ML19274G070
| ML19274G070 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 06/01/1979 |
| From: | Thorpe J GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7908290384 | |
| Download: ML19274G070 (15) | |
Text
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'JNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION I
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In the Matter of:
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IE TMI INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW 3
of 4
John R. Thorpe Manager of Environmental Affairs 5
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Trailer #203 9
NitC Investigation Site TMI Nuclear Power Plant 10!
Middletown, Pennsyhinia lh s"
Juno 1. 1979 19 (Date of Interview) 13 Julv 6. 1979 (Date Transcript Typed) 14 290 15!
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(Tape Number (s))
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20j 21j NRC PERSONNEL:
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Antho;.19 N. Fasano, Inspection Specialist 23!
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' Robert Marsh, Investigator 25t 2000 084 J
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MARSH:
The date is June 1, 1979.
The time is 3:39 p.m.
My name is 2!
j Bob Marsh, and I'm an Investigator with the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory 3"
Commission, assigned at the Region III offices, Chicago, Illinois.
4{
This afternoon we're at the facilities of GPU... no the headquarters 5
of GPU Service Corporation, located at 260 Cherry Hill Road in Mountain 6
Lakes, New Jersey.
At this time we will be conducting an interview of 7
Mr. John R. Thorpe, whose title is Environmental... Manager of Environ-mental Affairs.
At This point before we begin, I would like the other 9
individuals in the room to identify themselves, spell their last name 10 and indicate their position.
Tony, if you would begin.
11' 12 FASANO:
Anthony N. Fasano, Inspection Specialist, NRC.
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14 THORPE:
Jack Thorpe, Manager of Environmental Affairs, GPU Service lb Corporation.
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1 H0VER:
J. G. Hover, Manger of Generation Division Support.
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MARSH:
I thank you.
Mr. Thorpe, before we turned the tape on, we had 20) a short discussion addressing the two page memo, which you have signed.
21' And I just want to make reference to it briefly on the tape here and 22, indicate that that memo does cover the purpose of our investigation...
I 23 the NRC investigation, the authority under which it is being conducted, 24 and the scope.
It also addresses the rights of the person being inter-25i t
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viewed, and on the second page there are several questions which I 2!
j would like to get your response to at this time.
First question reads, 31 do you understand the above, making reference to the reference to the 4'
i two page memo?
S' 6i THORPE:
Yes.
7 8
MARSH:
Do we have your permission to tape this interview?
9 10' THORPE:
Yes.
11l 12 MARSH:
And finally, do you want a copy of the tape or transcript?
13 14 THORPE:
Yes.
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MARSH:
We will provide you one.
There is a fourth question not specifi-t 17l cally called out on the second page, but covered in the body, and that 18[
addresses your right if you so desire to have a company official present 19I during the interview.
And it is my understanding that that is the role 20 Mr. Hover is in this afternoon.
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22 H0VER:
That's correct.
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l MARSH:
To begin with Mr. Thorpe, could we get you to give a brief 2'
l resume of your experience in the nuclear field, and then a description 31 of your duties with GPU at this time.
Following those then we'd like e
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to go into your recollection of your involvement with the incident at 5'
TMI starting with March 28th.
Your first notification of what had Ej happened and in sequence what actions you were involved in.
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THORPE:
To start off with, I have two degrees in chemical engineering, 9l a bachelor and master's degree, which I was pursuing until mid...
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until the mid 1950's, in which time I was sent to the Oakridge School 11I of Reactor Technology, in Oakridge, Tennessee, by the United States i
12 Navy, to take the one year course.
Following successful completion of 13!
that course, I... a year later ended up working for a New York Ship-14!
building Corporation on the construction of the N. S. Savannah.
At the 15 completion of that, I was worked on the construction of the D.L.G.N.
16i 35, the TrJckston, a nuclear powered frigate.
And then I worked as II Reactor Safety Officer in the operation of the N. S. Savannah.
The 18{
reactor safety officer was part of the shore staff as roughly equivalent lh to a position that would be called Safety and Licensing Manager in 20!
other organizations.
And then 9 years ago I came to General Public 21, Utilities.
