ML19274G103
| ML19274G103 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 06/21/1979 |
| From: | Dan Collins, Shackleton O, Yuhas G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I), NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II), NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7908290645 | |
| Download: ML19274G103 (65) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA I
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1
In the Matter of:
i 2!
IE TMI INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW i
3I of Mr. Edwin C. Fuhrer Engineer III, Nuclear 4
Si 6l 7
8l Trailer #203 9l NRC Investigation Site TMI Nuclear Power Plant 1 01 Middletown, Pennsylvania ll!
Itay 2, 1979 12; (0 ate of Interview) 13 June 21. 1979 (Date Transcrip: Typed) 141 I
92, 93 15j (Tape Numoer(s))
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19i 20 21l NRC DERSONNEL:
22i l
Mr. Larry L. Jackson 23 fir. Douglas M. Collins vn=. Gregory P. Yuhas 241 Mr. Owen C. Shackleton 25 2002 152 1
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1l SHACKLETON:
This is an intem;3ew of Mr. Edwin C. Fuhrer.
Mr. Fuhrer 2
is an Engineer III, Nuclear, with the Metropolitan Edison Company, 3j assigned to the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant.
The time is i
4l now 3:45 p.m., May 2, 1979.
This interview is being conducted in 5
Trailer No. 203, which is parked just outside the south security gate 6f f the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant.
Present to conduct this interview are Mr. Larry, L. Jackson. Mr. Jackson is a Radiation 7
Spe ialist in Region II of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
In 8
I addition, present is Mr. Douglas M. Collins.
Mr. Collins is also a Radiation Specialist assigned to Region II of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory i
101 t
Commission.
Present also is Mr. Gregory P. Yuhas.
Mr. Yuhas is a 11; Radition Specialist assigned to Region I of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory i
Carmissivi.
My name is Owe C. Shackleton.
I'm an investigator 131 assigned to Region V of the O S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Just prior to starting this interviaw on a tape recording, I presented to 15!
Mr. Fuhrer a two page-document, prepared by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which sets forth the purpose a1d scope of this investiga-17l tion.
It identifies the authority by which the United States Nuclear 181 Regulatory Commission can conduct this investigation, and further 191 identifies the rights that Mr. Fuhrer has to refuse to be interviewed 20 or to supply a signed statement.
On the second and last page of thi 21!
document there are three questions.
Mr. Fuhrer answered all three questions in the affirmative.
At this time, to make this a matter of 23 record, I'm going to repeat these questions for Mr. Fuhrer.
Do you 24 understand all the information that was supplied in this two paged 1
25i document?
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FUHRER:
Yes, sir.
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SHACKLETON:
And do we, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 3t i
4j have your permission to tape this interview?
l 5
FUHRER:
Yes, sir.
6 7
SHACKLETON:
And, would you like a copy of the tape?
8 9
FUHRER:
Yes.
10l n;
SHACXlETON:
Alright, sir, that will be provided.
And now, Mr. Fuhrer, for the benefit of all the people who may take time to listen to this t
tape, would you please give us your background and experience in the 14!
nuclear field.
15!
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FUHRER:
17l My background in the nuclear field is almost...it is exclusively I
at Three Mile Island.
I have a bachlor's degree in Chemical Engineering 181 from Drexel.
I graduated from Drexel University in 1973, and I joined 19!
Metropolitan Edison at that time.
In the late winter of 1976, I was 201 assigned to cover part of the maintenance which was being done at 22 Three Mile Island during their first refueling outage.
At that time, that was my first exposure to Three Mile Island, and I covered shift 23 l
work on some of the corrective maintenance and new systems that were 24!
being installed after its first year of operation.
After the refueling 25j I
2002 154 i
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utage was over, I was promoted to Engineer II, Nuclear, and assigned i
2l permanently to the site.
My capacity at that time was in the general 1
3l liquid waste field, both radioactive and industrial wastes.
I, in that capacity, I worked on capital projects and day to day operations 4
in both of those areas.
In about, I guess, October of 1978 I was 5
promoted to Engineer III, Nuclear, and about the same time my duties 6l were directed almost entirely toward the radwaste field.
Around the 7
first of the year I picked up duties that included being the radwaste 8
coordinator of both Unit 1 and Unit 2.
How would you like me to g
elaborate on that?
10 11:
SHACKLETON:
That's fine and I think that gives everybody a good 12!
understanding of your background.
I'.'l now turn the interview over to the Radiation Specialists that are present.
14!
i 1Sj JACKSON:
Ed, if you would, I would like you to expand on what your duties as radwaste coordinator entail.
17l 18i FUHRER:
Okay.
In general, I follow the radwaste operation in both 19i Unit 1 and Unit 2.
The way the radwaste department, well, there is no 20l radwaste department.
What they've done is they've chosen an engineer, 21 l
in this case, me, to provide some coordination for radwaste between 22l the different departments that exist at Three Mile Island..
The radwaste 23 organization isn't very formal.
The operation departments of both 241' units actually perform day-to-day operations.
They turn the valves, 25 l
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they decide when certain tanks are going to be pumped from tank to 7
tank and when processes are to be started up.
I have some unofficial 2
input into that in that I can determine when, say for example, when 3
we'd start an evaporator because, say, a miscellaneous waste hold tank 4
r a miscellane us waste tank was becoming full, or I felt that that 5
was necessary to do that, if the operations department hadn't already chosen to do that.
Operations, in general, handler all of the liquid 7
waste up to the point where the evaporator bottoms have been dumped to the concentrated waste storage tank in each of the units.
At that
. point, radwaste becomes the responsibility of the Health Physics Department.
The Health Physics Supervisor has two radwaste foremen 11!
l who work for him, and their responsibilities are that of solid waste 12!
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handlers.
They're in charge of the workers that solidify the evaporator 13l i
bottoms and prepare trap shipments for disposal off site.
They also 141 l
prepare the solid waste shipments that solidify evaporator bottoms for 15i disposal.
Then, at that point, it becomes a totally health physics 16i i
responsibility in that the Health Physics Department is responsible 171 l
for surveying the containers prior to them leaving the site, preparing 18{
the shipping documents, the radioactive shipment records that go with 1SI the shipment on its way to whatever burial site it is that we're 20!
i currently using.
Normally, we use Barnwell, South Carolina.
The 211 other aspect in my job is that of evaluation of existing systems and 22 the back fit of equipment in order to increase the productivity and 23 efficiency of the radwaste equipment.
In that area I have been working 24 on two or three,,what I would consider, large projects that involve 25l l
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5 rsdwaste.
One was for a total back fit of our solidification equipment l!
in Unit 1.
The other is to put in a storage area on the Unit I heat 2
exchanger wall.
It was to be a total enclosed storage area so that we 3
41 could take the solidified materials and store them prior to shipment 5
so that we wouldn't have to have a truck waiting for the shipments to get it off site.
There isn't very much storage area existing in 5
either of the plants. One of the things that has kind of limited us 7
in Unit 2 has been the fact that they don't have their own misce _llaneous g
waste treatment system.
They've got some tankage to store the waste, 9[
i but all the waste had to be shipped, transported by pipe, to Unit 1 101 where it would go into the Unit 1 miscellaneous waste evaporator, and 12{
then concentrate it and then solidify it in the Unit 1 system.
So the I
two units are held together very tightly along those lines.
I also 13l acted as coordinator between the two units.
The two operations departments 14l are almost independent of eact other and there was some need to just 15i coordinate those two activities in order to make the best possible use l
of tank volumes and those types of things.
17l 18(
JACKSON:
Okay.
Getting back to, on the 28th now and starting to deal 191 more specifically with the incident, crn you go into how you were 20!
notified and what actions you took that morning?
i 21 22, FUHRER:
Yes, sir.
That morning I was in Reading, Pennsylvania, at 23l Gilbert Associates.
They're the architect engineering firm in Reading 24l and Metropolitan Edison uses them extensively for engineering design.
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They were working on the new solidification system that we were to 2l have installed in Unit 1.
And I :.ad gone to Reading to interface with 3
the Gilbert's people regarding the desigr, el this equipment.
At about 4
9:30, I was called at Gilbert Associates by a Met-Ed telephone operator Sj and asked to return to the plant.
No information at that time was 6l given, so I immediately called the plant and asked for my supervisor, Dir't Dubiel, Supervisor of Health Physics and Chemistry.
And he 7
indicated at that time that there was a primary to secondary leak in 8
Unit 2 and that I should return to the site.
No mention was given of gj magnitude of the problem--I was just asked to come back.
The possibility 10 of a primary to secondary leak, at that time, seemed to me quite I
natural for them to want to call in the Radwaste Engineer, because if 12!
I you continue to operate in that mode for any length of time your 131 secondary plant becomes contaminated to some extent, and that would 14!
indeed be a radwaste burden that I would have to deal with.
On the 15!
way back in the car I heard some more things on the news regarding 16,:
site evacuations and the declaration of a site emergency, and a general 17l emergency.
And I proceeded back to the site to come in and become 18!
part of the ECS team, which is my normal function during the emergency.
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21l SHACKLETON: Mr. Fuhrer, could you please identify what ECS stands I
for?
22I 23 FUHRER:
Emergency Control Station.
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1, SHACKLETON:
Thank you.
i 2
JACKSON:
Okay. When you arrived at the ECS, can you state who was 3
4l in charge and what your initial duties were?
5 FUHRER:
6{
Jim Seelinger, the normal Superintendent of Unit 1, was in charge, I think.
Its been a month now, I think that he's the person 7
that I first interfaced with.
It was either--I'm pretty sure that it 8
was Mr. Seelinger.
My first duties, my first official duties given to g
me by him was to act as a phone talker between the ECS and the Depart-10 ment of Environmental Resources.
In that capacity, I more or less just kept an open line and transferred messages to the Department of 12; i
Environmental Resources.
13l 14!
JACKSON:
Then, the Department of Environmental Resources is which 15i organization?
r 17 FUHRER:
It's the Pennsylvania...
