ML19274G065
| ML19274G065 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 05/31/1979 |
| From: | Klingaman R METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7908290357 | |
| Download: ML19274G065 (35) | |
Text
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of:
1 2'
IE TMI INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW 3
of Mr. Richard N. Klingaman, Manager for Generation Engineering 4I
\\
si I
6i 7l 8!
Trailer #203 9
NRC Investigation Site TMI Nuclear Power Plant 10 Middletown, Pennsylvania 11!
l May 31, 1979 12!
(Date of Interview)
I 13l July 5, 1979 (Date Transcript Typed) 14!
- 287 15l (Tape riun,ber(s))
l 161 17l ProhroFr7 lI 18I
'l 20 21l NRC PERSONNEL:
22 Mr. Anthony N. Fasano Mr. Thomas H. Essig 23 Mr. Robert Marsh 24{
25f i
?000 001 e
i I
I
1 MARSH:
The date is May 31, 1979, and the time is 8:57 a.m.
My name 2.
is Robert Marsh and I am an investigator with the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory 3
Commission assigned to the Region III office, Chicago, Illinois.
This 4
morning we are at the facilities of Metropolitan Edison at 2800 Topsville 5
Pike, in Reading, Pennsylvania, for the purpose of conducting interviews.
6 At this time we have with us Mr. Richard N. Klingaman, who is Manager 7
for Generation Engineering.
Also in the room is Mr. Rudolf R. Lefin, g
who has been requested as a company representative to sit in during this interview.
At this time we would like each individual in the g
10 m to identify himself, to spell his last name, and to give his r
11 p sition if he would starting with yourself Mr. Klingaman.
12 KLINGAMAN:
13 My name is Richard N. Klingaman and I'm Manager of Generation Engineering for Metropolitan Edison.
14 15!
LEFIN:
My name is Rudy Lefin and I'm Supervisor for Mechanical and 6
System Engineering.
,7 1
18l 19l ESSIG:
Thomas H. Essig, Chief, Environmental and Special Projects Section, NRC, Region III.
21 FASAN0:
Anthony N. Fasano, Inspection Specialist, NRC, out of Region 22 I.
23 2000 002 24 25 I
i i
2 1
MARSH:
Thank you gentlemen.
Mr. Klingaman, before we turned the tape 2
on, I had a short discussion with you regarding this two page memo, 3
I'm not going to go into detail on it, but as we've discussed and 4
you've read this memo covers the purpose of ou: investigation, it's 5
authority and scope, and it goes into some detail regarding your 6
rights.
At the end of that memo are three questions which I'd like to 7
review with you at this time.
The first question reads, do you understand 8
the above, making reference to the two page memo?
9 KLINGAMAN:
Yes sir, I do.
10 11 MARSH:
12 And do we have your permission to tape this interview?
13 KLINGAMAN:
Yes, you have my permission.
g I
15{
MARSH:
And finally, would you like a copy of the tape and/or transcript?
6 17 KLINGAMAN:
I would like to receive a copy of it.
19f MARSH:
Fine, I will get you a copy of the tape within a day or two, as soon as we're back at TMI where I have duplicating material.
So, we'll get you a copy of that.
At this time then Tony I'll turn it over to you, I guess you'll start with questions.
24 25 t
2000 n03 I
I 3
1 FASANO:
When did you become involved with the March 28, 1979 event?
2 3
KLINGAMAN:
The first phone call I had from the site was approximately 4
7:00 a.m. on the morning of March 28th.
At that time Ron Warren 5
called me and advised me that a site emergency had been declared.
The 6
time being approximately 7:00 a.m, by way of recollection and my own 7
indication just from my watch, so, times as I.ndicate throughout the g
day may be somewhat inaccurate with clock times because they're recollections g
of things I've done and times...my watch may have been off, this is 10 the only point.
11 FASANO:
12l What was your involvement, how did you participate in the TMI event?
13 14, KLINGAMAN:
15 I had no direct participation with regard to the site. I received a call.
At that time in the morning I was the only manager in the office, I believe, and this is conjecture, that the call was g
really made in order to advice Mr. Lawyer, who was not here.
The system dispatchers turned the call over to me and I, as I say, I was g
I the only manager available in the office at that time in the morning and that only occurred because I happened to come in ehrly in the morning and I Delieve it occurred because they were not able to advise Mr. Lawyer btcause I don't believe they were able to get a hold of him at the time.
He was out of town at another meeting and they, I believe, contacted me just by way of advising a manager of the situation.
251 l
2000 006 i
i
4 1
MARSH:
Excuse me just a second.
Mr. Klingaman can you identify Mr.
2 Lawyer's position?
3 4
KLINGAMAN:
Mr. Lawyer is~ Met Ed's Manager of Generation Operations.
5 6
MARSH:
Fine, thank you very much.
Excuse me, Tony.
Go ahead.
7, FASAN0:
At 7:00 p.m. then you were informed.
What was this...that d
g there was a general emergency?
10!
AMAN:
No sir.
I was informed at about 7:00 a.m. that there was 11 a site emergency.
Very shortly thereafter, and I may be inconsistent y
with time, as I said before, but at approximately in the neighborhood 13 of 7:15 to 7:20 a second call came in which I answered and at that
- 9" " #8 15 situation had changed and at that time a general emergency had been declared.
So I really received two calls that morning, by way of advising -:c.