First as Safety and Licensing Manager, and then for the 22 last five or six years, I've been Manager of Environmental Affairs, 23 which includes responsibilities in both the environmental area and in 24 safety and licensing.
And that's both nuclear and non... or as we 25!
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call it, environmental licensing... in power plants.
Now, I guess A
2l that's pretty much my background.
Now, your interested in my recollections 31 l
of the day of the action... the accident, and how I was involved in 41 it.
About mid-morning, that day, I had asked one of my people t, I
5' contact Three Mile Island, and at this time I was not aware that there 61 was any sort of a problem there, to get some information concerning the 7
need for river gauge data, that's available from Harrisburg, to see 0
whether or not we should be supporting the maintenance of that gauge.
9 He called the plant and came back, and said that the people that he was 10 trying to contact sent word back that they couldn't talk to him.
That 11 there was... that they were having a problem there.
And he mentioned 12f that they said that the radiation alarm in the top of the containment 13
... the radiation indicator in the top of the containment had alarmed, 14 which bothered me somewhat, because I realized of course then, that 15l there was some significant radiation in the containment building.
Not 16i long after that, a meeting convened in Dick Wilson's office to attempt 17 to provide information to the staff at TMI, with respect to that...
ISj the incident.
And as I remember, individuals like Dick Wilson, Bob 19!
Keatin, Don Cronberger and I were there.
Others came in that I remembered 20!
during the times... I think Mike Morrel came in.. Ed Wallace, Leon 21 Garibbien, Dick Chilsom... those sort of people.
And we were providing 22, answers to questions raised by Bob Arnold.
I think that at that time, 1
23 Bob was in direct communication with the plant.
I don't remember that 241 we were.
This type of meeting lasted through about a normal lunch 25!
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l tima.
Sandwiches were brought in for us, and I remember we were discussing 2!
l various things to be looked at, and the like, in this area.
And then, 31 l
not long after lunch, we went to... we were summoned over to Bob 4!
j Arnold's office, and about that same group, not quite everybody, but 5
I'm not sure in my mind just who was there.
And we went into Bob Gi Arnold's office.
At that time, there was direct communication with the 7
Control Room by telephone.
And then for the rest of the regular work 8
day, and then on into the evening somewhat, we spent in Mr. Arnold's 9l office providing information and the like, to the operators.
That's my 10 basic re:ollections of what happened that day.
11l 12 MARSH:
Tony, do you want to get into specifics?
13i 14l FASANO:
Then you say, that your first knowledge was indirect.
One of 15!
your personnel had found out that there was a reading in the dome of 16; the... is outside containment or up in the 17l 18!
THORPE:
No, inside containment.
There is a detector right in the 19I dome.
20' 21 MARSH:
That's the shielding one without the...
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THORPE:
That's correct.
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FASAN0:
Did they give him a number, or...
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THORPE:
They may have, but I did not make a note of it, or anything or 4i that nature.
I knew that it had alarmed.
And I realized that there i
was significant problems when that got high enough to alarm.
But, as 6l to what was the number, I-don't know.
7 0
FASANO:
- 0. K.
And did you know that a general emergency had been 9
called, or was anyone told at that time or...
10' 11 THORPE:
I think that... no, at that time I was not aware that there 12l was a general emergency.
I think that the alarming of that is... is i
13
... enough to call a site emergency.
I think that's one of the criterion 14 on which they base calling a site emergency.
And then a general emergency lb is based on specific dose measurements.
And I remember that.
And by 16 the way, there is one point, I think I should make now, that I think I 11l forgot to make.
There is an organization called the General Office 18j Review Board, which is the overview, the management level overview for 19!
reactor safety for TMI.
We have a similar one for Oyster Creek.
And I 20!
am the Chairman of that committee for Three Mile.
So, I was fairly 21;l familiar with the site emergency plan and things of that nature, because 22 they have gone through a trial run of the emergency plan, not too much 23l in advance of that.
And the board was interested in what was happening, 24 so I was familiar with the content of the thing.
So, that I knew that 25j l
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l when that alarm went, that there was a
... you know, a site emergency 2!
l had been declared.
But, I did not know that there was a general emergency 31 until the later meeting had convened.
