ML19271F258
| ML19271F258 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Limerick  |
| Issue date: | 06/22/1984 |
| From: | Eisenhut D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Brenner L, Cole R, Kohl C NRC ATOMIC SAFETY & LICENSING APPEAL PANEL (ASLAP), Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8406250228 | |
| Download: ML19271F258 (3) | |
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June 22,1984 MEMORANDUM FOR:
Limerick ASLB (Brenner, Cole, Morris)
Limerick ASLAB (Kohl, Edles, Gotchy)
FROM:
Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director Division of Licensing SUBJECT.:
TRANSMITTAL OF BN 84-062 AND 84-067 TO THE LIMERICK BOARDS The Limerick Boards were inadvertently omitted from the distribution of Board Notifications84-062 and 84-067.
The Limerick Boards and parties are being informed of these Board Notifications by copy of this memo.
"Uriginal Signe:137:
.-r y Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director Division of Licensing
Enclosures:
Board Notifications cc:
Parties to Proceeding L
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4 DISTRIBUTION LIST FOR BOARD NOTIFICATION Limerick, Units 1&2, Docket No. 50-352/353 Mr. Robert L. Anthony Atomic Safety and Licensing Mr. Edward G. Bauer, Jr.
Board Panel Lawrence Brenner, Esq.
Atomic Safety and Licensing Martha W. Bush, Esq.
Appeal Panel Mr. Timothy R. S. Campbell Docketing and Service Section Dr. Richard F. Cole Document Management Branch Troy B. Conner, Jr., Esq.
Gary J. Edles, Esq.
Charles W. Elliott, Esq.
ACRS Members Zori G. Ferkin Dr. Robert C. Axtmann Mr. Thomas Gerusky Mr. Myer Bender Dr. Reginald L. Gotchy Dr. Max W. Carbon Jay Gutierrez, Esq.
Mr. Jesse C. Ebersole Steven P. Hershey, Esq.
Mr. Harold Etherington Christine N. Kohl, Esq.
Dr. William Kerr Mr. Marvin I. Lewis Dr. Harold W. Lewis Angus Love, Esq.
Dr. J. Caron Mark Mr. Gregory Minor Mr. William M. Mathis Dr. Peter A. Morris Dr. Dade W. Moeller Ms. Maureen Mulligan Dr. David Okrent Spence Perry, Esq.
Dr. Milton S. Plesset Mr. Frank R. Romano Mr. Jeremiah J. Ray Robert J. Sugarman, Esq.
Dr. Paul C. Shewmon Mr. David Wersan Dr. Chester P. Siess Mr. Joseph H. White, III Mr. David A. Ward Mr. James Wiggins Director, PA Emergency Management Agency 6/84
Board Notification 84-062 and 84-067 Branch service lists of addressees receiving material oii the following dockets:
LIMERICK DOCKET Honorable Lawrence Coughlin Roger B. Reynolds, Jr., Esquire Frederic M. Wentz Eugene J. Bradley Mr. Vincent Boyer Mr. Karl Abraham Mr. Suresh Chaudhary Steven P. Hershey, Esq.
Jacqueline I. Ruttenberg, Esq.
Mr. J. T. Robb, N2-1 Governor's Office of State Planning and Development, PA Department of Environmental Resources, PA Chairman, Board of Supervisors of Limerick Township U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, PA
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50-374 50-397 MEMORANDUM FOR:
Chairman Palladino Comissioner Gilinsky Comissioner Roberts Comissioner Asselstine Comissioner Bernthal FROM:
Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director Division of Licensing SUBJEC1:
BWR CORE THERMAL HYDRAULIC STABILITY (BOARD NOTIFICATION NO.84-062)
In accordance with NRC procedures for. Board Notifications the enclosed information is provided to the Comission.
The enclosure is a description of recent thermal hydraulic stability tests at a foreign boiling water reactor.
As stated in the enclosed memo current US BWR Technical Specifications place restrictions on US BWR single loop operation.
In addition, the GE calculations show that considerable margin exists even witn the large neutron flux oscillations.
The staff is presently working with applicants and with BWR owners group in the review of BWR Technical Specifications regarding this issue.
By copy of this memorandum we are also informing all applicable BWR Atomic Safety and Licensing Boards, the appropriate BWR Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Boards and the corresponding parties.
