ML19269D170
| ML19269D170 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 01/30/1979 |
| From: | Bickwit L NRC OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (OGC) |
| To: | Ahearne J, Bradford P, Gilinsky V, Hendrie J, Kennedy R NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7902270417 | |
| Download: ML19269D170 (16) | |
Text
2 O ru M S T. ' '. [
T O
UNITED STATES t-y
,7-1, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
{ $'bk....,/
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 A
n+
e January 30, 1979 MEMORANDUM FOR:
Chairman Hendrie Commissioner Gilinsky Commissioner Kennedy Commissioner Bradford Commissioner Ahearne FROM:
Leonard Bickwit, Jr./bf(3 General Counsel
SUBJECT:
LEGAL ISSUES ARISING FROM THE UNITED STATES' NEW CHINA POLICY Introduction The Commission has received applications seeking authoriza-tiontoexportpowerreactors,specialnuclearmate{ pal, source material, and. heavy water for use in Taiwan._
President Carter's decision to extend full diplomatic recog-nition to the People's Republic of China (PRC) and his declaration that the PRC is the sole legal Government of China raise several significant legal issues concerning the NRC's continued export licensing activities regarding Taiwan.2/
The purpose of this memorandum is to present OGC's analysis of these issues and to outline possible future courses of action for the Commission.
President Carter's December 30 Memorandum On December 30, 1978, President Carter issued a memorandum instructing federal agencies on how the new United States policy on China is to be implemented vis-a-vis Taiwan.
(44
-1'/
A list of applications requiring Commission action and their current status is appended as attachment 1.
-2/
See the December 22 memorandum from Carlton R. Stoiber te the Ccmmission entitled " Implications for NRC of the New United States China Policy".
CONTACT 3:
Carl Stoiber, OGC, 634-3224 Trip Rothschild, OGC, 634-1465 Steve Ostrach, OGC, 634-3224 79022704li
The Commission 2
Fed. Reg. 1075, January 4, 1978). 3/
The President declared and directed that:
(1) federal agencies are to carry out ongoing programs, transactions and relations with Taiwan; (2) existing international agreements and arrangements with Taiwan remain in effect; (3) whenever any law, regulation or order of the United States refers to a foreign country, nation, state, government, or similar entity, federal agencies shall construe those terms to include Taiwan; and (4) the above directive shall apply to and be carried out by all agencies, except as the President may otherwise determine.
The President also stated in the December 30 memorandum that legislation to implement these principles will ae introduced in the Congress.
The President's Poliev and the Agreement for Cooperation Recuirement A major legal issue raised by the new China policy involves the status of the current agreement for cooperation between the United States and the formerly recognizec Republic of China and the trilateral agreement including the Interna-tional Atomic Energy Agency.
Section 126a.(2) of the Atomic Energy Act, when read in conjunction with sections 53a. and 103d. of the Act, provides that before licensing a nuclear export, 3/
the Commission must determine, among other things, that the recipient has entered into an agreement for cooperation with the United States pursuant to Section 123 of the Act. 5/
~3/
The Commission has also received a copy of a January 9, 1979 Memorandum from Peter Tarnoff, Executive Secretary, Department of State to Assistant Secretaries and Office Heads entitled " Instructions Regarding Proper Termino 1-ogy for Referring to China, People's Republic of China, China Mainland and Taiwan in Official Statements and Publications."
1/
Agreements for Cooperation are required for exports of power reactors, research reactors, and special nuclear material.
5/
This latter section provides that "no cooperation with any nation, group of nations, or regional defense organization.
shall be undertaken until" certain specified procedures have been followed and an appro-priate agreement for cooperation has been concluded.
The Ccmmission 3
The President's view, as expressed in the December 30 memor-andum, is that the United States Agreement for Cooperation with the former Republic of China 6/ remains in effect and that Taiwan should be treated as a nation for purposes of the Atomic Energy Act and the Commission's implementing regulations.
The result of this approach would be to estab-lish a legal regime in which Taiwan is treated as a nation for purposes of U.S.
domestic law but not for purposes of international law or foreign relations.
This arrangement is conceptually difficult.
If, in the view of the United States government, there is only one China -- governed by the PRC -- what is the logical basis for affirming the existence of a second China (Taiwan) also treated as a nation under U.S.
domestic law?