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FASANO:
So by that indication, you then concluded that there must have 6
been at least a site emergency.
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THORPE:
Emargency.
That's right.
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10 FASANO:
When you went to Mr. Bob Arnold's office, he said you had 11 direct communication with the Control Room... with the operators or 12l with whom?
13 14 THORPE:
As I remember, the voices that I personally remember being on 15 the phone was Joe Logan, who is the Unit 2 Superintendent, and I can't 16 remember the name of the B&W onsite rep, but he was the other person 17 that I remember hearing on the phone.
18j 19l FASANO:
And this was about one o' clock or so?
20l 21 THORPE:
It was sometime right after lunch, so I would think that's 22 probably it.
And we stayed there as I said, then for the best part of 23'
... the rest of day, and into the evening.
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Were you giving advice to the Control Room as to what you 2'
evaluation was, or to what might be appropriate action based on the 3
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information that your were getting from Mr. Logan, or anyone else from 4
the Control Room?
5l 6
THORPE:
Yes, that would... that was part... we were obviously acquiring 7
information and trying to make some evaluations of the data ourselves.
8 But we were also attempting to give advise.
si 10 FASANO:
What specific information were you getting, and what advice 11 were you giving?
12 13 THORPE:
We were being appraised of the temperatures in the loop.
The i
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fact that the temperatures were off scale... the hot leg temperatures 15 were off scale.
The fact that there was a gas bubble in the hot leg of 16!
each loop.
And our basic attention at that time, appeared to be an 17 attempt to get to... to condense that bubble which we had... at that 18l time we were thinking of only steam.
And to getting the pumps running 19!
again so that there would be forced circulation to the core.
That's my 20{
recollection of being the major concern that we had at that time.
21; 22 FASANO:
Now this... can you recall when you were coming up this kind 23l of information and conclusions, was it, say, later in the afternoon, or 2d was it the early part of the afternoon?
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l THORPE:
Gee, I really couldn't say.
The only thing I can tell you, 2!
l was that that is the major question, that I carried away from me.
I 31 did not make any writtan notes.
But that was the major question, that 4!
l I carried away with me from that meeting.
5 6
FASANO:
- 0. K.
And that meeting you were in Mr. Arnold's office between 7
what period of time?
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9 THORPE:
About one, one thirty, something of that nature, I think.
Up 10l
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until about 6 or so.
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12 FASANO:
Six or so?
I 13 14 THORPE:
Six thirty, yes.
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16 FASANO:
So this information, and these decisions were made between one 17 and six... to your best recollection?
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THORPE:
That information, yes, was being given in that time frame.
201 Yeah.
21 22 FASANO:
Did you made any decisions or suggestions?
You're personal 23 involvement?
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THORPE:
Well, first of all, no, I did not make any decisions cause I 2!
l am not in the decision making chain.
I was involved in the discussion.
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But I can't point out to you that I made this point, versus someone 41' else made the other point.
My memory is not that clear on that.
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6l FASANO:
As far as the environmental affairs, did you get involved or 7
were you... did you begin to get involved in the environmental con-8 siderations at this time?
9I 10 THORPE:
No.
You mean off site dose readings, and things of that I
11l nature?
No.
I did not.
12l 13 FASANO:
So, the first day, this was not part of what you were doing?
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15i THORPE:
That's correct.
16:
I 17 FASANO:
0.K.
You left Arnold's office about six?
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i 19 THORPE:
That's right.
20 21 FASANO:
When did you leave GPU?
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THORPE:
It was at the same time.
I had a... i don't want to say an 2!
l engagement... but I had a meeting to go to that evening, which I never 3
did get to, as the town's representative on a solid waste council.
And 4l they were taking a very important vote that nigh't, and you know, I left 5
so that I could go to that meeting.
But, I got a... when I got home, 6l I got a call from Bob Arnold and he asked me to make some estimates, 7'
based on some information he gave me of what kind of exposures people 0
... people would be getting right off the... right off the site.
And 9!
so, I stayed at home and made those kinds of estimates... until like i
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9:30 or 10 o' clock that night.
So, I never got to tN ineeting, but you 11!
know I was at home working on that, 12 13 FASANO:
Do you have ary questions.
