ML19269C709
| ML19269C709 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 02/05/1979 |
| From: | Gilleland J TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | Varga S Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7902120109 | |
| Download: ML19269C709 (13) | |
Text
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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY CH ATTANOOG A TENNESSEE 374o1 500C Chestnut Street Tower II FEB 5 1979 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS Attention:
Mr. S. A. Varga, Chief P00R QUAUTY PAGES Light Water Reactors Branch No. 4 Division of Project Management U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555
Dear Mr. Varga:
In the Matter of the Application of
)
Docket Nos. 50-327 Tennessee Valley Authority
)
50-328 Enclosed is TVA's revised response to Reactor Systens Branch question 25 of your letter co N. B. Hughes dated June 28, 1978, requesting additional information on the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant.
This response to the staff position on residual heat removal will be incorporated into Amendment 60 of the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Final Safety Analysis Report as a revision to question 5.28.
Very truly yours, N-(),
(pq J. E. Gilleland
)
Assistant Manager of Power Enclosure (10) 7902120t03 5'a An Equal Opportunity Employer
SEQUOYAll NUCl. EAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 REVISED RESPONSE TO RSit QUESTION 25 0F JUNE 28, 1978, LETTER FR0tl S. A. VARGA TO N. B.11UGliES Q5.28 The Regulatory Requirements Review Committee, in a memorandum from (RSB-Q25) E. Case, Committee Chairman, to L. Gossick, Executive Director for Operations (dated February 16, 1978), has approved a new staf f posi-tion (IITP RSil 5-1) for the Residual lleat Removal System (RllR). The technical requirements for your plant are described below.
Please respond to these requirements in sufficient detail to enable the staff to review your compliance in an expeditious fashion.
1.
Provide nafetvgrade nteam generator dump valves, operatorn, air and power nupplien which neet the ningle failure critcrion.
Zhe sequoyah ( 'F.)N ) steam generator powerod atmospheric du;rp valven Jone jer generator) are seinmically qua li f i ed.
2he suppliec to thene jvalves are from the rinnt sa f ety grade auxiliary control air synte:r.
'ihe power and air nupplien to thene valves are t rain ized (two valven per t ra in), receiving necennary electrical power from the 125-volt vital Lattery nyntem.
Ihc mos' limiting ningle f a i lu re would be the lonn of one tra ir of the ;,afety grade air nynter., or one train of vital power.
2hin would prevent control room iri tiated ntean dumping via two of the fcur rower-crerated relie f valven.
_If nuch an event-were to cccur, c.perating pernonnol could enter the va lve rocnq (outnide of cont a inment) and throttle steam release from any a f f ected valven by manual operation.
2he nocond mcst limiting ningle failure would he a rechanical breakdown within cne of these S.G.
relief valven ne that the valve would tc "fvozen" nhut.
,;n thin case tin operc.ing forsonnel could circumvent the ningle active active failure as 1.;:/ll cws :
ja) "rina th" plant down to P!iR cut-in conditiona via j
naturil convection in the r"tra i n i n g three active loorn.
P thin cannot be done, SUN will proceed as in (b).
Jh) Alternatively, a 6-ir.ch ha n 1 va lve upstream of the fatled rtlief va lve would Le closed an1 tl'e relief valve repairod or replaced.
Jhin would he done under emergency conditions.
j.
Previde the canaailit y to cooldown to cold shutdown in less thar 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> gunuming the mont limiting ningle failure a n.1 lons or offnite power ar show tha* manual actions inside or outnide containment or roturn to hot standby until the manual actions or maintenance can be
performod *o correct tre failure provides an acceptable alternative.
2he PCs is capable of being cooled via natural convection.
Diablo Canyon and Salem a re prototypical of SQ:;, and tests conducted at Diablo Canvan would demonstrare the ability to cooldown to RHP initiation on natural convection.
The time limit of 36 to 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> to the PHP cut in point currently suggested seems reasonable, Larrirg unforeseen difficulties, but prototype testing at Diablo Canyon will verify the time required for this operation.
fCS, since it has only one PH9 suction line containing two safety grade geried valves for tie-in of the PCS to the PHR, might be constrained by the mechanical failure of one of these valves (inboard) to open to affect the final tie-in.