19 FASANO:
Can you tell us then the information that was presented to you and how it was used here, or how you got involved indeed in any of 21 I
decision making, or if you did get involved in any decision making?
22 23 24 2000 005 25 i
I l
l
5 1
KLINGAMAN:
I think my involvement was more from advising corporate 2
staff, and that was my responsibil1S at the time and in opposition to 3
decision making with regard to the situation.
I was advised that 4
earlier that morning the Unit had suffered a loss of feedwater, the 5
turoine had tripped, the reactor had tripped, and that they had reached 6
the notification levels in the emergency procedure for declaring a site 7
emergency.
Shortly thereafter they advised me that the levels for a g
general emergency were reached.
I advised...the only, as I mentioned g
before, Mr. Lawyer our Manager of Generation Operations was not in the 10 ffice that early in the morning, he was out of town.
I did advise Mr.
11 Tropher, our Manager of Generation Quality Assurance when he arrived 3
which was somewhere in the neighborhood of 7:05 to 7:10, it was between the two phone calls.
So we did know what the situation was, my only 13 actions at that point were to advise, Mr. Creitz, the President of Met p
15; Ed when he got into the office and that was approximately 7:55.
I had e
a message aM Med to get a hoM of Mm earlier and I aMsed Mm 16 I
at about 7:55 what I knew of the situation that was occuring at the 17l site and it did, as I say, consist of notification that the two levels 18!
l of emergency had been declared earlier that morning.
19!
i 20 FASAN0:
Okay.
The information then that you got you relayed this to 21; Mr. Tropher and also to the president.
23 KLINGAMAN:
Yes sir, and to Mr. Creitz, the president, at approximately 24 7:55 when he got into his office.
I 2000 006 I
I
6 1
FASANO:
Did you have any further involvement?
Now this _is about 8:00.
l 2'
3 KLINGAMAN:
I had... involvement that may or may not have Learing on 4
your investigation but I can discuss it.
5 FASANO:
However, it may be of importance.
6 7
KLINGAMAN:
At apprcximately 8:15 I talked with Mr. Robado, who's our g
g Vice-President of Operations, we at that time discussed personnel matters, I guess I should say.
We discussed the confusion that appeared 10 3
to exist at the observation center because of the large number of people who were not going onto the site.
We discussed what Met Ed's g
action should be, because we, in the home office, didn't have an awful lot of information on what was going on minute to minute at the site.
Mr. Robado and I discussed what we should advise the people at the 15!
observation center to do with regard to all the people there.
At that time what we discussed was the fact that we thought we should, based on our knowledge, advise the people to remain there and cake a decision later in the day whether they would be advised to go home for the day.
There are many things we need to be concerned about in that circumstance, 20' with regard to paying people, the large number of people.
Those decisions are not normally made at a station superintendant's level, they're made at a vice presidential level.
Mr. Robado and I discussed them.
- Later, 23 at maybe 8:15 or 8:30 or so, Mr. Robado talked to me again and indicated 24 that Mr. Creitz had talked to Mr. Arnold, the Vice-President of Generation 25 2000 007 l
t i
7 1
and Engineering from GPU, and indicated that we did not want to send 2
the people home.
We wanted to keep our people there and we would make 3
a decision later in the morning as to whether we should keep the people 4
there. We did not know at that point whether people would be able to go 5
to work on the island.
So we were delaying that decision.
That was 6
the involvement that I had early in the morning of that 'ay.
Merely d
7 the interaction and advice between what information I had gotten from g
the site and our management people and decisions with regard to people g
going to work or being sent home.
10 FASANO:
11 You mentioned the sparcity of information coming for decisions, 12 n w w uld that be specifically for the emergency plan or would that be f r the specific problems in the control room?
13 14 4g KLINGAMAN:
The involvement I really had no bearing on the site emergency plan that was being conducted from the site.
The decisions we Nere 16 involved with were merely Met Ed and contractor personnel... payment of them...go...being able to go to work or being sent home for the day, those type decisions.
20l FASAN0:
Did you have any information with regard to the events of the...the events at the control, in the control room which reflected the condition of the plant say at 8 or 9 o' clock.
24 KLINGAMAN Not at that time in the morning, I did not.
25
8 1
FASANO:
Later on?
2 i
3l KLINGAMAN:
Yes sir.
At approximately 9:40 in the morning, Mr. Tropher, 4
our Manager of Generation Quality Assurance and I had a phone conversa-5 tion with Gary Miller.
Gary Miller had previously been our station 6
superintendant and was recently promoted to a manager.
Gary Miller 7
called us and advised us that as I say, about 9:40 in the morning, g
advised us that he had been in contact with the state.
He had provided g
them with the scenario of what the situation was at the plant.
The 10 pr blems with the secondary plant resulting in the turbine trip, the g
reactor trip,'the pressurizer relief valves lifting, and the fact that p
we had some reactor coolant released to the reactor building.
He advised us that he had told the state he had declared a general emergency.
3 I do not know at what time his call to the state was made, but he I
advised us that he had done that.
At that time he advised us that 15l there were no known releases to the environment above normal background 16i 17f level and that the emergency plan did not require any action with i
regard to any activity levels and any action with regard to the public.
t 181 He did advise us the plan was to take the plant to a cold shutdown. He did not expact any effect on the public for what he knew at that time.
He advised us that he had discussed the situation and the scenario with 21 Margaret O'Reiley and Mr. Dornsief from the State...I forget the exact department.
