ML19264B522
| ML19264B522 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Yankee Rowe |
| Issue date: | 06/22/1977 |
| From: | Burger A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19264B515 | List:
|
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8011140238 | |
| Download: ML19264B522 (50) | |
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%[t UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMICslON h
S WASHi*d GT ON. D. C. 205F5 l
DDCKET NO. 50-29 DATE:
M 2 21977 LICENSEE:
Yankee Atomic Electric Company (YAEC)
FACILITY:
Yankee-Rowe
SUMMARY
OF MEETING HELD ON JUNE 17, 1977, FOR BRIEFING ON MATTERS RELATING TO ECCS PERFORMANCE EVALUATION FOR YANKEE-ROWE On June 17, 1977, representatives of YAEC met with the NRC staff to report on mtters relating to ECCS perfomance at Yankee-Rowe.
A list of attendees is attached.
Important hig' lights of YAEC's presentations and commitments made during the meeting are summarized below.
A copy of YAEC's handout which illustrates significant aspects of the presentations are also attached.
On June 9,1977, YAEC shutdown Yankee-Rowe following its discovery of modeling errors in the ECCS performance analysis being done in preparation for obtaining NRC approval to operate Yankee-Rowe with the next Core XIll.
YAEC decided on early shutdown because of difficulties to resolve it.- analytical uncertainties in the Core XII ECCS performance analysi and to provide more time to accomplish the necessary work in preparation for Core XIll startup.
YAEC described the progressive upgrading of the ECCS which was originally installed at Yankee-Rowe during 1960.
Presently, the ECCS includes three 50 percent pumping trains (3 Hich Fressure Sa#ety Injection and 3LowFressureSafetyInjectionPumps)capableofbeingpoweredfrom redundant cnsite emergency diesel generators.
One ECCS accumulator provides rapid response to large ruptures in the reactor coolant pressure boun dary.
Flow from the accumulator begins when the reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure drops below the pressure in the accumulator with the concurrent opening of several swing check valves in the injection flow path. The injection flow path separates into four safety injection lines (Yankee-Rowe is a 4-loop reactor) each connected to an RCS cold leg by a ther:nal sleeve.
Each safety injection line (nominal 4 inch) has a 4 inch check valve and a 4 inch motor operated valve upstream of the check valve. A 3 inch motor operated valve is downstream of the check valve.
Existing instrumentation permits monitoring of flow in each safety injection line.
The original functional requirements for the 21/2 inch 1.D. thermal sleeve no longer exists.
Prior to operation with Core XII YAEC intended to use the motor operated valves to isolate a break in a safety injection line downstream of the check va l ve.
A break upstream of the check valve would not result in depressur-iration of the RCS.
Because of single failure implications, YAEC was required to operate Core XII with power removed from the motor operated valves in the safety injection lines and the valves in the open position.
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YAEC has previously determined in its ECCS performance analysis for Core XII that a break in a safety injection line at the location of the 21/4 inch 1.D. thermal sleeve would be the most limiting small break (resulting in highest clad temperature for the spectrum of small breaks).
During the Core XIII ECC performance analysis efforts YAEC discovered that if a break were assumed in the short 4 inch pipe section downstream of the 4 inch check valve in the safety injection line, this wo:,ld result in a higher peak clad temperature than for the break location at the thermal sleeve.
While th P.CS blowdown characteristics would remain the same (blowdown would still be through the flow resistance of the thermal sleeve), the spill of accumulator and pumped injection water to the containment floor (previously assumed through the 21/4 inch thernci sleeve) would be significantly greater because of the lower flow resistance at the location of the 4 inch break.
To determine the impact of the nodeling error on past operations with Core XII, YAEC performed best estimate calculations using non-conservative assumptions.
YAEC stated that its cciculations indicate that a break at the 4 inch section downstream of the 4 inch check valve in a safety injection line would not have resulted in unacceptable peak clad temperatures, To correct the analysis error prior to operation with Core XIII, YAEC proposed to restore power to the motor operated valves in the safety injection lines and to assume in the ECCS analysis for Core XIII, isolation of the broken safety injection line (in the 4 inch section downstream of the check valve) within 15 minutes into the accident.
