ML19274D683
| ML19274D683 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | North Anna  |
| Issue date: | 01/05/1979 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19274D679 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-338-78-42, NUDOCS 7902220167 | |
| Download: ML19274D683 (7) | |
See also: IR 05000338/1978042
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION 11
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Report No.: 50-338/78 ,2
Docket No.: 50-338
License No.: NPF-4
Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company
P. O. Box 26666
Richmond, Virginia 23261
Facility Name: North Anna Power Station, Unit 1
Inspectio.) at: North Anna Power Station, Miieral, Virginia
Inspection conducted:
Dacember 11-15, 1978
Inspector:
T. J. McHenry
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Approved by:
H. C. Dance, Chief
Date
Reactor Projects Section No.1
Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch
Inspectiin Summary
Inspection on December 11-15, 1978:
(Report No. 50-338/78-42)
- 1-eas Inspected:
Routine unannounced inspection of plant operations, limiting
conditions for operation, and plant tour. The inspection involved 31 inspector
-hours on site by one NRC inspector.
Results: Of the three areas inspected, two items of noncompliance were
ident.ified in two areas (Infraction:
Failure to perform surveillance test,
338/78-42-01; Infraction:
Failure to review and approve temporary procedure
changes with 14 days, 338/78-42-02).
7902220\\W
RII Rpt. No. 50-338/78-42
1-1
DETAILS I
Prepared by:
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T. J. McHeng, Heactoi Insppfor
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Reactor Pr6jects Section No. 1
Reactor Operations and Nuclear
Support Branch
Dates of Inspection:
ecember 11-15, 1978
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Reviewed by:
H. C. Dance, Chief
'Dat e
Reactor Projects Section No. 1
Reactor Operrtions and Nuclear
Support Branch
1.
Individuals Contacted
a.
Virginia Electric Power Company
W. R. Cartwright, Station Manager
>J. D. Kellams, Superintendent, Station Operations
- S. L. Harvey, Operating Supervisor
- E. R. Smith, Jr. , Supervisor, Engineering Services
- D. M. Hopper, Health Physics Supervisor
- S. Sarver, System Health Physicist
- D. C. Woods, hTC Coordinator
- D. L. Smith, Resident QC Inspector, Operations
- M. D. Tower, Quality Assurance Supervisor, Maintenance and
Operation
Several Control Room Operators and Operating Personnel
b.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- M. S. Kidd, Resident Inspector
- G.
R. Jenkins, Radiation Specialist
- Denotes those present at the Exit Interview.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings
No previous items of noncompliance or deviations were reviewed during
this inspection.
3.
Unresolved Items
No new unresolved items were identified during this inspection.
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RII Rpt. No. 50-338/78-42
I-2
4.
Exit Interview
A meeting was held on December 15, 1978, with Mr. W. R. Cartwright,
Station Manager, and his staff members denoted in paragraph 1.
The
scope and findings presented in these Details which related to the
inspection activities were di cussed.
Items of noncompliance were
discussed, including station management's response and planned actions.
Also, four open items identified in the Details were discussed,
including station management's response and planned actions.
5.
Review of Plant Operations
The inspector reviewed the following Unit 1 logs and records for
October through November 1978, to ascertain whether operation was in
conformance with the Technical Specifications and established
administrative requirements:
Log-11, Action Statement Status log
Log-6A, Control Room log
Log-6B, Emergency Diesel and Boiler log
Log-6C, Turbine Building log
Log-6D, Auxiliary Building log
Log-6E, Outside log
Log-1, Shift Supervisor log
Log-2, Control Room Operators' log
Log-4, Operators' Surveillance Sheet
Log-12, Diesel Generator Running log
Log-8A, Liquid Waste log
Log-8B, Boron Recovery log
Log-8C, Gaseous Waste log
Plant Jumper log
Deviation Reports
a.
Turbine Generator Auto Stop Oil Functional Test
Technical Specification 4.3.1.1.1, Table 4.3-1, Item 18.A requires
that a functional test of Auto Stop Oil be performed prior to
reactor startup if not performed within the previous seven days.