They're part of the state department of...I don't remember the exact department that Margaret O'Reiley and Mr. Dornsief are involved 24 with but I do know that we had interacted with them in many cases in 25
'000 009
9 1
the past with regard to radiological involvement and that was their 2.
responsibility with regard to the State.
That was the gist of the 31 conversation we had with Mr. Miller, which was, as I say, 9:40 or i
4l shortly before 10:00 in the morning.
It was merely advising us of the 5
status of the plant at that time.
6 FASANO: Based on this conversation, did you take any action or make any 7
8 decisions which affected either the comr.unicating with the State or g
back to condition at the plant? Apparently he said that they were 10 g nna go into cold shutdown and I guess...
I 1 18 KLINGAMAN:
Excuse me, at tPat time there was no overt action taken on my pert, it was merely information that was passed along to us, since we had been receiving calls from vcrious members of our management qu stioring us with regard to the status of the plant and the situation 15 at the p ant.-
I was curious and needed to have some information of 16j status of the plant because in addition to advising our management the situation and status, shortly after that, or prior to that I should say, we had started to receive calls with regard to status and the 191 l
situation at the plant.
Shortly after that conversation I assembled 20[
21;l all the Generation Engineering personnel and advised them of what I knew of the status of the plant, and advised them that if there were 22 any calls that came in from friends, suppliers, whoever they may be, 23 that any requests for information were to be directed to Mr. Fabian, 24#
Mr. Blaine Fabian, in our communications services department.
Shortly 25 l
20f)] ^I3 i
10 if after that, since Mr. Lawyer was not here, I made a conference phone 2l call with Mr. Crissman in my office, who's our Manager of Generation 3
Admin-istration and I talkea with personnel at Portland Station, Titus Station, and Yorkhaven Station to advise them of the status of what we 4l 5
knew at that point and also to advise them if there were any calls or 6
any requests for information, that they and their personnel were to 7
direct any of those requests to Mr. Fabian in our communications ser-vices department.
So my involvement was to advise people as best I 8
i could of what I knew of the situation within the company, both our g
c rp rate officers and also the other Generating Station personnel.
As 10 I mentioned, at that time I advised them that any contacts that were made for information should be directed to the Information Services Department, rather than answer it directly.
14!
FASANO:
So you had actually established a focal point for communications, 15!
i in and out, through Mr. Fabian?
16; i
17l l
KLINGAMAN:
That was the instructions that were given that morning, 18!
yes.
19 20 FASANO:
They also...who was the focal point for technical decisions 21 with your technical staff...did they get involved in actually taking specific data or obtaining specific information and using it to develop some engineering type decision or some engineering conclusions?
24l 25l 2000 GII I
t
11 1,
KLINGAMAP:
To the best of my knowledge there was no technical feedback 2'
or decisions being made by my staff with regard to advising the station 3
for actions to be taken at that time.
The only, if you will, technical 4
data that we received, was received by personnel in my radiation safety 5
and enviror:aental engineering group who were beginning to receive 6
information with regaru t. off-site situation, they did remain throughout 7
the day and any detail on that can be provided by Mr. Mudge who will be g
available. Mr. Mudge was here that day and several of his people and g
they were receiving information with regard to off-site exposures, 10 ff-site readings taken at various locations.
It's not quite c' ar in g
my mind exactly what was gotten and at what times that day.
But they 3
were here throughout that day and that evening, receiving information.
13 And we were the organization that attempted to receive the information and coordinate...providing of information for the ensuing period of ays to de N E personnel.
15 I
16i 17 l
FASANO:
Alright.
I'm most interested in the first 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br />, and I'm 18!
l interested in the health physics aspects, but I'm most interested in if 19I there was any information such as thermocouple readings, pH, your hot leg temperature, cold leg temperatures, the possibility of steam generator failure due to the in rush of cold water eight minutes after the incident, the trip that is.
Information like that, were you given the detailed type information and if so, was anythug done with it?
24 2.000 012 25
12 1
KLINGAMAN:
To the best of my recollection none of the specific in 2:
plant data was provided to me throughcut that day.
The overall situ-3.
ation was provided to me, but no specific data...no specific in plant 4
data, with regard to specific circumstances or specific values was 5
pr vided to me that day.
6 FASANO:
So as far as operations, and that was going on in the control 7
8 room, you did not have information provided so that you could assist in g'
making decisions.
10 KLINGAMAN:
No, sir.
12 FASANO:
Were you in contact at all with B&W?
l 14!
KLINGAMAN:
I don't remember the exact time but sometime that day I did 16l receive a phone call to advise me that B&W was sending I believe three people to the site to provide assistance.
I believe the only reason I received the phone call is because came of the personnel at B&W knew me i
18{
j and were trying to advise the site and communication was very difficult 19l chat day. Again, I don't remember nor have a record of specifically who 20' I talked to, out I did relay the information to the site that B&W was 21 sending three technical personnel to assist in the evaluation of the transient.
But that was really my only involvement, I was acting as a 23' communications link if you will, not providing any technical advice at 24 that point.
2s 2000 '^d5 i
I
13 1
FASANO:
You were contacting whom, who were you contacting?
2 KLINGAMAN:
B&W called me.
I believe it was Jim Finney from B&W, my 3
4 recollection isn' t that clear.
I was told three people were coming up 5
to assist in evaluating the transient.
I believe that I passed that 6
inf rmation along to Mr. Seelinger, but I'm not certain that it was Mr.