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Enclosure:
February 27, 1984 Memo Mattson to Eisenhut cc:
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SECY (2)
OPE OGC EDO Clinton ASLB (Clark, Ferguson, Paris)
Perry ASLB (Block, Bright, Kline)
Perry ASLAB (Kohl, Buck, Edles)
Shoreham ASLB (Brenner, Ferguson, Morris)
Shoreham ASLAB (Rosenthal, Edles, Wilber)
Zimmer ASLB (Frye, Hooper, Livingston)
Parties to the proceedings
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASWNGTON, D. C. 20555
,.k FEB 2 7 2 MEMORANDUM FOR:
Division of Licensing FROM:
Roger J. Mattson, Director Division of Systems Integration
SUBJECT:
BOARD NOTIFICATION - BWR CORE THERMAL HYDRAULIC STA 1.
Item for Notification The staff has been informed by General Electric (GE) of recent thermal hydraulic stability tests at a foreign reactor, a boiling water reactor with relatively high power density, which demon-strated the occurrence of limit cycle neutron flux oscillations at natural circulation and several percent above the rated rod line.
It was predicted that limit cycle oscillations would occur at the operating state tested and the oscillations were observable on the APRMs and suppressed through control rod insertion.
The charac-teristics of the observed oscillations, however, were different than those previously observed in other stability tests.
Exami-nation of t.'.a detailed data of this test showed that some LPRMs oscillated out of phase with the APRM signal and at an amptitude as great as six times the core average measured by the APRMs.
These data are important since they confirm the possibility of local thermal-hydraulic instabilities which have been postulated but not observed in similar stability tests performed in the L'nited States.
The staff is presently working with applicants and with the BWR Owners Group to review the standard Technical Specifications to assure that they properly protect against the potential for insta-bilities.
If changes are to be required, they would follow staff procedures for generic Technical Specification changes, including CRGR review.
2.
Relevancy and Materiality Stability tests on a BWR/4 reactor demonstrated that limit cycle oscillations can occur within permissable operating space belcw the rated rod line at natural circulation flow.
The high power level (120 percent) scram protection which is based on APRM signals would not necessarily prevent violation of critical heat flux (CHF) limits if local instabilities occur.
Contact:
G. Schwenk, DSI:CPB7]) c _ p _9 P X-29421
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D. G. Eisenhut IO Core designs are known to decrease in themal hydraulic stability with higher power density and with higher gap conductance which is associated with fuel designs having smaller fuel pin diameters.
The conditions which led to local instabilities in the foreign test rather than global oscillations with all fuel assemblies in phase are not clear.
Until core stability behavior can be better pre-dicted and explained, the staff believes that the new information showing that local oscillations non-characteristic of the APRM signals may occur is relevant to all BWR designs, but is of greater significance to those having higher power density and lower damping characteristics as typified by the BWR/4, BWR/5, and BWR/6 designs.
3.
Sionificance of Test Information The test demonstrated that local themal hydraulic oscillations which are out of phase with the APRMs can occur.
This raises the possibility of local oscillations occurring in the plant which might not be detected by the operator without monitoring of LPRM signals and/or LPRM upscale alarms.
It is unclear at this time how high a local oscillation could grow before detection by an operator using current monitoring procedures.
Since we cannot predict the limiting magnitude for such an oscillation, we can not be certain that CHF limits would not be exceeded.
It is for this reason that we will examine BWR Technical Specifications to assure that they provide adequate assurance that operating regions of potential instability are avoided and that neutron oscillations of unac-ceptable magnitude are detected and suppressed.
The staff concludes that the new infomation from the foreign stability tests does not pose an immediate safety concern for continued BWR operation prior to orderly examination and possible change of Technical Specifications for the reasons which follow:
(a )
Current BWR Technical Specifications place restrictions on operation under conditions of natural circulation or single loop operation such that the frequency of operation in regions with low stability margin is very low.
In addition, the core designs for most operating reactors are sufficiently stable that limit cycle operations are believed to be unlikely even in the less stable permissible operating regimes.
Even if such oscillations should occur, it is believed that the high power level APRM scram protection would be adequate in most cases.
(b)
The magnitude of thermal hydraulic instability induced neutron flux oscillations is considerably higher than the oscillations in the average cladding heat tTux because of delays caused by the fuel thermal time constant.
General Electric Company m
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D. G. Eisenhut FEB 2 71984 calculations for the case where the neutron flux oscillates up to 120 percent of rated (RPS trip point) indicate that the surface heat flux has a peak oscillation amplitude of only 5 percent of its rated value.
Thus, a considerable margin exists to safety limits even if very large neutron flux oscillations occur.
(c)
The oscillations are readily detectable with proper monitoring and can be easily suppressed by inserting control rods.