To enhancc the perforr.ance capability of the ECCS, YAEC had previously proposec modifications involving the addition of an injection delay feature to the ECCS a:cumulator subsystem. This proposal is presently under staff review in conjunction with its review of YAEC's Core XIII refueling evaluation.
A model change for the large break analysis involving an alternate definition of End of Bypass (E03Y) has also been submitted by YAEC.
The staff has found this model change to be acceptable for use in the Core XIII ECCS performance analysis.
YAEC also intends to propose a model change for the small break analysis involving the use of a heat transfer correlation that more accurately describes heat transfer at low flows.
With regard to YAEC's proposal to reinstate power to themotor operated valvesin the safety injection lines to permit valve closure for preserving accumulator inventory, the staff corrented that considerable support would have to be provided to justify operator action (to identify and isolate the broken line).
The staff suggested that as an alternative to relying on operator action, YAEC should give thorough consideration to flow balancing by changing the flow resistances as necessary so that the system flows would more closely match the ECCS performance that had previously been considered acceptable.
N At the conclusion of the meeting YAEC withdrew its initial proposal to reinstate power to the motor operated valves in the safety injectior.
lines and committed to the following actions for obtaining NRC approval for operation of Yankee-Rowe with Core XIII.
To provide the increased pemanent flow resistances in each safety injection line by replatenent of the 4 inch check valves with a 21/2 inch check valve or by other appropriate means as determined to be suitable and practical.
Provide descriptions and bases for the modifications.
To proceed promptly with the planned ECCS performance verification tests which in part will provide data for determining the added flow resistances needed in the saf.ety injection lines.
To submit detailed information in support for the planned rodel change for the small break analysis involving the pool boiling heat transfer coefficient.
To provide the Core XIll ECCS performance analysis with the approved evaluation models and acceptable model changes.
The analysis will incMe two large breaks and one small break with the safety injection dea u feature and the added flow restrictions in the Core XIll configuration.
YAEC also committed to submit the confimatory Core XIII ECCS analysis for the entire break spectrum sh]rtly after obtaining NRC approval for Core XIll operation.
YAEC stated that because of the anticipated heevy summer demand for electric power, startup with Core XIII is scheduled for August 1,1977.
Therefore, YAEC asked for prompt staff review of its submittals. We indicated that in order for us to be responsive, YAEC must time its submittals of the remaining items so as to allow at least two weeks for staff review.
In this connection, we pointed out that we consider the small break model change to be the critical path item in our Core XIII review.
Therefore, it is necessary for YAEC to make this submittal as soon as possible but not later than two weeks from the date of this meeting.
q~' t z qp
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L L A ~.U u-Alfred Burger, Project Manager Operating Reactors Branch #1 Division of Operating Reactors Enclos ures:
1.
List of Attendees 2.
YAEC's Handout cc w/entis:
See next page
2 MEETING WITH YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC COMPANY CONCERNING YANKEE-ROW'E LIST OF ATTENDEES NRC A. Burger D. Haverkamp W. Lazarus K. Herring R Iandr
. noone
, raral S. Rhow N. Anderson K. Parczewski P. DiBenedetto K. Jabbour D. Tondi F. Nolan R. Woodruff YAEC J. Thayer J. Consolatti W. Szymaczak A. Ladieu J. Chapman T. Keenan J. Turnage A. Husain R. Grube R. Shone P. Rainey M. Ebert NIE 2 2 };77
JUli 2 2 W7 4 -
Veeting Sumary for Yankee Atomic Electric Company Docket liRC PDR LOCAL PDR ORB *1 Reading tiRR Reading E. G. Case V. Stello K. R. Goller D. Eisenhut A. Schwencer D. Davis G. Lear R. Reid L. Shao B. Grines W. Butler R. Baer Project Manager Attorney, DELD Ol&E (3)
Licensing Assistant Each liRC participant T. B. Abernathy J. R. Euchanan
Y/STIE RO*.'E ECCS PERFOP3W:CE MEETI' G AGE::DA Yankee Atomic Electric Co pany and Nuclear Regulat ory Commission June 17, 1977 9:00 AM Bethesda, Maryland N/JT TIME I.
Introduction
.. R. M. Grube 9:00 - 9:10 11.
Rove ECCS Description.
. R. P. Shone 9:10 - 9:30 A.
Hist o ry B.
Current Confituration J. C. Turnage/
9:30 - 10:15 111. LOCA Analysis.