7 Seelinger.
8 FASAN(.
g About what time would you say?
i 10 KLINGAMAN:
I believe it was early in the afternoon, I don't have a record that I had written down exactly when that call came in but I believe it was after lunch sometime in the early afternoon that I was advised of that.
14!,
15i l
FASANO:
Alright.
So how late did you stay?
How long did you stay here?
17 18{
KLINGAMAN:
I was here till approximately 2:00 the following morning.
19' 20 FASAN0:
Okay.
So we now...we're about 12:00, 10 to 12?
21 i
22 KLINGAMAN:
Yes, and in addition at around 12:00, I knew Mr. Herbein 23 had not been in ',he office the day the incident occured and my first 24 contact was somewhere in the neigorr cod of 12:00 noon, or a little 25!
2000 016
14 1{
after noon, Mr. Herbein called and I believe Mr. Hilbish was in the 2
office at the time we received that call with me and we talked with Mr.
3 Herbein and he again advised us generally of the situation at the 4,
plant, much similar to what Mr. Miller had done at a little before 10 S
in the morning.
But again, it was advising us of the status very 6
similar to what Mr. Miller had indicated and again at that time in-7 dicating that our expectation was to bring the plant down to cold g
shutdown and our expectation was to go in decay heat later that after-noon.
g 10 FASANO:
Okay.
So you knew they were going to decay heat...
u KLINGAMAN:
We knew that was the plan, yes.
14 FASAN0:
So, they went through the evolution of trying to get their 15 core flood tanks on, I guess you were informed of this?
16!
I 1
17 KLINGAMAN:
I don't know that. I do not believe I knew that detail at 18!
l that point in time, no.
19j 20' FASAN0:
Later on?
21 22 KLINGAMAN:
Later on I knew about that, yes sir.
2000 M5 24 25 I
15 1
FASANO:
So you did get some details?
e 2
3 KLINGAMAN:
Of the operating evolutions they were going througn, yes. I 4
did receive that.
My point earlier was, specific data with regard to 5
temperatures, pressures throughout the system, I did not have.
The 6
genere.1 avolution they were going through and their plans for cool 7
down, shut down, coing on decay heat were passed along to us throughout that day.' As I said earlier, by Mr. Miller and then at approximately g
g noon time or a little after noon by Mr. Herbein.
10 FASANO:
But no decision was made here as to do otherwise or to advise yy in any capacity.
12 13 KLINGAMAN:
No, sir.
l 15i FASANO:
Okay, so your involvement then, how did it proceed? We're at 12:00 now.
18{
KLINGAMAN:
Somewhere in the middle of the afternoon, it might have 19}
l been around between 2:15 and 2:30, I received a call from Mr. Limroth, 20 Dave timroth, at that time requesting help and assistance I guess I should say with regard to a need for additional respirators. Mr. during, who later had been assigned to the site but was still here on my staff at that time was here, and I had Mr. Buring check with everyone we 24 could think of, neighboring utilities with regard to where we could 25l l
2000 016 l
16 1
get additional respirators.
We checked with...Mr. Buring checked with gt PP&L and he checked at Salem and he checked at Peach Bottom and he 3
checked at Oyster Creek.
We were attempting to support the staff by 4
providing more respirators for them.
That call did come in at approxi-5 mately 2:15 in the afternoon.
So at that point, and Mr. Buring was in 6
Mr. Mudge's group.
So between the efforts in that group they did do a 7
considerable amount cf checking, phone calls with friends, associates, g
neighboring utilities to find out where we could borrow and also inter _
g acted with our purchasing people to determine where we could quickly 10 pr cure more respirators.
So the first, I quess I should say real 11 support operation we performed that day was in the area of providing additional respirators to the site.
12 13 FASANO:
These were for the people in the control room or generally l
throughout the site?
15l 16!
KLINGAMAN:
I don't know that we had a definition of where they were specifically to be used.
The call came in that they had used a good
- 18l, I
many of their respirators and needed more in anticipation of ongoing 19!
I functions and frankly at that point there was no question on our part 20' with regard to the utilization.
It was merely a reaction in order to provide support for the staff people.
23 FASAN0:
That's aboet mid noon...might as well go ahead with...
24 2q 2000 M l i
1 17 1
KLINGAMAN:
I think the next direct involvement we had in support and I
2t again this is the same kind of off site support, late in the afternoon 3
Mr. Dreybelvis, Mr. Robert Dreybelvis, who is our Manager of Purchasing 4,
contacted me, since he had been involved with some of my people with 5
regard to procurement of respirators and he advised that the Tristate 6
laundry company had a portable trailer laundry I believe at Salem 7
station and advised him that if we needed it they could have that 8
trailer brought to the site in order to use it for decontamination and gl cleaning of respirators.
A decision,F not made that e/ternoon.
Mr.
10 Dreybelvis advised me that he had a contact point with Tristate laundry 11 and we would need to advise him by I believe it was 8:00 the next 12 m rning if we wanted that trailer brought up.
I don't have a detailed g
record, my recollection is that either Mr. Mudge or Mr. Buring, one of my personnel contacted Dave Limroth of the site people to determine e er ey nee e er.
e were a seG later that nig M 15 that they dic.
I'm again not certain but either that night or early the next morning we did advise Mr. Dreybelvis that we wanted Tristate to bring that trailer to the site and again it was providing services 18l for the site people that we were accomplishing at that time.
g I
20!
FASAN0:
Go back a bit.