The President's policy could b7 rationalized if Taiwan were to be considered a de facto nation, a position the Executive Branch is unwilli l to adopt explicitly because of its facial inconsistency with the "one China" policy.
The Commission's task of determining whether Taiwan is a nation for purposes of the Agreement for Cooperation require-ment wculd be simplified if Congress were to enact legisla-tion codifying the President's view.
However, in the absence of such legislation, the Commission must attempt to resolve the conceptual difficulties described above and to determine whether the Presidential interpretation provides a firm legal basis for its export licensing activities regard-ing Taiwan.
Our conclusion is that we cannot say, on the basis of information presently available to us, that it does.
Both the language and the legislative history of Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act are silent regarding what factors are to be considered in determining whether a particular entity qualifies as a " nation".
In the absence of legislative history to the contrary, it seems reasonable to presume that Congress intended the term to be given an ordinary, not a totally novel, meaning.
And it would be novel to say the least to include within the reach of " nation" those entities
~6/
Signed at Washington, April 4, 1972, 10 U.S.T.
2023.
T.I.A.S.
4371, 361 U.N.T.S.
115 The Agreement for Cooperation was amended on March 15, 1974, 25 U.S.T.
913, T.I.A.S.
7834.
The Commission 4
which the United States Government does not consider to be nations in the conduct of its foreign policy.
Moreover, it is likely that Congress did not use the term
" nation" inadvertently.
Agreements between " nations" -- as will be discussed later in this paper -- are as a rule more valuable than other agreements as tools to ensure the imple-mentation of agreed-on objectives.
Althcagh it is our view that we still have an enforceable agreement with Taiwan, it is to some extent less valuable than the agreement we had before our withdrawal of recognition.
Accordingly we are not able to advise that the proposed exports to Taiwan would comply with either the letter or spirit of the Atomic Energy Act.
We do not reach this conclusion without some reservations.
Two factors in particular have given us pause.
"Objectivist" Theerv of Nationhood First, under principles of international law accepted by the United States, a state or nation is an entity having (a) a defined territory and population; (b) a government in control of the territory and population; (c) the capaciLy to engage in international relations; and (d) a substantial likelihood that conditions (a)-(c) will continue in the future. 7/
Taiwan meets these requirements because it possesses a clearly defined territory and population, which is under the control of authorities having the power to govern.
The authorities on Taiwan presently conduct diplo-matic relations with some twenty-two nations, evidencing a capacity to engage in international relations.
- Finally, there is no indication that the above conditions will not be met in the immediate future.
-7/
See the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, 49 Stat. 3097, T.S.
881; 165 L.N.T.S. 19 (1933) (The United States is a Party to that Conven-tion); Restatement, Second, Foreign Relations Law of the United States, $ 4; and Statement of Assistart Secretary of State Philip Habib before the Special Subcommittee on Investigations, House International Relations Committee, December 17, 1975.
The Commission 5
The fact that the United States does not recognise the auth-orities on Taiwan as a government does not mean that Taiwan is not a state. 8/
A long established principle of interna-tional law -- the "obj ectivist" theory of nations -- is that a state may exist without a recognized government.
A state comes into existence as a legal person when the conditions of international law, delineated above, are fulfilled.
Recognition of its government is subsequent to the legal fact of its existence. 9/
This theory might justify an terpretation of Taiwan as a nation for purposes of the Atomic Energy Act were United Statas policy one of acknowledgement of the existence of Taiwan as a nation but nonrecognition of the authorities of Taiwan as the legitimate government of that nation.
But that is not our policy.
The President has not only withdrawn recognition from the Government of the former Republic of China; he has coupled this action with a denial of the existence of Taiwan as a nation for purposes of the conduct of our foreign relations.
In light of this denial, the above princip2es are distinguishable and cannot reasonably be looked to as supporting the Administration's interpretation of statu-tory provisions such as the nationhood requirement of Section 123 In the past, the United States Government has frequently taken the position that, "While we acknowledge X exists as a nation, we do not recognize the de facto government of X."
To our knowledge, however, the United States has never taken the position -- nor would it be reasonable to hold -- that "While X exists as a nation -- since it exhibits the generally accepted characteristics of nationhood -- we do not acknowledge its nationhood."
In our view, no theory of statehood exists --
even the most "objectivist" around -- which would sanction this latter statement.