1si 191 JACKSON:
Pennsylvania State?
20l 21 FUHRER:
The Pennsylv:nia State Department of Environmental Resources.
22 23l JACKSON:
Okay.
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COLLINS:
About what time did you take on your duties?
1 2!
FUHRER:
I arrived at the ECS about quarter of 11:00 and it was sometime 3
t 4l between 11:00 and 12:00 that I assumed those duties.
i 51 JACKSON:
When did you assume your...some radwaste responsibilities?
6 7
FUHRER:
In late 1976.
8 9l JACKSON:
I mean with respect to the incident...
10l 11;i FUHRER:
Oh, with regard to the incident?
12l 13 JACKSON:
Yeah, that day.
15i FUHRER:
I'd say about 2:00 to 2:30 in the afternoon of the 28th.
I 17l JACKSON:
Okay. When did you make initial entry into the auxiliary 18!
building?
19i 20l1 FUHRER:
In Unit 2?
21l 22 JACKSON:
Yes.
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FUHRER:
I didn't do that until, I guess, a day later.
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9 JACKSON:
So you made initial entry ca the 29th.
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21 FUHRER:
Yes.
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JACKSON:
Okay.
Can you discuss that entry a little bit, and state 5
what the purpose of the entry was, what conditions you found?
q 7
FUHRER:
I prefer to do this in chronological order.
Okay?
8 9
JACKSON:
- Okay, i
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FUHRER:
There were things I did do in Unit 1 that had some bearing on 12t the incident.
The evening of the 28th, as I assumed the radwaste duties, one of the things that I was concerned with was to remove the I
relatively large volume of preincident water that was in Unit 2 at the 15i time the incident occurred.
We had just come off of the Unit 1 refueling i
outage, and during that outage we generated a considerable amount of 17l l
radwaste.
Due to an unfortunate occurrence at the end of the refueling 18!
outage, in which a portion of the fuel transfer canal drained to the 19l l
Unit I reactor building sump the concentration of cobalt isotopes in 20i the miscellaneous waste was quite high, and our evaporator didn't do--
21 didn't perform according to it's design in removing these contaminants, 22 and so we were having a rather hard time getting rid of the water that 23 was on site prior to the incident, which was probably two or three 24 weeks prior to the inc.ident.
We were maintaining the level that was l
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in the plant but we weren't really getting ahead of it in a very expeditious manner.
So, when the incident occurred we had stored a 2
3 considerable amount of Unit 1 water in the storege tanks in Unit 1 and 4l also in the storage tanks in Unit 2.
When "
incident occurred this 5
caused the problem in that the water that originally came out of the reactor building, or came from the incident, ended up on the floor in 6
the auxiliary building rather than being put in tanks because the 7
tanks were already filled with water that had been there prior to the 8
incident froc Unit 2 and had been stored there from the Unit 1 outage.
y My first actions were to try to get that water moved to Unit 1.
Because the tankage from Unit I was already used up, my actions included pulgging or having the floor drains of the Unit 1 reactor coolant 12!
I bleed tank, were plugged with expandable pneumatic plugs.
And it took until about, I guess midnight that first night to get that accomplished.
I It was sometime in t hat time frame.
The next thing was to devise a 15i method to get the water in the Unit 1 tanks somehow on to that floor.
16i The normal piping system doesn't lend itself to that too readily.
So 17 i
what we did was we found a sample cor.nection.
We installed a hose on 18l the sample connection and brought it down the corridor of Unit 1 at 19!
the 281 elevation in the auxiliary building and into the reactor i
20l coolant bleed tank room and prepared to start filling the floor.
The 21!
capacity of the floor is approximately 20 thousand gallons for the 22 first 7 inches.
That was based on a calculation I had done of the 23 surface area of the floor.
I did that most of the first night and 241 i
then I went over to the Unit 2 to see if I could...I'd been relieved 25}
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f' rom my duties as the phone talker for the Department of Environmental 2j Resources relatively early.
And I then went over to Unit 2 to their 3
control room to speak with my supervisor, Dick Dubiel, to see if there 4
were any duties or any things that he would like me to perform.
I did that and I stayed at the Unit 2 control room for most of that 5
evening f 11 wing the action that was there, and also trying to coordi-6 7'
nate the implementation of my plans to put the water on the reactor Coolant bleed tank room floor.
Sometime during that evening or during gl that night, from midnight to, say 6:00, I guess, on the 29th, the floor had been plugged and sometime the next day we started filling the floor.
I can't remember exactly what time that is, but you would be able to find that by going back to the Unit 1 control room strip chart for the level in the miscellaneous waste storage tank.
On the 29th the tank level starts to go down rather drastically and that's 1 45 because they were dumping water in the floor, through the sample line.
151 That's pretty much what I had done during that first day.
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IT JACKSON:
Did you start transferring anything from Unit 2 to Unit 1 on 181 that first day?
19!
20 FUHRER:
1 Nould have to go back and refresh my memory by going through 21.
the logs.
I ve going through this a number of times.
I just can't 22[l remember exactly at what point we started that transfer.
During the 23J night, on the, I guess it was the 29th, the beginning of the day, at i
24 about 4:00 or 5:00 I assumed Dick Dubiel's duties of HP Coordinator 25!
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f r a short period of time.
He had sent his relief home, or his 2
supervisor of Health Physics home that night, sometime early in the 3
morning to get some sleep and the relief was to take place at 7:00 or 8:00.
And so, what I had volunteered to do was that, since it was 4
5 reasonably quiet at time and there weren't a lot of Health Physics actions going on, that I would cover for Mr. Dubiel and allow him to 6
7 g home and get some sleep... wait, I think I have that sequence wrong.
Tom Mulleavy, the Supervisor of Health Physics, was on shift and he 8
was in Unit 1.
I remained in Unit 2 so that Dubiel could go home and g
get some sleep and them come back sometime in the morning of the 29th.
10' I
I was told by him that the Health Physics Foreman, Pete Velez, would lli be in some time in that morning and he would relieve me, and that's, indeed, what happened.
After my relief sometime that morning, I guess I
it was around 9:00, I prepared to exit the plant and did, indeed, that 14) 15:
went home, caught a couple hours of sleep and returned to the plant.
l I'm trying to remember what time I returned to the plant.
It was 16i sometime the following afternoon.
It would have been, I think 5:00 or 171 I
something like that, 4:00-5:00, that I returned.
That would have been 18f 5:00 p.m. on the 29th.
At that time I was informed that Earl Showalter, 19{
the former Radwaste Engineer of Unit 2, and I would be assigned to 20 cover 12, back to back,12-to-12 shifts with myself going from 7 in 21, the evening to 7 in the morning and Showalter covering 7 in the morning 22 to 7 in the evening.
At that time I was informed that some of the 23 water had been transferred to-Unit 1, and that process was ongoing and 24 underway.
There was some concern when I returned to the plant that 25i i
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yl that they were in the 5 to 15 R/hr range in the area of the radwaste i
panel and those types of things.
There were conflicting reports at 2
that time as to the radiation levels.
We entered the reactor building 3
4j between 11:00, I mean the auxiliary building, excuse me, between 11:00 and 12:00 that night. We proceeded down the corridor on the 305 eleva-5 tion toward the radwaste panel, which is at the extreme north end of 6
the auxiliary building in 305 elevation.
To the best of my memory, I
the radiation levels in general were 150 to 200 mr/hr and that was 8l pretty consistent for that level of the auxiliary building in the main passage way.
We went in, I went in first to the miscellaneous waste hold tank to determine the radiation levels in that room and to 1 11 check to see whether or not the overflow from that tank had been used.
12l The room was dry, there was no evidence that water had overflowed from 13) the tank.
I attempted to determine whether or not the rupture disc 14f had been blown out by placing my gloved hand over the outlet of the 15!
overflow.
There appeared to be neither an inflow or an outflow of air 16i v; gas from the overflow.
That led me to believe that the rupture 17) disc was still intact.
The tank, the radiation levels inside that 18{
cubicle were not very much different from the background radiation 19i levels at that level with the auxiliary building.
One of the areas 20l that we had wanted to go through was the corridor outside of the 21(
makeup valve alley, on the 305 elevation.
Let me interject this... pro-22lI bably a personal error on my part was to continue with this investiga-23l l
tion even though our high range instrument, the teletector, failed 24l probably 5 to 10 minutes into the trip into the building.
Contrary to 25!
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all things you're taught regarding radiation safety, Mr. Showalter and 2
I continued on using the E-520 instrument that we had brought with us 3l in addition to the high range instrument.
We discussed it at the p int that we found that failure did to exist and we decided that we 4
5l w uld g s far as we could with what we had, and try to attempt to
[
stay away from areas where the instrument were to to pin at the high range.
I think high range on those instruments is 2/R.
We continued....at 7
the point that the high range instrument failed, we had not seen 8
anything very much greater than 500 mr/hr.
g 10l SHACKLETON:
We'll have to cut the tape at this time.
It is now 4:45 11:
I p.m. and we'll resume on another tape in just a minute. May 2, 1979.
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SHACKLETON:
This is a continuation of the interview of Mr. Edwin C.
14i 1
Fuhrer, Engineer III, Nuclear, with the Metropolitan Edison Company, 15l assigned to Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant.
The time is now i
4:17 p.m., May 2, 1979.
Mr. Fuhrer, if you would please, continue 17j 1
with your presentation on what transpired on your entry into the 18!
auxiliary building.
l 20l l
FUHRER:
From the miscellaneous waste hold tank and the radwastr 21l panel, Mr. Showalter and myself proceeded on the 305 elevation in the 22j auxiliary building toward the corridor outside of the makeup and 23 purification valve alley.
We entered a door adjacent to the so-called 2 41 Unit 2 model room and proceeded south down the corridor toward the 25l 2002 166
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1l valve alley.
Along this route there are a number of penetrations 2
along the wall into the cubicles below.
We noted that there was b'gh 3
level streaming of radiation from these penetrations and we attempted 4l to minimize our exposure by staying away from them.
