ML19274E982
| ML19274E982 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 04/14/1979 |
| From: | Deyoung R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Sohn J HARVARD UNIV., CAMBRIDGE, MA |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7906070065 | |
| Download: ML19274E982 (4) | |
Text
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Mr. Joel Sohn Museum of Comparative Zoology Harvard University Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
Dear Mr. Sohn:
Your letter of March 25, 1979 to John M. Deutch, relative to the velocity cap at Seabrook, has been referred to me for coment.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has had some experience related to use of velocity caps at nuclear power plants. Velocity caps have
_J been used at offshore submerged intakes as an effective means.of E.
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reducing the passage of fish through the plant cooling system.
The capability of the velocity cap at Seabrook to withstand northeasters or other damaging.stoms has not been specifically reviewed by the NRC.
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A primary objective of our safety review was to determine that water would be available from the ultimate heat sink complex during any severe natural phenomenen and following the postulated failure of any man-made structure.
If the velocity cap were to fail, resulting in total blockage of the intake, water can be delivered by reverse flow through the discharge tunnel to the onshore pump structure (SER Section 9.2.3).
Total loss of this flow would result only if the several ports of the multiport diffuser were blocked.
If both intake and discharge tunnels were ccmpletely blocked,. cooling would be provided by.an onsite mecbanical draft cooling. tower. The cooling tower storage basin will provide a minimum of seven days supply of cooling water (SER Section 9.2.3).
In Section 2.4.9 of the SER, four separate means of obtaining makeup water for the cooling tower basin are. identified.
If the event which caused the damage were a severe northeaster, and the velocity cap were to be completely destroyed, the safety of the plant would not be compromised.
Since the velocity cap is not safety-related, the operational depend-ability of the cap was not analyzed by the NRC.
In general, individual applicants are responsible for structural design of such nonsafety systems.
These analyses determine the structural engineering requirements for with-standing particular ocean waves and currents.
In general, structures such 070(y65
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as these are designed to meet appropriate building codes. Although
-.4 our review did not specifically consider the capability of the intake 5=
system to assure continuous operation of the plant during Northeastern m
storms, we would note that in Section 3.4.1 of the Environmental Report the applicant stated that one objective included in the selection of n ""
the heat dissipation system is that it incorporate a maximum amount of E
proven and reliable technology. The applicant also stated that the structure is firmly attached to the tunnel riser shaft to provide stability from wave induced forces. Should you desire specific infor-
..Z mation on the design of the velocity cap, you should contact Public Service Company of New Hampshire.
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With regard to the apparent indefensibility of the intake system to
[: J.Z sabotage, the discharge system and the cooling tower serve as backup F sg systems. During the operating license stage of review, the applicant will have to demonstrate compliance with.the Commission's regulations p= _.i pertaining to sabotase, i.e., Section 73.55 of 10 CFR Part 73. During that review we will make certain that the security system and plant features will ensure that a source of water will always be available from the ultimate heat sink complex.
I trust that this information is responsive to your inquiry.
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Richard C. DeYoung, Director i
Division of Site Safety and li~~~
Environmental Analysis P "~~~
Office of Nuclear Reactor Reaulation E
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Department of Energy i
Washington, D.C. 20545
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i Mr. Joel Sohn Museum of Comparative Zoology Harvard University Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
Dear Mr. Sohn:
- Your letter of. March 25,.1979 to John M. Deutch expressi,ng concern l-l about the velocity cap of the Seabrook plant has been referred to I
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this office for reply.
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. Inasmuch as matters pertaining to Seabrook are urider the cogniz'ance q 'jy__
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of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, we are referring this lette'r si I..
to them for appropriate action by copy of this letter.
l Sincerely, 7
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Robe o L. Ferguso Program Director for Nuclear Energy
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51USEUM OF COMPARATIVE ZOOLOGY N
The Agassi: Museum S
HARVARD UNIVERSITY. CAMBRIDGE, M ASS ACH U S ETTS 02138 TEL. 617 495-2466 March 25, 1979
Dear John,
I apologize for writing but I have not been able to reach you by phone. Back in September,Harley Laing, Deputy Counsel for Region I EPA Ad=inistrator Adams requested that I write a report concerning the l
scientific irregularities in the Seabrook Case. I have spent some of my time trying to track down the scientific irregularities, and some of my time trying to figure out how they occured. The-study'has allowed me to " chart the causes of error making, error suppression, and the suppresion of the detection of error " during the decision making process.
1 I have communicated some of my resu.ts on the irregularities i
to Richard Dowd ( I think he is Scientif t / Counsel to the-Administrator);--
I and to Dave Burrmaster at CEQ.as well as to Herbert Perlman, Chief Administrative Law Judge for EPA. These gentlemen are,of course, concerned with environmental problems. There appears.to be one-outstanding error which must be examined. The error appears to be one of design which is probably easily rectified. I suggest that the correction of the error will help assure e more continuous flow of energy from the plant.
I will now bother you with a few details. I am concerned about the structural integrity of the Velocity Cap which is to be placed i
on top'of the intake pipe to the cooling water system. There seems -
to be real doubt about the ability of this platform to withstand j
stress during Northeastern storms. The platform is to be placed just below mid-depth in sixty feet of water about one mile from shore.
I have been unable to find any engineering reports on the stability of the platform.
Simple removal of the velocity cap from the specifications may remove this error. The alleged ! reason for the velocity cap is protect i
the environment, particularly benthic fishes from capture by the intake system.
I am concerned about one other problem concerning the intake system. It concerns the apparent indefensibility of the intake system to sabotage. As the installation is more than a mile offshore the problem is very real. Hating worked with the ONR UTV in the Bahamas I am f amiliar with the problems of underwater surve11ance.
UTV will not be very useful in these waters.
I am told that you are trying hard to rid of the waste! Would you kindly move this letter to the right person?
Si erely yours,
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Joel Sohn
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