(d)
General Electric Company is in the process of providing to all its operating plants guidance on the proper methods to monitor for thermal. hydraulic instabilities and on the actions that should be taken to suppress such oscillations if they should BWR owners have been made aware of the problem and of occur.
pending actions.
4.
Re,lation to Projects The foreign stability test results relate to all BWR reactors.
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It is recommended that appropriate boards be notified of the new infonnation and of the staff's plans to work with the BWR appli-cants and licensees to assure that the Technical Specifications for all BWRs properly protect against the potentfak or instabilities.
I OLlk cp Roger J.
tson, Director Division of Systems Integration
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% y, o APR 13 1984 Docket No. 50-322 50-440/441 50-358 MEMORANDUM FOR:
Chairman Palladino Comissioner Gilinsky Comissioner Roberts Comissioner Asselstine Comissioner Bernthal FROM:
Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director Division of Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
SUBJECT:
BOARD NOTIFICATION NO.84-067 BWR MAIN STEAM LINE INTERACTION FOLLOWUP In accordance with the NRC procedures for Board Notification, the following information is being provided directly to the Comission as a followup to BN-83-187, which was issued on December 27, 1983.
Appropriate Boards and Parties are being informed by copy of this memorandum.
In our Board Notification 83-187, we indicated that the NRC staff would study the main steam line interaction issue on an expedited basis.
The attached memorandum dated March 23, 1984, (Mattson to Eisenhut) provides the results of that staff study concerning interaction of main steam and main feedwater lines at BWRs. Basically, the staff study finds that the interaction results are acceptable for BWRs.
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arr G. E se rector Divis.on of Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
As stated cc w/ attachment:
See next page
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cc: SECY (2)
OPE OGC EDO Parties to the Proceeding ASLB FOR:
Shoreham 50-322 (Brenner, Ferguson, Morris )
Clinton 50-461 (Clark, Ferguson, Parris)
Perry 50-440/441 (Bloch, Bright, Kline) 7immer 50-358 (Frye, Hooper, Livingston)
ASLAB FOR:
Shoreham 50-322 (Rosenthal, Edles, Wilber)
Perry 50-440/441 (Kohl, Buck, Edles)
Zimmer 50-358 (Rosenthal, Wilber)
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MM 2 31984 K'ORANDUM FOR:
D. Eisenhut, Director, Division of Licensing, NRR FROM:
R. Mattson, Director, Division of Systems Integration
SUBJECT:
BOARD NOTIFICATION FOR POSSIBLE INTERACTION OF MAIN STEAM LINES AND MAIN FEEDWATER LINES AT BOILING WATER REACTORS On October 21, 1982, Region III requests (TIA 82-69) that NRR review certain design aspects of the Zimer main steam system, main steam system restraints, and applicable main turbine building supporting structure.
Our evaluation of Zimmer revealed the potential for failure of the nonseismic Category 2 main feedwater piping resulting in the failure of adjacent main steam line piping, whose pressure boundary integrity is necessary, following an earthquake, for the successful operation of safety-related systems.
This problem was resolved for Zimmer by the applicant proposing modifications to the feedwater piping supports to assure main feedwater line integrity following a safe shutdown earthquake (SSE).
Based on the findings at Zimer we recomended in the memorandum to you dated December 6,1983 (Enclosure 2) that appropriate board notifications be made for certain plants, as.the same situation indicated above may exist at other BWRs.
We stated that we would continue to study this matter on an expedited basis.
This study is now complete.
Our conclusions, the bases for which are contained in Enclosure 1, are as follows:
1.
BWRs which were recently reviewed against the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.29, Position C2 (Enclosu*e 3) can be disregarded because 1) they have seismic Category I main steam and main feedwater lines, thus pre-venting the postulated interaction from occurring, or 2) the postulated failure of the main feedwatcr piping following an SSE was evaluated and found to satisfy the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.29, Position C2.
2.
Additionally, BWRs which were reviewed a number of years ago (Enclosure 4) may not have been reviewed against Regulatory Guide 1.29, Position C2 but were reviewed using the Giambusso Criteria.
A major portion of these criteria was devoted to the interaction of main steam and main feedwater lines with each other and with structures, systems, and components that are necessary to mitigate the consequences of the postulated pipe break accident and bring the reactor to the cold shutdown conditions.
The plants listed in Enclosure 4 were evaluated and found to be acceptable for the postu-lated interaction of the main steam and main feedwater lines and to be capabla of cold shutdown following a break in either of these lines.
