ML19271F410
| ML19271F410 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 06/08/1984 |
| From: | Mcdonald R ALABAMA POWER CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (ORM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19271F411 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8407020102 | |
| Download: ML19271F410 (1) | |
Text
LQ July 12, 1984 MEMORANDUM FOR: Thomas A. Rehm, Assistant for Operations Office of the Executive Director for Operations FROM:
A. Bert Davis, Deputy Regional Administrator
SUBJECT:
CALLAWAY INCIDENT Enclosed is an updated #act sheet regarding the incident that we discussed by telephone on July 6 and 12, 1984.
The information is current as of 12:00 noon on July 12, 1984. No conclusions or suspects have yet been identified.
Should you have any additional questions please call.
We will keep you informed of any significant findings, conclusions, or changes.
A. Bert Davis Deputy Regional Administrator
Enclosure:
As stated cc w/ enclosure:
J. G. Keppler J. A. Hind C. E. Norelius SD - d s RIII RIII
$0]DO O
3
/jg s
7/st/84 7//1/84
DATA SHEET CALLAWAY IlflDEh1 0F JULY 4, 1984 UPDATE JULY 12, 1984 1.
Background:
On Ji/ 4, 1984 at 3:10 p.m. about 10 minutes before shift change Control Room Ventilation and Containment Purge isolations signals were received in the control room which were caused by 120V power supply breakers that hal Leen manually opened and not tripped.
The licensee cleared the isolation signals and reset the breakers.
They reported incident to NRC Operations Center at 5:58 p.m. that day.
The licensee initially speculated the possibility existed that an employee had opened the breakers because he had been required to work on the Independence Day Holiday.
2.
Region III (Chicago) Actions: As noted in the earlier report, Region III notified NRR and the Information Assessment Team (NMSS) and dispatched a Physical Security Inspector on July 5, 1984.
A Confirmatory Action Letter was issued on July 6,1984 confirming that the incident would be thoroughly investigated and that an investigation would be reviewed and accepted by the NRC prior to criticality.
Since Friday, July 6, 1984 our actions have included:
a.
At least daily telephone monitoring of licensee's activities by regional personnel on July 7, 9, 10, and 11.
b.
On July 10, 1984 a conference call was held with licensee investigators and management to provide suggestions, guidance and focus for their activities based on accumulated data.
c.
On July 11, 1984 a security inspector was sent to the site to followup on our review of the licensee's progress and results to date, d.
The Resident Inspectors have reviewed the licensee's activities on site each day and communicated with the Regional personnel who are also monitoring the licensee's activities.
These contacts were in addition to direct Region / licensee contact, e.
Reviewed licensee's actions with the Director, Region III Office of Investigation and obtained advice regarding focus, techniques and adequacy of licensee's investigation.
3.
Union Electric Company Actions:
Began investigating incident on July 5, 1984 by assigning two security managers (both with criminal investigation experience) full time.
Used available access control equipment to determine the number and names of personnel who had physical access to the area at the time of the incident. A fingerprint was obtained from breaker panel.
The local and Kansas City, Missouri offices of the FBI were notified.
Since those initial actions, the following additional actions have also beer. taken:
a.
The FBI detemincd that they would not open an investigation because f Mre has been no crime falling within its jurisdiction.
An agent n s on site July 9, 1984 and discusseo the licensee's activities to date and had no further recommendations.
The Callaway County bheriff's Department was notified but also declined to investigate.
b.
Licensee investigators complcted initial broad scoped interviews with 65 of 66 individuals identified as having possible physical access to the breakers at the time of the incident.
Thirty-eight were initially eliminated as suspects because records showed they were probably not in a location near the breakers during the event.
(Note:
66th individual has moved from the area and is considered not to be 6 suspect.)
c.
A second round of interviews has been scheduled to begin on July 12, 1984 with those individuals (28) noted above who had not been eliminated as suspects.
These interviews will be focussed on more direct questioning on individuals' activities on July 4, 1984.
d.
The personnel and/or psychological assessment and/or background screening records of those involved are being reviewed.
e.
Fourteen supervisors have been interviewed to determine if any disciplinary actions had been taken recently on any indiviauals identified as having access and also to determine if employees were required to work or whether they volunteered to work on the holiday.
f.
On July 9, 1984, a letter was sent to all employees from the Vice President, Nuclear describing the significance and seriousness of equipment tampering.
Disciplinary consequences were also described.
It also solicits employees support for reporting and identifying similar incidents.
g.
The licensee's legal staff has determined that both polygraph tests and suspensions could be used if sufficient cause or reason demonstrates that those actions were necessary.
Their actual use would be considered on a case-by-case basis.
h.
The licensee is considering possible increased security measures if the identity of the person who opened the breakers is not positively identified. An additional security measure has already been taken.
i.
Daily management reviews of activities and findings to date have been conducted.
The Vice President, Nuclear has been involved in these reviews.
J.
The identification of the individual whose fingerprint was found has not yet been established.
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