Radiation levels 5l were at least 2/R per hour and the instrument pinned," when held over 6
the penetrations, quite rapidly and strongly.
We proceeded to the 7
end, to almost the end of that alleyway and just before you get to the end, on the left hand side, there is a door, behind which there is the g
block oriface to the letdown. We didn't step in front of that door.
g We inched our way along the wall and I stuck the meter in the space that would come right out of the door, directly in front if it and the meter pinned.
At that time we left that area.
We went back the way we came and then we went down the main stairway to the 281 elevation, that's the stairway that's adjacent to the auxiliary building elevator.
14ly On the floor of the 281 elevation, we noted that there was water covering the floor to a depth of approximately 2 to 3 inches.
The radiation levels of that water were not significantly greater than the 17j general background, so, therefore, I would say that it was probably a 18{
200 mr/hr range, as I remember.
We didn't take with us any maps or 19!
anything to markup up on the way because of the short amount of time that we had available due to ouv air supply, and because of the contami-21i nation that we knew would be present.
Creating such a document probably 22 would have been futile and it would have probably been left behind due 23 to being contaminated.
From there, we went together along the corridor 241 adjacent to the reactor coolant evaporator.
One of the things that we 25j l
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had wanted to do on our trip was to isolate the vent header from the t
2i evaporator, or to verify that it was isolated.
Those isolation valves 1
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can be reached from the corridor and I manually verified that the t
4l valves were closed.
We then proceeded south down the hallway, of the i
281 elevation to, past the RR pumps, which we know were leaking d
rather badly frcm their seals.
At that point, you can look down into 6
the decay heat pump cubicle and there was water runnir.g over the edge 7
of that vault from the 281 elevation.
It's a very small cascade of g
water down into the vault.
We continued around that corner and we g
went into the pump room for the pumps that service the reactor coolant 10 bleed hcid tanks.
Mr. Showalter took a radiation level reading in I
that cubicle, and I can't remember exactly what the radiation levels 12; I
were.
The radiation level at the entry to the reactor coolant bleed 131 tank room was definitely in excess cf 2/R.
I personnaly make that 141 determination.
We then went back up the hal'way and that point we 15!
,Iplit up.
Making note of the--intent in splitting up was that I would 16,1 continue surveying the area on the 281 elevation and Earl Showalter 17l would go back up to the radwaste panel and verify a valve lineup that 18i we had wanted to check.
He was also going to either open or close a 191 series of valves.
Our agreement was that he would stay in areas that 20j we had known the radiation levels of, and he would proceed out of the 21l building from the panel.
I proceeded back through the decay heat 22 closed cooler area of the 281 elevation, penetrating as far as south 23 as I could on that elevatio1.
I encountered a locked door where that 24l cubicle ends, or where that room ends going into t e r to i di r.g,
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to the space around the reactor building, and then I retraced my 3
pathway out.
Since wr had decided that we were goirg to meet back at 3
the checkpoint, I wantec co, i nad made...well, I made a detour bac.i 4l by way of the reactor coolant bleed tank room entryway.
Some place 5
along the line I had convinced myself that I wasn't quite sure wnat 6
the radiation level was at that entryway to that room, and so I 7
returned and made a quick check on the entryway to that room and then left the auxiliary building by the south stairway and then came out g
through the checkpoint.
The radiation level was confirmed to be g
greater than 2/R per hour at the doorway.
When I exited the area I g
determined that my high range dosimeter recorded something in excess of 3/R, at that point I said " cops, and proceeded to undress to get I
back into my respirator.
I had not become contaminated in the trip, 13l l
and I returned to the control room, indicated to my supervisor and Mr.
142 Seelinger, who was the person in charge at that time, that I was 15; puss 1bly overexposed.
And I was aise debriefed when I i 2 turned.
Do you have any questions regarding my expedition?
I 18{
JACKSON:
Let me clarify one point.
I think you said you went into 191 20 an area near, next to the reactor building.
Is that the tendon access?
21-l FUHRER:
No, that was earlier.
The tendon access gallery G beneath 22 the reactor building itself.
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JACKSON:
Okay, right.
2 FUHRER:
Ok.
There is an air space or corridor that's at the 281 3
4f elevation that circumvents the reactor building, or at least almost circumvents it.
I think you could probably go from this space at the 5
end of the hallway for the decay heat closed coolers around to what's 6
known as the, I think its the M-20 area.
There's a way that you can 7
do that.
I was just going to see, if that door was open, I would have glI done a radiation survey at the reactor building itself, in that area.
g i
10l JACKSM:
Okay.
One other question concerning the miscellaneous waste storage tank.
Did you determine, anytime during your tour in there what the volume of the liquid in the miscellaneous waste storage tank 13l' was?
14i t
15i FUHRER:
It was between, the height of the liquid in the tank was 16!
between 7 and 8 feet.
Full in the tank, I think, was around 10.
So the tank was not full when by the time we went to the panel 19l JACKSON:
Okay.
Is this tank normally lined up to the, either the 20l reactor building sump or the reactor coolant drain tank?
21 22 FUHPg:
I don't know that.
I've been told subs,quently that the 23 normal lineup for the reactor building sump is the miscellaneous waste 24 hold tank.
I'm not sure if that valve lineup was in effect at thst 25!
l time or not.
I 2002 170 I
I
l 20 l
gj JACKSON:
Do you...this tank has subsequently gotten hotter water in 2
it from somewhere, apparently, from what you measured on your trip down there.
3 4,
FUHRER-
' % t's right.
5 I
6 JACKSON:
Where did that water come from in your opinion?
7 8
FUHRER:
Most of it's come from the sump, and we transferred the water i
9!
I that was initially in that tank, off.
Subsequent, or because of the radiation levels that we had determined in that room--we determined I
that the quality of water in the tank was not as bad as, or had not 12.l deteriorated because of the accident.
Because of the radiation levels 13 being not very.much above background, we determined that there wasn't 14!
a lot of high radiation level in flow of water that had gone into that 15!
tank, if any.
And so based on that we transported or transferred some 16i of this liquid to Unit 1 during the first couple of days of the incident.
18l l
JACKSON:
Isn't it true that some of the water that ended up in Unit 19i 1, and I'm not surc if this was the only transfer, was actually a 20f hotter, than normal waste.
21!
22 FUHRER:
Yes, sir.
23 24 25!
i I
2002 17.1 1
i
21 JACKSON:
And did that, did some of that water get processed into 1 4 solid waste?
2 3
FUHRER:
Yes, it did.
By going back through the logs I could probably 4
5 Prepare a scenerio regarding those transfers, and if you would like me to do so at some futura t.ime, I would be happy to do that.
Without 6l having made that preparation, I could not be a hundred percent certain 7
f what actually did transpire.
In general, what had happened was 8
that we made some room in Unit 1, we emptied some tanks in Unit 2, we g
took some sump water from Unit 2 and put it in those tanks, and then 10 they found they're still being some water on the floor.
Some of the water in Unit 2 was transferred to the Unit 1 miscellaneous waste hold tank, or miscellaneous waste storage tank is the terminology in Unit 1.
Some of that was then evaporated and the concentrates were mixed 14 with concentrates that had previously been processed and were only 15,1 Unit 1 material.
161 17 JACKSON:
Okay.
18[
191 FUHRER:
I will proceed, I guess, with that first night.
It was 20 determined that I had possibly received in excess of 3/R accumulated 21 dose that night, and so my next--I was told that I was to report to 22 the Observation Center in order to have my TLD counted, TLD being the 23l record for exposure.
And I proceeded immediately to go to the Observa-24) tion Center and put my TLD in to be counted.
It was 2 or 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 25!
i t
2002 172 i
l 22 I
l 1l until the TLD was counted.
There was some other counting going on and I indicated that mine was priority, but there was already quite a bit 2
f pri rity TLD readings in the works, so, I waited, at that time they 3
receive dat much and Gey asked me to stay 4{
around.
Well, first of all they said that I shouldn't return to the 5l]
site and that I should stay around until they read my TLD from the el previous month.
The TLD that I had was a temporary one that I'd 7
picked up on the way in that night because I had given up my permanent i
8l TLD the first night on the way out.
I handed that to the guard with g
my badge and I exited the site, I guess i' was that morning, the t
10l l
morning of the 29th.
So, it was later determined that I had received 11!
I in the vicini+; of 4.0/R for that quarter, the remainder of the dose 12l I
having been received due to some radwaste operations that I had been 13l involved stith at the end of the refueling outage in Unit 1.
There was 14!
l some resin transfers that I was working on.
I was the low man of the 15j radwaste, of all the radwaste people.
Being an engineer, somewhat of 16i a desk jockey at times, normally you don't receive too much radiation.
17!
And the foremen had picked up probably an excess of an R of radiation 18!
each previously in the quarter.
So, I had been doing some resin I
19!
transfer work and gotten approximately 1 to 1 1/2/R previously that 20(
month.
I was then, because of my radiation exposure, I was then kept offsite until the first of the month when the new quarter began.
From-6 I
22l midnight to approxirastely 9:00 on I guess it would be the 30th now, I 23l worked assisting the TLD operator processing TLDs and generally trying 24 to make myself available for any activities in the Observation Center.
25l t
2002 i73
23 JACKSON:
D,you know when it was first determined that contaminated y
water was going to the industrial waste treatment system?
2; 3l FUHRER:
I remember it happening but I can't tell you what day.
I believe it was the first day that I was at the Observation Center, 5
during the day.
So I came back the afternoon of the 30th about 3:30 6i and at that time somebody mentioned to me the possibility that industrial 7
waste might be contaminated to the point where it could not be discharged g
in to the river.
I'm not exactly sure if that is the day or not.
g I
There were some conflicting reports over NRC or Pennsylvania Department 10l l
of Environmental Resources permission to discharge what we had.
11l i
During that confusion, I was, I'd say that about 100,000 gallons were 12!
discharged of what had been in the sump.