-8/
In international law, a state and a government are two different concepts.
state is a community of a
people and a government
.s the political agency through which the state acts in international rela-tions.
See Hervey, Legal Effects of Recognition in International Law (1928') at p. 122.
2/
See Restatement, Second, Foreign Relations Law of the United States, S 107, 1 0'Connell, International Law, 165 (1970).
The Commission 6
President's Power Over Foreien Relations A second, and we believe more persuasive, factor working against our conclusion is the President's foreign policy power.
It is a fundamental principle of administrative law that the President cannot direct or control the performance of licensing functions by an " independent" regulatory agency.10/
But it is also a fundamental legal principle that the President is the nation's chief spokesman in the area of foreign policy; 11/ and that the courts (and, a fortiori, administrative agencies) "should not so act as to embarrass" the President in the conduct of that policy. 12/
In the past the Ccmmisslon has attempted to reconcile these diver-gent principles by giving " substantial deference" to Presi-dential positions and "it has accorded due regard to Executive Branch views in matters affecting United States foreign policy in the absence of a clear statutory mandate to the contrary". 13/
In determining whether a foreign entity constitutes a
" nation" there is an additional rationale for ceferring to the President.
The U.S. Government's primary institutional expertise on what foreign entities constitute " nations" is exercised by the President and the Department of State.
More importantly, the President has a constitutional authority to recognise foreign diplomats. 14/
In interpreting this authority the Supreme Court nas held that only the President can recognize a state. 11/
1S!
See Humchrey's Executor v.
United States, 295 U.S. 602, (1935); E.
Corwin, The President, Office and Powers, 85 (1957).
~~11/
See Younestown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579 (1952).
12/
Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S.
30, 35 (1944).
11/
Mixed Oxide Fuel, CLI-78-10, 7 NRC 711, 719 (1978).
See also Babcock and Wilcox (Application for a Facility Export License), CLI-77-lo, 5 NRC 1332, 1349 (1977).
14/
~ ~ ~
U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 2, cl.
2.
ll/
Banco National de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S.
- 398, 410 (1964).
The Commission 7
The underlying issue here involves the conduct of U.S. foreign policy.
The decision whether an Agreement for Cooperation continues to exist between this country and Taiwan is a ques-tion that will have a significant effect on this country's relations with Taiwan and the PRC and may conceivably have broader foreign policy implications as well.
Accordingly, the rationale of the Commission's GESMO decision also suggests that the Commission should give substantial weight to the President's views.
Moreover, the President has made his views known in this instance publicly, unambiguously, and in a legally significant manner.
The fact that the President's December 30, 1978 memorandum is not in the form of an executive order or a specific communication to the Commission on a license application does not affect its legal character.
We are unaware of any judicial determination that executive orders have greater legal weight than other formal invocations of Presidential authority.
According to informal views received from the Department of Justice, 15/ the December 30 memorandum is an " executive memorandum", a document normally more specific or temporary in nature than an executive crder, and which is ordinarily not published in the Federal Register. 17/
The Justice Department contact also stated, that, although
" memoranda" and " orders" differ in the procedural formality with which they are issued, they are not intended to and have not been treated as having a different legal character.
This view is consistent with the text of the December 30, 4
1978 memorandum, which indicates that it was intended to represent a full exercise of the President's power.
The memo-randum was signed by the President, and refers to his "consti-tutional responsibility for the conduct of... foreign relations."
It includes mandatory terms, such as " declare and direct".
While the President may not, either by executive order or executive memorandum, alter the express terms of a statute, it thus appears that he can effectively communicate his
--16/
Telephone communication between CGC and an attorney of the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel.
- 17/
The December 30 memorandum was published in the Federal Register on January 4, 1979
The Commission o
views in proceedings under that statute through either of these -- as well as other acceptable -- mechanisms.
Yet one factor should be noted which suggests that in this instance Presidential views ought to be accorded somewhat 5
less deference than in ocher circumstances.
The central issue here is the interpretation of the term " nation" as used in the Atomic Energy Act, essentially a " question of law" as distinct from a " question of fact".
Questions of law are normally, as here, questions of statutory interpre-5
?
tation involved with discerning what Congress meant by a i
certain term (e.g., did Congress intend by " nation" to include entities which the United States does not acknowledge
}I to exist as nations in the conduct of its foreign relations?).
