ML19274G073
| ML19274G073 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 07/09/1979 |
| From: | Bryan K METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7908290399 | |
| Download: ML19274G073 (22) | |
Text
. -
UNITED STATES 01-AME2ICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1.
In the Matter of:
i 2
IE TMI INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW 3
of Ken Bryan Shift Supervisor 5
6 7
8 Trailer #?03 9
NRC Investigation Site TMI Nuclear Power Plant 10 Middletown, Pennsylvania 11l 6
Unknown 12l (Date of Interview) 13l July 9, 1979 (Date Transcript Typed) 14 278 15 (Tape Numoer(s))
16l i
17'
}fgfff6)ff 18, 19 20 21 NRC PERSONNEL:
22l Ed O'Connor Bruce Cantor (Energy, Inc.)
200g
' 2fb 23 Larry Kripps (Energy, Inc.)
24\\
25 i
l l
If O' CONNER:
This is Ed O'Conncr with the GPU Task Force who is investigating 2,
what happened on March 28, 1979.
We are in the process of interviewing Ken Byran of the Met Ed operating staff.
Also with me is Bruce Cantor, of 3
4 Energy Incorporated and Larry Kripps also of Energy Incorporated who are assisting the GPU Task Force.
S 6
0' CONNER:
7 Ken, could you please tell us what your position is here at TMI?
8 BRYAN:
I am a shift supervisor.
g 10 0' CONNER:
For both units?
11 12 BRYAN:
Yes.
13 14 O' CONNER:
Do you have a senior operator's license on both units?
15l 16!
BRYAN:
Yes.
17 18j O' CONNER:
When did you arrive onsite the morning of March 28?
19l 20i BRYAN:
11:00 the evening before.
21 i
22 0' CONNER:
So you were on watch the 23 24 4
25!
l i
2000 127 i
2 1
BRYAN:
11 to seven s. Sift.
2.
0' CONNER:
You were in Unit I?
3 4l BRYAN:
Yes I was.
5 6
0' CONNER:
At what time did you go over to Unit 2?
7 8
BRYAN:
Well, at the time I didn't know but it was about 4:08 when I got to g
10 11!
0' CONNER:
Just a few minutes or so, eight minutes after the trip?
13 BRYAN:
It was, I got to Unit 2 at the time the aux feed valves got open.
I 15i O' CONNER:
Exactly eight minutes.
16l 17 BRYAN:
So I assume by that it was exactly eight minutes.
I know I was 1 81 there at eight mi.itas of.
19{
20' 0' CONNER:
Can you relate to us what was going on at that time.
What was 21 going on through the operators and your mind and what your plan of attack 22 was at that point?
2 2000 '28 24 25 I
I t
i
3 BRYAN:
Well, I was in Unit 1 at the time.
We were heating up and we were 1.
2 using steam from Unit 2 and they announced a turbine trip over the page.
3 The first thing I did in Unit I was send some guys down to the boiler.
4 Fire the boiler up because we did not have the boiler on.
Had vacuum on 5
the turbine and we were heating up.
So I waited a little while and then I 6
called down to see if the reactor tripped and Bill said yes it did.
He 7
said, "Come on down, I've got an ES injection and everything."
So I went down and the first thing I noticed when I got there was there wasn't any 8
feedwater flow.
Then I said to one of the operators, I said "You don't g
have any feedwater flow." And he looked down and said "The 12 valves were t
10' closed", and he opened them up.
That was within the first minute that I got to the control room and, let me see what else.
They had the makeup pumps secured I believe at that time.
They had increased letdown, the la, pressurizer was full and I know the T indicator was reading 592 degrees avg j
when I walked into the control room.
15j 16!
0' CONNER:
What would be normal after a trip like that?
17 181 l
BRYAN:
5:50, 5:45, something like that.
19l 20 0' CONNER:
And it was probably high because you didn't have the steam 21t generator system taking away heat.
22 23 BRYAN:
True.
Yes.
24, i
25 2000 129 l
i 4
O' CONNER:
It was about 50 or so higher than it should have been.
1.
I 2t BRYAN:
- Yes, 3
4l 0' CONNER:
5 When did the first become apparent to the operating staff or 6
y urself that things didn't seem right?
7 BRYAN:
Well, I remember at the time Bill was worried about the high hot 8
well level.
g 10 0' CONNER:
This is Bill Zewe?