And I can remember somebody saying that it was---that it gave us at least some leeway.
The reason that it was being discharged, by the way, was that it was 15j already overflowing.
The turbine building sumps in Unit 2 are discharged 16l
[
to that industrial waste treatment building and the sumps had not been 17!
shut off so they were still in operation, and I had been told that the ISI water was overflowing from the industrial waste facility.
So, one way 191 or the other, it would probably have gone to the river, anyway.
20!
21 JACKSON:
Did you hear anyone discussing the activity levels in the 22 turbine building sump?
Is that where they assumed the activity was 23 coming from?
24 25!
i 2002 174 i
f
f 24 FUHRER:
That's where they assumed it was coming from.
I don't--I've y
no knowledge of that activity level I'm not sure.
I didn't see any analyses.
I just don't know the answer to that.
3 4
JACKSON:
Okay.
In your first two day there, the 28th and the 29th, 5
did you become involved in any of the problems regarding the gaseous 61 releases, like...
/
81 i
FUHRER:
No, sir, not at all.
9j 10J J
JACKSON:
Okay.
11!
12!
FUHRER:
My involvement in radwaste is limited virtually 95+ percent 13 to liquid and solid waste handling.
I had not become very involved at 14 i
all in gaseous waste and, therefore, did not get involved in that 15i problem.
16j 17 j
JACKSON:
Okay.
18l 19!
FUHRER:
There was some contention that a lot of the activity was 20l t
coming just because of the water that was in the auxiliary building I
21 and just going out through the auxiliary building ventilation system.
22 23l JACKSON:
I'VE just got one last question concerning the radwaste and 241 then I'll turn it over to someone Else, but are you familiar with any 25!
i 2002 175 l
25 y
of the arrangements that were made for temporary tankage or temporary 2j filter systems?
I know all these tanks started rolling in on the 1
30th.
3 Someone had mace arrangements for those tanks earlier than that.
Did you get involved in that?
4 i
5 FUHRER:
That was not me.
I didn't order any of the tanks.
The only 6
input that I had was that I suggested to Showalter that'we do whatever 7
we could to get the.Epicore, Capolupo and Gundal group in, in order to 8
process the waste we did have, rather than relying on our evaporators.
10 JACKSON:
Do you have some kind of open ended contract or something with these people so that they can respond on real short notice?
l 13l l
FUHRER:
We don't have any formal arrangement with them.
Due to past 14!
I experience, we knew that they would be able to respond as quickly as 15i anybody could to this type of problem.
Last year during the spring 16i and early summer we used Epicore, Capolupo and Gundal, their subcon-17) l tractor to process waste, miscellaneous waste from the Unit i due to
- 18i, an evaporator outage we had at that time.
Both of our evaporators had 191 failed to operate and we had brought in this group ta hold us over 20t i
till we got the evaporatar r"nning again.
2 11 i
22l JACKSON:
Do you have any formal or informal arrangements with any 23 other vendors to supply you a kir.d of emergency or short notice service, 24 such as Chem-Nuclear?
I know they rolled in pretty soon.
And/or any 25!
t other vendors?
l 2002 176 l
i 26 FUHRER:
No. We do not.
The only outstanding radwaste contract that 1,
2.
we have is with Nuclear Engineering Company for the disposal of the 3
evaporator bottoms and trash.
Those are the portions of the contract 4,
that we use most.
Chem-Nuclear was brought in probably because they've 5
g t the greatest variety of shipping casks available and so, therefore, they'd be your first choice.
If I was choosing a company to support 6
7 me, I'd pick Chem-Nuclear to provide that service for disposal and whatever.
I don't know what formal arrangements or what arrangements g
were made to set up their being onsite to handle the waste disposal.
g 10 JACKSON:
Okay.
That's all the questions I have.
I'll turn it over...
12!
FUHRER:
Excuse me.
Let me go back.
One of the things that we do l
have outstanding is a contract with Chem-Nuclear to solidify evaporator 14l 15l bottoms.
We have an outstanding contract for them to solidify bottoms 1
and we have an outstanding contract with them to take off dewatered 16i resins or dispose of dewatered resins for us.
We have since utilized the purchase order of contract for solidification of evaporator bottoms.
We haven't used the other option for dewatered resins since the incident 19!
occurred.
20l 21 YUHAS:
We're going to be going over the circumstances surrounding your apparent exposure in excess of 3 rem.
Who sent you and Showalter 23 into the Aux building?
24 25l 2002 177 i
i
27 1,
FUHRER:
I'm not sure if anybody formally said "you guys go in".
Mike l
2!
Ross, the Supervisor of Operations in Unit 1, who is also--who has a 3
senior reactor operators license for Unit 2, and Jim Seelinger, noted 4
the importance of going into the auxiliary building to determine if 5
there was any gross leakage that was occurring.
I guess the choice of I
6l Mr. Showalter and myself to perform that function was based on our 7
knowledge of the liquid waste systems in Unit 2 and because we were 8
b th relatively low in exposures.
One of the things that the operations g'
staff was very aware of is you don't want to burn out, so to speak, y ur perating staff, the people that actually turn the valves and 10f y
push the buttons, because that really does limit your capability to operate in the future.
Because of that, I guess you could almost say that engineers are to some extent expendable.
f 141 SHACKLETON:
Excuse me, Mr. Fuhrer.
Could you explain for the listening 15!
audience your term " burn out"?
17!
181.
FUHRER:
Burn out refers to exceeding either administrative or actual limits on radiation exposure within a given period of time.
19; 2 1' SHACKLETON:
Thank you.
22 YUHAS:
So, it was sort of a mutual decision then that you fellows 23 would go in and make a tour of the aux building.
24, i
25f i
2002 178 i
28 lj FUHRER:
Yes, sir.
l 2
YUHAS:
Ross didn't tell you to, or Potts, or anyone else.
3 i
4l FUHRER:
No.
Some place along the line I'm sure we could have refused.
5 6
YUHAS:
Okay.
Did someone fill out a RWP for you and Showalter?
7 8
FUHRER:
No, sir.
g 101 i
YUHAS:
Did you ask about an AWP?
12!
FUHREi:
13 Not at that time, no, I did not.
We were not living under the 5 system at that time.
We were not foilowing strict radiation I
protection pro.cedures, at least not formally.
Radiation protection 15) was covered by the Health Physics Foreman that was in the area, in the 16,i control room at the time of our entry.
He reviewed the actions that you would take when you were to go in.
And, in general, we were to 18!
rely upon our knowledge of radiation protection during that, during 19I whatever entry we made.
21!
i YUHAS:
Which Health Physics Foreman briefed you prior to this entry?
22 23 FUHRER:
It would have been Joe DeMan.
We indicated to him that we 24 were going to go in and he provided, he ei.ther directly or indirectly 25!
j 2002 179 f
t
i e
29 1
pr vided us with the equipment that was necessary to go in.
There 2
wasn't really a formal briefing which he said " don't do this, don't do that".
He was notified.
You know, we did more or less obtain clearance 3
i 4l through him to go in.
None of it at this time was very formal.
I 5
YUHAS:
Who reviewed with you the survey data up to that point of the 6
auxiliary building?
7 8
FUHRER:
We reviewed, Showalter and I reviewed the survey data ourselves.
g There was an unofficial map, a drawing, if ycu will, of the different elevations in the building, in the Auxiliary building, and there'd I
been radiation levels indicated on that mao from previous operators 12l I
that had entered the building.
At that point there was no formal mapping of radiation levels.
It was all being taken care of on a rather informal basis.
It was whatever information somebody e.
' had 15i brought back and put down on the sheet.
i 17!
YUHAS:
Can you remember about how many nunhers were indicated for the 18!
305 and the 281 elevation in the auxiliary bui; ding?
19i 20t FUHRER:
No.
I cannot.
I just have no idea.
21 22 YUHAS; Can you use the terms like many, a few, sparse..something 23 like that?
24 25l i
2002 180
33 FUHRER:
Maybe between half a dozen and a dozen in that area.
1 i
2 COLLINS: Where was this map located? Was it the....
3 4
5' FUHRER:
It was located on a table in ti,e sout. west corner of the control room.
6l 7
COLLINS:
This would be the table where the HP technicians had taken g
up residence?
g i
10 FUHRER:
Yes, sir.
I'm not sure there were HP techs at that table at that time.
It was manned by operators when we left.
12f 13 YUHAS:
Did you dress in the control room?
141 i
15i FUHRER:
Yes, we did.
I 17:
i YUHAS:
Okay.
What range of high range pocket dosimeter did you have?
ISj 191 FUHRER:
0 to SR.
20 21{
YUHAS:
Okay.
Now, where did you wear that dosimeter on your body?
22 23 FUHRER:
It was clipped to the outside of my plastic coat, plastic 24 suit.
2 51 i
2002 181 L
l
I a
I i
{
31
-_UHAS :
At any time during your tour, did your read that pocket dosimeter?
YU 1.
l 2!
l FUHRER:
Yes, sir.
31 I
4f YUHAS: What time and what did it read?
5 I
61 g
FUHRER:
After I came out of the makeup and purification alley--it was the alley outside of the valve alley--I looked at it and at that point 8
it was less than 500 mr.
That might have made me somewhat over confident.
g i
10l YUHAS: Who provided you with the two instruments for entry into the I
auxiliary building?
12!
13 I
FUHRER:
We obtained those from two auxiliary operators that had gone 14!
l into the auxiliary bui'. ding previous to us.
There was a general lack 15i of equipment in the control room at that time.
I'm not sure what the cause for that was.
There was only two high level instruments available, 17l you know, high level pocket dosimeters, and we actually had to wait, 18i suited up, without using the breathing apparatus for maybe a half hour, for the operators on a previous tour to return so that we could 20!
i use their pocket dcsimeters.
21{
22 YUHAS: Was this also true of your portable radiation survey instruments?
23i i
24l 2s!
2002 182 i
i
i l
i I
(
32 I
l 1!
FUHRER:
Yes, sir.