Questions of fact typically involve determinations of what
=
developments took place, or can be expected to take place, in i
a given setting (e.g., will the authorities on Taiwan have
~
the ability to govern people on that island?).
Most deter-minations of courts and agencies have aspects of both these questions associated with them and are considered " mixed questions of law and fact".
Yet even such mixed questions i
can generally be subdivided into component questions of law and fact.
The consequences of which categor/ an issue falls into traditionally have been significan; for purposes of judicial review.
Agency determinations of questions of law, as a general proposition, have been accorded less deference by reviewing courts than have determinations of questions of fact.
The distinction is a sensible one, based on the view that although agencies -- and the President for that matter --
are better able than courts to assess factual circumstances with which they are familiar, courts are ordinarily as pro-ficient at reading a statute and determining what Congress meant by it.
In our view the Commission would be well advised to adopt this distinction for purposes of the weight it assigns to Presidential and State Department views -- and the views of other interested agencies -- on matters before it.
Where the views in question are views, for instance, on the con-sequences for U.S.
foreign policy of a given action, con-I siderable deference to the foreign policy expertise of the institutions in question arguably can be justified.
Where the views, however, are on the meaning of statutory provi-siens, the arguments for substantial Commission deference to other agencies of government are less persuasive.
3
The Commission 9
It is not being suggested that the law-fact principle should be applied rigidly.
Few courts - ply it without some flexi-bility which allows them to cons *aer other relevant factors bearing on the issue of deference.
In this case, the question of law involves interpretation of a term in a statute admin-istered primarily by the Commission -- an argument for less deference to Presidential views than might otherwise be appropriate.
That the term is " nation", on the other hand, most definitely sugg?sts additional deference to the Presi-dent's institutional expertise on questions of statehood.
Our advice is to bring all such factors into consideration but, while doing so, to keep in mind that the basic issue here falls squarely on the law side of the law-fact distinc-tion.
Procosed Lecislation The primary relevance of the proposed legislation foc continuing relations with Taiwan lies in the fact that it provides a concrete opportunity for Congress to confirm or rej ect the President's policy.
The leading case of the extent of the President's authority holds that the President's f
authority is strongest when he is carrying out a Congressionally-mandated policy, or when Congress approves or acquiesces in his actions. 18/ In its GESMO proceeding the Commission recog-nized that Presidential policies could achieve added weight when they were consistent with the expressed will of Congress. --19/
Conversely, if Congress should rej.ct the proposed legislation, thus implicitly rej ecting the President 's policy, his power would be at its lowest ebb. 20/
It should be noted that in the one previous circumstance where it was questionable whether an entity met the nation-hood requirement in the Atomic Energy Act, the issue was Sk!
Younestown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J. concurring).
12./
See 7 NRC at 719-20.
'20/
Id. at 637
The Commission 10 ranolved by legislation.
In 1957, Congress added Section 125 to the Atomic Energy Act, authorizing nuclear coopera-tion with the Federal Government of Germany on behalf of Berlin.
The precedential significance of this provision is that when the U.S. decided to engage in nuclear cooperation with an entity having a special status in internatisnal law, and not possessing all the accustomed legal attributes of a state, particular statutory provisian was made for that cooperation.
However, the Taiwan situation is legally distin-guishable from that of Berlin, because Taiwan possesses some characteristics of nationhood beyond those attributable to Berlin.
From an historical perspective, the Administration's approach to dealing with Taiwan appears to be a unique one.
At least we are unaware of precedents in which the United States Government has treated a foreign entity as a nation for purposes of domestic law, while concurrently taking the position that the same entity lacks the legal personality of a nation under international law.
Because of these unique circumstances, it can be argued that Congress should have an opportunity to resolve the legal uncertainties before the Commission acts on pending export license applications to Taiwan.
The Legal Status and the Adequacy of Assurances Received From Taiwan (Formerly the Reoublic of China)
If the Commission determines, either before or after Congres-sional action on the matter, that the nationhood requirement of Section 123 is met, it will then have to reach determina-tions on the other statutory requirements referenced in Section 126a.(2).
A number of legal issues involving the status and adequacy of assurances received from Taiwan are relevant to these determinations as well as to the apparent purpose of the nationhood requirement.
Under international law, the fact that the United States no longer recognizes a political entity known as the Republic of China does not affect the international rigPts and obliga-tions of that entity.