On the observation center did...wac there a 21 decision finally made to release thatc f.,eople? I know you talked earlier and the decision was to keep everyone there.
2000 MB 24 25 i
I
18 1
KLINGAMAN:
Oh, my recollection is I... earlier in the morning I did 2,
call back to Bill Parker, who was at the observation center, and advised 3
him to keep the employees available.
I think I told him as and this 4
again was prior to 9:00 in the morning, I think I told Bill Parker that 5
if we had no defined information that he should have any people there 6
remain and not send them home. I believe I told him if we reached lunch 7
time he should have them take lunch and return, but not specifically send them home.
Quite' frankly the the only reason I took that posture g
g is because of the large number of people and the commitment to pay them for the rest of the day if we sent them home.
We did tell bin,we would 3
try to make a decision based on what we knew, we would try to make a decision by 11:00 in the morning, I don't believe the decision was made by then.
g 14!
MARSH:
Excuse me.
I'm going to interrupt at this point take a brief 15; l
break here while we change this tape.
The time being 9:27 and reading 16!
470 on the meter.
17 18{
MARSH:
Resuming at this time, the time still being 9:27, 470 on the meter.
Excuse me, go ahead.
21 FASANO:
The question we were persuing was the decision with regard to 22 the personnel at the observation center.
I don't have a record, but my 23 recollection is that sometime either very late in the morning or early 24 25 l
2000 019 i
I i
I
19 1
in the afternoon, there was word passed along to Mr. Limroth to release 2,,
our peop!a for the day.
I, I'm basing this on rather fussy recollection, 3
it was not a notification I made, I do think it came from Mr. Robado, 4
but I'm not certain of that.
5 6
FASAN0:
So later on in the afternoon you were down to about 4 or 5 i
o' clock.
And your involvement continued in the same vein, to...
8 g
K_LINGAMAN:
It changed slightly in that at roughly the conclusion of 10 what would be a normal staff work day at about 5 p.m., we were in a 11 p sition where there were a tremendous number of phone requests coming in to the corporate office for information.
At about 6:30 in the 12 13 even ng, myself, Mr. John Hilbish, and later in the evening, Mr. Buring, all helped our communication services people with answering the phones.
y 15l There was a tremendous number of phone calls from public, and the press and various other phone call coming in that evening.
They had manned a 16!
station with a number of phones in another area of the building.
Initially the two of us, Mr. Hibish and I ard later on Mr. Buring, all went over there and continued to or began to I should say, not continued, 19l we begEn assisting in the answering of phone calls or providing of whatever information we had with regard to status and that continued until about 1:30 the following morning.
At which time that facility was pretty well secured and any phone calls later on were taken by the corporate telephone operators. So they...I believe, my recollection is 24 earlier in the evening Mr. Buring was with Mr. Kreitz but at about 6:30 25 i
2000 020 i
20 1!
my recollection is Mr. Hilbish and I began responding to and anwering 2
phones in another area of the building for the communication services 3
people and then later on Mr. Buring joined us in that effort and it did 4
continue until about 1:30 in the morning.
5 FASANO:
The information then that you had was the general information 6
7 that you had been gathering all day and then this is what you were g
using for answering a question, as I gather?
9 KLINGAMAN:
That's right.
At that time, we had, as I said earlier, 10 little update since the conversation with Mr. Herbein at about 12 which 3
indicated the general status of the plant and the plans for the ensuing day, the plans to bring the plant to a cold shut down and go on to decay heat.
That information in addition to, I believe, Mr. Hilbish had some update of information that was available to us from someone at 15:
the plant later in the day.
I'm not certain I know who provided that information to him but Mr. Hilbish and I had discussed collectively what we knew of the situation at the plant based on information I had i
18j 19l received, information he had received and as I say, it was not specific in plant data but just general overall status and that was the informa-tion we had that we utilized when we were attempting to answer phone 21 requests that evening.
23 FASANO:
By 8:00 then, what was the general status that you had, in 24 other words what was the general condition as far as your knowledge on 25, l
the 28th?
They had tried to go on decay heat and apparently they had I
changed their status and do you recall..
'$))
,,3 r
21 KLINGAMAN:
I'm sure at that point in time, in the evening, we were...we 1;
2.
really had not received any information directly from the plant to the 3
/
best of my recollection after about 4:30 or 4:45.
So it was that 4
information that we had, that was all we h?d throughout that evening 5
fe any requests we got.
I'm not certain we get into discussing whether, 6
r wi M anyone the detail of whether or not we went on to decay heat.
7 I do believe that both of us throghout that evening did still feel and 8
indicate that our plan was to bring the plant to a cold shut down, but g
not knowing any specific detail of just how we were going to get there 10 at that point.
11 FASANO:
12 So there was no ind:fation that they were going to repressur-ize at that time, as far as you vere involved?
g 14 KLINGAMAN:
I don't think either of us knew that at that point in time.
15 16 ESSIG:
I would like to come back Mr. Klingaman to a couple of telephone conversations that you had, cne with, you said at about 0940, when Mr.
18j Miller called, Gary Miller, and said that there were no off site releases.
Do you know if that information that he relayed to you at that time was l
based on on no indication by off-site survey or was that based on no 21{
indication based on in plant measurements, monitor readings, that type thing in plant.
Or did he say?
23 qqq cq1 24 25 I
l
22 1
KLINGAMAN:
I don't believe in the course of that conversation that Mr.