I 2'
YUHAS:
So you waited for someone to turn in a teletector and E-120?
3 4l t
Sj SHACKLETON:
This is a continuation of the interview of Edwin C.
i 6l Fuhrer.
The time now is 4:50 p.m., May 2, 1979.
Pleas continue.
7 YUHAS:
We were just talking about the availability of instrumenta-8 tion.
When the teletector was provided to you or the E-120. did you g
field check the instrument prior to taking it in?
10 1 11 FUHRER:
Yes we did.
We did a battery check on it and it seemed to 12!
work acceptable.
14:
Yl'HAS:
Was there a check source available..
15; 16!
FUHRER:
No, Sir.
l 18!
YUHAS:
...to check it's response to radiation?
19l t
20\\
I FUHRER:
No, there was not.
211 22 YUHAS:
Does the licensee routinely, in non emergency conditions, have 23 check sources available to verify the portable radiation instruments 24 are responding to radiation prior use?
4 25l 2002 183 I
i
.)
33 FUHRER:
In general, those sources are available.
1{
2!
3l YUHAS:
Where are these normally located?
4 5l FUHRER:
They are usually located in the health physics lab.
And one f the other things that there was somewhat of a shortage of, would 6i have been tanks of breathing air.
I ren: ember th' t we had to wait for a
7 a number of tanks to be brought up so that we could enter the building.
g And I also remember using the last two tanks that were there for our g
i entry.
11!
YUHAS:
At this point you were dressed, and you got your Scott Air-Pac ready to go.
You got a teletector, and an E-120; and you have been briefed and they told you that the dose rates were somewhere between 5 141
'nd 15 R/hr, is that correct?
1 15i 16i FUHRER:
Yes, the dose rates in the corridors were indicated to be, in i
the range that we saw, was 150 to 200.
The whole building wasn' t 18(
indicated as being in the 1 R/hr range.
191 20j l
YUHAS:
Just let me clarify this, is that E-520 or an E-120?
21!
22 FUHRER:
E-520.
23 24 25!
l 2002 184 9
l I
i l
34 YUHAS:
E-520, Ok.
In retrospect, when do you feel that you likely 1;
2' received the bulk of exposure on that trip?
3 FUHRER:
4 It would have to have been, obviously, from my having taken a 1
S k at my self-reader after exiting that valve alley.
It would have had to have been sometime after '. hat, and I really can't say where it 6
was that I received it.
I just have no idea.
I've tried to go back 7
through my mind and determine where it was.
The more I thought about 8
it the shakier I'd get.
And actually being able to recount accurately g
the sequence of the events...I just don't know.
101 l
11' YUHAS:
12l 13 JACKSON:
When you were talking about the valve gallery, is this the valve gallery where make up valve 105 is located? Whatever that 15:
number is?
16:
i 171 FUHRER:
I'm not familiar with the valve numbers of the make up valves.
1SI 19 JACKSON:
Gkay. Did you or Mr. Showalter have an assignment to check 20!
this make up valve?
i I
22l FUHRER:
Neither of us were specifically told to check that valve.
23l 24
?S 2002 185 i
.f 35 I
I yj JACKSON:
Okay, I thought that in his interview, that he had said that 2
he thought that you had checked the--operation, had asked you to check the make up valve.
's that true or not true?
3 4i I
FUHRER:
I don't recall it, and I don't recall specifically checking g
it, although maybe a verbal description of where that valve is and
,oi what it does, would refresh my memory.
I'm not extremely heavy on, or knowledgeable about, plant operations outside the radwas_te area.
I'm 8
familiar with it to some extent, in that I know what, to some extent, what the functions of certain pieces of equipment are.
I am not familiar with valve numbers and those types of things directly.
And l
11; I
that is why there is some difficulty on my part in remembering that.
13l i
JACKSON:
Okay then, I don't have much more information at my finger 14!
i tips on this.
All I have is that it was the valve ga.11ery on elevation 15i 305, and it was make-up valve 105.
16!
i 17i i
FUHRER:
We walked down that entire gallery there, the persor:nel side 18l of the gallery.
Anc..105--that's right, we did... I can' t remember 19I the number, but we did check--Showalter checked, closed a valve on 20 that alleyway. We then walked back down the alleyway and called the t
control to tell them the status of that valve.
As I understand it, 22l I'm not sure whether this counters what he said or not, but he was the 23 l
one that made that check with the control room, and he told Chuck 24l l
Adams, the Shift Foreman at the time, that he had either opened or 25\\
l 2002 186 i
i
36 closed that valve.
Subsequently, after we'd gone up stairs, we told 1
2, that again.
And I think that he opened the valve.
I would have to go back and take a look at what the actual function of that valve was.
I 3
4; think is was some sort of bypass valve.
And he had opened that valve, l
5l to the best of my knowledge.
That would be my guess, if I had to chose one or the other of opened or closed.
And apparently it didn't 6
f help the letdown situation.
Now that I'm talking about it, I think that's one of the, it could be the letdown, the bypass valve in the 8
letdown system, or the letdown portion of the make up system.
91 l
101 YUHAS:
The valve alley that you keep refering to, is actually the t
l walk way outside the make-up and pump valve rooms, is that correct?
121 i
13I FUHRER:
Yes, that's a make-up and purification valve room.
141 l
1m YUHAS:
So after, in your last description you stated that after you 16,i i
came out of the valve alley, you went down to 281?
17!
18 FUHRER:
That's correct.
19f i
20\\
l YUHAS:
Okay, then you and Showalter parted?
2 11 22 FUHRER:
No, we went together to the the transfer pumps that take 23 their suction from the reactor coolant bleed hold tanks.
And we 24l checked-what our major intent was to check the piping in that vicinity.
25j 2002 187 1
37 f
l 3j That was part of the reactor coolant system-well, it's not really the 1
2 reactor coolant system, it's piping which there is reactor coolant.
i 3
And we were going to check that as being some of the most available 4
reactor coolant type piping that was in that area.
And we didn't I
discover any gross leaks in that room.
And just as a matter of course S
we checked the radiation level of the entry to the bleed tank room.
g 7
YUHAS:
Did you and Showalter discuss the advisability of leaving when 8
you kept pegging your E-520 instruments?
9l!
10 FUHRER:
We did discuss that, at some point along the way, and we 11!
12l had--we've been very careful about pegging the instruments.
I think 3
probably part of our problem was our lack of experience with high radiation levels.
When you peg an instrument that's got a high range of 2/R, that you could be you know, the radiation level could be 15!
l anything above that.
And I think that was probably the error that we 16j made, since we've have been used to relatively or considerable lower i
171
[
radiation levels in our previous experiences.
Looking in retrospect 18j i
that was definitely a mistake on our part to continue without that 19l l
high range instrument.
20l l
21!
YUHAS:
What were the symptoms of failure on the teletector?
23 FUHRER:
It just appeared to be dead.
There was no swing on the dial 24l i
at all.
25j 2'02 188
k I
38 YUHAS:
In other words, it would not come up off 0.
I 2!
H i:
No, but it appeared--the instrument appeared completely dead.
3 4
YUHAS:
So, about how long were you in the auxiliary building?
5 I
k FUHRER:
15 to 20 minutes.
8 YUHAS:
And about how much of that time were you without high range instrument capable of reading the doses?
I u!
I FUHRER:
Maybe 3/4 of the time.
12!
I 13l YUHAS:
Now you stated that you were not contaminated when you came 14!
out.
15i 16i l
FUHRER:
No, sir.
17l 18I YUHAS:
Who checked you and where?
19l 20' FUHRER:
We took off our clothes at the HP check point.
And then 21 because of the airborne problems in the building, we walked up to 22l the--we put booties on and we walked, with clean booties on, and we 23 j
walked up to the control room and we were checked--and we were frisked 2 41 up there.
25f l
2002 189
I 39 YUHAS: When you got to the control room, did you discuss your pocket 1,
dosimeter reading with anyone? HP's in particular?...Dubiel or...
2, 3
FUHRER:
Yeah, I disc ~ussed it immediately with Dick Dubiel.
5{
6l YUHAS:
What was Dubiel's response?
1 7
FUHRER:
He was somewhat concerned.
In fact, he chastised me to some extent...not extremely, but he indicated his displeasure at my...at of overexposing myself in'that manner.
10' 11; I
YUHAS:
Okay.
12t 13l
[
FUHRER:
Mr. Seelinger's response was along the same line.
14i l
15i 16l YUHAS:
After you proceded to the Observation Center, could you describe the type of TLD reader that was being used and who was using it to 17 read your TLD? TLD being a Thermoluminesent Dosimeter.
18{
191 i
FUHRER:
I don't know the model number of the TLD reader.
I recognized 20!
l it as the standard TLD reader that we have been using onsite.
It was 21l the one that we have. had and used prior to the incident.
A Rad-chem-22 tech, senior, Ed Egenrider, was operating the device.
23 24 25 i
292 190 I
l
{
40 e
i YUHAS:
Is that a two chip TLD?
1 2.
FUHRER:. Yes sir, it is.
3 l
YUHAS:
Did Mr. Egenrider read both chips of the TLD?
5 6
FUHRER:
To my knowledge he did.
I think that is standard procedure.
7 8
YUHAS:
Ok, let's go back a little bit...
i 9l l
10 FUHRER:
Excuse me, the instrument provides a hard copy read-out on a teletype of both chips.
12!
13 i
YUHAS.
That hard copy read-out, is this that light source reading, or 14!
is it an x y plot of a glow curve? Do you know what it is?
15i 16!
FUHRER:
I really don't know. There is a teletype that prints out one 17 line per TLD.
From looking at it while I was there, I wasn't able to 18!
determine the meaning of the numbers.
19l 201 l
YUHAS:
Let's go back to the period of time when you came in and you 21!
were at the ECS for a couple of hours on the 28th.
What was your I
22}
function in the ECS at that time?
23 24{
25!