For example, absent dec arations to the contrary, treaties remain in force. 21/
However, a number
. of consequences flowing from nonrecognitation could make agreements entered into by the former Republic of China difficult to enforce, even if they are deemed to survive 21/
1 0'Connell, International Law 165 (1970).
The Commission 11 non-recognition.
For example, nonrecognition signifies United States " unwillingness to acknowledge that the govern-ment in question speaks as the sovereign authority for the territory it purports to control". 22/ Accordi.. gly, formal written communications are not transmitted to an unrecog-nized government.
Formal written communications received from an unrecognized government are not formally acknow-ledged. 23/
The United States also cannot enter into new bilateral international agreements with Taiwan without implying a recognition of Taiwan as a state and recognition of its government. 24/
These communication barriers may delay the exchange of important information and complicate attempts to procure additional assurances regarding safe-guards and other important nuclear matters.
The Government of the Republic of China entered into several international agreements conditioning its use of nuclear equipment and material provided to it by the United States.
That Government ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and also entered into a bilateral agree-ment for cooperation with the United States and a trilateral agreement with the United States and the IAEA.
In addition, it has provided the United States tne assurances on physical protection which are required by 10 CFR $ 110.43. 25/
The Executive Branch has informed the Commission orally that it har also received assurances from the authorities in Taiwan tha~ they intend to carry out all the legal obligations
--22/
Banco National de Cuba v
,_.gatino, 376 U.S.
- 398, 410 (1964).
2_1/
2 Whiteman, Digest of International Law, 655
~~24/
Restatement Second, Foreign Relations Law of the United States, $ 104(b).
~~25/
Rather than provide the United States with a physical protection assurance generically covering all nuclear exports, the former Republic of China chose to provide the United States a separate assurance for each contem-plated export.
The Commission 12 incurred by the former Republic of China, specifically including those in the nuclear area.
If the Commission finds that these agreements remain in force by virtue of the President's December 30, 1978 memorandum, it must also determine whether effective means of enforcing these assurances continue to exist. 26/
With the withdrawing of diplomatic recognition there is no governmental entity recognized by the United States which can formally assure the United States that Taiwan will comply with its existing obligations, or with whom new obligations may be negotiated.
Instead, the recently incor-porated American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) will apparently negotiate directly with a parallel corporate entity which will be established in Taiwan.
Under its articles of incor-poration, the AIT will clearly be acting as an agent of the United States government.
A major unresolved question is on whose behalf the corporate entity of Taiwan will be acting.
It cannot be acting as an agent of a " government" recognized by the United States.
Since the United States would not be receiving governmental guarantees, the nature of the legal authority possessed by the Taiwan entity needs to be clarified to ensure that the assurances provided the United States can be effectively enforced.
Adequate information on which to base a conclusion as to enforceability has not yet been forthcoming.
To our knowledge, the Commission has never authorized an export without receiving governmental assurances.
However, notwith-standing the fact that implementation of the entire U.S.
nuclear export control system has been premised on govern-ment-to-government safeguards commitments, there is no explicit language in the Atomic Energy Act requiring that assurances may only be received L.m a governmental entity.
--26/
is our understanding that the IAEA safeguards will It continue to be applied in Taiwan.
In this regard, the new China policy poses another conundrum.
If, as the President has asserted, Taiwan is a part of China, and China is governed by the PRC, since the PRC is a nuclear weapons state under the NPT, a hypertechnical argument could be made that Taiwan is not bound to accept IAEA safeguards under the NPT.
Such an absurd result was clearly not contemplated by the Administration.
How-ever, trying to articulate an argument against such a conclusion graphically illustrates the logical traps for the unwary in this situation.
The Commission 13 We know of no norm of domestic or international law which precludes the United States from entering into commercial or other relationships with non-governmental entities.
In the past, the United States has had extensive dealings with nations and governments it did not reccgnize.
Obvious examples arise in the China context.
Former Presidents Ford and Nixon visited the PRC, the United States established a liaison office in Peking, and bilateral trade with the PRC was instituted prior to diplomatic recognition.
Alternatives for Commission Action 1.
Adoet
..e President's view One alternative would be to adopt the view that Taiwan meets the nationhood requirement in Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act, and to conclude that safeguards and other assurances received from that entity are adequate and enforceable.
