ML19274G080
| ML19274G080 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 04/22/1979 |
| From: | Daugherty T METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7908290491 | |
| Download: ML19274G080 (31) | |
Text
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[i UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY CCMMISSION i
t l
1l In the Matter of:
2 IE TMI INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW l
3!
of Mr. Terry Daugherty I
Auxiliary Operator A-Nuclear 4J Si t
6l 7
l 81 Trailer #203 9
NRC Investi;;ation Site TMI Nuclea-Power Plant 1 01 Middletown, Pennsylvania 11!
Aoril 22, 1979 12 (0 ate of Interview) i 13!
Julv 2, 1979 (Date Transcript Typea) 14!
49 151 (Tape Numcer(s))
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17i 18l 19l 20 l
21 NRC PERSONNEL:
,22 Mr. Robert Marsh
[
i 23j Mr. James Creswell 24l 25!
/\\x
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MARSH _: The time is 4:31 we are now resuming and I read 900 on the meter.
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I'll turn it back over to you, Jim.
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41 CRESWELL: Terry, do you remember while you were working on the bypass valve 5l whether Bill Zewe was in the area?
l Gi 7l DAUGHERTY: Bill Zewe, he had come down... Yes, he was in the area at that i
8l time because Bill had initially started to help Don and I open the valve gj and...
i 10j 11j CRESWELL: Was the handwheel there whenever you first got there.
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DAUGHERTY: The handwheel was not on the valve.
Now, that was one thing 13 j
that I'd indicated to Bill, as a matter of fact.
The valve is about 15 feet in the air and its located right above a ventilation duct.
You' re 15 bringing a lot of things back in my memory, that works pretty good.
Bill lo_ i j
Zewe had directed me from the Control Room, as a matter of fact, to go down
.7; there and check on that valve.
To go down and open it, or crack it.
He said that they were having difficulty in opening it with the motor.
When I 40; we't down there, that was what I..,just walking up and looking at the valve, I knew where it was, I went directly to it and I looked up and I immediately saw that the handwheel wasn't there.
Bill came down very shortly thereafter, and I told him that I was going to go back upstairs to our toolbox and get a pipewrench so I could open the valve because the handwheel was missing.
And he said alright, go and do it quick.
I went up 25l l
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and got the pipewrench, I came back downstairs and when I got there Bill 2
and Don Miller were up on the vent duct and what had happen was that the I
31 handwheel had apparently vibrated off and just tallen and was laying right i
4j on the vent duct and when they crawled up there they found it.
So, they 5l had just put it back on the shaft and were starting to open it.
And that i
Sj was the way we had continue to open the valve.
Bill had also asked me at 7
time to check on the electrohydraulic fluid system to see what the temperatures 8
in the oil system were, because he was expressing concern at that time, gj about the turbine that he didn't want to have problems with the turbine 10i S, I went around at that time and check the EHC system and in fact n w.
y the temperatures were down, which was to be expected because the load was off the system and then I did throttle back the cooling
'ow on those.
I 131 CRESWELL: Now this was the EHC system, not the lube-oil system?
15:
DAUGHERTY:
This was the EHC system, yes.
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CRESWELL: Did you happen to notice what the condition of the bypass valves
- 181, was at this particular time?
20!
DAUGHERTY: The bypass valves...
22 CRESWELL: C che turbine?
23 24 25l 2001 285
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if DAUGHERTY: No I didn't.
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31 CRESWELL: Lets return back to a later point in time then, if you have no l
4]
other recollection...
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DAUGHERTY: That's about all that I was really involved with, back over on i
7' the secondary side.
The rest of my time was mainly involved back on the 8
primary.
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10
_CRESWELL:
So you're back over, around the rad waste panel, Tiny has come 11 by, he's going over to the.
I 12f 13l DAUGHERTY: Yes, he was going to the Health Physics Lab.
Mike Janouski had i
14j come through, with the teletector.
And it was some time right in the same 15 vicinity that I started to notice that water was backing up in the basement, 16i back up through the hole.
I had just looked down through the hole into the h
basement again and I was noticing water backing up through the floordrains.
't I called Ed Frederi-k at the time and I told him that, and I told him that gl I was going to the basement to try to find where the water was coming from.
20j I started to go, in fact, I went to the basement.
In looking down the hallway I saw water backing up through all the floordrains, so I knew the g
sump was backing up, just making a quick trip I didn't see anything, right away, that just stood right out a lot of water going anywhere.
I went back upstaics, and again got the print book.
Well, I was sort of just trying to come up with something in my head.
I looked at the panel to see 2001 286
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if I saw anything abnormal on the panel, like tank levels had changed or 2'
anything where I might be losing some water.
I started looking through the 3l plans and in looking down the hallway from the desk where I was at, I 4l noticed an awful lot of activity down in the corner around the intermediate 5
close coolers and the reactor building monitor, radiation monitor, HPR-219 I
6l I sorry...