2002 191 t
i i
(
41 l
1 FUHRER:
When I first arrived? I first arrived and I was asked to 2
report to the ECS by Dick Dubiel, via the telephone conversation I l
indicated that I had early.
And at that time Mr. Dubiel indicated 3{
4j that he would like me to be present from the ground floor of this 5
thing, just because there was probably going to be a rather large 61 involvement of the radioactive waste processing people, subsequent to 7
whatever happened that day.
So I reported to the ECS in Unit 1 and 8
asked what I was to do, And the first response was that there wasn't g
anything immediate that I could and so, therefore, I tried to stay out f the way as much as possible.
And then a couple of hours later, 10 whoever had been the phone-talker with the Department of Environmental Resources was given another job, or...oh, as I remember, he was evacuated from the building.
He was a Unit 2 engineer, Ron Warren and he was evacuated, as far as I know, offsite.
And I took over the responsi-14:
]
bility for being that phone-talker.
But that was, to my knowledge, that's what seemed to go on at that time.
16!
17.
YUHAS:
Why was Mr. Warren evacuated?
19l FUHRER:
There were a number of Unit 2 engineers that were present.
It appeared to me that there were probably, there were more engineers at the ECS than there were actually required to perform the ECS function.
And so, therefore, somebody, and I assume it was Seelinger, made a determination of who was to stay and who was to go.
At that time 241 there was a large number of people in the Unit 1 control room, and 25, L
2002 192 a
42 li attempts were made to limit the number of bodies that were there.
2 There were, I'd say, probably a half of dozen NRC representatives 3-there, at least.
There were three of them who entered the building, 4;
entered the site, at the same time I did and we--I was actually their 5
escort to get them up to the control room.
When we got here, there were a number of NRC people there.
Others came after that.
So I'd say that that was part of the contingent that was in the building.
7 8l A1so, we were just going to respirators at the time, and there was i
only a limited number of respirators available.
That was one of the g
other reasons why Warren was relieved of post, just because we didn't have respiratory equipment available.
11; 12 YUHAS:
The decision to go on respirators in the Unit 1 control room is based on what?
141 15 FUHRER:
I assume that it was done based on an air sample that was i
taken, or possibly radiation levels in the building, pending an air 17!
sample.
We were asked to go on respirators and I would assume the 18i normal policy would be that they take a sample of the air, analyze it 19i on a some kind of device to confirm whether we were to be in respirators 20{
or not.
At that time I remember being somewhat amazed that Unit 1 was 21l in respirators, and the people over in Unit 2, where all the action is 22' supposedly taking place, they weren't in respirators.
23 24 25l t
2002 193
l l
43 8
YUHAS:
What sort of respirator did the personnel in the Unit 1 control 14 room don?
2 FUHRER:
Full-face.
Most of us had full-face respirators on.
I don't 3
know if there were iodine canisters on the bottom or not.
It--they 4
g weren't the purple canisters that we used subsequently.
Two or three 6l days into the accident, a switch of canister types was made.
We were 7
just using standard canisters, to the best of my knowledge, at that time.
8 9f
]!
YUHAS:
In your tour of the unit one control room, when they asked you to put on masks, did you look at the control room air monitors to see I
what their condition was at that time?
13 FUHRER:
No, I oid not.
I, not being very much of a health physicist, 141 l
I have never really paid a lot of attention to the air monitors.
I 15i wasn't familiar with their location, or the meaning of them and I f
didn't feel it was necessary for me to do that at that time.
I just 17l didn't do it.
IS(
19i YUHAS:
When you were on the phone in communications with the State 20l l
Department of Environmental Resources, you were on a mask at the time.
21l 1
I 22 FUHRER:
Yes sir.
23 24 25 2002 194 I
t
44 i
YUHAS:
7 Can you describe the imosct that had on your communications with the State?
2 3
FUHRER:
It limited it to some extent.
You had to shout rather loudly to be heard through the mask.
5 6
YUHAS:
Do you KnoW the name of the individual you were in communica-tion with?
8 I
9 FUHRER:
There was, I don't know the name of the individual on the other end.
A Ms. Reilly was the cognizant individual on the other 12:l end.
She wasn't in a continuing communications with us, although she I
was available whenever there was data available.
Essentially what 13l hanened was there were two people, that weren't in a management 14!
l position, operating the phones.
Myself on our end, and somebody else 15j serving in an equivalent compacity on the other end.
When Mr. Seelinger 16i wanted to talk to somebody from the State, he would ask me to relay a 17!
message to the, my counter part, and then Ms. Reilly and the ECS IS!
coordinator would get together and speak over the phone.
19!
20i YUHAS:
Can you briefly describe the type of information that was 21, communicated by you to the State in the several hour period that you 22 were on the phone?
23l 24j 1
25!
i l
6 6
2002 195
}
l
i tb 45 FUHRER:
We were communicating radiation level reading with them. We 1
2 had two environmental teams out in the field, at least two.
There was 3
at least an onsite anc' offsite team, and I don't remember whether there were two offsite teams or not.
It's possibie that there were 4
m re than one offsite team.
Whenever they radioed information back to 5
6{
us, we would transmit that information immediately to the Department of Environmental Resources and we also were giving them the information 7
regarding wind speed and direction.
8 9
YUHAS: :Did you convey to the State Department of Environ. mental Resources the condition of the Unit 2 facility during the course of your conversation or the speculated condition of the Unit 2 facility?
13 FUHRER:
No sir, that informat.on wasn't readily available, at least 14!
to me.
And I don't remember--it's possible that Nr. Seelinger did 15[
i speak with them about that.
I wasn't in the room whenever that type 16p I
thir.9, whenever he was speaking, at least not 100%.
Whenever he came 17, i
in, I would stay around for a time and if the conversaH on appeared to 18j be length,y I would go out to check on whatever progress and whatever 19I information I could gain, for my personal interest, out in the control 20 room.
The conversations took place in the Shift Aupervisor's office 21 that is adjacent to the control room in Unit 1.
22; 23 YUHAS:
On these reconnais:,ance missions, this is about noon between 24l 11 and 1, right?... on the 28th...
Based on your findings', what was -
25l j
the condition of Unit 2 at that time?
i i
2002 196 i
t I
i
[
l f
46 FUHRER:
I had no idea.
I could not...
The information just wasn't y
2j available to mc.
I asked the people that I knew personally, and that 3
includes the contrcl room operators the operating staff, and I did not t;k Jim Seelinger, for example, because he was tied up doing other 4
things.
I only investigated it by talking to people that didn't have 5
specific on going responsibilities.
I also spoke mainly to people who 6
were o' my engineering level, just because those were the pecple that l
I knew perso.1 ally.
So I was really 100%, unaware of the magnitude of g
the problem in Unit 2.
g l
10l YUHAS:
Did you ask Tom Mulleavy, as to the condition in Unit 2?
111 12!
FUHRER:
I don't remember discussing that with Tom, although I did 131 l
speak with Tom on and off during that period of time, and he did not 14t i
convey to me, spontaneously, that ir. formation.
I'm not sure if it was 15i available to him or not.
He was more involved with dispatching the on and offsite teams and coordinating the radiation level investigation I
that was going on in.and around the plant at that time.
To my knowledge, 18i he did noi, appear to be aware of the severity of the operational 19!
problem in Unit 2.
20!
21, yuhas; Were there other HP Foreman in the ECS at the time?
22 23 l
FUHRER:
No sir.
To the best of knowledge, HP was being run mainly by 24 Dubiel and Mulleavy, and I'm not sure exactly why that was.
I think 2sj i
2002 197
I b
i l
{
47 1;
that it might have been that the HP Foreman had been sent offsite in 2
rder to be fresh or to..... be able to relieve Mulleavy and Dubiel 3
at some later time. That is the understanding that I got.
I'm not 4j exactly certain as to whether that is 10.4 true, but that's the feeling that I have.
5 i
6i YUHAS:
7 At that period of time, was anyone calculating or plotting sodose lines?
8 l
9 FUHRER:
Yes, that was an ongoing process.
There was one or two 10l people that followed that 100% of the time.
i 12f i
YUHAS:
Do you remember who those were? Who those individuals were?
131 i
14l 15l FUHRER:
Len Landry, the Health Physics Engineer, was doing that.
i 16l
{
YUHAS:
Okay.
17 I
18i l
FUHRER:
He was being assisted by--I think Howard Crawford was in the 19I control roon at that time, or one of the other nuclect engineers.
I 20{
think it was Howard Crawford, although, it's hard to go back and 21l identify names I know that we did have one or two people that were 22 continually following that activity.
There was also NRC staff involved 23 in that activity concurrently.
24 25; i
2002 198
J I
i 48 i
lj YUHAS:
Could you briefly describe what the NRC was doing in the 2l control room in that period of the 28th, when you were there, at about i
3j 11:30 to 1:00?
4l FUHRER:
Yes sir.
There were a number of--there were two people that 5l 6
wera maintaining an open phone line with somebody at the NRC.
That was ongoing for the entire time while I was there.
In addition to 7
that, the NRC was most interested, in my mind, in the radiation levels 8
in the vicinity of the plant, and I guess secondarily in the plant g
itself.
That's the activity that was going on in the Unit 1 control 0
room I wasn't in the Unit 2 control room, so therefore, I don't know what was there, at least not at that time.
But the activity in the i
12!
Unit 1 control room centered mostly on the on and offsite teams and I
the radiation levels they were sending back.
141 l
15i YUHAS:
Was the NRC in a consultant mode of operation or were they i
merely :n a data gathering, data relaying mode at the time?
171 181 FUHRER:
I'd say they were acting as both.
We were performing activities 191 at the unofficial direction of the NRC at that '.ime.
We would send 20!
I people to various areas at their sungestion, if it was concurrent with 21l our thinking.
We did take care of considerations, or their requests 22f l
into consideration when we dispatched our teams.
23l 24l 25!
2002 199
i i
l t
{
49 i
YUHAS: 0o you remember specifically who this conduit of requests was?
1 2:
FUHRER:
No I don't remember the names of people that were there at 3
4j all.