12 BRYAN:
Yes, and I think he left right after I got there.
He went out to check the hot well level and he came back and said that it was around the 14 top of the sight glass.
We had the feedwater back on now.
We had the solid pressurizer, well almost solid, it was just bouncing off the top of 16i the scale.
So probably within like 4:20 or 4:30 somewhere around there things just weren't going right and we knew something was screwed up.
18[
19i I
0'CONNR:
What was your reaction when you heard that the high pressure 20l injection system had been actuated?
21 i
22 BRYAN:
I didn't run down or anything.
I..
that was not the first time 23 that has happened.
24 25!
2000 '30 i
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5 O' CONNER:
That is a fairly normal thing to happen?
y i
2 BRYAN:
Unit 2 yes.
3 4
0' CONNER:
5 During a normal trip what would cause that to happen?
6 BRYAN:
7 If you don't get the makeup pump on, hooking up, if the reactor trips it immediately starts to cool down, it shrinks the pressurizer, the g
i g
pressure goes down and if you don't get a makeup pump on quick enough and 16 valve is opened to makeup for the loss in inventory, the pressure starts going down and it is touch and go whether you get ES injections.
It is not a big deal.
13 0' CONNER:
Okay, normally you would get EF injection.
You would also have i
low pressurizer level?
15i 16' BRYAN:
Yes.
17l l
18l 0' CONNER:
Now I know you can't speak for the other guys in the control 19 room at that time but they were aware that they were having a high pressur-20 izer level in the ES injection.
Do you have any idea what sense they made 21 of that if any?
22 23 BRYAN:
Now, my first impression was when I got there and I saw that...
24 the first thing I looked at when I walked into the control room was T 25 avg' l
6 1.
I saw it was real high.
And I looked over and saw there wasn't any feed-water flow.
I think that about the third thing I noticed was pressurizer 2,
level.
Well that made sense you know.
I don't know if it were for the 3
i right reason or not but with the high T,yg and the high pressurizer, with 4
5 high temperature you know you just expand the water.
6 0' CONNER:
Sure.
7 8
BRYAN:
And I wasn't even, well when I walked in there I had forgotten g
everything.
Like he said he had gotten ES injection and such, I wasn't 0
even thinking about that.
I was just looking to see what we had at the I
time.
And while the makeup pumps were off I believe, yes I am pretty sure they were.
14; l
0' CONNER:
Well, I remember looks like they shut down, well they bypassed 15i 16l the signal about six minutes after the trip.
i I
17l Well, after the first 8 - 10 minutes or so what did you do in the control i
18t I
room?
191 20 BRYAN:
Somebody come around the corner and said that the reactor coolant drain tank was full and how about pumping it down?
I walked around to pump 22 it down and it was empty.
I looked and there wasn't any water in it.
' te 23 indication was downscale all the way.
I said ch! oh! and then I sort of 7
24 7000 s'
walked around front again.
25j t
- - ~ '
7 1
0' CONNER:
The indications on one of the rear panels, around back?
I 2
BRYAN:
Yes.
Near the door where you were standing when I came in.
If you 3
4 g to your left it is right there, the first panel.
5 0' CONNER:
Oh.
6 7
BRYAN:
Sometime right around then we got a reactor building fire alarm'.
g Then we started looking around you know.
We got the reactor building fire g
a arm and went back to ne temperature recorder and Mey were all Wendng 10!
up... well a bunch of them were trending up.
They probably all were.
So we started the reactor building emergency cooling right away.
And I think about this time we figured that we blew the rupture disk on the drain tank.
Because there wasn't any level in it and the temperature was going up in the reactor cuilding and we didn't see anything on the radiation monitors 15!
16 i
17 0' CONNER:
Is the reactor building emergency cooling, is that your RR l
pumps?
19l 20 BRYAN:
Yes.
21 22 0' CONNER:
How long was that, so that was pretty close at the front end of 23 the?
24 25l 2000 '33 i
i
8 BRYAN:
Yes it was.
It was in the first hour.
1 2
O' CONNER:
What did you make of all those indications at that time?
3 4
You had containment temperature pressure and going up and a blown rupture 5l disk or apparently a blown rupture disk.
l 6
BRYAN:
7 Yes, that is what we thought we had, yes, a blown rupture disk.
8 0' CONNER:
What caused that? What was the impression that you had at tiiat g
time of the cause of that?