A. Eusain A.
_ Core XIII 1
Large Ercak 2.
Small Ereak B.
Core XII Inc.'.ications-IV.
ECCS Perfor:ance Verificatien Tests.
. P. A. Eminey 10:15 - 10:30 Ereak V.
Restcratica of To er to Safety Injection Valves.. R. P. Shone /
10:45 - 12:15 F. D. Eaxter A.
Syster HisterN B.
Philoscphy ef Proposed Chance 1.
Operater Action 2.
Single Failure-Valve Installation C.
E1cetrien1 Circuitry Chances 1.
Spurious Valve Motica 2.
Keyleck Switches
. T. D. Reenan 12:15 - 12:30 VI.
Su==ary.
VII.
Sub-group Discussions (as needed)
VIII.
NEC and/or YAEC Caucus (as needed)
I' Conclusiens
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SUMMARY
i I.
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS LEADING TO SHUTDOWN A.
LOCA analysis associated with Core XIII revealed certain modeling errors.
B.
Reanalysis of present Core XII configuration was done to determine modeling error impact on operation.
C.
Conclusion was that shutdown was warranted due to analytical uncertainties and to maximize time available for Core XIII work.
II.
PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS FOR POST-CORE XII OPERATION A.
Analytical modifications regarding heat transfer correlations.
B., System Modifications 1.
Restore electrical power to eight safety injection valves.
2.
Add additicnal circuitry to effectively preclude spurious valve motion.
3.
Add keylock switches to essentially eliminate the possibility of operator error.
4.
Install safety injection valves in positions upstream of check valve in each injection line to provide redundant isolation capability remote from postulated break location.
(
III.
BASIS OF POSITION FOR RESTORING POWER TO VALVES AND ALLOWING OPERATOR ACTION A.
The restoration of power to the safety injection valves essentially restores the system to its operational mode prior to Core XII, with the addition of protection for:
1.
Spurious valve motion 2.
Operator error B.
The time required for operator action - 15 minutes is a reasonable time frame within which one can be expected to act, is outside the "immediate action" category, and, in our judgement, is acceptable for licensing.
This is particularly true in view of the fact that:
The need for any operator action exists only for a small break of the size in question at a very specific location.
All breaks of larger size will be adequately responded to by the system independent of operator action.
C.
The physical separation of the valves in question from the break location, including the existence of barriers, precludes any direct impact on the valves from the LOCA.
The conclusion reached is that the valves, operators and wiring remain operable for the required time interval.
w.
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ECCS DESCRIPTION HISTORY FEATURES OF ORIGINAL SYSTEM (1960)(SEE ATTACHED SKETCH) 1.
TWO LOW PRESSURE, HIG.' VOLUME PUMPS.
2.
CHARGING SYSTEM CONSISTING OF THREE 33 GPM POSITIVE DISPLACEMENT PUMPS PROVIDED HIGH PRESSURE INJECT 10ii.
3.
BACK UP POWER PROVIDED BY TWO OUTSIDE LINES.
4.
SI PUMPS AND FILL HEADER ROOT VALVES OPENED AUTOMATICALLY ON SI SIGNAL.
5.
OPERATOR ACTION REQUIRED TO CROSS OVER CHARGING FLOW AND TO STRETCH OUT S1 WATER INVENTORY.
6.
FROCEDURES PROVIDED FOR TERMINATING LOCA WITH LOOP ISOLATION VALVES.
EARLY MODIFICATIONS 1.
ADDED ONE INTERMEDI ATE PRESSURE PUMP IN PARALLEL WITH THE LOW PRESSURE PUMP IN 1962.
2.
IN 1970 THE CAPABILITY TO PROVIDE L0t{G TERM POST ACCIDENT RECIRCULAT ION WAS PROVIDED.
THIS SYSTEM FEATURED:
A.
THE CAPABILITY TO WITHSTAND A SINGLE FAILURE OF ONE PUMP OR ONE ACTIVE VALVE.
B.
THE CAPABILITY TO INCLUDE THE SHUTDOWN COOLING HEAT EXCHANGER AND CLEAN UP CF THE ECCS WATER.
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CURRENT CONFIGURATION FEATURES IN 1971 A MAJOR MODIFICATION TO THE ECC wt.S MADE.
THIS SYSTEM FEATURES:
1.
