ML19274G084
| ML19274G084 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 04/23/1979 |
| From: | Scheimann F METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7908290519 | |
| Download: ML19274G084 (54) | |
Text
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY CCMMISSION I
i l
h In the Matter of:
i 2l IE TMI INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW 31 of Mr. Frederick J. Scheimann, Jr.
l Shift Foreman in Operations 5l 6i 7l al Trailer #203 93 NRC Investigation Site
{
TMI Nuclear Power Plant 10!
Middletown, Pennsylvania 11!
April 23, 1979 12!
(Date of Interview) 13!
July 2. 1979 (Oate Transcrip Typea) 14; 55 lo!
(Tape Numcer(s))
16i 17
' S) 19j 20l i
21l
[-
NRC PERSONNEL:
'22' Mr. James S. Creswell 23[
Mr. Owen C. Shackleton 24$
i 25l 20g1 355 i
(
l, t
1!
SHACKLETON:
The time is 4:12 PM, April 23, 1979.
This is an interview i
2!
of Mr. Frederick J. Scheimann, Jr.
Mr. Scheimann is the Shift Foreman l
31 in Operations for the Metropolitan Edisor Company at Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant.
This interview is taking place in Trailer 203, 4j 5l which is located on Three Mile Island just south of the south gate of I
61 the nuclear power plant.
Present for this interview is Mr. William H.
7i Behrle, who is a Project Engineer for the Metropolitan Edison Company.
O gl Mr. Scheimann requested that Mr. Behrle be present for this interview.
gj Also present, conducting the interview for the United States Nuclear 10j Regulatory Commission, is Mr. James S. Creswell.
Mr. Creswell is a 11 Reactor Inspector in Region III.
The person speaking, the moderator i
12{
f r this interview, is Owen C. Shackleton.
I am an investigator for i
13l the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, assigned to Region V.
Prior g
to this interview, I presented to Mr. Scheimann, a two page document setting forth the scope and purpose and his rights regarding this
,o,
interview.
And at the end of this statement are three questions which 16; I would appreciate having Mr. Scheimann answer at this time.
Mr.
g Scheimann did you understand the two pages of the introduction to this 8
interview?
20j l
SCHEIMANN:
Yes I did.
21!
22l SCHACKLETON:
And do we have your permission to tape this interview?
l 24l 1
25i i
2001 356
)
i l
2 i
i 1!
SCHEIMANN:
Yes, you have.
2; 3l SHACK?.LTON:
And would you like a copy of the tape or transcript, or 4
both?
Si 6l SCHEIMANN:
I would like a copy of both.
7l l
3 SHACKLETON:
Alright.
Mr. Scheimann, for the purpose of the record gl and for the individual's who will be interested and listening to your testimony, would you please give us your background relating to your 10{
11 experience in the nuclear industry.
12l 13l ECHEIMANN:
My experience in the nuclear industry relates back to hovember 1964, when I went into the U.S. Navy.
From that point, I went through basic Nuclear Power School Prototype and I served on 3 Nuclear Power Submarines as an Electrical Operator.
From that point, 16i I came to Metropolitan Edison Company in March 1973, where I started as an Auxiliary "A" Operator and worked my way up to Control Room 18!
Operator.
In February of 1977, I was offered a Shift Foreman's job, g
which I accepted.
Training during that period, I had had 8 weeks at 20 j, l
the simulator training center in Lynchburg, Virginia, plus a very 21l 22,[
rigid company-administered training program.
I have passed both the i
senior and the reactor operators licensing exams.
23[
24l 25
i i
l 3
i l'
SHACKLETON:
Thank you very much.
Mr. Scheimann, in as much as you 2
were present on March 28, 1979, when the incident began to take place 3i here at Three Mile Island, we're very interested in every detail that 4{
you can recall, to the best of your recollection, that took place, i
Si starting when you came on watch on that day.
Would you please, to the l
Gi best of your recollection, tell us what transpired when you came on l
7l and what time did you come on duty on March 28, 1979.
8l 9
SCHEIMANN:
I came on duty March 28, 1979, but actually it was 11 PM 10l the night before.
I was on shift as the Duty Shift Foreman and through-11 out the course of the evening I made several plant tours in the Auxiliary 12 Building and also the Fuel Handling, Turbine Building areas.
At the 13l time of the incident, I was down in the basement of the Turbine Building, 1
281' elevation, up looking at a clogged resin problem for our polisher I
15; system.
At the time of the trip itself, I was up on top of the piping, 16i king at a site glass, and I heard a rumbling noise from pipes in 1
17!
the basement of the Turbine Building, at which time I got dcwn from the pipe area where I was at, just in time to hear the words passed, 18l 19l
" Turbine trip", and then " reactor trip" a few seconds later.
At this p int, I went up to the Control Room.
It took me approximately 3 20l minutes to get up to the Control Room, at which time I broke out the emergency procedure book for Reactor Trip and Turbine Trip, and asked I
the guys that were on with me whether they had completed the immediate actions.
Most of the immediate actions were being verified as taken, 24 l
25:
We proceeded to try and control the plant, as best as we could by our j
i e
l b
j 4
I 1!
indications.
At this time, I moved over to the pressurizer level in 2h Pressure Control Station...Let's see now.
At the time I come up, all l
3; of the condensate pumps, the booster pumps and the feed pumps had been 4j tripped, the emergency feed pumps were running.
There had been an ES Sj actuation.
Pressurizer level was stablized out around 150 to 160 1
6l inches and starting to rise again.
Pressurizer pressure, system 7
pressure was approximately 1100 to 1200 pounds at this point.
Frori 8
this point, the pressurizer pressure level continued going up.
We cot gj up to around 350 inches, and I was concerned about going solid in the 10 pressurizer.
Approximately 8 minutes, I would say, after the initit' 11:
trip, it was observed that EFV 12 A and B, which were the emergency i
12 feed isolation valves, were shut, causing us not to have any feed flow 13 to the generators.
We took and opened the valves, heard flow noises j
through the monitor that we keep in our control building area for atmosphere valve testing, and started to see level come up in the 15 generators.
About this time, I was noticing that the pressurizer was 16:
rapidly reaching a solid indication, and we backed off.
We took and g
overrid the emergency safeguards system to try and control the rate of increase of the pressurizer level.
In doing this, we took and we had 19:
throttled back completely on two of the emergency makeup valves to the 20j 21li reactor coolant makeup system, and we took off one makeup pump.
Pressurizer level was still going up, and we took and we backed down c2 flow on the other two 16 valves, emergency makeup valves, and about this time we were down to about 150 gallon a minute emergency makeup going into the pressurizer system.
And about this time, the pressurizer 25j was actually indicating solid conditions.