2L Miller indicated the basis for the information he was providing.
The 3
conversation really was a notification to us of what he had discussed 4
with the state.
Not the details supporting it, so I honestly can't say 5
that there was any question from our end or indication from Mr. Miller's end n the basis for that statement.
6 7
ESSIG:
8 Okay, what you're saying is that at that time of the morning you had no reason to question.
He made a flat statement that thera g
10 were n ff site r= leases and you had no reason to question that.
11 3 INGAMAft:
That's correct.
13 ESSIG:
Now, when Mr. Herbein calls you at about noon and he updated f
the earlier status that Mr. Miller had given you, did he at that time 15!
indicated anything witn respect to off site releases?
17 KLINGAMAN:
My recollection is that Mr. Herbein did have some values for the levels measured at some locations.
I don't have a record of 19 what they were at the time, but my recollection is he did relay to us 20 some data that he had with regard to activity levels around the site by 21 that time, I'm...we...I'm sure he relayed to us information for in-22 dicated levels in the reactor building, in the plant, around the plant 23 i
and some off site values but as I say, I don't have a record of the 24 values that he provided to us at that time.
Not a numerical record of 25 it.
2000 023 I
e
23 1
ESSIG:
Okay.
And again was this information being related to you more 2
for your information rather than asking you for input?
3 4
KLINGAMAN:
Yes, sir.
I think at that point in time and throughout the 5
day we were merely support function if you will and the information was 6.
provided to us from the site people because they did realize there was 7
a tremendous amount of request for information and they were trying to 8
keep us as up to date as they possibly could which really didn't keep g
us very up to date because they were so terrificly busy with all the 10 things that were going on. So those two calls, I'm sure there were mort.
11 and I...my recollection is that Mr. Hilbish had one or more additional 12!
phone calls in the afternoon from site people. But those two, the one with Mr. Miller and the one with Mr. Herbein, in the middle of the 73 afternoon were the only two that I recollect that I was a party to where they were passing information along to us.
None of these con-15 versations that I had were the kind of a conversation where the site provided data and asked for analysis or interpretation or response.
They were merely passing information along for our utilization in responding to outside requasts or also in a few cases where we were 19;;
requested to respond and support them with service, equipment, as I 20' menticiied the one with the request for respirators and those kind of things but they were support functions, not the kind of things that would be insolved with the determination of actions taken inside the 23 plant.
24 n'ga 024 25 l
t t
i
24 I
ESSIG:
Were you successful in rounding up those respirators?
g 2'
3 KLINGAMAN:
Yes, sir.
Again, I don't have numbers.
My recollection is 4
we purchased some and I don't know when they were delivered, either the 5
next day or subsequent to that.
We borrowed some from Philadelphia 6
Electric.
I believe we borrowed some from PP&L.
We had a member of 7
the station staff at Oyster Creek and my recollection is he actually 8
came back that evening from Oyster Creek and brought some with him.
So g
my recollection is that we did manage to round up several hundred 10 respirators later tnat day exactly when they got to the site I don't know.
I know that some of them got there later that night, the ones that were brought back from Oyster Creek, but my recollection is that we were able to get somewhere in the neighborhood of 300 respirators 13 from neighboring utilities and we also initiated action through our purchasing department to order several hundred more.
15 I
16f ESSIG:
Could we come back to the Tristate laundary truck just for a minute.
You indicated that that truck at the time you got involved was 18l 19l at the Salem station and that you had to make a decision I believe by 8:00 the following morning as to whether or not you needea their ser-20i vices and I think that you said that you did decide that you would need their services.
Is that correct?
22 23 2000 025 24 25 l
i
25 1
KLINGAMAN:
My recollection is and I would like to have it verified by 2
Mr. Mudge, but my recollection is that after I had talked with Mr.
3 Dreybalvis late in the day was advised that the trailer was at Salem 4
and Tristate could pick it up and bring it up if we required it.
My 5
recollection is that someone from the site did advise us later that 6
evening that they did want us to get the trailer up and either that 7
evening or the next morning we did advise Mr. Dreybalvis to have Tristate 8
bring that trailer up to the site and I do believe that was accomplished g
the following day.
10 ESSIG:
Okay.
Was your involvement on the second and third day, that's g
thursday and friday the 29th and 30th, much different from the nature f the involvement you had the first day or let me rephrase that.
13 Could you state what your involvement was on the second and third day?
15j KLINGAMAN:
I think a good portion of our involvement was very similar 16l to the first day. Trying to stay abreast of the general overall situation at the plant to respond to requests from our management and from outside g
agencies.
We again, several of us spent almost all evaning and into the following morning on the 29th responding to queries from the public or from the press.
In addition, some of my people were trying to obtain information on availability of tanks throughout...that is any tanks that could be used to store liquid...throughout thursday, the 29th.
Late in the morning at approximately 11:00 to 11:15 in the 24 morning on the friday tr.e 30th Mr. Dreybalvis and several of the pur-25 2000 026 f
i
26 1
chasing people were in my office and presented to me an outline of and 2
a tabulation, if you will, of all the various tanks and containers, if 3
you will, that they knew of that were available through either procurement 4
or leasing.
We did review that and I did advise them which cases I 5
wanted them to go ahead and procure tanks and have them shipped to the 6
site or lease tanks and have them shipped to the site.
Some cases I 7
did n t want them to go ahead.
I accomplished this really on the basis 8
f a general overall judgement that I perceived there would be a need for tanks.