Si 6j YUHAS:
That's fine.
Ok.
You came back to work to the Observation Center after you had been told you'd received a dose in excess of 3
/
rems.
g 9
es s k 10i 11' YUHAS:
And you stated that you worked in the TLD system.
What were your specific duties in that period of time?
14 FUHRER:
I helped Mr. Egenrider count or process the TLDs. There is 15!
manual operations involved in taking the little chips out of the plastic containers, arranging them in some type of order, counting 17i them and then putting them back into the correct container.
Since I 18!
was going to be on froa 7 to 7--that was my normal shift that day-- I 19!
felt that I probably should be doing something active during that 20 time.
I had checked with the person that was in charge of the Observa-21 i
tion Center and they didn't have any specific tasks for me to do.
And 22l I guess at that point, sometime early in the morning like 4:00 or 23 5:00, it became a choice of either curling up in a corner and going to 24l sleep or assisting somebody on whatever task I could find.
So I...there 25!
2002 200
{
l 50 lj was only person working on that TLD machine, and so I asked him if 2
there was anything I could do.
I started opening up packages to get 3
the chips out.
4l YUHAS:
How many manual readers were available at the time?
5 61 FUHRER:
There was only one available at that time.
7 8l YUHAS:
Would you say that the man was booked solid?
g 10l FUHRER:
Yes sir.
He was booked solid.
He looked like he was going t
to be booked solid for some time.
12!
I 13l YUHAS:
So you helped out on, it would have been the 30th and 31st 141 than, at the Observation Center.
15; 16; FUHRER:
Well, it was the morning of the 30th that I worked at the 17!
Observation Center on the TLD system...I'm trying to recount the activities...
19!
20i YUHAS:
This would be a good time to switch the tape, then.
21}
22 SHACKLETON:
We'll change the tape at this time.
The time is now 5:18 23 p.m., May 2, 1979.
24 25 l
t 2002 201 i
[
51 i
l 11 SHACKLETON:
This is a continuation of the interview of Edwin C.
1 2l Fuhrer.
Present conducting this interview with the time now 5:26 3
p.m., May 2, 1979, from the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, is 4
Mr. Yuhas and Mr. Collins and myself, Mr. Shackleton.
Mr. Jackson has 5l left the interview.
Mr. Fuhrer, would you please continue.
)
61 7
FUHRER:
I was discussing my activities at the Observation Center 8
f Ilowing my verexposure.
On the morning of the 30th, I had worked gj assisting the rad-chem tech that was working on TLDs. After about 9:00 10 r so I went home, got a little bit of sleep--didn't sleep very well lli as I remember-and then came back about 3:00 that af ternoon, or 4:00, y
to the Observation Center, where I reported for duty again.
At the Observation Center I worked with the...oh, I met Dave Limroth.
He's 13 g
the 3 Mile Island Superintendent, Administrative Technical Support, and the Health Physics and Chemistry Department reports to him.
So I 15 6
guess y u c uld say he is my immediate superior or boss along the reporting chain, so I asked him what it was that he wanted me to be doing.
And we came to an agreement that I would work on coordinating
,8t l
health physics or radiation and protection personnel manning the 19t following morning.
So I stayed around until sometime that evening, 6 or 7 o' clock, and then went home, so that I could sleep, so that I could get up for my shift the next day.
And that's the way I left it that day. I can't remember exactly what duties I performed during that I
time.
They were just miscellaneous and general; answering questions 24{
j for whoever was there, coordinating receipt of pocket dosimeters, that 25!
2002 202 l
il
l q
52 lli type of just general assistance.
The next morning, which would have 2
been the morning of the 31st, I took over my duties as coordinator of 3
personnel for that shift to health physics people, and I worked on I
4 that along with a gentlemen from PP&L, another local utility.
I I
S pr ceeded uneventfully for that day and I went home at the end of my 61 shift plus a couple of hours, so it was about 9:00 or so that evening, 7
and I returned the next morning to do the same type of thing.
Since 8
it was the morning of the 1st, that would be April 1, I was very aware g
of that it was a new quarter for the purpose radiation exposure, and s, therefore, officially I was no longer overexposed.
I dis-10 f
cussed this with the Health Physics Department, so they had no problem with my returning to the site.
Limroth indicated that I should pro-ceed--continue with my function as health physics coordinator for some
]
period of time.
And we were making preparations at that time for the y
President's visit, trying to get together all the paraphernalia required for entry to the site, the breathing apparatus and the dosimetry, so 161 that it would be available.
'.t that time I remember calling Dick 171 Dubiel to request somebody to intercede on that matter for me, so that 18l I could return to the site.
I recognized that I was probably of more 19l value to the site personnel, in that I was familiar with plant systems, 20!
I rather than just being a coordinator of personnel.
And I was told, 21l t
through Dubiel, to return to the site, and that is what I did.
22' 23 YUHAS:
The preparations-you are giving us the impression that the 241 preparations for the Presidential visit was a frustrating situation.
25j Could you elaborate a little bit?
l 2002 203
53 1:
FUHRER:
I guess it was only frustrating in that, there was...I don't l
2 know how to put this, I guess...
l 3l 4
YUHAS:
Tactfully..
5 FUHRER:
Tactfully. (Laughter).
Gi 7
YUHAS:
You can be quite candid.
I'm sure the President may listen to 8
g' this... sitting around the fire some night.
10 FUHRER:
Well, for political reasons, the people in charge wanted
]
things to go as tmoothly as possible for the President's visit.
There had been problems in getting face masks and things for just about 3
anybody that was going on site.
And I guess it was rather frustrating for the individuals involved that extraordinary precautions or extraordi-15i g
nary measures were to be taken for somebody that was just visiting and not really going to do any " productive work".
The other thing that was frustrating was that access an'd egress from the site was completely i
18l l
curtailed for a number of hours prior to the President entering, and 19!
that limited plant operations to some extent.
And the people that had 20j gone off, maybe to grab a bite to eat, because there was no real good 22{
place to eat at that time at the site, couldn't get back on for an 3
extended period of time.
24l 25l t,
2002 204
54 l
1l YUHAS:
I'd like to ask you some, a few other questions now that deal 2
specifically with the incident.
3 COLLINS:
Let me ask a couple of specific questions before we move on.
4 g
When you were assisting in the processing of TL0s on the 30th, morning f the 30th, do you--which TLDs were being processed that time? Was 6
it the previous months TLDs? Was it the 28th's, 29th's, do you recall?
7 8
FUHRER:
It was the previous day's TLDs.
And there was some hurry in g
i tnat we were trying to get the TLDs read from the previous day, not 10l the ones that had just been turned in, but the previous day, so that 11{
12; we could reissue a new TLD to the people that were going to go on 3
i site.
13!
t 141 15l COLLINS:
By " previous day" you would mean then the 28th's..
i 16i FUHRER:
Yes sir.
17l l
18l l
COLLINS:
...TLDs were being processed at that time.
19!
20 FUHRER:
Yes, sir.
We were trying to get into an every other day mode 21 for TLDs.
22 23 1
COLLINS:
What was happening to the data that was coming off on the 24l printer? Was this data being interfaced to a computer?
2Si 2002 205
g i
i
{
55 i
1:
FUHRER:
No, sir, not at that time.
There was no computer available 2j to do that at that time.
3l 4f COLLINS:
Where was that data, how was that data being handled, do Sj y u know?
I 61 7l FUHRER:
Well, I think that there was some sort of microprocessor or something, that caused the output of the TLD reader to be transmitted g
into some sort of data so that it can be put out on the hard copy.
It g
was my understanding that there was a difficulty in a direct interface 10 with the computer in that there were a multiple number of entries for an individual a month.
I was told that was a difficulty.
And our...it was my understanding, and I'm not thoroughly knowledgeable in TLD operations, but it was my understanding that the normal mode or the normal ability of the system is that somehow the data comes out on 16l some sort of a tape or cassette and then its fed directly into some 17l other computer to interface with the REM system, a computer program that somebody has written for the plant or company computer.
Because 18l of the number of multiple entries that we needed, because we were reading them so frequently, that wasn't available and there had to be 20l a lot of manual reading in order to update somebody's files.
At that 21l I
time, on that day, I don't think that people's personnel files were up 22' I
to date to that day.
For example, in order-somebody had to do some 23l searching in order to determine what my previous exposure history had 24 been.
It wasn't directly available.
i 25l i
l l
2002 206
56 1l COLLINS:
You mentioned that the TLDs were being read manually.
You i
2l mean loaded *into an automatic reader manually?
3 4
FUHRER:
Yes.
I guess what I meant by " read manually", the output, 5
the information that came out was reviewed by an individual.
Now, in 1
61 order to get any information out of that system somebody had to look i
7l at it.
I 81, COLLINS:
You mentioned some involvement in pocket chamber...your g
10 inv lvement in pocket chamber reading and issue.
Were you involved in llj that at all?
12 FUHRER:
No sir.
I'm not familiar with what you' re talking about.
13 141 COLLINS:
Okay.
Were.you aware of anyone making any correlations 15 ween p c e c am er rea ngs and RD readings?
16 l
17!
mn am ar pc c am er readngs.
18 19!
YUHAS:
Pocket dosimeters.
20j l
21l FUMRER:
Oh no, nobody was correlating those at all to my knowledge.
It wasn't until... I guess it was the 1st, it was one of the...
I think it was the 1st, although it might have been the day before, we were trying to get together a hardcard system, so that anybody entering 25l 2002 207 t
i 57 1
the site would record there ongoing pocket dosimeter reading on a card -
2 so that--that would be retained when he came out.
Now that wasn't i
3{
available the 1st and 2nd day that I had gone on site.
And the second i
4j day that I went on site, the guard recorded the information going in, 5j and I'm not sure of any ability if there were any ability to correlate my utgoing reader, reading.
Somebody recorded it, but I don't think 6
anybody was able to put those together just because of the mass data 7
and the uncoordinated method in which it was collected.