In this case the cooldown by natural convection would be continued as far as possible Eelow the 3500 F-450 psig normal tie-in point, the RCE would be depressurized as far as practical, ef forts would be made to open the stuck valve (vial handwheel, thermocycling, etc.), while steam dump via the steam generators is continued.
Ihe probability of a failure of cne of these valves (FCV 7 0- 1 and FCV 7 4-2) is extremely remote.
Ihese valves are powered from different emergency power trains.
failure cf either power train or of either valve operator could prevent initiation of RUP cooling in the nornal manner from the' control room.
In the event of such a failure, operator action could be taken to open the affected valve manually.
The mechanical failure of the disc separating from the stem has been investigated JKC A P-9 2 07 ) and its probability has been fcund to be in the range of 10-3 to 10-* per year.
The probability of an earthquake larger than the CBE at sequoyah is 10-2 to 10-3 per year.
]he combined protability of valve stem failure coincident with the ea rti: quake is 10-5 to 10-7 per year, 30 low that it need not he considered in the single failure analysis.
In the event of such a failure
'he plant woi.ld remain in a safe hoe standby condition with hnat rtmoval via the steam zenerators.
l J.
Provide the capacility to depressurize the reacter coo la nt system with only safetygrade systems assuming a s in g le failure and loss of offsite powet or chow that a mual actions innide or curside the containment or reFaining at jot standby until rdnual actions cr repairs
~
are completo provides an acceptable alternative.
2he reac tor coolane system is normally depressarized by neans of the pressurizer spray, fed through a single valve FCV62-84, from the discharge of the centrifugal charging pump (c).
_9hould this 2-inch valve fail to open following a seisric event everv effort would be 3ade to open it via portable compressed gas cylinder, or by maintenance, and if these attempts f ail system pressure
could te reduced ny blowing the pressuriner down through one of the two parallel power-operatcd relief valves provided for this purposo.
JPCV68-334 or PCV 68-340A).
4.
Provide the capability for horating with anly sdfetygrade systems assuming a single failure and loss of of fsite pcwcr or show that manual actions inside or cutside containment or remaining at hot standby until manual acticn or repairs are completed provides an acceptable alternative.
2Fe normal method to heavily borate the SQ'l FCS is to take suction for the charging pump (s) f:om the 12 percent horic acid solution of the horic acid storage rank (s) via the horic acid transfer pumps and the normal charging line.
Ihis is a safety grade route.
An alternate method of boration is to align the discharge cf the noric acid pumps, as above, and align the discharoc of one centrifugal or the positive displacement charging pump with the cCS through the Scron Injection Tank JNormal safety injection piping to the PCS).
l Should a single failure of a common valve in this normal charging line occur, every effort would be made to open it via handwheel, etc., and if these fail an alternate horation path would be used, adritting the 12 percent horic acid solution tc the FCS via the Boron Injection Tank (S&fety In jection Route) or via the RCD seal injection l i r.e s.
Ihese are also safety grade flow paths.
j.
Provide the systen and component design teatures necessary fcr the prototype testing of both the mixing o f. the added horated water and the cooldown under natural circulation conditions with and without a single failure of a steam generator armcspheric dung valve.
These testn and analyses will be used t o obtain information en cooldown times and the corresponding AFW requirements.
Ecration is perforned through the normal Chemical and volume Control. System (CVCS) charging line (3) via the j
i positi.ve displacement or centrif ugal charging pump (s),
and sampling can Le done continuously or intermittently from several nampling connectione in the normal or alternate letdown lines, cr from two separate hot legs of the }CF loops.
In a " worst case" situation the
'oron injected into the PCS can he determined amount of r,
[y reduction of inventory and analysis of the toric acid tanks.
Sirce this plant uses 12 wgt percent boric ccid salution, the BCS can he adequately horated even if no PCS letdown is possible.
vixing of the boron with PCS water would be evidenced by repetitivr or continuouq horon analysis during a e
I
[rctotypical test (i.e.,
Diablo Canycn).
Jtic rel; 2ble data exists for plant cooldown with only three i
Eunctional loops of a four loop plant, but as shown in lh natural convection wauld be induced in the fourth 1 cop if necessarv.
6.