Contact:
D. Hearn, X29468
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MAR 2 31984 3.
Zimmer is a unique situation.
While this plant was reviewed against the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.29, Position C2 and found not complying, the applicant has committed to modify the feedwater piping supports in order to satisfy the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.29, Position C2.
Based on the above three conclusions, we have determined that no further action is necessary on this matter.
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F. Miraglia D. Terao J. Brammer L. Hulman T. Quay L. Xintner W. Minners D. Wessman F. Rowsome A. Schwencer B. Youngblood L. Rubenstein
- 0. Parr J. Wilson P. Hearn R. Bosnak
ENCLOSURE 1 BOARD NOTIFICATION FOR POSSIBLE INTERACTION OF MAIN STEAM LINES AND FEEDWATER LINES AT BOILING WATER REACTORS Regulatory Guide 1.49, Position C2 states that a Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) should not result in the failure of safety-related structures, systems or components through the failure of a nonsafety-related structure, system or component.
Our review, as requested by TIA 82-69, revealed that Zimmer did not comply with Regulatory Guide 1.29, Position C2 as far as the potential for nonseismic Category I main feedwater piping failures to cause the failure of adjacent main steam piping whose integrity is necessary for the successful operation of safety-related systems.
Consequently, a preliminary review was performed to determine which BWRs might have similar design deficiencies and would require Board Notification.
Based on the results of our preliminary review we recommended in a memorandum to D. Eisenhut dated December 6,1983, (Enclosure 2), that a Board Notification be issued regarding possible interaction of main steam lines and main feedwater lines for the following plants:
Susquehanna 1 and 2, Shoreham 1, LaSalle 1 and 2, Hnpe Creek 1. Nine Mile Point 2 and Fermi 2.
5:e also stated that we would continue to study this matter on an expedited basis to determine whether, in reality, a problem exists at any other BWRs.
This study is now complete.
It has been determined that the BWRs listed in Enclosure 3, which were recently reviewed against Regulatory Guide 1.29, Position C2, do not require a Board Notification. includes the six BWRs that had Board Notifications issued and now need the Board Notifications withdrawn.
This determination
. was based on the fact that 1) these reactors have both seismic Category I main steam lines and main feedwater lines, thus preventing the postulated interaction from occurring or 2) the postulated failure of the main feed-water piping following an SSE was evaluated and found to satisfy the guide-lints of Regulatory Guide 1.29 Position C2.
e For the BWRs which were not recently evaluated against Regulatory Guide 1.29, Position C2 (Enclosure 4) it has been detemined that they were evaluated using the Giambusso criteria contained in Appendix B to Standard Review Plan 3.6.1.
A major portion. of the Giambusso criteria is devoted to the interaction of main feedwater lines and main steam lines with each other and structures, systems or components necessary to mitigate the postulated pipe break accident and bring the reactor to cold shutdown.
These reactors were evaluated a number of years ago and found acceptable for the effects of the pcstulated failures of the main steam lines and main feedwater lines. Although these reactors may not meet the guidelines con-tained in Regulatory Guide 1.29, Position C2, the staff's current judgment is that this is not a safety concern because after a main feedwater line failure the reactor can be brought to the cold shutdown condition.
From our evaluation of all BWRs we conclude the following:
1.
All BWRs that were recently reviewed against the recommendation of Regulatory Guide 1.29, Position C2 and the NRC regulations with respect to the iriteraction of main steam and feedwater lines with safety-related equipment are acceptable,
. 2.
All BWRs which were previously reviewed against the Giambusso criteria meet the NRC regulations with respect to the interaction of main steam and feedwater lines with structures, systems or components necessary to mitigate the posLulated pipe break accident and bring the reactor to cold shutdown and
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3.
Zimmer is a unique situation. While this plant was rereviewed against the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.29, Position C2 and found not complying, the applicant has emumitted to modify the feedwater piping supports in order to satisfy the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.29, Position C2.
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MEMORANDUM FOR:
D. Eisenhut, Director, Division of Licensing, NRR FROM:
R. Mattson, Director, Division of Systems Integration, NRR R. Vollmer. Director, Division of Engineering, NRR
SUBJECT:
RECOMMENDED BOARD NOTIFICATION FOR P051'BLE INTERACTION OF MAIN STEAM LINES AND MAIN FEEDWATER LINES AT BOILING WATER REACTORS On October 21, 1982. Region III requested that NRR review certain design aspects' of the Zimer main steam system, main ' steam system restraints, and applicable main turbine building supporting structure.