11 BRYAN:
Well, the rupture, we the safety valves, we figured the safety lifted on the pressurizer and blew the rupture disk you know, just over-pressurized it.
That is what we thought right at that minute.
14!
l 15l l
O' CONNER:
So when you went back to check the reactor coolant drain tank, 16i i
you never turned the pumps on.
So those pumps were never turned on, to the 17 best of your knowledge.
18l 19 BRYAN:
I never touched nothing right?
20 21; 0' CONNER:
Right.
22 23 BRYAN:
I don't know if they were running or not when I got there.
24l l
251 l
2000 'M I
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9 O' CONNER:
Okay.
1, 2:
BRYAN:
3 I just looked at the level and went on to do something else.
I 4j walked around the front and got the fire alarm them.
It just kind of, I mean I never checked the pump.
5 6l 1
0' CONNER:
Where do those pumps pump to?
7 8
BRYAN:
The bleed tank.
g 10 0' CONNER:
The bleed tank.
Does the fire alarm have any automatic action?
12 BRYAN:
No.
13 14!
l O' CONNER:
Just a heat sensor?
15i 16i i
BRYAN:
Yes.
17!
i 18j l
O' CONNER:
I remember reading or someone told me that there I think you or 19{
someone had the impression that they may have had a steam leak in contain-20i ment about that same time.
Is that?
21 22 BRYAN:
Yes, that was thought of yes.
23 2000 135 24l 1
25 i
10 1.
O' CONNER:
Is that why the B generator was isolated about 5:30?
2 BRYAN:
Yes.
The level in the 8 generator was going up when we thought we 3
4 had a tube leak.
The fact... a steam leak I think was mentioned and we 5
mentioned a steam leak when we started around and the level in the B gener-6 at r was going up and we figured we had a tube leak.
I think then we went right back to the assumption that we had the rupture disk blown in the 7
drain tank.
I don't think we pursued that too long.
8 9
0' CONNER:
Okay, so you'd isolated the B generator level was increasing.
0 Not because you had any indication of activity in there?
12 BRYAN:
No we didn't have any indication of activity.
Sometime early in this, within the first half hour I think.
Around a half hour we secured 14!
I the circ water pumps so that the atmospheric relief valves would lift to 15j 16rl keep the water from building up in the hot well.
i 17 0' CONNER:
Yes.
Was it an interlock?
18l t
19 BRYAN:
Yes, with no circ water pumps running it closes the bypass valves 20' and pressure controls reverted to the atmosphere dump valves.
21 i
22 0' CONNER:
Would it not have been possible just to take manual control over 23 the atmospheric dumps and open them?
24
?
00 ' M 25i l
11 1:
BRYAN:
If you go down to the valves, yes.
2 0' CONNER:
Go down to the valves?
3 4
BRYAN:
5 It is easier to turn the circ. water pumps off.
6 0' CONNER:
Yes.
7 8
BRYAN:
While we were trying to stop the~ steam from going to the turbine, g
g to the hot well, at the time because of the level, letting the steam blow out the atmospherics so that the hot well level would eventually start coming down, that was the theory that we were going on now.
13 0' CONNER:
When did you start to suspect that the electromatic relief
(
valves may have been stuck open?
15l 16i BRYAN:
I checked the temperatures at least twice, maybe three times within 17 the first couple of minutes well, within the first half hour that I was 18l l
there.
And each time all three of them indicated -- I forget the numbers, 19!
but they were within 15 degrees or something like that and I figured well, 20l it is not stuck open cause the other two are indicating the same.
21,l 22 0' CONNER:
And it was hot and they were just cooling down?
23 24 2000 '37 2s l
l
12 1.
BRYAN 1 Yes.
Yes, being hot it didn't bother tre, I was looking for one i
2,!
that was leaking by.
3 0' CONNER:
You expected it to be a lot higher than the other two.
4 5
BRYAN:
6 I know I looked at the indications for the valves and it indicated closed.
7
~
8 O' CONNER:
There seemed to be an apparent reluctance to shut the block g
valve just for the heck of it just to play safe.
10, 11 BRYAN:
I don't think there was any reluctance.