Commit to providing specific procedures for cooling down using natural circulation and submit a summary of these procedures.
a TVA will provide specific procedures for cooldown using natural circulation, based on these answers as a summary.
7.
Provide cr require a seismic Category I AFW supply for at lease four hours at Hot Shutdown plus cooldown to the CHP system cut-in based cn the longest time (for only onsite or offsita power and assuming the worst single f ailure), or show that an adequate alternate scismic Category I source will be available.
The normal AFW is supplied f ro:r the condensate storage tank, which is a nonseismic tank.!
However, the design is such that low isFW pump suctioq line pressure admits EFCK to the AFW pumps suction via automatic multiple, separate saf ety grade valves.
Ihe ESCK therefore provides the seinmic Category I supply and can furnish emergency $2xiliary feedwater indefinitely, assuming the worst single active failure.
l 6
I I
The following is a acre detailed scenaric f or the cold shutdown problem.
JFor GGN Unit 1 or 2 may be mentioned, but the units d re exact duplicates; therefore the analysis is valid.)
COLD SHUI _DCh5 3CLNAFIC JAssumina lcas of all non-se!.smic Categorv 1 eguinmentl The safe shutdown design basis of Seouo'/ah is hot standby.
Ihe pla n t can he maintained in a sa fe hot standby condition while manual a'ctions arc taken to permit a chieverren t of cold shutdown conditi.ons followino a cafe shutdown ea rthquake with loss of effsite pcwer.
IJnder such conditions the plant is capacle of achieving PHR initiation conditions japproxirately 350 F,
400 psig) in aiproximctcly 36 to 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, includin, the tine re<1u i red fcr any manual actions.
Io achieve and maintain cold s hu t-d ow n, fcur key functions must te performed.
These are:
(I) circulation of the reactor coolant, (II) removal o' residual heat, JIII) Laration and makeup, and (IV) depressurization.
I. Circulation of Feactor_ Coolant Circulation of the reactor coolant has *wo stages in a cocldown from Jjot ntandhv to cold shutdcun.
Ihe first stage is from hot standby to 3500 F.
During this stage, circulation
, of the reactor coolant is provided by natural circulation with
\\
the reactor core as the heat source anu steem generators as the heat. sink.
Steam release from the steam generators 13 init ia lly via the stearr genora t or sa fety valves anti occurs automatically as a result of t urbine and reactor trip.
Steam release for cooldown is via the steam generator power operated relief valves which can Le operated manually with
- heir handwheels.
Ihe steam generator power operated relief valves arc accessible fcr local operation.
1he sta tus of each steam generator can te tronitored using Class 1E instrurrentation located in the Control Poom.
Ihree separate channels of indications for both steam generator pressure and water level are available.
lecdwater to the steam generators is provided from the Auxiliary Feedvater Eystem which has a minimum reserve of 190,000 gallons in the non-seistric condensate stcrage tank as the primary source and two separate Seismic Category 1 piping sub-systems.
The first sub-system is compcsed of two motor-driven put.js each powered from a dif ferent o;rergency power train, a nti ti e second sub-systerr inccrporates a turbine driven pump which can :ece ive motive stgam from either of two steart generators.
Alditional backup isjfrom the fully oualifie'l seismic category I Essential Paw Cooling Water syst err via f ully qualifiel trultiple automatic admission valves.
Ihe operation of the auxiliary feedw c system can he monitored using Class 1E instrumentation located in the Centrol 90cm.
There is a single indication of the f.ows inta each steam generator, ae1 pumi-crarating status lights for the motoc driven pumps.
There is one indication in the main cont rol room for the level in each condensate storage tank.
Ihcre is local ind ica tion for suction and' discharge pressure for the turbine driven AFW pump.
The second atace of Peactor Ccolant circulation is frcm 3500 to cold shutdcwn.
puring this stage, circulation of the reactor coolane is provided by the Eesidual lieat Bemoval Pumps and a fully qualified, redundant systCm.
II.
pgmoval_of_Eesidual_ggat Femcval of residual heat alsc has two stages in a cooldown from i.ct standby to cold shutdcwn.
]he first stage is from hot standby to 3500 F.
puring this s'agc, the steam generators act as *he means of heat removal from the reactor coolant system.