During the review of the Control Room Log for October 25, 1978, it
was determined that PT-34.1, Turbine Generator Auto Stop Oil
Functional Test, had been performed subsequent to reactor startup.
The inspector discussed the performance of this test with control
room personnel who indicated that this test was performed routinely
following reactor startup since it was performed as prescribed by
the turbine startup procedure which follows reactor startup.
The
performance of this functional test subsequent to reactor startup
was discussed with the Operations Supervisor, who acknowledged
that an oversight of the prior to reactor startup requirement had
occurred and corrective measures would be taken to correct this
.
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RII Rpt. No. 50-338/78-42
I-3
item.
Licensee representatives stated at the exit interview that
even though PT-34.1 had not been performed, the functional opera-
bility of the Auto Stop Trip was available due to existance of
trip status light for Auto Stop Oil prior to reactor start.
The
inspector indicated that failure to perform Auto Stop Oil Functional
Test prior to reactor start was an apparent item of noncompliance
with Technical Specification 4.3.1.1.1, Table 4.3-1, Item 18.A and
is identified as an infraction (338/78-42-01).
b.
Review of Deviation Reports
The inspector reviewed Plant Deviation Reports for period October
through November 1978 to confirm there were no violation of Technical
Specification limiting conditions for operations and reporting
requirements. Several Plant Deviation Reports were caused by
exceeding Technical Specification 6.8.3.c requirement that the
Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee (SNSOC) review and
station manager approve temporary procedure changes within 14
days. The inspector determined that many failures to meet the 14
day review and approval requirement had been identified by the
licensee and noted by an NRC inspector during inspection 338/78-18
on June 13-16, 1978, and that the licensee had taken corrective
action to correct and prevent recurrence.
The inspector discussed
the apparent ineffectiveness of the licensee corrective action
with a licensee representative who stated that the problem had
been corrected, and felt that only a small percentage of isolated
items existed.
The inspector reviewed the SNSOC meeting minutes
for the period of September 8-November 7,1978 and determined that
15 temporary changes had been identified by the licensee in excess
of the 14 day requirement.
The inspector discussed this item with
licensee representatives at the exit interview.
Licensee repre-
sentative stated that the record of late 14 day reviews and approvals
should be reviewed as it was felt that the percentage of these
items had significantly improved since June 1978.
The inspector
left this item unresolved at the exit, pending a detailed review
of identified overdue 14 day reviews and approvals by the NRC
Resident Inspector. The Resident Inspector review of SNSOC meeting
minutes within the period of July 3 through November 27, 1978,
indicated that for that period, 23 of 290 temporary procedure
changes were identified by the licensee to have exceeded the 14
day requirement. Even though the failure to review these temporary
procedure changes had been identified by the licensee, the number
and percentage of the occurrences of this item indicates that
corrective actions to prevent recurrence have not been effective.
This matter was discussed with the Plant Manager by telephone on
December 21, 1978, at which time the inspector indicated that this
item is an apparent item of noncompliance with Technical Specifi-
cation 6.8.3.c and is identified as an infraction (338/78-42-02).
1
RII Rpt. No. 50-338/78-42
I-4
c.
Functional Tests with Inputs to Solid State Protection System
During the review of PT-34.1, Turbine-Generator Auto Stop Oil Trip
Functional Test (noted in paragraph 5.a), the inspectcr found that
PT-34.1 did not verify input trip functions to both Train A and B,
Solid State Protection Systems (SSPS). The inspector discussed
instrumentation functional tests with a licensee representa-
tive who indicated that the tripping of both Trains of SSPS was
verified in instrumentation group periodic tests in that both the
trip status light and computer outputs were verified.
Licensee
representatives question the inspectors' concern since SSPS is
functionally tested as required by Technical Specifications.
The
inspector stated that functional testing of SSPS functionally
tested input circuitry within the SSPS but did not functionally
test the input circuitry from the process instrumentation. There-
fore, functional testing which inputs to SSPS must include func-
tional operability of inputs to both Trains of Solid State
Protection. This matter was discussed at the exit interview.
The
licensee stated that PT's 34.1 and 34.3 would be revised to provide
required functional checking of inputs to both Trains of Solid
State Protection.