I never suspected that the thing was leaking by and I would not have hesitated to close the block valve. It didn't seem like that was a problem.
l 15!
l O' CONNER:
Yeah.
16) 17l l
BRYAN:
Once you close them things you know you might not get it open.
18j i
19j i
0' CONNER:
Yes.
20[
21 BRYAN:
And there was no justification to close it at the time that I could 22I find.
23
}QOO 24 25 t
l
13 0' CONNER:
No.
1 s
2 BRYAN:
It indicated shut all three relief valve temperatures were approxi-3 4f mately the same.
5 0' CONNER:
Can you shed any light on what made the operators want to shut 6
down the reactor coolant pumps.
7 8
BRYAN:
Yes.
From the time I got there the flow indication was going down.
9 RC flow was jdst drifting' down the chart and va were getting... vibration was increasing.
12 O' CONNER:
What kind of inaications did you get in the control room that you were having the vibration?
f 15(
l BRYAN:
We had Bentley-Nevada indicators.
16i 17 0' CONNER:
Pardon me?
18l 19f BRYAN:
Bentley-Nevada Indicators.
20!
21 t
O' CONNER:
Are they audible?
22 23 BRYAN:
Well, we looked at it all right.
I think it was higher than normal.
24l I don't know if there was an alarm for that or not.
I was not paying 25 attention.
7nng '39 i
aj' ' -
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14 i
1 0' CONNER:
But it just measures the mils of the vibration?
2:
BRYAN:
Mils of the vibration yes, and they were getting pretty high.
3 4
The number I can' t give you.
It was higher than normal.
5 0' CONNER:
What was the concern?
6 7
8 Well,' something was screwed up because the flow was decreasing and BRYAN:
all the pumps vere still running and it seems to me like it decreased 30 or g
10
- 40% over an ho tr and a nalf or so and hour or whatever it was.
11 0' CONNER:
I don' t think we really... the only concern was the vibration and the flow was decreasing.
We don't really know at that time what the hell was going on.
t 15j l
BRYAN:
Sure.
16) i 17l
,0't0NNER:
You wer.e afraid of damaging the pumps or the pipe.
181 l
191 BRYAN:
The pumps.
20,'c 21 0' CONNER:
Someone suggested that part of the concern was that the pumps 22 may start to vibrate so vielently that you might destroy the integrity of 23 the primary system.
24 25l 2000 '40 I
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.b 15 lt BRYAN:
No, I, we have ren the reactor coolant pumps the higher vibration O
2p than I seen that morning.
That wasn' t... I never heard anybody mention I
3 it, the thought never occurred to me until just now.
4' 5
0' CONNER:
So let me see, you shut down two pumps at first and then later 6
n two others?
7}
BRYAN:
Well, later on, you don't want me to say because I went back to 8
UEit 1.
g When I was there Ithink he shut down two pumps in che B loop.
10 O' CONNER:
They went first right? Why were they shut down as op. posed to the As?
13 BRYAN:
I don't snow.
But Bill was there and I was there.
I was looking at things and he was looking at things I remember him just stepping up and 15;
,6l turning them both off.
I think by this time Mike Ross was there and George 1
Kunac and there was a couple of people in the control room.
18f 0' CONNER:
Don't get me wrong, we are not trying to find out who did and 19j why did they make the the decision.
We are just trying to get some general 20l understanding as to you know, looking back at the traces and you know looking at one thing at the time and a quiet room like this.
You say boy, r
22 I wouldn't have done that, for sure.
23 24l 25[
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2000
'41 i
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16 1
BRYAN:
No, I, if I worked there, would have done the same thing probably.
He was over there and I was over here.
2:
3 4l O' CONNER:
Well, you say you left the unit 2 control room after a bit of time.
About when did you leave?
5 6
BRYAN:
Um, sometime after six.
I would say between six and 6:30.
7 8
O' CONNER:
By that timc had any of the emergency plans been initiated?
t g
10l BRYAN:
No.
At this time... en I lef t Unit 2, see Brian Mehler had came in I
and well Mike Ross was the supervisor of OPS in Unit 1.
He had came down.
12l We called him and told him to come on down and give us a hand.
Brian came 14l in so it was there were four or five people there we decided well one of us I
has to go back to Unit 1 and I had been in Unit 1 all night so I went back 15i l
over because i knew what the status at Unit I was.