2001 3'9
i 5
i 11 CRESWELL:
Maybe this would be a good point, to go back to the point 2!
at which you entered the Control Room.
I have some pictures here that l
3j I have obtained from the Three Mile Island Training Staff, that I'm 4j showing te Mr. Scheimann now.
This first color photograph is a picture 5l of the Control Room, taken from the back of the Control Room and near l
6l the electrical panels.
I believe it would be correct in saying that 7
this is close to the Diesel Generator.
8 g
SCHEIMANN:
I would say that is true...by the view.
I 10!
illi CRESWELL:
Okay.
Now the opening that you came through would probably 12, be more directed toward the angle though looking from behind the 13 process computer.
14' SCHEIMANN:
I would have come up this way when I come in.
15 16:
CRESWELL.
Okay, and that indicates that you will have entered through i
the center of the room, behind the 2 or 3 desks trat are in the center g
of the Control Room.
Where were the people standing?
I believe that we have established that Mr. Faust, Mr. Frederick.
i 21l SCHEIMANN:
And Mr. Zewe were in the Control Room when I got up there.
I 23 CRESWELL:
Where were they located at the time you entered?
25j f
}00\\
t i
6 1
SCHEIMANN:
One of them was at the makeup pump station, one of them 2
was at.the area by the emergency feed pumps, and I'm not sure where 3
the third was but I believe he was over towards the condensate pumps.
4, 5
CRESWELL:
Okay, could you indicate which individuals were where, do 6
you recollect?
7 8
SCHEIMANN:
No, not to be honest with you, I couldn't.
i 9
CRESWELL:
Okay, so could you indicate any alarms that you saw whenever 101 I
y u came into the Contr.ol Room?
11l I
12' SCHEIMANN: When I came into the Control Room I saw that the rods were 13 14!
all at the bottom--that'd be on your Reactor Red Position panel.
I saw the Turbine Trip alarm.
15 16i CRESWELL:
On Which panel?
i 18l I
SCHEIMANN:
Which would of been over on Panel 17.
I believe I saw a 131 1 ss of feed pump suction pressure alarm.
0 21 CRESWELL:
Okay.
22 23 SCHEIMANN:
On both feed pumps, but as to any other ones that I could readily pick out, I really couldn't say.
i 25l t
I I
2002 001 l
4
7 1.
CRESWELL:
Okay.
So what were these individuals doing.
You said l
2' there was one individual over by the makeup pump at this point--do you 3
recollect what he was doing?
4 5
SCHEIMANN:
Ah, let me see...
l 6l 7
CRESWELL:
What panel is the makeup panel?
8 g
SCHEIMANN:
That would be back on this side here, back behind this i
gentlemen.
That's the ES panei.
Makeup system would be off to his 10l 11l side.
12l CRESWELL:
Okay, we can't locate that right away here, but anyway, you 13 141 can't recollect what the individual was doing on the makeup panel, 15 there was screbody at the emergency feedwater station?
l 16!
SCHEIMANN:
17 Yes, there was an operator at the emergency feed panel.
18l CRESWELL:
And it's somewhat over..
g 20 SCHEIMANN:
In the vicinity of the condensate pump panel.
22 CRESWELL:
And what panel would that have been?
24l 25 l
I 2002 002 l
.l
8 1
SCHEIMANN:
The panel for the condensate pumps would have been this 2,
one here, but way over to the side.
That's the makeup panel there.
3 That's emergency feed, okay, the condensate pump area would of been 4
right over there.
1 5
6 CRESWELL:
Ar.d that woul d of been what panel?
7 8
SCHEIMANN:
That would be Panel 5.
9 10 CRESWELL:
Okay, so what did you do after you came into the Control Room?
11 12!
SCHEIMANN:
When I come into the Control Room, I reached over on the 13, Control Room operator's desk and broke out the emergency procedures, 15l and went to the reactor trip procedure.
i 16l CRESWELL:
Could you indicate which desk that that would have been g
cated in?
18 l
19l SCHEIMANN:
I believe t!.at would have been right on the CRO's desk, 20 right at the front of the console.
22 CRESWELL.
Okay.
24 25f i
~2002.003
e 9
1 SCHEIMANN:
For immediate use.
'2!
l' 3
CRESWELL:
Alright.
That's a single desk that's facing toward where 4
the Shift Engineer would normally be.
5 6
SCHEIMANN:
True.
7 8
CRESWELL:
Okay.
So you took out the procedures did you sit down or g
stand up?
10 SCHEIMANN:
I was standing at the time.
I opened up the procedure to 11 check and see if we have gotten all our immediate actions done, and 12 then after that I proceeded over to the pressurizer level control 13 station.
p i
15!
CRESWELL:
Which you would have to have turned around, 3pproxi-6 mately...
18!
SCHEIMANN:
I would have had to t'~rn around, maybe about 2 or 3 feet.
l 20f CRESWELL:
Okay.
And what did you do upon arrival at that station?
22 SCHEIMABN:
Upon arrival at that pressure control station, I was observing pressurizer level and system pressure, during the course of the transient that we were involved in.
25 2002 004 f
(
10 1
CRESWELL:
Okay.
2 3
SCHEIMANN:
At this time pressurizer level, when I first got in there, 4
was still coming down slowly, but with the high pressure injection it
~
5 was starting to turn and eventually come back, start rising again.
6 7
CRESWELL:
Did you give any instructions to anyone at this point, or 8
discuss this?
9 SCHEIMANN:
I had made ccmment, I believe, that the reactor coolant 10 11 system pressurizer level was starting to restore and was responding to 12 the increased makeup, however, pressure was seeming to hold steady at 13 around, oh I'd say around 1100 or 1200 pounds.
I wasn't seeing any
- Q increase in that.
I 15!
CRESWELL:
Do you remember discussing this with anybody at the makeup 6
controls,.nakeup pump controls?
)
18l l
SCHEIMANN:
Um, I might have said something, but I really can't recall
- 191, it at the present.
21 CRESWELL:
Okay.
So what was the next thing that happened that you recall?
23 24 25 2002 005
11 1
SCHEIMANN:
The next thing that
- z. call, we were starting to increase 21 in pressurizer level.
It was coming up at a pretty good clip.
And I, 3
at that time, had mentioned something to the operator off to the side 4
of me, that my pressurizer level was ccming off, let's cut back on 5
high pressure injection, because I was approximately 340 - 350 inches.
6 7
CRESWELL:
You don't recall who that was that was at the makeup panel?
8 g
SCHEIMANN:
No, I could make a guess but I'm not really convinced that 10 I'm sure of who it was.
11 CRESWELL:
Okay.
If you were guessing, who would you say it was?
12 13 SCHEIMANN:
I think it was probably Ed.
14 I
15i l
CRESWELL:
Ed Frederick?