7 8
CRESWELL:
It's 227.
9l DAUGHERTY:
Yes, 227. Now that activity was health physics people.
Mike 10j 11j Janouski, I think Tiny was there and Mike came down the hallway. I told i
12!
him, I said, "We're getting a lot of water coming up through the floordrains l
in the basement." And he said, "Yes, and we got radiation levels coming up 13l 14f pretty quick too."
He didn't say what they were and he was continuing on and he was during survey.
I told Dale Laudermilch, who was back over at 15 that time, I said "We got water coming up through the floordrains, the 16 1
sumps backing up, I don't know where its coming from, we got to find it."
17 i
7gj It was very shortly thereafter that Mike Janouski came down the hallway.
gl He had done some surveys oack in the valve alley on the 305 elevation and en ame 4
& W me some specinc areas to stay od ot One of 20 I
21; them valve alley on the 305 elevation. He said " Stay out of that corner up 22j around the reactor building monitor,"
. he said, and "to stay out of the 23l makeup tank room, that the levels were coming up pretty rapidly." And he i
asked me if I had anv idea where it was coming from.
And I said "I don't 24
~
know other than the fact that we have water backing up in the basement."
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RESWELL: Let's stop just a moment and go back to the time that you saw Mike i
2:
and Tiny around the reactor building air monitor.
Was Mike trying to 3l remove a cartridge from the air sampler when you got there or was he doing 4
survey type work?
i Si i
6j DAUGHERTY: That I really don't know, because were talking about a distance 7j of 75 or 80 feet, something like that, all the way down the hallway.
I was g
at the rad waste panel, he was all the way out the other end of the building, gj I wasn't really looking to try and see what he was doing.
I notice there 10 were people up there doing it.
And I knew he had the teletector and what i
have you.
11!
12; CRESWELL: Mike didn't have any water on his hand or on his arm?
3 14!
DAUGHERTY: Not that I noticed.
g 16)
CRESWELL: Nobody looked like they
.?
18i OAUGHERTY: No.
19l 20f l
MARSH:
On your own frisker, that was locally there, did you notice an 21l increase in that or does that kind of saturate out? Was that still rising 22l i
or did it stay about the same, do you have a:iy recollection?
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6 DAUGHERTY: Well, I don't really know, because what I had done, was I had l{
2i left it up on times 10 scale after I initially moved it up there.
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MARSH: So, it wasn't alarming?
i Si i
6l DAUGHERTY: No, it wasn't alarming. So it would ha've to be somewhere within 7l that range on the times 10 scale.
Nothing really... nothing good happened 8
after that.
I 9!
i 10f CRESWELL: What was the time, roughly, we're talking about?
i
.1; DAUGHERTY: Well, we're talking about now I would say around 6:00, 5:30 or 13l 6:00 somewhere around in that area.
I was trying to find out where the water was coming from, picking my brains and looking at prints. I was just leaving the desk to go to the basement, when I heard Mike yell at me and he
,5 J.
s eny, ge e e ere n ge ast " And I looked up 16 g
and he was coming down the hallway on the run with the teletector in his hand and everybody was scattering.
I know Mike pretty well also and he's a i
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good health physics person and it wasn't anything like I've ever seen 19!
him do before.
So I knew that he was very serious about what he was saying.
20l 21:j He wasn't just making things dramatic because he was moving himself.
So, we went out the door through the model room over to Unit 1.
A site emergency had already been called at this time, because they were starting to man the ECS and the Unit I health physics area.
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CRESWELL: ECS?
2l 3t DAUGHERTY: Emergency Control Station.
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5l CRESWELL: Where was the ECS located.
I Gi 7{
DAUGHERTY:At that time, that was located in the Unit 1 health physics area, 8j which is the primary ECS area.
The site emergency was called while I was gl at the panel.
That was while I was trying to find where the water was 10l coming from or trying to determine where it was coning from, that site i
11l emergency was called.
I told Dale at that time, Dale Laudermilch that we 12{
had to find out where the water was coming from.
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14; CRESWELL:
Was the site emergency called before Mike Janouski came running d wn the hall and said 15 16!
77{
DAUGHERTY: Yes, it was.
The site emergency was called. And the reason I know that is because when we evacuated the building, when we went through g
Unit 1, the people were already-, the ECS was already manned in the g
Unit I health physics area. And that was the result of the site emergency
?Oi 21,l being called.
i 22l y
CRESWELL:
The site emergency came over the 24 25l 2001 290 i
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I, 1l OAUGHERTY: Over the page, the page system.
The site emergency was I
2t 3
CRESWELL: Did you recognize the voice?
4l Sj 0%GHERTY: Yes, it was Bill Zewe.
Now the general emergency was called a 6i short time thereafter I understand, but that, I never heard called across 7j the paging system.