The data was g
gl there someplace, but it was hard to put it all together.
It wasn't I
10l until, it was either the 31st or the 1st that we had any kind of mechanism where somebody had to actually sign on to a card or have 11!
I their reading put on a card that was specifically for him, and then 12(
read out on the same card.
13 14 COLLINS:
Let me go back to something you were talking about earlier, and that was in your tour of the aux building, you mentioned that when you were in the basement of the aux building, I believe, which is a 1
171 I
281 foot level, that you had entered the decay heat service cooler 18!
area..
19l 20i l
FUHRER:
Yes, sir.
21:
I 22 COLLINS:
..and attempted to open a door into the area around, between 23 the aux building and containment.
24 25l i
l t
l 2002 208
(
58 FUHRER:
Yes, sir.
1 i
2 COLLINS:
Do you recall what the water levels were in the decay heat 3
4 service cooler area were--what the water levels in there were, and 5l particularly, how those levels changed, or any comments about how the 6
water was over by the door that you could not go through?
7 FUHRER:
Generally, there was water maybe an inch to three inches, 8
depending on the way the floor sloped to the floor drains in that g
Whole area.
As you got toward the door, I think that the water level probably went down to virtually nothing.
I can't remember that, 100 per cent. I don't remember any vast quantity of water rushing under I
the door.
Ok, I wasn't aware of that.
I can't remember whether I was 13l i
actually walking through water when I got to the door.
There was 14!
I water coming out of an overhead valve, drip wise, someplace in that 151 service cooler area.
16i i
17l COLLINS:
Do you recall any radiation level readings by the door?
18l 19!
FUHRER:
No, I don't.
Not at this point.
I remember taking them and 20; 21;j I remember recording them when I got back to the control ron, but I have no idea what they are now.
At this time I don't remember what 22 they were then.
23 24 i
2 51 i
t l
2002 209
j 59 1
COLLINS:
At what point were you first whole body counted after the 2
incident?
3 4l FUHRER:
It would have been the...oh, it was on the 31st, in the 5l afternoon.
When I got out to the Observation Center, I was told that I
61 sometime in the near future at whatever--at my discretion--I ought to be whole body counted.
And when the time became available and I had 7
some slack time, which was the afternoon of the 31st, I went out and 8
had my body counted.
g i
10l COLLINS:
Do you recall the results of the count?
11l i
12l FUHRER:
The technician that was running the thing said that it was a typical body count.
There wasn't any excessive amount of activity.
There was some traces of something and he felt that was normal.
15i 16!
l COLLINS:
Have you aeen interviewed previously by Met Ed or any other 17!
I organization making an inquiry.into the incident?
18!
f 191 FUHRER:
Not in a formal manner such as this.
20 21 COLLINS:
Have you been coached or given any assistance or any sugges-22 tions as to how you might answer questions for this or other interviews?
2 31 i
24 25-2002 210 I
i
{
60 FUHRER:
No sir.
1; I
2l I
3 Just a couple of quick questions, (noise) as soon as the car YUHAS:
leaves... based on your experiences here at Met Ed, do you feel or 4
suspect that there is any reason to believe that someone may have 5
deliberately tampered with systems that could have complicated the 6l involvement in the shutdown?-
8 FUHRER:
I don't know of anybody.
I don't know of anything that could g
have happened along that line.
I guess it seems strange to me that 10l the, there was an inability to have the emergency feedwater pumps, for ll!
instance, operate and that a similar type of occurrence was then found 12l at Unit 1.
I guess that was a reportable incident that we made within a week or so after the Unit 2 event.
That seems strange to me.
I'm i
14!
i not directly involved with operations.
I have interfaced to some-15i extent with operators before, to the operating personnel.
And I guess, generally, I would have to depend on who it was that did that valve lineup as to whether I'd say there was a good possibility that 18!
the guy actually messed it up or radioed his readings.
I don't know 19{
of anybody that does that on a consistent basis.
I'm not sure...I'd 20!
i have to take a guy's word for it he said that he'd done it.
I guess 21 I'd have to believe him.
There would be no real reason for me to 22 doubt that, and I guess the same would have to be for the Unit 1 23 system.
And based on that I'd have to say that there is a possiblity 24 of some sort of extraneous cause for the incident, at least a cause 25 for that portion of the incident.
I i
2002 211
(
61 i
ilj YUHAS:
Do you know of any previous anomalies that would cause suspicion?
2.
FUHRER:
Not directly. I've heard some rumors and there have been a 3
4f number of things that have gone wrong--in the startup of Unit 2 and I 51 guess, at some point in Unit 1.
Recently, in Unit 2 there was a 6
problem with oil in the secondary water systems, you know, in the 7
feedwater and the condensate system, and nobody was really ever able to determine how that got there, how or what the mechanism for it g
getting into the system was.
Also, there was a problem with some oil g
that had gotten into the Unit 1 reactor coolant bleed tanks or one of the bleed tanks.
I'm not sure whether that's an anomalie or not.
Those tanks will hardly ever drain down to the point where the pump I
would take, or the pump would lose suction.
And oil floating--it's 131 l
possible that any oil that might have been trapped in there could have 141 been trapped in there for a year or more without anybody knowing that.
lo,l And, I guess that's a possibility.
Those are two things that come to i
i my mind.
Now, I'm not sure what kind 'of credence you can give to that 17!
kind of rumor.
18i i
19i YUHAS:
What was the unfortunate incident that you alluded to with 20!
i respect to draining the Unit 1 transfer canal to apparently.the sump.
21!
22 23 FUHRER:
Oh...during the--at the time the Unit 1 transfer canal was 24 being drained, toward the end of that, for some reason, the seal plate 2Si 2002 212 a
b
{
62 at the bottom of that canal was lifted.
I'm not sure what the mechanism 1l 2j f r lifting was for sure.
I think it had something to do with the i
ventilation system.
I think somebody turned on a blower or something 3
that caused a positive pressure to come up underneath that seal plate, causing it to come up, and I think about 30,000 gallons of water that 5
had previously been in the bleed tank, no, the borated water storage GI tank and then in the canal, during all the transfers, was then put in 7
the reactor building sump.
That's...now, some of that is heresay.
I 8
gl wouldn't directly relate it to that incident.
i 10l l
YUHAS:
The cavity seal plates are bolted down, aren't they?
Is this 11!
I the plate that we're talking about?
12i 13 FUHRER:
Yeah.
I'm not sure how that's done.
I'm not sure whether 141 l
they're held in by gravity or just sealed with some sort of gasket 15; material or not. I'm not familiar with that.
I know that they lifted--
16i i
somebody said, "heh, congratulations, you got 30,000 gallons of water to process.
Go to it".
18t i
19!
YUHAS:
Is there any other comments you'd like to make at this time, i
20 relative to either what's going on in the past, or what went on during 21, the incident, that you feel may be of interest to us?
23 FUHRER:
No sir.
24, 25 2002 213 l
l i
63 YUHAS:
Ok, at this time I'd like to thank you for your several hours y
2l of excellent recall and cooperation here this afternoon. Maybe Owen w nts to make a few remarks.
3 4I, SHACKLETON:
I just want to extend our thanks, Ed, for all the time 5
y u've given us.
And we appreciate very much all the concentration 61 this has taken, in behalf of recall.
An'd I would appreciate, as you leave here and give more thought to this, that anything that may come 8
to your mind that would assist us in developing information to help 9l t
make nuclear power plants safer from this experience, that you would 10 give us a call, and I'll give you our number.
We're looking for any information that...you may recall now that we stimulated your mind and go back over the events of those first three days.
Is there anything, Ed, that you can think of, from your experience now, having gone through this unique experience in the nuclear power plant, that you 15i would make as recommendations to other facilities or to your own 16i company.
Anything you observed that you felt could have been done 17!
i differently to help bring about a plant to a safer point?
18l 19i FUHRER:
Not to my knowledge.
I'm not in a position where I can make 20l l
that determination I just don't know of anything that we could have 21 done..
22l 23 SHACKLETON:
Well, I'm relating also to systems that you work with, 24 storage tank capacity, interconnects between a dual plant such as you 25l have here at Three Mile Island.
4 l
l 2002 214
t 64 gj FUHRER:
The interconnects were--I think they've been a great help to f
us IN that they have given us a mechanism whereby we can get some of 2
the water out of the damaged unit and have it processed for disposal.
3 g
I guess one of the things that I'd have to make a comment on, since y u ask the question, is that--I guess, from my experience, more 5!
attention ought to be given towards some of the waste systems, both in their design and in their operation.
In general, they don't make 7
money for the company.
There're something you have to do to keep the plant running, but they're not generally a direct money maker.
And so 91 l
therefore, attention really isn't given to those systems until they're 10l t
a limiting factor in operation.
And I think people ought to pay more lli attention to those kind of things.
One of the things that you should 12!
definitely not do, and I think it's the failure of Metropolitan Edison and GPU, is to rely on a system that was designed for one unit operation 14I to handle the waste treatment capabilities of two units.
That's 15i essentially what we have in this case.
The unit 1 system was designed 16i for single unit operations by Gilbert Associates, and somebody evaluated 17 that system and determined that there was a significant excess capabil-18j ity there.
And in light of that they decided not to put that type of i
191 treatment system in Unit 2 and rather, rely on what was in Unit 1 for 20!
evaporation and for solid waste disposal.
And I would suggest that 21 j
that was, at least in retrospect, a poor choice.
As far as the tankage 22' is concerned I think that we had probably a significant amount of 23 l
tankage.
It was unfortunate that most of it was filled at the time 24 that the incident occurred.
25l 2002 215
f 65 r
1 lj SHACKLETON:
Thank you very much Mr. Fuhrer.
We appreciate your comments, and we'll close the interview at this time. Time is now 2
f 5:50 p.m. EDT,11ay 2,1979.
3j m
Si 6
i 7
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101 11l 12,!
13h 14) l 15!
16l 17 i
18!
19l 20f 21 22 23 24j 25i f
i 2002 216