ML19274D810
| ML19274D810 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png |
| Issue date: | 01/29/1979 |
| From: | Ziemann D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Bixel D CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7902260178 | |
| Download: ML19274D810 (4) | |
Text
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,o January 29, 1979 Docket No. 50-155 Mr. David Bixel Nuclear Licensing Administrator Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, Michigan 49201
Dear Mr. Bixel:
By letters dated March 29, 1978 and November 20, 1978, we transmitted requests for information and staff positions resulting from our review of your report, " Fire Protection Program Evaluation", dated March 29,1977 and from our visit of the Big Rock Point plant on October 10-13, 1978.
We have reviewed your responses dated July 14, 1978, December 8,1978, and January 17, 1979. Supplemental staff positions resulting from our review are enclosed.
These supplemental positions were discussed with your representatives by telephone January 22 and 25,1979.
Please provide your written response to the enclosed positions by February 5,1979.
Sincerely, Dennis L. Ziemann, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #2 Division of Operating Reactors
Enclosure:
Staff Positions cc:
See next page 7902260177
Mr. David Sixel January 29, 1979 CC Mr. Paul A. Perry, Secretary Consumers Power Conpany 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, Michigan 49201 Judd L. Bacon, Escuire Consumers Power Company 212 West Micnigan Avenue Jackson, Michigan 49201 Hunton & Williams George C. Freeman, Jr., Esquire P. O. Sox 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23212 Peter '.l. Steketee, Esquire 505 Peoples Building Grand Rapids, Michigan 49503 Charlevoix Public Library 107 Clinton Street Charlevoix, Michigan 49720
FURTHER STAFF POSITIONS BIG ROCK POINT FIRE PROTECTION JANUARY 17, 1979 1.
To provide an effective means of removing smoke from an area, two smoke ejectors should be available so that one may supply fresh air and the other exhaust smoke.
Thus, one additional smoke ejector should be provided in addition to the one addressed in the 12/8/78 CPC letter.
2.
An emergency shutdown procedure should be developed delineating actions to be taken to effect safe shutdown for postulated fires in the penetration areas or the electrical equipment room.
This should include actions that may be taken to restore power to pumps that may be used to provide makeup to the reactor vessel or steam drum.
3.
The response to staff position P12 indicates that the 3-hour rated fire damper to be installed in the ventilation duct between the control room and electrical equipment ronm will be actuated by high temperature in the duct.
To preclude excessive smoke infiltration into the control room resulting from a fire in the electrical equipment room, this damper should be actuated by smoke detectors in the electrical equipment room.
4.
The response to staff request 39 idar.tifies four doors that will not have fusible link closure devices.
One of these doors (between the turbine room and hallway) separates the control room from turbine room hazards.
This door plus the door between the hallway and the control room together provide an equivalent three-hour barrier.
Therefore, the door between the turbine room and control room should also be provided with a fusible link closure device.
5.
The calculations provided in the CPC letter of December 8,1978 demonstrates that the fire pumps have adequate capacity to meet the maximum fire suppression system demand plus hose lines, allowing 25 gpm for the emergency condenser.
The calculations do not identify what the available pressure would be at the emergency condenser under the conditions identified in Attachment A or B.
Identify what pressure would be available at the emergency condenser.
STAFF POSITIONS 6.
The response to item 32 in the CPC letter of January 17, 1979 indicates that the door in the barrier separatino R,om 104 (fire area 17) and Room 104A (fire area 25) is not a fire rated door.
The required rating of this barrier is two-hours since the barrier serves to separate redundant (RDS) channels so that two of the four channels are located in each fire area.
To provide adequate protection for RDS conduits in fire areas 17 and 25, this door should be upgraded to a fusible link actuated two-hour fire-rated door, or two-hour rated orotection should be provided on the RDS conduits, using Kao-wool protection as referred to in the January 17, 1979 response to position P6, or some other protection providing a two-hour fire-ratina.