And Greg Hitz came in, 16!
I he was my relief and I was telling liim you know we got a mess down in the way.
We were not concerned yet really to any great extent at this time.
i And him and I were sitting there it was turning overtime and they announced 19i this site emergency and I said you know, "What the f_ _ _ now!", and went out and looked and we had two radiation monitor alarms in Unit 1, one was 21, the sample room, and the hot machine shop.
You know we didn't know what 22 the hell was going on so we called down and I guess they had tried to take 23 a sample of Unit 2 at this time.
I am assuming that, I don't
.. because 24 the sample lines come right by the...
i i
i e
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f 17 r
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O' CONNER:
You were trying to get a boron sample at that time.
i I
i 2!
3 BRYAN:
Okay, that is the first indication we had that anything was going 4{
wrong.
Well, anything was going wrong other than the trip and a little bit 5
.~crewy in Unit 2.
We never expected to see anything like that.
6 0' CONNER:
Right. So we you left about 6:30 and about that... did you say 7
6 or 6:30?
8 9
BRYAN:
Yeah 10l i
1 11 0' CONNER:
Okay and during that, at about that time all the pumps were off....
14
- "9 15
~
16i i
0' CONNER:
Okay.
17J l
181 BRYAN:
They could have all been off.
I kind of think they were all off 19l l
but I can't I don't really remember it seems that they were because I think 20 they tried to go on natural circulation before I left.
I 22' CANTOR:
Can you rememt.er any other specific things that you were doing in
?.3 that couple hour time span before you went to unit l?
251 j
2nn0 '43 I
f I
{
18 I
lj BRYAN:
Well I know I got out the emergency procedures and went down the 2
steps and made sure we had everything covered in the turbine trip and the 3l reactor trip.
4, 5
0' CONNER:
You were you were just functioning as an extra pair of hands a 6
pair eyes and a brain, you were just helping out the people who were there?
7 Zewe was still in charge of the control room and making all the decisions?
8 gl BRYAN:
Well, he had Mike, tnere were four of us there.
We discussed a 10l couple of things you know.
I 11 0' CONNER:
Had the electromatic relief valve been isolated by the time you 13 14!
Sf BRYAN:
No 16!
0' CONNER:
We suspected that happened about 6:20 so you probably left closer between 6 and 6:20.
18!
19l BRYAN:
Okay, I know it wasn't isolated when I left because I was in Unit I and Mike called me he said hey, dummy, ne says, you know that electromatic is leaking by.
I said no, I said I checked the temperatures.
He said, well we just isolated it.
And... so I know I was in Unit 1 when they isolated it.
24 00 '44 25 i
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f i
I f
19 1!
0' CONNER:
Were you there when Mehler came in?
l 2!
l BRYAN:
Yes.
3l I
4!
0' CONNER:
I was talking to him the other day, just yesterday.
It sounded 5
6 like you know he suggested that that be isolated shortly after he got there 7
so it must have been about 6:15 or so that you left.
In case anybody ever asks you, you will know.
8 9
BRYAN:
That's right.
10 11' 0' CONNER:
What was the general attitude or mood in the control room at that time? Just before you left?
Confusion or did pecole think they had the situation under control?
14!
l 15!
BRYAN:
No, we didn' t really know.
We were mostly just... I think we were kind of just, everybody just sit back and started se tching heads, you l
know, trying to put this together.
That is about where we were at.
You 18f know you can get irvolved in something where you are standing looking at 19{
one thing and trying to take care of it and it gets to the point where you 20l 21(j just try to keep fixing little things and you are not getting the big picture we finally got to the point where we all just kind of stood back 22 and said listen, let's talk about this and see what we got here.
23 24 25i l
2000 '45 i
k a
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20 l!
O' CONNER:
Do you recall whac the HP injection pumps were doing the first 2{
two hours or so?
3 1
BRYAN:
Um, when I got there they were off.
And shortly after I got there 4
5 we started on it again.
We tried to start the A and it did r.ot start.
I 6
f rget which one we ended up putting on.
We did get one back on.
I know 7
we isolated the core flood tank valves sometime while I was there.
They were isolated when I left.
g 9I 0' CONNER:
10 Wnat was the reason for isolating them?
11l BRYAN:
Well, the pressure was going down.