So I really didn't even know that general emergency had 8
been declared until after I got back to the Unit 2 Control Room.
When I g
left the auxiliary building I went out through the model room, through the 10l Unit I health physics area wnere the ECS was being established.
I just 11 dr pped my stuff off there, my stuff being my Jacket and my lunchbox and 1
12f my paycheck, which I was concerned about later on.
But I dropped it off there and I left there and went around and came through the outside hallway 13 to get back over to Unit 2 and went back up to the Control Room.
I went and talked to Ed Frederick and to Bill Zewe and told them what I'd seen 15; over there, the last things that I had seen before I left and the condition that I'd left the panel in, what I could think, the tanks were on recirc, what have you, which were our neutralizing tanks and the levels that I could remember at that time which were all the same as when it had appeared g
the same as when it appeared on my log sheets.
21 CRESWELL:
Except for now the
...?
22l 23l DAUGHERTY: Except now that the auxiliary building sump was overflowing and 24!
I that the reactor building sump was pegged out high.
Everything else appeared 25i j
as it had been earlier in the shift.
2001 291 i
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1l MARSH: Those pumps had been shutdown, you indicated earlier?.
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i 3l DAUGHERTY: The reactor building sump pumps?
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MARSH: Yes.
6l 7
DAUGHERTY: Yes, they had, they been shutdown.
8 gl MARSH: By yourself?
10f DAUGHERTY: Yes, by myself.
I shut those pumps down somewhere around 4:45, 11, 4:30-4: 45, somewhere around there.
12 I
13j CRESWELL:
74 What, if you were to guess, what do you think was causing the I'"*I I" ' '
15 16 DAUGHERTY: My first feelings were, and I thought about this for days afterwards, and I had talked Bill Zewe about it, about the possibility of where this 18!
water was comir.g from. Well, he and I, all of us talked about it.
My thoughts were at first, that it had come from the miscellaneous waste holdup tank, that I was juso getting a false indication on the panel that the level transmitter had floooed and it was giving a false indication and that I was actucily overflowing at the miscellaneous waste holdup tank which just overflows directly to the sump.
Bill talked me out of that.
The reason being, is that the day and second day after the accident they 25j i
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pumped water out of that tank and to that tank, and what have you, and the l
2 level indication responded very normally which it wouldn't have done if 3f the instrument had flooded.
It would have had to beendrained and what have 4l you.
So, that rule that out.
In looking at it now, this time period and 5l afterwards, the only thing that I can, from my experience that I feel it i
6j must have come from, I feel that ir, must have been backflow through a line, 7
possibly through a relief valve. I feel it must have been maybe a pressure g
surge within the building, say within a make.up line or what have you that gj caused enough of a pressure surge that it backflowed it through a line and 10j p ssibly would have hit a relief valve somewhere in the basement in one of if those valve alleys or back in somewhere that you wouldn't see it unless you
,f got into the room with it because I never had the time to get to go to the 13{
basement and go into all the rooms.
The levels were coming up so fast that all I had time to do was just make quick inspection, more or less just ga gene a e area.
n e
s going down and looWg thou@
15 a hallway and seeing if just anything that looked out of normal, which I 17l didn't see.
Just thinking all those systems over in my head and going over j
them with Bill and Ed and everybody.
It was rapid level increase. I could stand there and I look down and I could see the water coming up out of the 19!
drain.
So it was a pretty good flou of sater that was ccming. I can't 21; believe that we'd see that kind of water level say from a packing or end.
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22l CRESWELL: A small line?
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li DAUGHERTY:
Right, I feel it must have been something on the order of a i
2j relief valve.
Some flow that was coming.
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l 4l CRESWELL: Which would be what size line would you estimate?
About 6 or j;
hundred...?
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DAUGHERTY:
Well, no. I wouldn't say that large.
But even, say, a 1 or 2 6
8f inch relief line, something like that, which if the relief valve is full gj open would pass a pretty good flow of water.
In going over the whole i
10l thing, I just could not imagine anyplace else that water could have been 11l coming from, to be as hot as it was.
The thing is we can track the levels.
i 12j Like the first hot spot that Mike Janouski found was back in that 305 valve alley and all of the seal injection lines and the makeup lines are all back in there.
14 15!
MARSH: How do know that? Was that from discussing it with him?
16!
171 DAUGHERTY: Yes.
That was one of the areas that he told me to stay out of.
18,!
gf The two areas that he told me to stay out of during the initial stages of this was the 305 valve alley and the rocm with the makeup tank.
I think he
.0 did tell me what the levels were, but I don't recall at that time.
I don't recall what he said they were, but like 10 R keeps sticking in my mind.
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There have been so many levels ot'r the last several weeks that I M ally 2 31 hate to say that's what it was.
But uhey were high I know at that time, 25l!
they were high.
