thomas, Mr. Thomas, 18; j
Tom Tongue, the guys sort of helped me out a little bit.
At my stand-191 point, I'm talking just strictly for myself, you know, it didn't 20:
bother me to have you you'uns around.
The questions the you'uns asked 21;;
sometimes I didn't understand, they stirred me a little bit cause I 22l l
thought you were trying to wheedle me or something or you know, set me 23l up.
OK.
I'm rather uncomfortable in that type of a situation.
- And, l
24l you know, after I realized then I started talking to you gt
,t}ghl,J I
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e
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90 ilj I kind of understood what you were trying to do.
Now I'm getting back 2
to the opinion that I had the first time when a few of these other i
3{
guys that are here that, you know, we have a job to do and there is a 4j certain,... you've got to draw the line at a certain point, it's OK i
c:l that you come in and you know, you have a job to do and we understand
~I g
that you have a job to do but we also have the feeling that we have to 7{
do our job.
And to follow it right down to the limit for every little g
thing, like if you have a truck come in to put a rope up in front of g'
the truck with a radiation sign on it and then have to take the rope b ck down to let the truck back out and you have an HP standing there.
10!
That sounded a little ridiculous to me.
When you people are fully g
aware of why or what that area is, you know, that sorta bothers me a I
little bit.
I had a run in with one of you people last night because 13!
of that.
141 15:
YUHAS:
Was the truck creating a field of more than a 100 mr per hour?
lo,,!
17!
JAN0USKI:
No.
18!
19i YUHAS:
Well, why is there a requirement to barricade it?
20!
21l JAN0USKI:
Well, the truck, ch, I'm sorry, say it again, maybe I 22' misunderstood.
23 24j 25!
I
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91 l
i YUHAS:
According to your technical specification you're only required 9
2; to barricade it if there is more than 100 milligrams per hour, right?
31 JANGUSKI:
Right. Right. Well, the truck was entering an area that
,. i was hi.gher that a certain point.
In other words, inside that area 3!
J there was a 100 mR area.
OK, the truck was parked in there, the 01 driver was out.of it, had gotten out.
The HP who was there, didn't put the rope back up because the truck, as soon as it was unloaded g
within a short period of time was going to come right back out.
The rope was laying there with the sign on the road and one of your people 10!
said, "Well, where's the rope? Where is the sign? Why isn't the sign 11!
I up?
I could've walked right in there and nobody would have said 12l I
anythi ng. " You know, this sort of bothers me, you know, this is, as 13l' far as I'm concerned as nitpicking.
You know, not only hindering us 14:
trying to do our job but then we've gotta sit there.and argue with you 15i to try and make you understand why we didn't do something, you know.
16; You' re actually defeating what we're trying to do and that's do our 17!
job.
You know, and I've been finding this out an awful lot the last ISi couple *ys, and then I get upset and then I get hostile and I don't 19!
like to get hostile, naw, I do like to get hostile.
But, you know, I 20 mean I like working with some of you guys, but then there's others 21:
that I can't take.
22!
23l
[
YUHAS:
Well, I think that's just the difference in people.
Bob, do 24i you have any other questions?
25i 0
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1
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92 i
MARSH:
tio, I don' t.
I'm just looking now it's 1:30 at this time and 1
2, I'm aware, Mike, that you've got to work again tomerrow morning so 3
even if se do come up with more stuff I think it would be better if we set it off to another day.
5; i
6l YUHAS:
I'd like to thank you for coming in in the middle of the night here.
It's hard enough staying awake out in the bushes.
We really do 7j appreciate your comments and the overall objectiveness of this investi-g gf gation as to find out what happened and to try and find ways to prevent f
it from happening again or trying to find ways to be better prepared 10, to cope with it and I think that your comments, especially with reference 11!
to training and qualifications on instruments and things like this, l
somewhere down the road, we can't promise you this week or next week, 13l but somewhere down the road I'm sure that you felleus will receive 14' more training, as will probably everybody else in the industry.
15:
f That's all I have and we really do thank you for coming in tonight, lo:
Mike.
17:
1 18i MARSH:
OK, the time is 1:28 and I'm reading 318 on the meter so at 19!
this time I'll also say thank you and we'll cut this tape off, 20!
21; I
22l I
23 29 25l 9..n 0 3 ' 29 2
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