16f l
17
" "^""*
18 19 Y'
20 21 SCHEIMANN:
Okay, at which time we took and started coming back on--we took and bypassed the ES condition, started throttling back.
24 25 l
l 2002 006
12 1
CRESWELL:
Let me ask you, if you could, to point out on this photograph 2
what would be necessary to bypass?
3 4.
SCHEIMANN:
Well, we'd have to go over to the next drawing you had of 5
the ES Console there.
6 7
CRESWELL:
And this would be panel...?
8 g
SCHEIMANN:
It would be on Panel 3.
10 CRESWELL:
3.
Okay.
11 12 SCHEIMANN:
I think you just had it back there.
Is that the right one 13 I want?
p I
15i CRESWELL:
Yah.
16 I
17 SCHEIMANN:
8l Okay, the top section here would be your high pressure injection control console.
Once you had the actuation, you would have 19l l
your channel trip light.
And we had all six of them, all the way 20l across.
21 22 CRESWELL:
All 6 channels, Okay.
24 25 i
2002 007 i
i f
o
13 1
SCHEIMANN:
Yes, so we had both actuations were fully initiated.
I 2!
3l CRESWELL:
And that was less than 1600 pounds.
4l 5
SCHEIMANN:
Less than 1600 pounds in the system.
6 7
CRESWELL:
Okay.
8 g
SCHEIMANN:
In order to take and bypass at the feed, which you normally 10 w uld do on a normal cooldown, you merely have to go to your channel 11l reset, or, wait a second.
i 12l CRESWELL:
Just take your time, now.
13 I
14!
SCHEIMANN-15!
You would normally go to your bypass pushbutton.
16l CRESWELL:
That's the yellow one.
1SI SCHEIMANN:
That's the yellow one.
And by depressing that, you would gl 20!
21, CRESWELL:
Okay. Do Can you recall who did this?
23 SCHEIMANN:
Nt, I don't for sure.
25!
i I
14 1
CRESWELL:
Okay.
Were all six buttons pushed?
2!
3 SCHEIMANN:
I really could not swear to it one way or another.
4l 5
CRESWELL:
Okay.
6 7
SCHEIMANN: We had to have gotten at least 2 out of 3 on each case.
8 g
CRESWELL:
Would you you didn't personnally push them?
10' SCHEIMANN:
No, I didn't push them.
11, 12 CRESWELL:
13 Okay, so what--now we're to the point where the emergency Ig cora injection--
15l A
g pressure injecdon.
16l 17 CRESWELL:
High Diessure injection was bypassed by pressing these 18f yellow buttons.
i 19i 20 SCHEIMANN:
Let me get this point clear right here though, by bypascing those buttons, it did not stop the injection flow.
It merely gave you manual control.
23 24 25l l
\\
l 2002 009 4
i f
15 1.
CRESWELL:
Manual control of what?
I 2
3 SCHEIMANN:
At no time was ES totally bypassed.
4 5
CRESWELL:
Okay.
But it would give you manual control.
6 7
SCHEIMANN:
This would give us manual control to enable us to throttle 8
back on flow to meet the desired amount of flow.
9 10 CRESWELL:
Okay, but when you say " throttling back flow", is that by 11 manipulating a valve?
12!
SCHEIMANN:
Yes, it is by manipulating control valves located on the 13 console 3.
14 i
15!
CRESWELL:
And their names are?
16j 17l SCHEIMANN:
MUV 16 A, B, C and D.
1g, i
191 20
, if we could go back in time and pickup the time where the bypass buttons were pushed, what would be the next thing that was done?
22 23 SCHEIMANN:
The next thing that would have been done probably would have been, if I remember right, was the start of the letdown flow going, so we could relieve the increase in pressurizer le/el.
i 2002 010 i
t l
16 1
CRESWELL:
Okay.
2 3
SCHEIMANN:
Because, due to the ES, our letdown line-up got terminated 4
by the actual ES actuation.
5 6
SHACKLETON:
Perhaps if, could you define, for those people who aren't 7
familiar with the terms, what ES means.
8 SCHEIMANN:
ES is Emergency Safeguards actuation system.
g 10 CRESWELL:
Okay.
So would you continue then.
11 12 SCHEIMANN:
Okay.
When we realized that we were up far in pressurizer 13 y
level, so in order to take and assist in reducing the level, we had to establish our letdown flow path, which was isolated for us on the 15 actuation of the Emergency Safeguard System.
So once we got manual control back in the system, we increased letdown ficw or established it and increased it to the Nximum capability of what we could possibly do for the temperature conditions and the flow paths we had available.
19l l
This seemed to be, for awhile, tending to hold pressurizer level where it was, up around 385 inches.
22 CRESWELL:
Okay.
Do you remember who made that manipulation on the letdown flow?
24 25 i
2002 011 i
t i
17 1,
SCHEIMANN:
I adjusted the letdown flow.
I was adjusting the letdown 2
flow-3 4
CRESWEll)
Could you indicate on this photograph here, what sort of 5
controls you would to manipulate to do that?
6l 7
SCHEIMANN:
Okay...
8 CRESWELL:
This is a photograph...in the area of the letdown cr lers, g
10 the graphics on the control panel?
11.
SCHEIMANN:
Okay.
The first one we had to get open was MUV376 there, 12 because it--oops (Coffee Spilled?).
You got king of a stain there...But 13 MUV376 is a letdown isolation valve, the valve I was referring to which closed on the ES signal.
We had to open that up t.] establish letdown flow.
At the time, if I remember correctly, we had both intermediate closed letdown coolers in service, so it's just a matter l
of going over to the right of the MUV376 valve, and we have a control
,gI station for our letdown valve.
19 20 CRESWELL:
Okav.
21
~
Could we wait just a minute until I locate that i
particular drawing?
22' 23 SCHEIMANN:
It would be up above that...No, that's seal injection.
24 25j i
k l
2002 012 i
I
18 1!
CRESWELL:
If you see it here why...
l 2'
l 3-SCHEIMANN:
That's from Reactor Building emergency cooling.
It should 4
be right off to the right of this section.
That would be it there.
5 61 CRESWELL:
Okay, can we run back over that?
7 8
SCHEIMANN:
Okay.
We have MUV5.
Okay, at the time that I took and g
reopened MUV376, I believe I had both cf my letdown coolers in service, 10 which would have given me a maximum letdown flow of approximately 140 11 gallon a minute with both strings in operation.
In order to contrcl letdown flow, I had to increase on my setting on the valve MUVS, which bypasses the letdown orifice.
I adjusted flow on that until I was at 13 appr ximately 120 gallon a minute letdown.
And I let her maintain 14!
there and I observed that pressurizer level, at least for the time 15 being, tended to turn and not go up as rapidly any longer.
16i 17l CRESWELL:
Okay.