Nothing was defined at that point with regard to our needs, g
10, nothing was defined with regard to how much tankage we might need, what n
sizes, what capacities, what pressures, I merely received from purchasing 3
in discussion what tanks were available, there sizes, there pressures, and there costs.
On the basis of a judgement which had no real basis g
in fact I advised them to procure this one, that one, that one, you know, whatever they might be and then followed up later with purchase 5j 2.g requisitions in order to actually provide the paper work to either procure or lease those tanks. So my involvement on friday the 30th was by way of advising our purchasing department what tanks or containers 18j they should order and have delivered to the site.
19!
20I ESSIG:
So you made that decision as to which tanks to )rder not really 21l l
kr.owing where they were going to be used, whether they were going to be 221 in plant, whether they'd be out of plant, pressures that they'd be subjected to, internal pressures, and that type thing?
24'
?000 n27 25 I
f
~
27 1
KLINGAMAN:
That is right.
And in fact some of those tanks we did 2"
receive and my recollection is we never used and than returned.
It was 3
a...a it was merely a reaction on cy part just because I knew that we 4,
were by friday in a situation where we were going to have to have to 5
handle alot of liquid and anticipating that and anticipating...even 6
though I nad no detail of what recovery would be... anticipating there 7
w uld be a need to store
- c. good bit of liquid, we did go ahead and g
procure tanks.
9 ESSIG:
Okay.
Does Mr. Mudge report directly to you?
10 11 KLINGAMAN:
Yes, sir.
12 13 ESSIG:
He does, okay.
So would that pretty "uch...with your involvement i
with the tanks and so forth on friday would that...does that pretty 5;
Duch summarize then your involvement, or conclude your involvement then on the second and thira day other than perhaps taking inquiries from the media...the news media and the public and so on?
191 i
KLINGAMAN:
That's pretty much correct with regard to my personal involvement.
The other responsibility I had and was beginning to support in those first few days were requests from the personnel at Three Mile Island where they needed additional people. Where they needed additional tachnical people to be assigned to the site to help 24 I was involved in reassigning some of our people...in making 8
out.
25 2000 2
28 1
people available.
I cid on the second day personally make the phone 2
call to contact Mr. Lavyer to ask him to go to the site which I did, 6
3 and my recollection is even in those first few days there were probably 4
one or two other contacts I made for technical people to assign them to 5
the site in order to help with their efforts with regard to what I 6l perceived at that time to be the beginnings of recovery.
So the only 7
other effort I had was in assisting in the assignment of personnel to 8
the site.
9 ESSIG:
In the assignment of personnel to the site that you assisted 10 11 with. were these primarily Met Ed or GPU people as opposed to con-12 tractor people?
13 KLINGAMAN:
This was primarily Met Ed personnel.
l 15l Y'
16 17 KLINGAMAN:
Some personnel from my staff and in some cases as I mentioned g;
Mr. Lawyer, personnel and equivalent level, not necessarily personnel i
that were reporting to me, but where I relayed requests from the personnel at the 1sland where they needed people of a...either specific people or people of a given background in experience and provide some few people at that time.
During the first few days it was only several people.
Later on it was much more involved and more people were assigned there.
But that activity had begun...it had really begun the first day because i
)
29 1
as I think I mentioned earlier I was involved with the answering of 2
phones in the office here from about 6:30 on the 28th til about 1:30 in 3
the morning.
Somewhere around that time I received several requests 4
from the site for personnel and at about 2:00 in the morning was when I 5
called Mr. Lawyer and asked him to go to the site.
At that time I 6
believe the request as I received it was to have Mr. Lawyer come to the 7
site and assist at the observation center and at that point I didn't 8
even know what that specifically involved but I made the call and the contact to do that.
We had discussed additional assignments of some g
m re f the personnel reporting to me to the island. Some of them were 10 not made until several days later.
g 12, ESSTG-I think that probably concludes the questions that I have.
g 14l MARSH:
I have a couple.
Most of the ones that I have written down 16l have already been covered so that will simplify it.
One thing Mr.
1 17l!
Klingaman I noticed in your responses to some of the questions that you 18l!
are making reference to your notes which appears to be a three or four page document.
I would just call your attention...you probabiy are 19' 20 aware of the fact an order has been issued by NRC for the preservation of records.
I see no need for a copy of those records right now but I l
would recommend that you preserve your own notes there.
22 23 KLINGAMAN:
Yes sir, I plan to do that.
24 25 2000 90
30 1
MARSH:
One question I've got is you indicated that going back to the 2
first day that you received some of the initial c.Ils at about 7:00 in i
3 the morning and then as the morning progressed you got off into other 4
duties.
How.was the organization established here at this location to 5
respond to this event?
Did you have a prearranged reaction plan or...
6i who came in and began to point people into specific jobs and how did 7
that develop?
It was just a matter of convenience or who happened to g
be near the phone or each guy took care of his own area?
9 KLINGAMAN:
We have established on an ongoing basis a corporat-taff 10 11!
duty section list which identifies an assigned duty manager and personnel ilg in various disciplines for given periods of time formalized for response 13 to any situation that might exist at any of the stations, fossil stations or TMI.
It so happens though on this dey I don't recollect who was the duty manager.
That can be determined but I do not recollect.
I happen 15l to be the one that was here early in the morning when the phone call 16 I
was made.