But of course, any of the levels that we were seeing at 2001 294 t
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this time were just far away higher than anything that we'd ever seen 2l before.
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4 CRESWELL: At this. point there is no question, but that there is son'e kind Sj of an abnormal..?
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DAUGHERTY: Yes. There's its no doubt about it.
Because at 4:00 in that i
g morning if I'd walked into any of those rooms down there with a detector in gj my hands and seen a reading of 200 mR, that would have been abnormal to me.
10, With the exception of the rooms where the makeup filters were. Now those l
11l as were locked anyway and they were identified as being high-radiation r
12 The makeup tank, in the room with the makeup tank itself, that was, areas.
13 let me think, I don't believe that that area was a high radiation area at that time.
I think the only high radiation areas that we had at this time g
15 were the makeup filter room and the spent resin storage tank rooms.
And there were three of them.
The cage down around where ;he evaporator condensate 6;
test tanks, back in that area there, it was also a locked high-radiation i
area.
But, anywhere else, especially the 305 valve alley, at any time, had I walked back there and seen any kind of level at all that would have been
,9i 40l a very abnormal reading.
So, like a say, 21!
CRESWELL: What about where the crud burst? Had you experienced crud burst before?
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i 11 DAUGHERTY: Not to my knowledge.
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3l CRESWELL: Lets go on back to the point where you re-enter the Control Room.
l 41 What conditions did you find upon first entry?
Si Gi DAUGHERTY: When I got back up there the four poeple that I had described i
7 before were there: Bill Zewe, Fred Scheimann, Ed Frederick, Craig Faust 8
plus, I think, at this time Ken Bryan, who is also a shift-supervisor, had 9
arrived and Mike Ross, who is the Unit 1 Supervisor of Operations. was also 10' there and, I believe, that Joe Logan, who is the Unit 2 Superintendent, I ll; think at this time, he was also there. If he wasn't, it was very shortly 12l after that.
13 CRESWELL: Are we talking about say 7 to 8 people in that range.
14!
15, DAUGHERTY: Yes, in that range.
Now there were also two people, two engineers, 16i 17f that were, I don't really know what they were doing, they were working with the computer and I don't know if they were just monitoring the computer or g
gj what they were doing. I don't know who they are.
In fact, I don't even know whether I'd would recognize them again.
I 211 CRESWELL: You got the impression they were computer engi. 2rs?
23 DAUGHERTY: Yes, In other words, they weren't anybody operational type 24l engineers that I had seen on a routine basis.
They were definitely working 25!
I with the computer only.
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CRESWELL: What did the panels look like? I mean, when you walked into the 2
room what did you see?
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4 DAUGHERTY: Well, there was a good many alarms. 'And, of course, the two 51 main things of interest was the fact that we had an reactor trip and a i
6l turbine trip which I obviously already knew.
But everybody was still very 7
busy and things were happening very fast at that time. It was some time 8
very shortly thereafter, that the ECS was moved into the Unit 2 Control g'
Room, which the Unit 2 Control Room is the backup where the standby ECS, if 10l the Unit 1 HP Lab starts to become a high level, which it did.
11l 12j CRESWELL : At that point Unit 1 HP lab.
l 13lg DAUGHERTY: Yes, the Unit 1 HP Lab, which is where the ECS was originally moved into the Unit 2 Control Room.
16i CRESWELL: Because it was t acoming a high rad (radiation) area?
17 18j DAUGHERTY: Yes, that's correct.
At that time I was just standing by in the 19:
i corner of the Control Room with the rest of the operations people that were 21,l there. The only people that were in there was the Operations people.
The maintenance people, that were manning there teams as far as the ECS, their emergency teams, and like I said. the ECS was being moved into there, so the status boards was being setup.
To be very honest with you, it was 24 really kind of like a very frightening, like a nightmare really going on, 25j
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because it was something that I'd been through about four times since I've i
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been here in drill form. And it was very obvious, you can tell by the 3
people involved that it was very serious and that it was...
4, 5l CRESWELL: The real thing?
61 7
DAUGHERTY: Yes, it wasn't..
8l gj MARSH: What was the demeanor of the Control Room?
Is it sober or were they 10t panicking..
these people?
11l DAUGHERTY: Well, it was very sober, but it was very business like. I suppose 12 13 I am prejudice to these four people that I work with, because I do work with them.
But I would like to say, that the times that I was in the 14 Control Room, and observing these four men that I was very impressed with 15 the professional attitude they were taking.
Like I said before, they were 6
communicating very well with each other.
They were very very calm.
They did have procedures laid out on the desk, I notice this was of course, I
sometime afterwards.
I felt very confident myself in their abilities.
19l I've know all of them for a good long while.
Two of them Bill Zewe and c0 Fred Scheimann, the Supervisor and Foreman, were both auxiliary A operators in my training program, we all came to work here at the same time.