181 19 SCHEIMANN:
From here, we went to the point where we took off one of 20l the makeup pumps.
21!
22 CRESWELL:
And when you say "we"...
24 25j i
l 2002 013 i
19 1
SCHEIMANN:
Well, myself and the operator beside me.
2 3
CRESWELL:
Okay.
4 i
Sj SCHEIMANN:
I directed him to one of them off.
l 6l 7
CRESWELL:
Okay.
Now, let me see if I can find that particular photo-8
!aaph so that...
9 10 SCHEIMANN:
You had it right there, the page before.
Okay, the makeup I'
11 pump control switches are there.
12 CRESWELL:
Okay, and which pump was it that...
13 i
14i SCHEIMANN:
I'm not absolutely sure which one we took off, anymore.
15 i
16!
y7{
CRESWELL:
Okay.
18t SCHEIMANN:
I know we had two of them for the ES actuation, and then 19l we throttled back on the 16's on the C and D side, I believe it was.
and then we took off one 'of the makeup pumps, which would have prob.cly had to been either the B or the C.
23 CRESWELL:
But you don't recollect, at this point?
25j i
2002 014 l
1
20 1
SCHEIMANN:
No, not right at the moment, which one exactly it was.
2 3
CRESWELL:
O kay.
4 5
SCHEIMANN:
And we did take one off and we throttled flow further on 6
the 16s for the other pump.
7 8
CRESWELL:
Okay.
9 SCHEIMANN:
And at this time the makeup tank level, I mean the pressurizer 10 11!
level was holding fairly constant around 385, and then it started i
12f creeping up on us again.
131 i
CRESWELL:
So at this point, was there one pump?
14j l
15l SCHEIMANN:
There was one makeup pump running--I believe it would of 16!
been somewhere in the vicinity of 200 gallon a minute flow through the high pressure injection lines.
18 19l g
I'd like to speak or address the 16 valve controller photograph.
CRESWELL:
It will take just a minute to locate that.
22 SCHEIMANN:
That's ES actuation...
23 24 25'
}
2002 015
21 l
I 1l CRESWELL:
O kay.
2 3
SCHEIMANN:
...Same...Same there.
4 5
CRESWELL:
Here's a 16. valve, isn't it?
6 7
SCHEIMANN:
16 is down below that.
It would be off to the left hand 8
side of the pumps...There's no 16s ther's, that's just the makeup g
tank... seal injection... The 16s would be--here's two of tnem right here.
10 11 CRESWELL:
Okay.
And what would be necessary, what would you have to 12 d t throttle these as you stated?
13 I
14l SCHo rMANN:
As flow was increased, I would have to go to the closed.
15 6f p sition on the switch.
17 CRESWELL:
Okay.
18l l
19l l
SCHEIMANN:
Merely by turning to the closed position.
It's a job 20!
I valve and as soon as you release contact in the switch, the valve 21l positions stops changing.
23 CRESWELL:
Okay.
Now what about the conditions of the lights.
We l
have indicated here a green light and a red light?
251 i
l 2002 016 L
i
22 1
SCHEIMANN:
The green light would indicate that the valve is in the 2
shut position, the red light would indicate that it's in the fully 3
open position.
4 5
CRESWELL:
Okay.
6 7
SCHEIMANN:
If you had both lights in your throttle position, you 8
w uld have both tne red and green, in this particular case.
9 CRESWELL:
Do yo recall seeing the green lights as the flow was being 10 adjusted?
11 l
12{
SCHEIMANN:
Not right off the bat, not until we took them and shut 13 down one side.
15 CRESWELL:
When you say " shutdown onside"
..?
161 17!
I SCliEIMANN:
When we shut the 12, or when we shut the 16s and took off 181 l
the makeup pump.
19l l
20!
CRESWELL:
Okay.
So, could you tell me about what time period, related to pressurizer level increase, that you had taken off the pump and saut both--
23 24!
25 i
l l
2002 00 i
i
23 1{
SCHEIMANN:
One side.
That would be, like I was saying, when we at 2
approximately 385 inches in the pressurizer.
3 4
CRESWELL:
Okay.
5 6l SCHEIMANN:
When we took in, isolated one side--Well, we didn't isolate 7
but we shut the 16s and took off a pump.
8 gj CRESWELL:
So you would have the green light indication--
10l 11l SCHEIMANN:
Right.
12,l CRESWELL:
On two--
13 14!
SCHEIMANN:
On two of the four valves.
15 16l CRESWELL:
Okay.
What about the other 2 valves?
g 18l SCHEIMANN:
The other two valves, at this point, were still in their fully open position, and the A pump was still running, I believe it 20f was the A.
21 22 CRESWELL:
Okay.
Now let's just stay with the makeup pumps for awhile.
Let's forget what else goes on.
When is your next recollection of any 24l change in that valve lineup, regarding the 16 valves or another pump 25(
starting or stopping?
2002 018 i
t 24 1.
SCHEIMANN:
To my knowledge, the next time I saw and it we did anything 2-with the 16s was a little while later.
We were still approaching a 3
solid indication on the pressurizer and we started to throttle back on 4
16B, I believe it was.
5}
l 6l CRESWELL:
Okay.
7 g
SCHEIMANN:
At this point, we still hadn't changed any other pump gp configuration. And to my knowledge, for the rest of the time we I
hadn't.
10 11 CRESWELL:
Okay.
So that would be, then you had one valve--
12 13 y
SCHEIMANN:
That was fully open and the other one was being throttled 15 i
16i CRESWELL:
Okay.
g 18f I
SCHEIMANN:
Which still would have given us total of at least 125 191 20l 21' CRESWELL:
Okay.
As the 16 valves were being adjusted, did you notice any change in the rate of increase in the pressurizer level?
24 25 i
i 2002 019 I
25 1
SCHEIMG4N:
If I did, it wasn't very dramatic.
21 3
CRESWELL:
Okay. Sh, so we have, at this point in time, we have three 4
of the 16 valves fully clo sed, showing green indications, and one 5
other valve--
6 7
SCHEIMANN:
we, didn't have three fully closed.
We just throttled g
back on the 168, at this point.
We only had 2 fully closed, we had 1 g
partially open, and 1 fully open.
10 CRESWELL:
Okay.
I'm sorry.
I didn't mean putting words in your 11 m uth.
Yo; correct me if I do misrepresent something.
Okay, so what 12l happens next?
13 14!
SCHEIMANN: Well, next is about the point where we observed that we 15 were at the full solid condition.
6 17
'8l
^
19' SCHEIMANN:
Or at least by our indications.
i 21!
CRESWELL:
What would you consider that to be, in inches?
23 SCHEIMANN:
Probably 400 inches.
25 2002 020 h
li
26 1
CRESWELL:
400 inches.