Since Mr. Herbein was not here it was not identified at that 17' point...I assumed the responsibility on my own to make the responses to 18{
corporate management that I thought Mr. Herbein would normally make i
191 them.
We did not really have any request to respond in accordance with the duty section list because our effort really was not to support that situation at the island but merely to interact with the corporate staff. But we have identified a duty section list and duty manager on an ongoing basis.
I do believe that I was not the duty manager that i
morning and only assumed the responsibility because I was the only one 25!
2000 031 l
31 11 here.
Later on I was advised that Mr. Herbein was going to remain at 2,
the site and I did many other things to support his interaction with 3
the other corporate officers in the Reading area. But that was not 4
identified to me by way of assignment that morning.
5 61 MARSH:
Your reference to corporate officers, are you making reference 7
to GPU in this instance or to both Met Ed and GPU or just to Met Ed?
8 KLINGAMAN:
Primari'y those responsibilities and those responses were g
1[
to corporate officers in Met Ed.
There were one or two phone calls that I did receive in the first few days from GPU officers requesting information or requesting contact be made with the site but primarily I w s responding within the Met Ed organization to the corporate officers 13 in Met Ed.
i 15!
l MARSH:
One final question.
The dispatch of people from this site to 16i Three Mile Island during the first hours let's say up til 12:00 oc til 18;!
the early afternoon hours, do you recall if personnel specialists of any nature were dispatched in this point and if so who would have dispatched them and what were the nature of the people dispatched?
21 KLINGAMAN:
To the best of my recollection from the corporate staff there were none dispatched on the first day.
The calls that I received for personnel came very late on the 28th or early on the 29th prior to 24 the phone call that I made to Mr. Lawyer which was at about 2:00 a.m.
25l l
2000 032 l
32 11 on the 29th.
So, to the best of my knowledge we had not assigned 2
corporate staff people to the site during the 28th.
The only ones that 3
I have a knowledge of who were assigned to the site happened to be 4
there because they were assigned to site functions on Unit 1 with 5
regard to the outage.
Some of my own people in some of my sections had 6
already been assigned to the site supporting efforts that had expanded 7
primarily because of the activities with the outage, the refueling 8
outage on Unit 1.
N I did have some personnel assigned to the site g
because of the Unit 1 outage.
To the best of my recollection we did 10 n t specifically assign any people to the site on the 28th from the corporate staff.
g I
12' MARSH:
I appreciate that.
That's all I siave.
g 14; ESSIG:
I have one more question.
On friday, the 30th, do you recall 16l!
receiving notification that an evacuation had been recommended by the i
NRC within 5 miles of the site, 10 miles of the site?
17l1 18i KLINGAMAN:
I don't have a documented record of when I received information 19!
in that vein.
I knew that of...the evacuation was discussed primarily because of what I read in the news which is not a good source of infor-21 I
mation for the kind of a discussion we are having so I really don't 22 recollect that as of friday that I had any knowledge of a recommendation 23 for an evacuation.
24 25 I
i 2000 033 I
i
33 1
ESSIG:
Okay.
2 3
FASANO:
I have one question.
As background information, do you or 4j your staff perform any review activity on the ongoing status of the t
5 plant.
In particular, such items as the event reports that are you 6
written up when you have a transiert or an event that's...an occurrence 7
that's reportable to the NRC?
8 KLINGAMAN:
Yes sir.
In accordance with our technical specifications r
g 10 personnel and the corporate staff review all event reports in accordance g
with section 6 of the tech specs that are...all event reports that are submitted to the Commission.
2 13 FASAN0:
14;l Then the occurrences on March last year and April and November 15li again where you had ECCS actuations, these would be familiar to your staff?
16!
17, l
KLINGAMAN:
Yes, sir.
ISj 19!
FASANO:
I guess the question is in...if this occurrence...in other 20' words if.., now that in retrospect...would your...would you have...would you like to have more detailed information in the assistance from the staff function, say in the future if indeed it is ever needed or do you think the status as you have it now is sufficient? What recommend-2^
ations might you have?
I I
li
34 l
1 KLINGAMAN:
I believe our responsibility still "emains to review the 2
circumstances surrounding events that are reported to the Commission 3
and still will continue to perform.
I don't believe though that requires 4
immediate notification in order to make that review.
I can be made by 5
the time the events have transpired and are reported to the Commission.
6 S, if I understand your question correctly, more timely or more detailed 7
involvement on a more timely basic I do not believe would necessarily g
improve our capability to understand and review event reports when they are submitted.
g 10 FASAN0:
71 I was thinking more in line with relations between transients y
once they have been reviewed from apart if indeed you could have had m re impact on the decisions in the reactor control room.
I mean this 13 is the idea, 14 t
15j XLINGAMAN:
I believe it is very difficult to sit 50 miles away from a plant and either act on a minute to minute basis on the decisions that are made.
I think they must be made at the site and we need to be 181 advised of them after the fact.
19!
20l 21 22 23 24 20f]0 O!.5 25 l
f l
1 i
35 1
FASANO:
That's all I have.
2, 3
MARSH:
Fine then since we are running out of tape here if we have no 4,
other questions I will terminate at this time being 9:57 and reading 5
928 on the meter.
Just in closing we'd like to say thank you Mr.
6 Klingaman for your time.
7 KLINGAMAN:
You are welcome.
g I
9 10 p
11, 12 3 13 14 15!
i 16i 17l 18l 19i 20' 21 I
22 23
'4 2000 036 25 I