Initially, n t ea rr is released f rom the n' eam generators via the steam genera tor sa f ety va lves to maintain hot stand'ov conditions.
hhen the operators are ready to telin the cooldown, the st e a ;r generatot power operat ed relief valves are slightly opened hv local creration with their handwheels.
33 the cooldown proceedt, the operator will occasionally adjust these valves to it. crease the amount they are open.
2his allows a rnasonable cooldown rate to be maintained.
[ecdwater makeup to the steam generators in provided from the Auxiliary Feedwater System.
The Auxiliary Feedwater System has the ahility to rereve decav beat hy providing feedwater to all four steam generiitors for extended periods
of operation.
ponnunications for these actions kill he by une of hand 1. eld two way radios.
She second ntage is from 3509 F to cold shut down.
{, urin 1 thin stage the Penidual I! ear Pemoval (Pile) Syste r in brought into creration.
The Pesidual licat Femoval I! eat Exchangers in the P!!R nyntert act as the means of heat removal from the Peact or Coolant System.
In the R!iR lica t Exchanger, the residual heat in transferred to the Component _Cocling System which ultimate]y transfers the hear to the Essential Faw Cooling hater fystem (EPCW).
Ihe Component Cooling and the EPCK nystems are both designed to Seinmic Category 1.
The P!iF system includes two Posidual lleat Bemoval Pumps and two Pesidual Heat Femoval ljeat xchangers.
Each RHP Pumps ia r
powered f rom dif ferent emergency power traina and each FilR peat Exchanqer in cooled by c different Corrponent Cooling loop.
If any component in one RHP loop beco:ren inoperable, cooldcwn of the plant in not compronised, however, the time for cooldown would be extended.
hel monitored uning Clans "he ope ration of the RilR synterr can
'"E inntrumentaticn in the Control ?ccri There in indication of the putri, dincha rge flow, the pump o'per'it ing sta t us and the Component Cocling fIcw frem the discharge of the BHF heat exchangers.
III. Iforation and Makt'2n joration is accc:r linhed using portions of the Chenical and e
Volume Centrol Syntom (C'iCS).
"oric acid 12 wt. T from the Foric '\\cid Tank s, (each of which han tNo redundant erergency powered heatern) in supplied to the su tion of the Centrifugal [harging Punps by the Boric Acid Transfer Pumps.
2he Centrifugal charging numps inject the horated water into the Peactor Coolant System via the ncrmal charging and reactcr coolant pump neal injection flow paths.
1he three Eoric Acid Tanks, four Horic Acid Transfer Pumps, and the ancociated piping are of neisnic Category 1 design.
Ihere is sufficient horic acid capacity in one t-ank to provide for a co ld nhutdown for one uni
- with the most reactive rod withdrawn.
Jhe Poric Acid Trannfer Pumps are each powered f rore differert errergency power trains.
1he Poric Acid Tank level can be monit ored to verify the operability of the Icratinn portion of tl.c CVCS.
For this, credit is taken for operato: ati. ion in using a portable diftercncial pressure indicator which can he connected to the level signal lines irom the Doric Acid Tanks.
Wheup, in excern of that provided ar 12 wt. % horic acid is providei from t,he Refucling Water Storage Tank (PkST) using Centritugal Charging Pumps and the nane injection flow paths on dencrihod tar horation.
]wo rrot or operat ed valven, each powered from different errergency power trains and connected in cara llel, will transfer the suction of the cPanging pumps to 3he BSKT.
Zakeup fror the PW9T can be ;ronitored using Clasr le instrumentation in t_ he Control Poom.
separate reduncant channels of PWST level indication exist.
. lV-ECHEDgu rizglion Coprennurization in acc.mplished uning pcrtionn of the Chemica l and 'lolurre Cont rol Synten (CVCS).
fi t.he r 12 wt. "
toric aci.1 or ref ueling water can he uned an desired for cje r rennurizat ion with the flow path being trom the Centrifugal Charging Pumpn to t he auxiliary spray valve in the Prennurizer.
The two Centrifugal Charging Purrps of the CVCS are of reintric Category I, and are [owered ' rom different emergency power trainc.
_rhe pumps he operated f rorr and their crerating statun monitored in the Centrcl Coorr.