2' 3
SCHEIMANN:
Is the highest on our scale.
4 CRESWELL:
Okay.
5 6
SCHEIMANN:
And ou'r scale reads 0" to 400".
7 8
CRESWELL:
And then, what is the condition of the 16 valves there?-
gj l
10 SCHEIMANN:
At that point, if I remember right, we still had 16A full 7
open and we're still throttled on 16B.
We were trying to approach, we were approaching a closed position on one of the 16s.
14!
CRESWELL:
Okay.
But you haven't received a green light yet?
15:
16i i
SCHEIMANN:
Well, we had the green light there on the whole thing.
We 17l had red and green combinations, as I was saying, in any intermediate 18l position you will have, on the 16s, a red and green light.
20 CRESWELL:
Okay.
The red light hadn't gone out yet.
21 22 SCHEIMANN:
Right, the red light hadn't been out yet, to my knowledge.
23 24 25; I
2002 021 1
i
(
27 1
CRESWELL:
But you had seen the red light go out on--
2' 3
SCHEIMANN:
Yes, on the two of T. hem, there was strictly a green light.
4 5
gACKLETON:
Gentlemen, if we can just take a minute while we just 6l change the tape to the other side.
The time is now 4:41 PM, April 23, 7
1979.
8 g
SHACKLETON:
This is a continuation of the interview with Mr. Frederick 10 J. Scheimann, Jr.
The time is now 4:42 PM, April 23, 1979.
Please continue.
11, I
12!
CRESWELL:
Okay, Fred, let's ge back to the point where you said that 13 y u had 4 inches in the pressurizer and if you--
14 l
15i H MANN 0 inches.
i 16 17 CRESWELL:
400 inches, sorry, in the pressurizer--could you go down 8{
once again, the status of the lights on the 16 valves?
i 19!
20 SCHEIMANN:
At the time when I noticed that we had 400 inches, I believe MUV16 C and 0 were in the shut position, 16A was open, and 168 was partially open with the red and green light showing.
24 25 l
l 2002 022 i
l l
28 1,
CRESWELL:
Okay.
2!
3 SCHEIMANN:
Again, I could be mistaken, you know, time frame and all.
4 5
CRESWELL:
Sure, sure, we just can appreciate that.
Now, what is the 6l next thing that happens, as far as makeup system is concerned?
7 8
SCHEIMANN:
As far as the makeup system is concerned, at this point gj when I was seeing solid indications, I would have chought I should of i
10' seen also an ir crease in my pressurizer pressure, system pressure, 11; which I wasn't seeing.
Pressure held constant for a good length of time at about 1100 or 1200 pounds.
13 h
CRESWELL:
Okay.
Had you looked at pressure while the pressurizer level was going up?
15 16l SCHEIMANN:
I was observing pressure and level.
They're right fairly ci se, similar location to each other.
8j I
19j CRESWELL:
Okay.
So you had looked at pressure--what was it doing while the pressurizer level was going up?
22 SCHEIMANN:
The pressure had been fairly well constant during the whole time, once we had the initial drop in pressure.
25!
2002 023
29 l
If CRESWELL:
Okay.
So we're at a point in time where the pressure drop, 2
the pressurizer is indicating 400 inches.
3 4.
SCHEIMANN:
True.
5 6l CRESWELL:
And that the pressure--
i 7
8 SCHEIMANN: Was holding relatively constant at around 1100 - 1200 gl pounds.
10 CRESWELL:
Okay.
What's the next thing that happens to the makeup 11!
i 12l system?
13 y
SCHEIMANN:
I'm not really sure when, but I'm sure we must have, at this point, gone off of this a high pressure injection system, and we 15 had to stay on with makeup pump for seals, and then I think we went to 16; 7l{
our normal pressurizer makeup valve.
Again--
18{
i CRESWELL:
You said you went off the--
19!
20\\
SOEiMANN:
Off the high pressurizer injection.
22 CRESWELL:
What did you mean by that?
24 25j i
2002 024 i
i t
i I
30 1
SCHEIMANN:
Well, what I meant by that was, we probably had taken and 2
closed 16 A and B and went on normal makeup, which would have been the 3
MUV18, 17 valve.
4 5
CRESWELL:
Let's see if we can find those.
6 7
SCHEIMANN:
That's seal injection there...We had to keep seals available 8
to us...It would be over on panel 4.
Right there is pressurizer level g
control, off to the left, and that controls MUV17, which is the normal 10 makeup valve, based on pressurizer level.
11 CRESWELL:
12 Okay, new again, could you say-you made the comment you 13 went off high pressure injection and onto the ncrmal makeup.
Could p
you go through again, what valve changes would be necessary for that?
15l 1gj SCHEIMANN:
The valve changes that would have been necessary in this g
case, would have been to take and close down on the MUV'6s, and then w 're in automatic control yet on MUV17 so we would have had to have 8
taken and gone on to manual control on that.
At this time, with pressurizer level being up so high, Ml!V17 would have been in closed position.
22 CRESWELL:
Okay.
Would that have been as a result of the Engincaring--
24 25l 2002 025 i
i
i 31 1
SCHEIMANN:
Do to the high level--no, due to the high level, the i
2 MUV17s would have been closed.
3 4
CRESWELL:
Okay.
Fine.
5 6
SCHEIMANN:
The only valve on.that lineup that would have been affected 7
by the Engineeren Safeguards Actuation would have been MUV18, which is 8
the block valve for the 17.
9 10 CRESWELL: What would have happened to--
11l' SCHEIMANN:
It would have gone closed.
12l 13 14l CRESWELL:
Okay.
Now, to go back, when you started opening the 17 15 valves, what would have been the condition of the indicating lights on 16l the 16 valves?
17, SCHEIMANN:
I believe they would have been green.
7g 19f CRESWELL:
All shut.
Oj 21f f
SCHEIMANN:
All shut.
23 CRESWELL:
Okay.
So you go over...this is you now?
25 l
l l
2002 026 i
i
e 32 1,
SCHEIMANN:
i really don't recall whether I did it or whether I had 2
somebody else.
3 4
CRESWELL:
Do you recall whether you gave anybody instructions to do 5
it?
6 7
SCHEIMANN:
No, I don't, at this time.
8 g
CRESWELL:
Okay. Sh, so the next thing you recollect was that the 17 10 valves were open.
11!
SCHEIMANN:
There's only one 17 valve, and it was closed as a result 12 of the high level--
'13 14 CRESWELL:
High level.
16i gl SCHEIMANN:
In the pressurizer.
18f I
CRESWELL:
What about the block valve--was it open?
191 l
20 SCHEIMANN:
The block valve, we had to open.
22 CRESWELL:
Okay.
Would you have opened the block before the 17 valve?