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i 15i MARSH:
No, I have none.
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FASANO:
You say your the head of GORB?
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THORPE:
Yes.
General Office Review Board.
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I 21; FASANO:
In that capacity, then you review the Licensing Event Reports 22 anu the...
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THORPE:
That's right.
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FASANO:
And the various modifications that require 10 CFR 50, 59?
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THORPE:
Yes, in a general fashion.
One of the things that we have 6i attempted to do with the GORB, as we will call it, is to rather than 7
being the normal second layer... you know. NRC requires two layers...
the plant level and then an outside level to review modifications and 9
things of that nature.
The people we have on the board are not the 10 kind that would want to encumber with that.
So we attack the things on 11l a broad overview type of situation, looking for... you know... indi-12) cations of trends or the like.
We do not investigate every modification.
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Although that information is made available to us.
And we could look 14 at any one that we wanted to.
15 i 16 FASANO:
On the Licensing Event Reports, in particular, the ones that 17
,esulted in any ECCS actuation, did you look at those for 1978? And 18!
were there any trends?
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THORPE:
I can say we re/iewed them.
I'm not aware that we recognized 21!
the trend... the majo: thing that we did note there, was that we h&d 22 problems with injection of sodium hydroxide into the primary system on 23 24 25
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a spurlous tCCS initiation.
And we felt along with others that this 2
was not beneficial, and that the design has got to be modified to keep 3
that from happening.
4 FASAN0:
I guers, the first two actuations, you had sodium hydroxide?
6 The one in March and the one in April?
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THORPE:
I think they were correct.
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10' FASAN0:
Just for my own information.
This was modified, this actuation 11I of your sodium hydroxide tank?
12 13 THORPE:
Yes.
The actuation signal as I remember, was modified to 14l require the 4 pound signal in the building, before you injected sodium 15i hydroxide.
because the sodium hydroxide basically, is designed to be 16i part of the containment spray system.
And the only time you want that i
17 in the system is essentially when you're going to go into the spray 18(
mode.
So they were having the four pound... if you didn't have a four 19 pound infection you weren't going to spray and you didn't want to put 20l sodium hydroxide into it.
And that kept us from feeding sodium hydroxide i
21 into the emergency.. or into the ECCS when it was just going into the i
22 reactor vessel.
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FASAN0:
Was there any connection with the level on your BWST boron 2'
water storage tank?
3 4I' THORPE:
There was but I can't remember what it is ncv, out there was Si also a connection there.
6 FASANO-I have no further questions.
8 MARSH:
Nor do I.
10 11 FASANO:
If you would like at this time to make any comments as to your 121 experience through this, if you have any ideas that might be helpful 13 for others, feel free to give them now.
14!
1 15i THORPE:
Well, I guess the one thing that bothered me.
You know, that 16!
I felt that I would like to say something about, at least to somebody, 17!
and maybe I'd feel better having said it here was, that my assignment I
181 the next day was to procede to Reading, and provide liaison, if needed 19l in Reading with the press, or with the media.
Because they were having 20i a press corference in.. at the island, and most of the people who 21 were knowledgeable had gene there.
So I sort of moved over one area to 22' do that.
And as part of that, we sat and listened to the prass conference 23 that was held at the Hershey Motor Lodge, the day after the accident.
24l And while today I realize that some of the things that were said at 25 i
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that press conference were not correct, I did not at that time identify 2
l anything based on what I knew from the day before to be incorrect.
It 3l was, you know, that the significance of the thing built on a day to day 4l j
basis.
And I guess the thing I'm trying to say is, I believe that the SI
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j company was candid in wha't they said the next day.
It may appear to 61 others that they weren't because later on, we found out different 7
things.
The truthfulness of we in the utility business is something P
that bothers me, because I've been accus2d of being a liar on several b
occasions, while discussing things with the public.
And I just thought 10 I'd feel better having said that.
11!
i 12l MARSH:
Well, if nobody has anything else, the time being 4:01 p.m.
13 Showing 365 on the meter, we will terminate the tape.
Thank you more 14l.
again, Mr. Thorpe for your time.
i 15, 16i THORPE:
Your welcome.
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