Ihe deprencurization of the reactcr coolant system can he monitored using Clann 1E ins t rumentat ion in the Control Poom.
Svailable to the operator are four channels of Prennorizer Frennure, thrce channels cf Prennurizer level and two channels of reactor coolant prennure.
IhdiDTdiDiDD_.EEf_ltinDCIdture and Prennure Without Lordown In perf orming the cooldown, the operatjor will integrate the functionn of heat removal, boration arpi rakeup, an1 deprennurization na t i..i t these Cunctionn can be acemrplished without letdsa iron the reacter coolant syntem.
tjoration, cooldown, and deprensurization will be accomplished in a w - i c r. of nhort ytopn arranged to %cep Ptactor Coolant Synter t empe rat ure and prencure and Frennuri7.er level in the desired relationshipn.
Howevcr, to cenanntrate that horat ion and eierrennurization can he dune without le t d owr., a sirrplor "cenar io ca n be used.
Zirnt, the oneratern horate the PCs to ti" cold shutdown conditions, taking advantage of the st oam space available in the preunurizer.
Second, the operatorn une t he cooldown contracticn to lower the prennurizer water level.
[inally, t'v operatorn une auxiliary spray from the CVCS to dercessurize the plant to 425 pnia.
Jhe annumed initial conditions followinq plant trip are:
547o F 2CG nrenuure 2250 pnia jcq T t tve ra t u re
=
=
_P.re n ru r ize r ha te r Volu:re = 500 ft3.P.ressurize r Steam Volume 1300 ftJ
=
20 calcance i f horation can he acco:rrlinhed without letting l
down and without taking the plant water nolid, wcrat cane condit ionn ot end o f life and maxirrum reak Xenon were assumed.
Thene res u lt in a requirement fo: 600 cubic feet cf 12 wt. 1 horic acid at 1650 F to reach cold shutdown conditions.
bhon added to the PCS, the horic acid would he heated to 547" " and would exrand to 800 cubic feet.
Since t hin vclone in lonn than the 1100 cubic feet available in the prennurizer ; team space, caraticn to cold shutdown ei mcen t ra t i oin can oc accomplished wit hout letdown, without taking the plant water solid, and without cooling down.
The ecclJown from 547 F *o 3500 F decreane7 the volume of water in the PCS by approvimately 1700 cub; feet.
yore of thin contraction in used to reduce t1e p r-surizer water level to the re-load water level (following the increase
caused by the be ra tion) and the remainder is compensated for i
by makeup from the refueling wa'er storage tank.
j Jo calculate if depressuriza* ion car. be accomplished without i
letting down and without taking the plant water Solid, it I
was assumed that the Pressuriner was at saturated conditions I
with 500 cubic fee 6 of water, 1300 cubic feet of steam, and the Pressurizer metal, all at 6530 F (2250 psia).
It was further asumed that no additional water would be removed frcm the pressurizer hy the ecoldown contraction.
Eith these assumptions, and including the of fcct of heat input frcm t he pressu rize r metal, it was determined that spraying in art roximately 820 cubic feet of 1650 F water would r rod uce saturated conditions at 425 psia (450o F) with a water volume of 1550 cubic feet and a steam volume of 250 l
cubic feet.
t 2he results of the calculations described above demonstrate that horation and depressurization can be accomplished without Intdown, without taking the pla..t water soli,d, and without takin; full credit for the available volume eteated by the cocidcwn contraction.
l A more detailed single f ailure evaluation is presented below:
- 1. girculgtigp_gj_3he reactor Coolant Zrem llot Standby tc 3500 F - Ecur reactor coclant lcops and steam genera tors a re orovided, any one of which can provide natural circulation flow for adequate core cooling.
_Even with the most limiting single failure (of a steam generator pcwer opcrated relief valve), three of the reactor coolant loops and steam generators remain available.
3s pointed out in 1b all four loops and steam generators would be available, if necessary, hy doing valve repair.
I I.
Remcval of P3_sidual i!ea
- A.
F rcm ilot Standby to 3500 F 1.
Steam generator power operated relief valves - Four valves are provided (one per generatcr), any one of which is su f ficient for residual heat removal.
In the event of a single failure, three power operated relief valves remain availai.le, with *.he four available oy valve rerair as stated in 1b.
2.