24 25 l
2002 027 l
i r
f,
33 1
SCHEIMANN:
Most assuredly.
l 2l 3 :
CRESWELL:
Okay.
4 5
SCHEIMANN:
Otherwise it wouldn't have done you any good to open the 6
17.
Besides that, we didn't open the 17 right away anyhow, because we 7
were already up high in level.
8 g
CRESWELL:
Okay.
10 SCHEIMANN:
At that time, we had seal injection going in.
11 12{
CRESWELL: What would have been the condition of the block valve, 13 that's the 18--
14!
15i 7gl SCHEIM_ ANN:
MUV18?
I 17l CRESWELL: Would it have been open then, giving a red light after you 18l
^
opened it?
g 20j SCHEIMANN:
After we opened it, it would have given a red light indication.
22 CRESWELL:
Okay.
And the 17 valve wouldn't have been oran?
24!
l 25l l
2002 028 3
i,
34 1
SCHEIMANN:
No, It wouldn't have been opened because it was still in 2l automatic yet and high level would have caused for the valve to be 3
shut.
f.
5 CRESWELL:
Can you override the high level signal?
6 7
SCHEIMANN:
We can override that by going to manual on the control 8
station for the valve and then manually using our throttle switch to gj control the valve position.
I 101 CRESWELL:
But your recollection is, with this high level situation, 11 that it wasn't open at this pofnt?
12 13 SCHEIMANN:
No, it wasn't open at this point.
At this point, we were engaged in trying to reduce level in the pressurizer, not build it up.
15 i
16l CRESWELL:
So, at this point in time, had no high pressure injection or no makeup ficw into the reactor?
18l l
19l l
SCHEIMANN:
20 did have makeup flow in, by means of the reactor coolant pump seals.
22!
CRESWELL:
Oh, okay.
24 2002 029 i
l i
I i
I
I i
35 1:
SCHEIMANN:
The reactor coolant pumps seals, you would have approximately l
2' 8 and 9 gallon a minute going into the RCS system frcm the pump seals.
3 4
CRESWELL:
Per pump?
I 3
61 SCHEIMANN:
Per pump.
I 7'
8 CRESWELL:
Okay.
9 SCHEIMANN:
10l So we would have had approximately 36 gallon a minute 11 g ing in yet.
I 12!
CRESWELL:
Okay.
Now, what's the next thing that--well, let me ask 13 ig you this--does anything happen to, like the seal water return valves, during the engineering safety feature actuation?
15 16:
17l SCHEIMANN:
No.
18 CRESWELL:
Are any of those valves--
l 20 (CHEIMANN:
No, I don't believe so.
21' 22 CRESWELL:
Okay, those valves stay open--
24
?.5 2002 030 i
f
l 36 1.
SCHEIMANN:
It would close strictly if you lo-t seal injection and 2
lost makeup, I mean, intermediate close.
But on an ES, on the 1600 3
pound actuation system, I don't believe they do anything.
i 4l a
CRESWELL:
Okay, so there was, during this period of time, no manipula-61 tions required for the seal injection valves?
7 SCHEIMANN:
No, act that I can recall, no.
8 I
9 CRESWELL:
Okay. Well, what is the next thing that you r-2.
i, as far 10 17 as the makeup system or the high pressure injection?
12l 13j SCHEIMANN: Well, it seems to me, I can recall that we sat there for quite awhile with pressurizer level up at the high end and pressure 15!
holding constant at around 1100 to 1200 pounds.
And it sort of, like stablized out right where it was at.
Periodically, I could, by use of 16{
the letdown system, get pressurizer level back down into a visible I
range; however, it just wouldn't seem to stay there.
It would drift 18[
19ll down a little bit, then would go back up again.
20 CRESWELL:
What would seem to be, what was causing that?
22 SCHEIMANN:
At this time, I really had no idea what was causing it.
24 25 i
i l
l i
37 1
CRESWELL:
Okay.
Anyway, there wasn't any valve or pump change?
2, 3
SCHEIMANN:
No, no, not at this time.
The only thing we were doing at 4l this time, as far as pressurizer was concerned, was adjusting letdown.
5 6
CRESWELL:
Okay.
7 g
SCHEIMANN:
In hopes that we could get the level down.
9 10 CRESWELL:
When do you recollect that any valving changes were made, 11!
as far as makeup or high pressure injection?
12' SCHEIMANN:
Oh gee, I really don't recall.
13 I
14i CRESWELL:
Okay.
But it would have been a considerable time?
15 16i SCHEIMANN:
Yes, it would have been.
77 18(
CRESWELL:
Like a half hour or hour?
g I
20t 21jl SCHEIMANN:
Again, I really couldn't say because time, in a case like that, really don't mean a hell of a lot to a person.
22 23 CRESWELL:
Okay.
Now, what else was going on in the Control Room.
Let's get back a way?
2002 032
38 l!
SCHEIMANN:
In the Control Room, we were--at the same time, one of the 2
people was trying to see why the steam generator levels was going down i
3 yet on the secondary side. We had indication that both motor drive 4
emergency feed pumps had started, steam driven had started.
We had 5
pressure indication, showing that they were actually running, but yet 6
steam generator levels were still coming down.
7 8
CRESWELL:
Now these would be indicated on Panel 4?
i 9j SCHEIMANN:
That's affirmative.
Your two motor driven feedpumps would 10 11!
be right there.
You would have red and green lights for them, as well i
77l as an amber light.
SCHEIMANN:
Both of those were showing running, 13 due to the red lights showing on ti.e console.
Your steam driven 14!
emer'gency feedpump control valve is located right there.
Your two 15 steam supply valves are located right there, one on top of the other.
l 16l
_CRESWELL:
What would the indication lights have been?
g l
18j l
SCHEIMANN:
The indication lights on those would have been red in this 19j l
condition.
20!
21 CRESWELL:
Okay.
23 SCHEIMANN:
Okay, you have amps for the two emergency motor driven, which looked to be approximately normal.
I ca l
l 2002 033 s
i s1
39 1[
CRESWELL:
Okay.
I 2
3 SCHEIMANN:
You have pressure for the steam driven, and I believe 4j these are pressure for the motor driven.
5 6
CRESWELL:
Okay.
7 8
SCHEIMANN:
And they appeared to be in the normal region.
So, from 9
all indication, we should of been feeding.
10 CRESWELL:
Okay. When was it first recognized that there was something lli abnormal wrong, or something abnormal with the emergency feed system?
12 I
131 14f SCHEIMANN:
I would say it was probably 5 or 6 minutes into the thing that we noticed that we were having difficulties because levels kept 15l coming down.
16i l
17 CRESWELL:
In the steam--
18(
l 19!
i SCHEIMANN:
In the steam generators.
20,,
21 CRESWELL:
Okay.