I thought they were handling themselves extremely well.
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MARSH: Another point, under your site emergency and then elevating to 2:
general emergeocy, do you have specific assigned duties?
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DAUGHERTY: My assigned duties in the site emergency and in the general Sj emergency are to report to 'he ECS and to maintain myself in more or less a l
6l standby attitude, to do anything that's needed from a Operations standpoint.
7 There are maintenace people that report as a casual emergency repair party, gl what have you.
Things, like I say, it started to come very apparent that gj this was really the real thing, and it wasn't just a drill and because of 10 this fact there was a awful lot of people that were showing up in the 11; Control Room, important type people, Station Superintendent, Gary Miller.
12f It started to be kind of congested in there.
An awlful lot of people 13j g thered in there and they were trying to keep the status board.
At that time, one of the Foreman, one of the people in the charge, I don't recall who it was, came over to the group of operators and told us just to go out n the turbine building to our room out there.
We had a room on the turbine 6i i
floor.
Told us just to go out there and standby, just to be available.
18I CRESWELL: Was anybody in respirators at this time.
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l DAUGHERTY: No we weren't.
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22l CRESWELL: Do you recall whenever you came into the Control Room whether George Kunder was there at that point?
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DAUGHERTY: I don't believe George was there at that time.
Mike Ross was 2:
there...
3 4f CRESWELL: The four people
...?
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6i DAUGHERTY: The four people that were there, that I mentioned before. And 7
lastly, I believe Joe Logan had arrived, he was either there or he got 8
there very shortly thereafter.
He and Mike Ross were there very close to oj the same time.
We went out to the A0 room, and we were1't there very long 10l at all, I don't think, maybe more than 20 minutes and they came out and i
11l told us all to evacuate to the service building in Unit 1.
As we came into 12 the hallway to go by the Control Room and go out at that time, when I 1
13 ked through the windows into the Control Room, everybody in the Control Room was putting on respirators at that time. And that was very depressing.
We went on down to the service building.
How many auxilary operators, I 15, don't know whether there was any auxiliary operators left in the plant at 16
,,/ ;.
that time.
At that time, you became kind of lost.
We went to the service building. We didn't even muster or anyt: ling in the service building.
They
,8l were moving us on out.
20:
CRE5WELL: Offsite?
21l DAUGHERTY: Offsite, right.
22l 23l MARSH: Who was they?
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DAUGHERTY: Well, it was just being directed.
Who the people specifically 2
were, I don't really recall, they were just a 3l i
-l MARSH: It was just like a group of people moving out?
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6f DAUGHERTY: Yes, it was just-people were moving out.
In other words it was 7j more or less coming down word of mouth.
Well there's a group of people and 8
they said, wall, "The word came down they were to go offsite, we were g
suppose to get cars and go offsite."
10i MARSH: This was more or less under the direction of the emergency teams that are around this area?
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13j DAUGHERTY: I would have to assume that those words were coming from the ECS, from the man in charge in the Emergency Control Station.
5:
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17;l CRESWELL: It like you guys were talking among yourself, " Hey they said for l
us to get out?"
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DAUGHERTY: Yes, basically, that was it.
21l CRESWELL: It wasn't somebody designated that said to evacuate?
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DAUGHERTY: It was one of those sort of things. I realize that Bill Zewe was 2 41 up to his ears in business and I knew that it wasn't the appropriate time 25\\
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to get on the phone a'd call him up and say " Bill, should I leave or should i
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I stay or what." So, we went 3
4l CRESWELL:Were you guys walking or walking at a fast pace?
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6i DAUGHERTY: We were walking.
I don't recall seeing an / body that was on the 7l site, involved in the accident, that was even in any <
. of panick type a
situation.
The only one I even saw that appeared to be afraid was Jur;ita gl when I passed her going out the door and like I say I could understand.
It 10 sounded like the whole building was coming apart out there. It was just i
11j steam release.
i 12!
MARSH:
Let me ask you a few questions here?
13 14!
h Turning tape over.
4:59 on watch, 3:55 on the meter.
16!
Taoe Side 2 17 18!
MARSH: The time is 5:00.
I'm reading 358 on the cater.
We're resuming--
g Jim, I'll turn it back over to you and we'll continue..
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CRESWELL: Terry, as I indicated before, I'd like to ask you a few extra 22' questions here, in general. What sort of information could we get off of, say, the strip charts from the rad waste panel?
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DAUGHERTY: From the rad waste panel, there's not...the strip charts on the 2{
rad waste panel you probably couldn't get a lot of information from..
l 3l because the strip charts on the rad waste panel, mostly--we had one which indicates liquid release flow, which was nothing at that time.
We weren't 5'
releasing anything at all, so we don't really have any thing on the rad 6l waste parel that would give us anything at all, really.