Auxiliarv feedwater pumps - Two motor driven and one aream driven auxilia ry feedwater pumps are provided.
In the even e of a sinole failure adequate pumps remain available, to provile suf ficient feedwater.
j.
Flow control valves - Air operated, (the normal flow cor. trol va lvec, for the motor driven AF's pumps fail open; thor,e for the nteam :lriven punty flcw fail clonetl but have air accumulators to nupply them for alequate control tie'c'.,
plus barniwhi'. In i f neetied to e n,.l.li runo.il o;nnijn o J n ti..,
- f
,imile
'..,i,,;
.n:..
f l.c
F.
Flcw Control Valve FCV62 This normally open valve fails open on loss of air cr power.
If FCV 62-93 were to close spuriously the ccetrifugal charging pumps would safely operate on their minificw circuits.
_ Efforts would he nade to open it, however, boration could he accomplished by starting t-he positive displacement cha rging purrp, or using the sa fety injectien - boron injection tank path, or by using the seal in; ation pdth.
G.
Flow Control Valve FCV62 This normally open valve fails open on loss of air or power.
If FCV 62-89 was sr.uck nearly closed as a result of a single failure, manual bypass valve 62-538 could he opened lccally.
II.
Isolation Valves FCV 62-90 and ECV 62 If either of these norrally open, motor operated valves, which are powered frcy different emergency power trains, should close spuriouslv, operator action could be used to dcenergi7e the valve operator and reopen the valve with its handwheel.
J.
Isolation Valve FCV 62 If this normally open, fail open valve should close spuriously, alternate charging valve FCV 62-86, which fails open, could be used.
I_ V.
p$ ressurizaticn Auxiliary Sprav Valve FCV 62 This normally closed valve fails closed en less of air or power.
Use of a portable nitrogen bottle would a llow FCV 62-04 to be opened.
If FCV 6?-84 was stuck closed as a result of a single failure, the redundant geismic Category I overpressure crotecticn valves (PCV 68-334 and PCV 68-340A) can be used to depressurize the BCS hy venting the pressurizer to the PRT.
Env i ronmen ta l_gua li f i ca t ion of the FHR Sec3 i on_T s_cla t ion Valves.
Ihe Rila suction isolation valves are qualified for the steam line break envircnment J2800 F).
Therefore they are qualified for the less severe environment which would result from venting the pressurizer to dep ressurize the SCS.
l M a risen _of_y p wi.th Peferenced Ciablo Canven Test Sequoyah is similar to Diablo Canyon Power Station in design, both heing hestinghouse PWR's.
i The natural circulation flow capability of Gequoyah is not expected to differ '. rom that of Diablo Canyon.
Ihe two plants f
hydraulically similar with respect to loop characteristics a re and FV lower internals.
Ihe coefficients of resistance for Sequoyah's' loop piping and RV nczzles are puhstantially less than
...,. thone o f Diablo Cariyon.
Ihe.cequcvah FV utper internals differ tron those at Diable Canvan, but the net rffect or the upper internals on natural circulation flow in insignificant since the flow resistance Lctwecn the trlet an.1 outlet plenums through the upper head is ;,li gh ccir pa red t o t h
op renintances that control nat ural circu. Fin e i r 1 i :
- v.
.u alt n:
flo t I i 1* d C t.D r i S t-
- I i t :i att-aritiCipated Diablo Canyon Moquoya!
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1 EE152 3CE2 EEnsilen EE61LEia TVA_i)Ma_E9-Tills I
Circulation-Steam Dump 10.3-1 4 7k8 01-1 913 Main and Reheat Steam II Femoval of Penidual *!ca t 10.4-19 47W803-2 R16 Auxiliary Feedwater III Coration and Fakeup 9.3-17 47K009-5 P6 cuCF Chemical Centrol 9.3-14 47k809-2 F3 CVCS Chemical Control 9.3-13 47W809-1 R13 Cherr 6 Vol Control System 6.3-1 4 7k'811-1 P15 Safety Injection Gyntem IV Ce p re n *; u r iz a t io's S.1-1 4 7W d 13-1 E7 Feactor Coolant System bi!R Tic In 5.5-6 47k810-1 F8 Peniciual lleat Femoval Sy". tem
.