23 SCHEIMANN:
And it was approximately 8 minutes into it that we found the 12, EFV12 shut.
20 2002 034 i
i l
I
40 1:
CRESWELL:
Could you indicate where EFV12 is?
2, 3
SCHEIMANN:
Okay, EFV12A and B are located right next to the main 4l steam supplies for the emergency steam driven feed pump.
5 6
CRESWELL:
Okay.
And at titat time, while they were shut, the lights 7
would have been what color?
8 gj SCHEIMANN:
They would have been green at that time.
10 CRESWELL:
Okay.
Did you have a chance to look over there at the j
12 panel at those valves?
13 SCHEIMANN:
I myself, personally, did not.
g 15!
CRESWELL:
Okay.
Du you know who was over at the panel at that time?
16{
17
- 9 18 19l CRESWELL:
Okay.
What's the next thing that you remember?
21f SCHEIMANN:
I can remember hearing somebody say that the 12s are shut.
23 CRESWELL:
Okay.
25' l
2002 035 i
t i
41 SCHEIMANN:
So at that point Bill Zewe, I believe, told them to open l{
2 them, which he was already doing at the time.
3 4
CRESWELL:
Okay.
5 6
SCHEIMANN:
As soon as he noticed, he yelled out they were shut and he 7
went and opened up on them, at which time, we had a speaker that was 8
located right behind this chart, and--
9l 10f CRESWELL:
You're indicating at the top of the 4 panel.
11!
SCHEIMANN:
Top of the 4 panel, correct--that we had hooked up to a 12 13 sound system rigged in our control building area, and the steam emergency feed lines go right through that same area.
And when he opened up on 14 15 the 12s, we definitely heard distinct flow noise going through the I
PIP "9' 16 17l CRESWELL:
What did it sound like to you?
18 19f SCHEIMANN:
Sounded like a real big rush of water or steam, a loud 20 blowing noise.
22 CRESWELL:
Okay.
24 25 2002 036
42 1;
SCHEIMANN:
In some short period of time after that, they were beginning 2'
to observe that they had some level increase, finally.
3 1
4 CRESWELL:
Level increase--
i 5
6 SCHEIMANN:
In the steam generators, and also that pressure was coming 7
back down to where it should have been.
I believe at the beginning of g
it when we found valves shut, we were at about a thcusand pounds on gl the secondary side of the steam generator.
I 10l CRESWELL:
At the poir.t where you found the 12 valves were shut, there 11 12 was a thousand pounds of pressure--
t 13[
SCHEIMANN:
I believe so.
I 15 !.
CRESWELL:
In the steam generators.
Ok, so what happens next?
6 i
17 SCHEIMANN:
Hell, we started regaining level.. 0h gee, what did happen 8
l after this.
19i i
20 CRESWELL:
Just take your time a minute and collect your thoughts.
l 22\\
l SCHEIMANN:
We started restoring feed watar by use of the emergency feed system and we were observing an increase in level in the steam generator.
At this time, back over on the primary side, we were still I
e j
2002 037
43 1
up somewhat in the 400 inch level o- +5e pressurizer level and pressure 2
was still holding at about 1100 pounds y- -- 11, 1200 pounds.
3 4
CRESWELL:
Wr, that ycu t!.. was looking at that?
5 6
SCHEIMANN:
That was myself that was over there at that area.
7 8
CRESWELL:
So you would be on the far left side of the 4 panel.
91 i
10 SCHEIMANN:
Right.
That was where I was at the time.
11l i
CRESWELL:
And Craig would more than.likely at the--
12{
13 SCHEIMANN:
He was at the far right side.
I believe that Ed might 14, 15 have moved over to back him up at that point, when he was saying that the 12s were shut.
16 17l CRESWELL:
Okay.
18l 19!
SCHEIMANN:
Because as far as this was concerned, over on the left 20l hand side where I was at, we were in a fairly stable configuration, as far as anything changing.
23 CRESWELL:
Okay, so you were over at the far left of the 4 panel, looking at pressurizer level and pressure, and then what happens?
2002 038 l
44 1
SCHEIMANN:
Hell, about this time, if I recall right, we started 2
seeing other people showing up--other supervisors, like one from Unit 3l 1 and one of '.he plant superintendents.
SCHEIMANN:
I believe he 4l showed up within about 20 minutes after being called.
And we were 5
discussing amongst ourselves what our next move was to be.
And one of 6
the concerns--
7 3
CRESWELL:.Were the reactor coolant pumps running at this time?
9 SCHEIMANN:
There were still running at this point.
One of the concerns 101 I
11' was that we were starting to see an increase in reactor building 12 pressure, and it was for nr accountable reason.
13 CRESWELL:
How would you have an indication of that on the control p
panel?
15 16;
[
SCHEIMANN:
Okay, over on panel 3, we have two chart recorders... Yeah, that looks like them there.
8j 19l
,, I CRESWELL:
You are indicating BIN 35.
c0 21 SCHEIMANN:
R. B. pressure--widerange, narrowrange.
Those are the two recorders.
23 24 25; 2002 039 I
i
[a
45 CRESWELL:
Okay.
1, 2,
3 SCHEIMANN:
We were starting to see a slow upward trend on building 4
pressure.
In fact, at one time, if I am not mistaken, it got up to 4 5
pound range where it actually gave us a containment isolation signal.
6 7l CRESWELL:
But that was more than likely later?
I 8
SCHEIMANN:
That was sometime later.
g I
10l 11' CRESWELL:
Okay.
12' SCHEIMANN:
13 But as we werd observing that go up--I'm trying to think f what else happened in this time frame here.
I am trying to think 14!
f e u "a
solating Ge B steam generator, because seeing 15 that pressure was orie of the reasons why we isolated it.
We suspected we had a problem with the steam generator.
18j CRESWELL:
What would that problem have been, you know, what could 19!
you--
21 SCHEIMANN:
Possibly a leak in it.
2002 040 I
CRESWELL:
Where?
24l 25{
t t
I i
46 1
SCHEIMANN:
I am not really sure myself on taat, but we suspected we 2
had a problem with it, I think, because we were getting, we had--I 3
don't know if we had that VAR 748 alarm yet or not.
I believe it was 4
a consensus of opinion that we had a problem with the generator, and 5
we bottled it up as far as feed and steam to the generator, the B 6
side.
At that point I remembered seeing a decrease in the reactor 7
building pressure, very slight decrease, but it had turned, no longer g
went up, and started decreasing again.
9 CRESWELL:
Okay, what did you attribute that to?
10l lij 12.
SCHEIMANN:
I, myself, thought that when we isolated the generator, we might have stopped the leak.
13 14!
15l CRESWELL: What would have been necessary--
i 16' SCHEIMANN:
It could have been a steam leak, it could have been anything inside the building.
18!