The Zimer issue was evaluated pursuant to Task Interface Agreement 82-69 and was also the subject of Board Notification 83-115, " Staff Review of the Zimer Main Steam Line Design Calculations."
The staff evaluation of Zimer revealed the potential for nonseismic main f'eedwater piping to fail and conseqoently cause the failure of adjacent main steam line piping whose integrity is necessary for the successful operation of safety-related systems.
The applicant was requested to pro-vide additional analyses to demonstrate that the design safety functions would not be impatred.
A recent submittal by Cincinnati Gas and Electric (FSAR Revision 98, dated Octob'er 28, 1983), indicates that the Zimer feedwater piping design was inadequate and that pipe support modifications would be required.
As a result of the Zimmer findings, DL requested DE to evaluate the potential for nonseismic feedwater piping interaction with other safety-related systems at similar BWRs (memorandum from F. J. Miraglia to J. P. Knight dated November 10, 1983).
Subsequent discussion between the staffs of MEB, ASB, and DL revealed that this issue also involved the question of sy':tems interaction.
In the steam tunnel area, the main feedwat'er piping for some BWRs is routed parallel to and in the vicinity of the main steam piping.
The feedwater piping in this area is classified as high energy piping and may not Se seismically qualified.
Thus, a postulated break in the feedwater lin3 could result in unrestrained whipping of the feedwater pipe impacting the nearby main stea:n piping.
Ifsafety-relatedsystems(e.g.,MSIVleakage contrcl system) are connected to the main steam line piping in this area the integrity of this piping must be assured.
Contact:
R. Lobel, X29463 h
While thi: :ituation has besn acceptably resol'.ed for Zimsr. it is possible that the same situation may exist at other BWRs of similar design.
Based upon a prelintinary review we recomend that the appropriate board notification be made for the following reactors regarding the potential for an interaction of nonseismic feedwater lines.with seismic Categcry I main steam lines or other safety-related lines whose integrity is necessary to assure the opera-tion of safety-related systems.
Susquehanna 1/2 387, 388 Shoreham 1, 50-322 LaSalle 1/2, 50-373, 374 Hope Creek 1, 50-354 Nine Mile Point 2, 50-410 Femt 2, 50-341 Should this problem exist, it could significantly affect the conclusions reached b'y the staff in the SERs for these reactors since the assumption of steam line integrity is necessary to assure proper functioning of the asso-ciated safety-related systems. This issue therefore is a new issue which would not have been previously brought to the attention of licensing boards for these facilities or the Comission.
We will continue to study this matter on an expedited basis to determine whether, in reality, a problem exists at these other reactors and will notify you of our findings when we have completed our review.
Q,d qn rA gd.Q R. Mat Director Division of Systems Integration p/Arw R. Vollmer, Director Division of Engineering
. cc:
F. Miraglia F. Rowsome D. Terao A. Schwencer J. Bramer B. Yeungblood L. Hulman N. Wagner T. Quay J. Wilson L. Kintner R. Lobel W. Minners D. Wessman h
ENCLOSURE 3 BwRs REVIEWED AGAIllST REGULATORY GUIDE 1.29, C2
- Hope Creek 1
- LaSalle 1 and 2
- Nine Mile Point 2 WNP-2 Clinton 1
- Fermi 2 Grand Gulf 1 and 2 GESSAR Hartsville, Plant A, 1 and 2 Limerick 1 and 2 River Bend 1 and 2
- Shorehmn
- Susquehanna 1 and 2 Perry 1
- originally recommended for Bo rd Notification in Enclosure 2 and require withdrawal of Board Notification S
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ENCLOSURE 4 BWRs REVIEWED AGAINST THE GTAMBUSSO CRITERIA Big Rock Point Browns Ferry 1, 2 and 3 Brunswick 1 and 2 Cooper Station Dresden 1, 2 and 3 Duane Arnold Fitzpatrick Hatch 1 and 2
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Humboldt Bay Lacrosse Millstone 1 Monticello Nine Mile Point 1 Oyster Creek Peach Bottom 2 and 3 Pilgrim 1 Quad Cities 1 and 2 6
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Document Name:
MEM0 BN 84-062 AND 84-067 Requestor's ID:
PEGGY Author's Name:
P. O'Brien Doc'; ment Cornments:
service list for memo tnnsmitting bns to limerick boards
Document Name:
BN 84-062 & 84-067 LIMERICK Requestor's ID:
MARY Author's Name:
R. Stark Document Comments:
Transmittal Memo
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