ML19269D428
| ML19269D428 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | LaSalle  |
| Issue date: | 05/02/1979 |
| From: | Knox J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Giardina R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7906040035 | |
| Download: ML19269D428 (5) | |
Text
a UNITED STATES 6
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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 t,
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MAY 2 1979 MEMORANDUM FOR:
R. Giardina, Auxiliary Systems Branch, DSS J. Knox, Power Systems Branch, DSS
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FROM:
F. Rosa, Chief Power Systems Branch, DSS THRU:
FIRE PROTECTION STATUS REPORT, LASALLE COUNTY
SUBJECT:
STATION UNITS 1 AND 2, POWER SYSTEMS BRANCH The enclosed fire protection status report covers those portions of the LaSalle fire protection review for which the Power Systems Branch has review responsibility. This report is based on infor-mation in Amendment 23 of the FSAR, the site visit of April 2, 3, and 4,1978, and section 8.3.1 of the FSAR through Amendment no. 38 In the memorandum transmitting our LaSalle SER to D. Vassallo dated October 27, 1978, physical identification for safety-related cables and raceways was addressed as an area to be viewed during the Power Systems Branch site visit. This area relates to fire protection and was viewed during the fire protection site visit.
Items 1, 2, and 3 of the enclosure delineate the results of our site visit in this regard.
Items 4 and 5 of the enclosure request additional information needed to complete our fire protection review.
AW
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John Knox Auxiliary Systems Branch Division of Systems Safety
Enclosure:
As stated 2258 152 cc: See page 2 l906040gy wlww weFuc wszwsw WV escL
VAy e M7'1 R. Giardina 2-cc:
R. Mattson S. Hanauer R. Boyd D. Vassallo (Parr A. Bournia D. Fischer F. Rosa R. Scholl F. Ashe V. Benaroya H. Balukjian
Contact:
J. Knox x27276 2258 153
ENCLOSURE FIRE PROTECTION STATUS REPORT LASALLI: COUNTY STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 50-373/374 1.
Class IE and associated circuit cables at the LaSalle County Station are marked at each end and in junction boxes. Cables, located in cable trays, are not marked and the markings, located in junction boxes, lacked sufficient durability to be readily recognized as color coded markings. Visual verification that the cable installation is in conformance with separation-criteria was not possible, In accordance with the specific identification criteria of IEEE standard 384-1974 and Regulatory Guide 1.75 (Revision 1), it is the staff's requirement that both Class IE and associated cables be marked in a manner of sufficient durability and at a sufficient number of points to facilitate visual verification that the installation is in conformance with separation criteria. Cables must be marked either before or during installations. Since this has not been done at the LaSalle station, we require a detailed review of cable identifi-cation and routing methods.
In this regard, we require a positive physical check of the installed cable be performed using high-frequency f racing (or other method) and sample testing techniques. The positive physical checking performed should be monitored by I&E.
2 In accordance with section 8.3.1.3.2 of the FSAR, exposed conduits are supposed to be marked by color codes at the beginning and the end of the run, on both sides of a wall through which the conduit passes, and at both sides of junction boxes.
Class IE conduits at the LaSalle County Station are not marked by color code in accordance with the FSAR.
Visual verification of separation between redundant divisions was, therefore, not possible.
I&E was informed of this design deficiency during the site visit.
It is recommended that this design deficiency also be formally identified to I&E for their action.
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2-3.
In regard to separation between Class IE and non-Class IE cable trays and cables, the separation is less than 3 ft, between trays separated vertically, the separation is non-existent between cables rising from both Class IE and non-Class IE trays in cable spreading areas (cables are bundled).
It is the staff's concern that failures or faults in non-Class IE cables will degrade Class IE circuits below an acceptable level.
For the non-Class IE cables rising from trays with no separation from Class IE cables, it is the staff's position that they are associated circuits and must meet the requirements for associated circuits of IEEE standard 384-1974 and Regulatory Guide 1,75, for vertical separation of less than 3 ft, between Class IE and non-Class IE trays, we require results of an analysis in accordance with section 5,1.1.2 of IEEE standard 384-1974, that demonstrates that failure or faults in non-Class IE circuits will not degrade Class IE circuits below an acceptable level or these non-Class IE circuits must be considered associated circuits and meet the applicable requirements of IEEE standard 384-1974 and Regulatory Guide 1.75 for associated circuits, 4
To assure that redundant safety related cable systems are separated from each other so that both are not subject to damage from a single fire hazard, we require the following information for each Class IE system required to bring the plant to safe cold shutdown, a.
Provide a Table listing of electrical equipment required or essential for safe shutdown, b.
Define each equipments location by fire area, Define each equipments redundant counterpart with a description c.
of its locations with respect to its redundant counterpart, d.
Identify the essential cabling (instrumentation, control, and power) for each equipment, e.
Describe the routing of each essential cable identified in item d (by fire area) from source to terminations, 2258 155
, f.
Identify each location where essential cables are located in the same fire area with their redundant counterpart, g.
For each location identified in item f, describe the effects on safe shutdown if both redundant cables are lost from an exposure fire.
5 Section H.3.4.3 (page H.3 63) of Appendix H to the FSAR fndicates that for the design basis fire in the control room:
(1) the auxiliary equipment room contains the remote shutdown panels, (2) all circuits in the remote shutdown panels are electrically isolated from the main control room, and (3) remote shutdown circuits are unaffected by loss of the control room circuits.
To assure that the electrical isolation between the control room and the remote shutdown systems is sufficient to preclude a design basis fire in the control room, in the auxiliary equipment room, or at remote shutdown control locations from reducing the safe cold shutdown capability below an acceptable level, we require the following information, Identify each circuit located on the hot shutdown panel required a.
for shutdown with a description of how it is isolated from the control room circuitry, b.
For each circuit identified in item a, provide detailed electrical schematic drawings which clearly describe the electrical isolation between the hot shutdown panel and control room, Identify each circuit required for safe cold shutdown located in c.
the control room but not on the safe shutdown panels located in the auxiliary equipment room, d.
For each circuit identified in item c, provide the results of an analysis that demonstrates that failure (open, short, or hot short) of these circuits due to a design basis fire in the control room will not affect their remote safe shutdown capability.
2258 156
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