7 CRESWELL:
Ok. Did you personally make any valve line up changes in the rad g
gl waste system, Prior to, say 7:00 a.m.?
101 DAUGHERTY: No, I didn't.
The only valves that I changed through the whole 11 course of the accident was the river water flow to the intermediate closed y
coolers, and I did shut off the reactor building sump pumps.
Now, the 13 lineup from the pumps, from the pump discharge to the miscellaneous holdup n, was not changed.
It was lined up to ne miscellaneous wane hoHup 15 tank and those valves were left open.
6i 17!
CRESWELL: That has been verified since the event?
18{
19I DAUGHERTY: I don't know whether it's been verified since the event, but 20t that's the way I left them.
21j 22I CRESWELL: That is the way you left them?
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2001 303 l
I 21 II DAUGHERTY: Yes, that's correct.
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31 CRESWELL: When-on some previous shift?
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S' DAUGHERTY: No, in other words, when I shut the pumps down, I did not isolate 6l their flowpath from them to the tank.
i 7l 8l CRESWELL: Does that mean that their would be a flowpath from the sump in gl the reactor building to the sump in the auxiliary building? Would there be 10f ther lines open there?
11!
i 12f DAUGHERTY: There would be a path from the reactor building sump to the 13 miscellaneous waste holdup tank which, yes, would overflow to tne sump.
I 74i Now, you're talking about--now the miscellaneous waste holdup tank is on the 305 elevation of the Auxiliary building,
'.,d the sump, of course, is on 16; the, below the 281 elevation of the reactor building.
l 17:i CRESWELL: So, if any flow occurred, it would be from the holdup tank to
, 81 1
the sump?
g 20!
21j DAUGHERTY: Yes.
22 CRESWELL:
But are there check valves.
24l 25l 2001 304
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DAUGHERTY:
There are check valves in the line.
Of course, I would assume i
2!
it would on how much water was in the building too.
Theoretically, if i
31 there was enough water in the building, I suppose you could get flow, i
4f possibly.
Si l
6l CRESWELL: Were you aware of any problems with the waste gas system leaking, 7
prior to the accident?
8 gj OAUGHERTY: No, I wasn't.
Our waste gas system, we hadn't had an opportunity 10 to use that system much, or we hadn't had an opportunity to see it used I
11!
very much.
Prior to this accident, maybe a month, two months at the most, 1
12f we had started using our RC evaporator in Unit 2, which hadn't been used at 13l all up to that time.
And through the course of our initial startups and 7[
learning to operate the evaporator and what have you, we found that through some miss valve lineups we were putting nitrogen directly through the 15 evaporator into our waste gas system, and in doing that we were filling our 6i 1!
waste gas tanks.
Now, it was some time frame before we discovered what was
/;
it we were actually doing, and we did find out that it was just nitrogen we 8
were putting into our waste gas tank.
And we cid do routine gas releases 19!
on those tanks, routine release to the atmosphere with release permits and through the standard procedure.
But as far as the gas system itself, we 21l hadn't experienced any problems, to my knowledge.
23 MARSH: You indicated in the beginning that these tanks were relatively high 24l level-the water holding tanks, the different holding tanks-when you assumed 25:1 duties.
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l lj DAUGHERTY:
Yes, that's correct.
2!
i 31 MARSH:
How has your past history been, has it been normal for you to find 4l these tanks at high level when you came on? Was that a trend?
5!
i 6l DAUGHERTY: Yes, we have experienced difficulty, if you will, with water l
7 inventories, with high inventories of water.
And here again, it's--a lot 3
of it is attributed to t'-e f act that we had--that sharing flowpath with gl Unit 1, the ability to only release one side at a time.
Unit 1--I have a 10l pretty good amount of experience in operating on Unit 1 also, and the i
11l Unit i release is a fairly slow process, depending on the tank.
For the 12{
m st part, generally speaking, releasing the Unit 1 holding tanks, it's i
13 normally an 8 to 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> type process.
If you're building up water on one 14; side when you're in the middle or early in a release on the other side, you 15 can accumulate a fair amount of water before you actually get a chance to 16; do yours, and then if you add to that a holding time to get the chemistry 17 and everything done, you can really, it builds up rather fast.
181 MARSH: Have you encountered any severe problems with this in the past?
g 20l DAUGHERTY: No, we haven't, no.
22f CRESWELL: Any other rad waste problems, gas or liquids, that you've encountered?
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1 DAUGHERTY: No, really...
2!
i 3
CRESWELL:
The system runs pretty well?
4l 5
DAUGHERTY: Yes, and we've had really fairly good luck with it.
Ir. fact, 6i the 1C evaporator which, like I say, we had just start.ad up, and it's a 7l fairly big operation, had been operating very well.
We'd experienced that 8
problem with the nitrogen but it was just a matter of a valve lineup that gj was being worked out.