REDut1 DANT ON-SITE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS.
2.
THREE 50 PERCENT PUMPING TRAINS CAPABLE OF FURNISHIt1G ECC WATER FOR THE FULL RANGE OF BREAKS.
3.
PROTECTION FOR SIf4GLE ACTIVE FAILURE.
4..
Ir4JEC'iION FLOW COMMENCES ON RCS DEPRESSURIZATION I.E.
MOV'S ARE PASSIVE.
5.
PRESSURIZED ACCUMULATOR.
6.
OPERATIOR ACTION IS GREATLY SIMPLIFIED AND IS REQUIT.ED li4 EARLY PHASE OflLY FOR THE BREAK OF THE SI LINE ITSELF.
FOR CORE XII THE SYSTEM WAS MODIFIED TO PREVENT SPURIOUS FAILURES AND OPERATOR ERROR.
EARLY PHASE OPERATOR ACTION WAS ELIMINATED.
IN ADDITION L0i!G TERM HOT LEG INJECTION WAS PROVIDED TO PREVENT BOR0ff PRECIPITATIOfl.
FOR CORT XIII THE SYSTEM IS EElt1G MODIFIED TO DELAY INJECTION DUR!f1G THE BLOWDOWN PHASE AND INCREASE FLOW RATES DURING ACCUMULATOR INJECTION.
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PRESENT SAFETY I!UECTION SYSTEM
RESTORATION OF POWER TO SAFETY I!1JECTI0i1 VALVES HISTORY THE ECCS SYSTEM IN ITS PRESENT CONFIGURATION WAS ORIGINALLY DESIGNED TO PROVIDE THE CAPABILITY TO ISOLATE FLOW TO AN INDIVIDUAL RC LOOP.
THIS WAS REQUIRED ONLY IN THE CASE OF A RUPTURE OF THE SI BRANCH LINE DOWNSTREAM OF THE CHECK VALVE.
THE CORE XII ECCS ANALYSI, DID NOT ASSUME ISOLATION OF FLOW TO THE BREAK.
BASFs ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT ISOLATION WAS NOT ESSENTI AL, YANKEE PROPOSED TO PROTECT AGAINST OPERATOR ERROR AND SPURIOUS FAILURE BY REMOVING I'0WER FROM THE BRANCH LINE MOTOR OPERATED VALVES.
PROPOSED CHANGE YANKEE INTENDS TO ASSUME ISOLATION OF FLOW TO THE BREAK IN THE CORE XIII ANALYSIS IN THE CASE OF THE BRANCH LINE BREAK DOWNSTREAM OF THE CHECK.
THEREFORE, RESTORATION OF POWER TO THE n:<ANCH LINE VALVES AND THE RE-RECOGNITION OF OPERATOR ACTION ARE REQUIRED, YANKEE PROPOSES TO RESTORE FC.'ER TO CS-MOV-536, 537, 538, 539 AND SI-Mov-22, 23, 24, 25 WHICH WILL PROVIDE REDUNDANT CAPABILITY TO ISOLATE THE EROKEN 3 RANCH LINE, FROM THE CONTROL ROOM.
RESTORATION OF POWER WILL PROVIDE PROTECTION AGAINST
a CPERATOR ERROR AND SPURIOUS FAILURE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INTENT OF BTP-18.
ANALYSIS INDICATES THAT THE OPERATOR HAS 15 MINUTES TO IDENTIFY AND ISOLATE THE BROKEN BRANCH.
YANKEE FEELS THAT OPERATOR ACTION WITHIN THIS TIME FRAME IS JUSTIFIED BECAUSE:
1.
OPERATCR ACTION IS REQUIRED ONLY FOR A BREAK OF THE SI LINE DOWNSTREAM OF THE CHECK, AND 2.
NO OTHER SHORT TERM OPERATOR ACTION IS REQUIRED.
IN ADDITION YANKEF PROPOSES TO PROVIDE IMPROVED RELIABILITY OF THIS ISOLATION CAPABILITY BY EITHER OF THE FOLLOWING:
1.
RELOCATE THE DOWNSTREAM VALVES OUTSIDE THE LOOP, I.E.
REMOTE FROM LOCA IMPACT, OR 2.
INSTALL NEW REPLACEMENT VALVES OUTSIDE ThE LOOP.
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