If the Commission then determines that the other export licensing requirements referenced in Section 126 of the Atcmic Energy Act are met, export licenses to Taiwan could issue.
2.
Await Congressional action The new China policy raises legal issues which have not heretofore been addressed by the courts.
No judicial prece-dent we have found clearly holds that Taiwan may be treated as a nation for purposes of U.S. domestic law, bu* not under international law.
Neither have we found a preced.:nt which would prohibit such a result.
The President's proposed legislation directly addresses the legal questions involved here and the Executive Branch has urged the Congress to enact the legislation promptly.
In light of the dearth of legal precedent and the legal questions raised earlier in this memo, the Commission may prefer to await Congressional action before making a determinat on about whether proposed exports to Taiwan meet the requirements of the Atomic Energy Act.
With respect to this course, it should be noted that some
, of these applications have been pending before 'he Commis-sion for over 120 days since receipt of Executive Branch views.
For others, the 120 day time limit is rapidly approaching.
If the Commission does not act within 120 days after receiving Executive Branch views, the President may authorize the export by executive order upon making a
/
The Commission 14 determination that "further delay would be excessive" and that " withholding the proposed export would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of United States non-proliferation objectives, or would otherwise jeopardize the common defense or security." 27/
The President's decision would be subject to a sixty-day statutory review by Congress. 28/
3 Forwpfd pending applications to the President Because of the difficult legal and policy issues raised by the new China policy, the Commission could decide that an appropriate and expeditious means of resolving questions concerning future nuclear exports to Taiwan would be to issue an order stating that it is unable to make the statu-tory determinations required under the NNPA.
The pending license applications would then be referred to the President, who could either let the Commission decision stand or authorize the exports by executive order.
There is no time limit for Presidential action.
If the President authorizes the exports, his decision would be reviewed by the Congress.
The difference between this alternative and alternative number 2 is that it squarely places the matter before the President and removes it frcm the Commission's docket.
In cases of referral, Section 126b.(2) of the AEA also requires the Commission to " include an explanation of the basis for the decision and any dissenting or separate views."
Treatment of Existinz Licer.ses In the event chat the Commission decides not to grant the license applications, it should also consider how to treat
- e. port licenses previously issued for shipments to Taiwan.
Section 186a. of the Atcmic Energy Act provides that the
--27/
See Section 126b.(2) of the Atomic Energy Act.
There is no statutory period within whicn the President must act to withdraw an export license application from the Commission.
~~28/
See Section 130 of the Atomic Energy Act.
The Commission 15 Commission may revoke any license "because of conditions revealed by such application.
. which would warrant the Commission to refuse to grant a license on an original application."
In such a case the Commission would be required to offer the applicant a public hearing. 29/
The revocation could be made effective prior to the ccmmencement of the hearing if the Commission determined that the "public health, safety, or interest so requires." 10/
The significance of revocation in the export licensing con-text is unclear.
An export license only authorizes the transfer of material or facilities beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.
If material or equipment has not left the United States, the license covering the shipment may be revoked with some effect.
However, if an
. export has already passed through United States customs, the act of revocation would appear to be nugatory.
The only means of recovering material or equipment already physically present in Taiwan would be to request that the Department of State or the newly-created American Institute in Taiwan seek to negotiate such return with the recipient entity, a task that would be ccmplicated by the absence of diplomatic relations.
In any event, the power to revoke licenses is discretionary with the Commission, and no obligation to do so would necessarily arise frcm a decision r.ot to issue new licenses.
Attachment:
Status Chart cc:
~29/
The hearing would be conducted pursuant to 10 CFR Part 110, Subpart G.
--30/
10 CFR $ 110.60.
t.
ct~
ATTACHMENT 1 STATUS OF PiNDING EXPORTS TO TAIWAN REQUIRING COMMISSIONER ACTION
- License Application Executive Branch SECY Paper Number Views Received (Containing Sta:.'f Views)
Power Reactors XR-113 (2 reactors) 5/11/78 78-520 Scecial Nuclear Material XSNM-134' 12/14/78 XSNM -1279 6/9/78 78-593 Decleted Uranium XU-08412 10/30/78 78-570 XU-08393 10/31/78 79-21 I
Heavv Water XMAT-3 Application sen; to State 10/6/78 - no response received XMAT-13 Application - eni co State 10/20/78 - no rusponse received This information was provided by the Office of International Programs.
a
~