We had a low pressure and we had the full pressurizer.
We did not need any more water.
14!
15:l O' CONNER:
All right so you were concerned that the core flood may dump more water in.
So I guess the tendency during that period of time was to i
let down as much as you could and not makeup.
17l l
18i BRYAN:
Makeup...
You know the thing you got a full pressurizer, well we 19!
didn't know anything about the bubbles ar.d s _ _ _, so we just assumed, you got a full pressurizer we don't need any more water.
That wasn't our 21 problem it was getting rid of some water.
22 23 CANTOR:
We are curious on what this... were they doing any playing, and 24 l
maybe as the day goes on, we are interested in ventilation systems and how 25!
7nn0 '46 i
i
l 21 1!
they were operating in the control room ventilation system and how many 2,
times you can remember I guess you were in and out of respirators I guess 3
in both units and they were shifting the emergency team back and forth and 4l what not.
5 BRYAN:
We did a lot of things with ventilation in Unit 1.
What they did 6
in Unit 2 I don't know.
We tried -- we shut it down we started up... and 7
8 just tried different things.
I don't remember how many times... I really can't remember being in a respirator at all.
I left at 9:30 or 9:00 or g
O somewhere cat evening.
10 11I 1
CANTOR:_ In that evening?
i 13 BRYAN:
Yes, and I don't really remember, but I was in Unit 1 control room the whole day.
Yes, I do remember because some guy called from oh, Arizona and I was in a respiratnr.
It pissed me off because he kept wanting to talk and I am trying to scream in a... you know....
17l1 1
18l l
CANTOR:
19i 20 BRYAN:
He heard about it and called to see what was going on.
Pat Schwartz, he used to work here.
22 23 CANTOR:
Oh....
pause....
Why did you stay so long in Unit I?
24 2000 '47 as N
s i
i
22 1
BRYAN:
Well, we had set up the emergency control center in Uriit 1 well, it i
g!
was set up in Unit 2 and moved to Unit 1.
And there were a lot of things 3
9 I'1g on.
We had when Gregg went down Hitz, yes, Hitz made a tour through 4
the aux building in Unit 2.
So I stayed in Unit 1 to keep things going 5
m re or less and help and.Seelinger was there as emergency director part of the time.
He left.
I forget who else come in and out.
6 7
0' CONNER:
8 Do you recall who operated the radio, was there a rr.dio phone g'
there?
10 BRYAN:
I think that Good was, I know Ben Good was there.
I think she was started on the radio.
I couldn't swear to that.
13 0' CONNER:
Can you shed some light on what was going on in the aux boiler, j
we're to trying to pin in you know Unit 2 one time and the lost vacuum 16;l because I have heard that the aux boiler was up and down and two were up I
and one came down.
Can you give us a sequence of events as to what was 17' going on with the aux boiler over there?
181 19i BRYAN:
Yes, they were up and down.
We were having some trouble with them.
20:
21l I had an instrument guy down there working on them.
-I know the first part t
of the morning we decided that we were not going to send Unit 2 anything, 22 right and that somebody called and said send me steam and I said nope you 23 don't get any steam but it was a shift foreman er something okay?
Early in 24 the morning they decided well, well first of all you can't run both units 25 2000 '48 i
i
{
23 1,
on those two aux blowers and Unit I was in a state where we were ready, we 2
were heated we were ready to go, and we needed the steam for the feedwater 1
3 heating and to maintain vacuum and we had figured Unit 2 is down the hell with it you know we were just going to we will try to keep Unit 1 on.
That
'l 5
was the first decision that was made early in the morning, not to give Unit 2 anything.
So I wasn't overly concerned about the aux boilers once we got 6
7 into the offsite radiation teams going and everything.
I didn't really follow it too much until somebody else called and said, well they need the steam for the vacuum you know they were going to start putting the vacuum back on and it they went just the opposite, Unit 2 got the steam and Unit 1 10 they didn't care about.
And then they got to be a little bit more important and this was I don't know, lunch time or something.
Once we started sending them steam then we had a guy down at the boiler.
I think we kept one on the rest of the time.
14!
One might have tripped and come back on you only l
need one to maintain turbine seals doesn't really take that much.
15i 16 i
0' CONNER:
So your recollection is that you started sending Unit 2 steam 17}!
from the aux boiler at noonish time?