19 CRESWELL: What would have been necessary to have isolated the steam 20i 21;l generator? Would that have been on the panel 5?
t 22!
SCHEIMANN:
Some of it would have been--well, initially we isolated, 23 lets see, 5... yeah, it would have--no, it wouldn't have been 5, it 24l would have been on 4.
25l 2002 04l
{
47 1
CRESWELL:
On 4?
2 3'
SCHEIMANN:
It would have been on 4.
4 5
CRESWELL:
Okay.
6 7
SCHEIMANN:
Okay, for one thing, I believe we shut down on the 11, 8
EFV11, valve on that sida.
The generator level was still going up g
and we shut the 12 valve, EFV12, on that side.
And if I am not mistaken, 10 level was still going up in it, so we suspected we possibly had a 11 primary to secondary tube leak on it, if I remember correctly.
12!
CRESWELL:
Okay.
13 14!
SCHEIMANN:
And at that point, we went back to the back, I believe, 15 and we shut MSV4A--not 4, I don't remember whether it was the A or the 6i B, but it was one of the 4 valves or one of the 7 valves, to isolate the B generator.
8 191 20 21l SCHEIMANN:
Yes, that would be on the back, the ES panel.
23 CRESWELL:
Okay.
I 25 2002 042 1
l t
48 1
SCHEIMANN:
Wall D--Containment Isolation Panel.
2, 3
CRESWELL:
All right.
4 5
SCHEIMANN:
And at that time, once we had the steam generator isolated, 61 it looked to us like pressure had leveled off and was starting to turn 7
downward somewhat.
8 CRESWELL:
So you felt like you had isolated the leak?
g 10f I
SCHEIMANN: We thought that we might have isolated the leak at that lli p int.
12 13 14l CRESWELL:
Okay.
I 15r r
SCHEIMANN:
Roughly, a little bit later than that, another supervisor 16 j
come up, and he seemed to have the opinion that maybe we should have I
isolated the electromatic relief valve, which wou'Id have--
i 18{
1 1
19j CRESWELL:
Do you recollect who he was?
"l 21 SCHEIMANN:
I think it was Brian Mehler, again, I could be mistaken on it.
23 24 25l
(
i i
i I
l
{
49 1
CRESWELL:
Okay.
2 3
SCHEIMANN:
He come up and made some comment about closing the isola-4 tion for the electromatic relief valve.
I 5
6 CRESWELL:
What was the indication of the electromatic relief valve?
7 8
SCHEIMANN:
Well, our indication as far as the electromatic relief g'
goes, we got a red light above the key switch, which would be right there.
10 11.
CRESWELL:
All right, what would that indicate?
12 13 SCHEIMANN:
No, that is the wrong switch.
There's your key switch g
there, and you got a red light that sits right above it all by itself.
5 I don't see it there.
6 17, l
CRESWELL:
Well, it's probably hidden...
g 19 l
SCHEIMANN:
Yeah, anyway, that indicates that the electromatic re ief 20.
I i
did receive power and a signal to open.
2 11 22 CRESWELL:
Okay.
24 2002 044 25 I
I l
50 lj SCHEIMANN:
It doesn't, to my knowledge, exactly say that the valve 1
21 did physically open or shut.
And as a result, *he valve could have 3
stuck somewhat partially open, and that could have been what caused 4(
our increase in building pressure.
5 6
CRESWELL:
Let me ask you again--what was the condition at the time--
f you think it was Mr. Mehler?
8 g
SCHEIMANN:
Yes.
I 10 11 (INTERRUPTION TO ADJUST TAPE RECORDER) 12' RESWELL:
13 We are allowing time to change out the tape here, for Mr.
Scheimann.. 0kay, let's go back to what we were talking about before, Sj and that was the indication lights for the EMOV valve, the electromatic relief valve, which Mr. Scheimann said had a red and yellow light, and 6;
the condition of the light before the EMOV was shut, was--
g 18j 19;f SCHEIMANN:
Well, the EMOV, okay, the electromatic relief--the only i
light you got there is you got an amber light above the key switch, 20{
which tells you you are in the automatic mode or you are actuated.
You have a red light above that tells you if the electromatic received an open signal.
24 25 2002 045
{
l l
l.
I 51 1
CRESWELL:
Ckay.
2 3
SCHEIMANN:
Okay, the isolation valve, I believe, is RCV2.
Okay, that 4
has a red and green light for indication.
Okay, that was the valve 5
that it was suggested we close to see if we cid have a leaking electro-6 matic valve.
7 8
CRESWELL:
Okay.
9 10 SCHEIMANN:
Seeing as we had no indication that, quote unquote said, ll!
"the electromatic is shut".
I 12!
CRESWELL:
I want to make sure that I understand this fully.
13 14!
SCHEIMANN:
Okay.
15 16i 77j CRESWELL:
When you looked at the panel, before the EMOV was closed, l
18f
- ~
19l l
i SCHEIMANN:
The EMOV should have been closed.
20 21 CRESWELL:
Okay, what indication would you have had if it was closed?
23 SCHEIMANN:
Again, I'll say the only indication I had for the EMOV is a red light that tells if the valve was energized to open.
If the l
valve is not energized to be open, the red light would go out.
2002 046 1
O' 4
2002 047
I 53 1,
SCHEIMANN:
After a consensus of opinion, I myself, personally reached 2
over and closed the electromatic relief block valve.
3 4
CRESWELL:
And received what?
5 6l SCHEIMANN:
And received green light, indicating shut condition.
7 3
CRESWELL:
Okay.
9 10 SCHEIMANN:
At this time we could see a remarkable decrease in reactor 11 building pressure, which would indictte to me that the electromatic 12 was leaking by.
131 14l CRESWELL:
Okay.
15j SCHEIMANN:
It would indicate that it either was leaking by severely, 6l or never went fully shut.
I 18l CRESWELL:
All right.
g 20l SCHACKLETON:
Jim, Fred requested that he leave as close to 5:00 as possible.
We got about only five minur.es more on the tape, would that be all right?
s 24 25 2002 048 1
4
54 1
CRESWELL:
Well, I think it's a good time to break in this sequence, 2
and we will want to continua on in this area.
3 4
SCHEIMANN:
Sure.
i 5
6 CRESWELL:
As you see today during this interview, we have got the 7
pictures here, we can talk about indication lamps, and so forth, and 8
we'll want to do that, on in the sequence at a later time.
9' SCHEIMANN:
Sure that makes sense.
10 11 CRESWELL:
Okay.
12 t
13 y
SHACKLETON:
All right, this will the conclusion of this recording with Mr. Scheimann.
The time is now 5:05 p.m., April 23, 1979.
15 16!
17 18l l
19!
i 20 21' l
22 23 24 2002 049 25 l
l I
t
!