We hadn't really experienced any problems of any 10 significance at all. We had changed several resin beds that we had never lli really encountered problems with, as far as high radiation levels or physically having problems with the resins transfers.
Really, everything had operated 12 pretty smooth.
No problems.
13 14!
CRESWELL: At this time, Terry, I'd like to ask you if you have any other 15 Comments, related to anything, that you would like to make?
r 17l DAUGHERTY: No, like I say, the whole experience was--I lcok at it from two 18 {.
l different directions and I'd like to reemphasize what I said before about 19l the four people in the control room.
I honestly feel and I'm not intending 40l 21.l to degrade any of the other operators or foremans or supervisors on this 22l Island, but I honestly think that if this thing had to happen that they had i
i the four best people tha\\. they could have had in the control room.
They're very, very qualified people, very confident. I think Bill Zewe is probably one of the best people I've eve-been associated with, a #ar as his attitude 25j l
2001 307
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25 i
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toward his job.
He's extremely responsible.
When he's on the job, he's 2!
all business.
We have a lot of fun away from here as far as things that we 3
do with our shift, but I have never really seen Bill Zewe at work on shift I
4l when he's had any kind of a lackidaisical attitude.
He's very business-5l like, in fact, we've had a lot of clashes--not he and I, but being a union i
6i representative, I've had to defend people who, other operators, who may 7
have come to work with a lackidaisical attitude one day and Bill Zewe will gj not tolerate that sort of thing.
He's very professional and, like I say, I i
gj honestly think that the right people were there, if the thing had to happen.
t 1 01 l
11l CRESWELL: n at about supervision in general, management, training-any of 19; those subjects vou'd like to discuss?
9 i
13{
DAUGHERTY: Not, really.
The training--I think everybody has a problem with g
training.
It's understandable a lot of people have difficulty training on 15; their own.
It's difficult to sit down and force yourself into a technical manual, an FSAR or something like that, and I know that there probably are an awful lot that don't do as much of it as they should.
That's one thing, 18i that's another high point for Bill Zewe.
He's very strong on training, and I think he makes as good an effort as any of the supervisorsto try to keep his people up to the level.
Now, he obviously aets wrapped up in an awful 21l lot of things.
That's one thing that I would like to say, is that I think, I
and maybe it will be one of the results of this, is that there should not 23l be one supervisor--I don't care what his abilities--tr at's responsible to 24' both of those Units. Now that's the way I feel about it. I think..the two 25:
2001 30B b
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26 If Units are not mirror image and there's a awlful lot of things that are 2;
different about inem, and I think it a very big responsibility for one man, i
31 4j CRESWELL: Do you think that having responsibilities for Unit I affected 5l Mr. Zewe's response during the incident at Unit 2.
I 61 7
DAUGHERTY: No, it didn't and I would venture to say that the only reason it g
didn't is because there was another Shift Supervisor on at that time.
And gj the reason he was there was because Unit 1 being down in the refueling 10l m de.
Under normal conditions, had Unit 1 been up at power and operating, he would have been the only man on the Island, 1 mean the only supervisor, and he may have not been in the Unit 2 control room at the time the accident happended.
As it was he was there, but under normal conditions he could be iy at either place.
He could have been in Unit 1 in his office over there,
[
and it would have taken him some time to respond, and in that case there would have been only three people there, three people in the Unit 2 control That's something--well, I myself have complained abcut it in previou; room.
years, from an auxiliary operator;s 1cvel, in that it's.aore or less the 18f 19l same thing, the auxiliary operators are required to train or both Units anc be resconsible for both Units.
The auxiliary operators As and I had found difficulty myself because most of my experience was in Unit 1 and then I'd 22j come over to Unit 2 on a permanent basis.
Just the fact that the equipmert is located differently, it's oriented diffently, the numbering system is different.
And it's one thing if you have time to think, if.t. hey tell you 241 to go check the 8 feedpump. It's one thing if you have time to say, "the B i
2001 309
27 l
1l feed pump is the one of the north side, "but in a situation like this where l
2j you've got to more or less respond on your instincst to the thing, it can i
3{
become a problem--orientation.
We had discussed this many occassions, 4
totally separating the Units as far as from the Shift Supervisors, right on 5}
down through the operators.
I 6i 7
CRESWELL: Do you feel that your having to go over to the secondary side 8l after tha time of the trip detracted any from the overall performance gj level?
t 101 1
11l DAUGHERTY: No, I don't. The only thing that I really feel that could have 12 caused any problem with, was the fact that I would have--had I been at the 13l panel from the moment that it happened, I would have probably seen the 74; reactor building sump increasing and seen the pumps come on when they did.
As it is, I don't really know how long there were on.
Other than that, I g
don't really think that it affected--and that's been the experience through trips that I've been in on Unit 1 or what have yuu.