Further, the licensee stated that a review of
other functional tests which input SSPS would be conducted. The
inspector indicated this item would remain open pending licensec
corrective action and subsequent review by an inspector at a
future inspection (338/78-42-03).
6.
Review of Safety Limits, Limiting Safety System Settings and Limiting
Conditions for Operation
The inspector reviewed plant logs, startup procedures and observed
plant operations to assure reactor operations were in conformance with
Technical Specification requirements for safety limits, limiting safety
system settings and limiting conditions for operation.
a.
Plant Startup Procedure Review
The inspector reviewed OP-1.5, Unit Startup from Hot Standby
procedures which were completed between July through November
1978.
During this review, the inspector noted that there was a
wide variance in the method used for the inverse multiplication
approach to criticality plots. The inspector discussed the
inverse multiplication startup plots with control room operators,
who stated that no procedure for performing the inverse multipli-
cation plots existed and the guidance for such plots was obtained
via the training program. The inspector discussed the lack of
approved procedural guidance for inverse multiplication plots with
the Operations Supervisor. The inspector stated that since the
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RII Rpt. No. 50-338/78-42
I-5
use of an inverse multiplication plot is only required when uncer-
tainty exists about the calculated critical data, procedural
guidance should be provided to assure the startup does not result
in critical conditions outside the limits established by the
Technical Specifications. This item was discussed at the exit
interview and licensee representatives stated that the matter
would be reviewed and procedural guidance for the performance of
inverse multiplication plots would be developed.
The inspector
stated that this item would remain open pending licensee develop-
ment of approved procedural guidance for inverse multiplication
plots and subsequent review by an inspector during a future
inspection (338/78-42-04).
b.
Wind Direction Channel Check
The review of Log-6A, Unit One Control Room log, indicated that
wind directions were routinely logged with a 60 to 100 degree
difference in direction between the indicator at 35 feet and 150
feet elevations.
In addition, no notation had been made on the
log indicating that one indicator could be possibly malfunctioning
even though '-chnical Specification 4.3.3.4 requires a daily
channel checn,
The inspector observed the wind direction recorders
during a plant tour and discussed the logged data with control
room personnel. Observation of wind direction recorders indicated
that instantaneous wind direction does vary; however, observation
of the recorder for sufficient time to estimate the average wind
directions indicated the average directions being approximately
equal A control room operator also stated that when the wind speed
is low the wind direction tends to vary to higher degrees. The
inspector discussed the lack of explanation on log-6A, when wind
speed variance between the two channels was high, with the Opera-
tions Supervisor who stated that the log would be reviewed and
revised as necessary.
The inspector stated this item would remain
open pending a review during a future inspection of the licensee's
corrective action to ensure an adequate performance and record of
the wind direction channel check (338/78-42-05).
c.
Power Calorimetric Review
The inspector reviewed completed copies of PT-24, Calorimetric,
for period of September through November 1978 to ascertain that
reactor power levels were maintained within the limits of the
Technical Specifications. The inspector discussed the methods for
obtaining the calorimetric data necessary for the power calculation
with control room operators.
It was determined f rom control room
operators that feed flow data was obtained directly from the
i
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RII Rpt. No. 50-338/78-42
I-6
computer. The inspector ascertained from plant personnel that
feed flow output from the computer is routinely calibrated;
however, the accuracy of the computer output could not be
established. This item was discussed at the exit interview. The
inspector stated that the concern was whether the feed flow accuracy
from the computer was adequate to meet the r aumption that the
calorimetric was accurate to plus or minus :.o percent in the FSAR
accident analysis. The licensee stated tha.
.n engineering evalua-
tion of the accuracy of the computer feed flow channel would be
conducted. The inspector indicated that this item would remain
open pending the licensee review and subsequent NRC inspection of
review data
(338/78-42-06).
7.
Plant Tour
The inspector toured portions of the facility including the auxiliary
building, turbine building and control room to ascertain the general
state of cleanliness and housekeeping.
Control room operations, including
observation of operations following an unscheduled reactor trip were
observed and discussed with control room personnel to assure compliance
with Technical Specifications. No problems were identified.
.