181 l
191 BRYAN:
Well, it wasn't 8 - 9 :00 in the morning.
I know it was later on.
201 Because we had said earlier we weren't going to send them anything.
Just 21, try to keep Unit I hot and keep the feed water heat in one.
23 0' CONNER:
We will turn the tapes now.
Hold on.
24 2s
,2000 '49 t
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f 24 1!
You said that Gregg Hitts made a tour of the aux building, did you ever 2;
talk to him after that, and get any feedback on what he saw down there, I'm 3
particularly interested in the water that kept getting in the building down 4j in the basement and whether it was hot.
5 BRYAN:
Yeah, it was hot dcwn there.
6 7
' CONNER:
Temperature wise or radiation wise?
8 9
BRYAN:
Radiation wise, it was hot OK.
Because I know when he came out of 10 there he lost everything he had on.
Even his TLD was too hot to count.
The plastic on it was crapped up.
He did talk about some water being in the Aux Building.
Let's see, it was starting to run into the decay heat vaults.
It was laying en the floor, like when you would walk it would make little waves on the floor it would just run over the edge a little bit, it 15:
16l wasn't gushing in or anything.
I know that he had mentioned some numbers and on I assume he had a teletector with him and he mentioned some numbers.
17l It was pretty hot there, I forget what they were.
He was talking about Rs 18{
though, not mr.
i 191 l
20l l
O' CONNER:
Is there anything in your mind that could make you speculate on 21; I
I where some of v is water was coming from?
I know people have said that the 22 RR pumps, and you said they came on quickly in the accident and they had a 23 history of pretty good leakage rate in the seals, that's river water but it 241 might have added some to the volume down there.
2s!
2000 '50
25 l
1, BRYAN:
Yeah.
No, I can' t really.
I 2'
3 0' CONNER:
Can you tell me anything about the spent fuel pump?
Do you recall anything at all?
4j 5
6l BRYAN:
The spent fuel pump.
It kind of rings a bell, I don't know why it 7
does.
Maybe someone mentioned about it that morning.
Sl i
O' CONNER:
g I have a notation on my sheet, that says that it was stopped and 10 I have other information that says that the pools were empty.
11 BRYAN:
Yeah, the pools were empty.
13 0' CONNER:
They would have to be running a long time.
I'm trying to resolve where that might fit in.
15i 16' BRYAN:
It seems to me that that word was mentioned in the control room 17 that morning.
I don't, it doesn't really relate to anything.
I can't 18l 19j really help you. Yeah, I think they were in the process of cleaning up up i
there.
20l 21 0' CONNER:
We seem to be running out of questions.
Is there anything we haven't touched on that you would like to just mention, that would help us piece together things.
24I
.?0nJ
'51 i
6 h
i
26 1.
BRYAN:
No, not really, we talked about everything I know.
2!
3 0' CONNER:
We've talked to all the operators who were on the Unit 2 watch 4t that morning, we've talked to yourself and Bryan Mehler and the senior 5
station people also because of the1r participation in the emergency plan.
l Gi Is there any other control roon operatars or auxiliary operators that you 7
think it would be worthwhile getting their comments?
8 BRYAN:
g No, the only well, I wasn't running the people in the Unit 2 like 10 the aux operators so.I don't even know who was working that night, to tell you the truth, in Unit 2.
Scott Wilson, he's an engineer, I'm pretty sure g
he came in the Unit 2 control room fairly early in the morning and I don't know how much he would know or how much he could help you but he was there i
14l early in the morning.
I don't know whether you talked to him or not cause 15:
like they used him to make the phone calls.
16) 0' CONNER:
Was he calling the state?
I 18l BRYAN:
No, no, we hadn't even considered calling the state yet.
He called George Kunder and Joe Logan, people like that.
21l 0' CONNER:
He was in Unit 2?
22I 23 BRYAN:
He was in Unit 1 prior to when the thing started.
I got to Unit 2 24 before he did but I can remember him showing up down there and there was 25 l
2000 '52 I
i
{
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another guy with him.
I know that he looked at the computer.
There's some i
2, things in the emergency procedure that you have to run out some of this and 3
that.
I had him doing that, whet 5er he did it I didn't follow that up.
4l 0' CONNER:
Thanks a lot, Ken.
5 61 7
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2000 '53 i