It's always been our g.
experience that when the trip occurs, the attention is always focused on the secondary side, just because of the fact that you have the condensate g
system to watch after, the oil systems to watch after, in Unit 1 we have l
the Powdex system so one operator always has to respond there to drop the 9
22j vessels off, to respond to the flow or what have you, and of course, the I
oil systenis go right out the bottom as soon as the turbine comes off of 23l them. So you know, all of our concentration has always been to the secondary 241 s1ce of the plant.
So I really feel--the pericd of time I was on the 25' 2001 310 t
(
28 i
i i
1; secondary side helping the other guys cut, I didn't really feel that I was 2;
missing anything that I should be seeing on the primary side.
When I went 3f down there, I went down more or less as a precautionary measure. I just 4
wanted to satisfy my own mind that everything was in fact still the way I Sj left it and what I expected to see.
As it was, I did find two things that I
61 were abnormal. And like I say, those were the first two indications to me 7
that there was anything abnormal about the trip.
I talked to Ed at that i
3 time and I got more or less the same indication frcm him.
He told me that gj something was going on inside the building, and those were almost his exact 10 words, and he was saying it to both me and to Bill Zewe-we were on the 11; phone.
But it was like they felt something was wrong but they really 12 didn't, even between the four of them, they really didn't know exactly what i
3{
it was.
14' CRESWELL: Did you happen to go by the emergency feed pumps after the turbine 15; trip?
16:
17 DAUGHERTY: No, I didn't.
The emergency feedpumps are not really in an area 1g where they are just accessible to normal traffic.
In other words, you would have through, from the turbine building, you would have tc go through 21,i
?ocked doors to get to it.
Now these locked doors, I mean, they are flood doors that have chain locks on them, so, either that., or if you came down 22;j trom the Contiol tower, you could come right into them.
But in other words, you'd have to make an effort to go to them. You wculdn't just normally i
past them just on a routine tour of the building.
2001 311 i
6
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I
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29 l
1:
CRESWELL:
Okay.
2:
31 MARSH: Let me ask one quick question. You indicated that you had exercised i
4l emergency plans in the past.
What are you feelings on the adequacy of 5[
those exercises were they realistic, having gone through it now? Did you 6i feel they prepared you and were
...?
7l g
DAUGHER'J: Most definitely.
There again, I guess it's hindsight or what g;
have you, but I can think back numerous times going through those drills 10l and sitting around and going, "ho hum, here we go again." I don't mean 11 ignoring just wha + was going on, but more or less going through the steps.
12 But the thing is, we did it.
It's like anything else, I think, if you go 13 through it enough times, something sinks in. The ECS, as I saw it when it 14!
was manned in the Unit 2 control room, it was very definitely not con-15; People were responding to the different jobs that they had, were fusion.
predesignated to take.
Even to the point when we finally left the island, 16 when we drove our cars out, they monitored our cars at the north gate.
We
,,/ l:
went to the 500 kev sub--
yg 19j CRESWELL: They did do radiation surveys of your car?
g L
21!
,j DAUGHERTY: Yes, they did.
They did a survey at the north gate and they m2, I
surveyed the cars and all personnel at the 500 kev sub also.
So, it was 23{
l carried out just to the letter, the way we had done it in numerous drills.
'- l t
That's another thing, I did talk with a man--I can't remember who he was.
251 I
2001 312 r
{
30 i
i 1l He was from NUS, I believe, and he told me at that time, we were just 2f general conversation about the whole thing, and this was some time afterwards, 3
several days afterwards. I ran into him in the control room, we were talking 4[
or we were doing something, and he did tell me--this might have just been Sj his opinion--that our plant was one of the best drilled plants in this i
gj area, anyway.
And he made the same statement that if this type of accident 7l had to happened, it was really, in a way, lucky that it happened here g
because these oeople were drilled well.
And I got the same impression gj myself.
i 10j MARSH: We're coming up on 5:20 and we have been talking for close to 2 11:
l 12!
hours, and recognizing you're coming off a full work shift and that it is a 13 Sunday, I'd like to wrap it up, unless you have more to go into.
We very p;
much appreciate your time and your recall and, as I indicated earlier, we may want to get back to you on some specific points. Don't feel apprehensive, 15 if we do want to talk to you about specific areas.
Before we go, I want to 6:
give you a card, that's my card.
If anything should come to mind, we' re g!
going to be in this trailer for the duration here now.
You can eitner find us here or if any problems come up, I don't expect anyone to make any comment to you regarding your appearance and your visit with us.
If you 20, encounter any problems, I expect to hear about. Just, you can reach me 21l through those numbers.
23l
,1UGHERTY:
All right, fine.
I i
2E i
2001 313
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31 I
ll MARSH: So we very much appreciate your time, and at this time I'm reading i
2l 675 on the meter, and it's 5:51 and I'm going to terminate the tape.
i 31 4)
End of tape.
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2 41 25l 2001 314 I