ML19263E385

Summarizes Responses to IE Bulletin 79-08, Events Relevant to Boiling Water Power Reactors Identified During TMI Incident

ML19263E385
Person / Time
Issue date:	05/09/1979
From:	Tam P Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
To:	Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
References
ACRS-SM-0109, ACRS-SM-109, IEB-79-08, IEB-79-8, NUDOCS 7906180003
Download: ML19263E385 (8)

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ncES M o!O'l May 9, 1979

_ PM sinly' P]DR BRISM ACRC,Membetc CUTW1Y O? lESFONSES TO IC BULLETIN 79-08 (GENERAL ETIC'IRIC RFACTORS) 1.

Review the desciiption of circunstances desciibed in Enclosut c 1 of IC Bulletin 79-05 and the pt eliminai y chr onolcrjy of the 'NI-2 3/20/79 accident included in Enclosut e 1 to IE Bulletin 79-05A.

a.

T1is t eview should be di ected towaid undet standing:

(1) the ext ene set iousness and consequences of the simultaneous bicching of both auxiliar y feedwater tiains at the Maroc Mile Island Unit 2 plant and othet actions taken dur ing the cat ly phases of the accidcat; (2) the apparent oparational err or s which lexl to the eventual cot e dcmage; and (3) t.he necessity to systematically analyze plcnt conditions and pat a a-etet s an3 take appropt late cot i ective action.

b.

Op21ational p2: sonnel should be insti ucted to:

(1) not ovet i ide automatic action of engincet ed safety features unless continued opet ation of crvjineet ed nafety featut es will iesult in unsafe plant conditions (see Section Sa.);

and (2) not make op?t atic>nal decisions based solely on a sirdle plant patanctet indication when one et mote con-fitnatory indications are available.

All licensed oper ator s and plant mana3anent and supetvisors c.

with o;rt ational r esponsibilities shall par ticipate in this ieview and such pu ticipation Lall be docuaented in plant iecords.

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~2355 343 Response of this Itea is quite uniform. All licensees indicated that thny have been followire t.he 'NI-2 incident vet y closely, and det iving lennons fi ua it.

Opet atirr; nanuals at e beity closely nct utinized and fot mal tt.iinito is being of for ed to all pet connel involved in operation, as Ie31ueSted.

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ACRS Member s May 9, 1979

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2.

Review the contaircent isolation initiation design and procedures, and prepare and implo.icnt all changes necessary to pnuit contain-rmnt isolation whether manual or automatic, of all lines whose j,

isolation does not dcgrade needed safety features or cooling

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capability, upon automatic initiation of safety injection.

Response

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' Die following table sumiarizes inpurtant aspects of licensacs' responses:

,t Plant Isolation Initiation Line.- to be Isolated Connent

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j Bt unswick All valves not needed Operator's in-l i

structed to

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verify such i,

P Browns

!!igh drywell P or low All valves not needed Periy acactor water - PCIS for EECS p

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f Oystet Iow water level or high Drywell equipnent drain i

C eek drywll P - PCIS tank valve, drywell floor

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drain sang, drywell and torus vent & purge, etc.

t, Dr enlen Five isolation gioups 1,2&3 i

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Cities 1,2&3 i

Pilgrim 111gh drywell pr essure All lines except E:CCS, 5

.or low eactor water and those nec<ied for t

' level causes ICIS accident nitigation and monitoring i

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l tiillstone !!igh diywll pt ensur e Containment and reactor j

1 or low acactor water coolant boundasy iso-i u ml-iclo ta u u c etpt iEC.5 a..a

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ACIG fiember s May 9, 1979 1

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Plant Isolation Initiation Lines to be Isolated CorTnent.

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Vermont. '

Five isolation gr oups Yanhee All valves not essential to safety features L

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Cooper Containment iso-t.

lation design &

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ptocedures have been ieviewed i

1 3.

Describe the actions, both automatic and manual, necessary for proper functioning of the auxiliar y heat t emoval systems (e.g., ICIC) that i

at e used when the main fecdwater systcm is not oper able.

For any l

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manual action nmessary, deset ihe in t.ummar y forn the procedure, by which this action is taken in a timely sense.

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lesponse i

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All licensees pro /ided 1-or 2-page responses in which their HPCI and RCIC

,I syste.ns m e den t ibed. Because of the bt evity of these responses, and variations amonj the systems, the respnses are rut summarized her e.

All the licensces hwe indicated that though these systems at e automatically 1

initiated, they can all be taanually initiated.

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4.

D2 scribe all uses and types of vessel 1cvel indication for both l

l autonatic end manual initiation of safety systems.

Describe other i

iedtndant inst trentation which the operator might have to give l

the same infor mation regar dityJ plant status.

Instt uct operators to utilize other available infotmation to initiate safety systems.

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Response

2, All licene'es provided t esyns.es but bccause of the diver sity in design

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of level i; dication, these responses at e not summar ized. A survey of these r esponses in licated tha presence of a laig.i nunber of differ ent t

.and tedundant level indicators insida II.G vereir..

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o ACIG Membeis; May 9, 1979 5.

Ibview the action dir ectd by the op2 rating procedures arri Liaining instt uctions to encut e that:

Operators do not over ride automatic actions of cruince ed a.

I safety featur es, unless continued opet ation of engineer ed safety featut en will result in unsafe plant conditions (e.g., vessel integt ity).

b.

Operator s ar e provided additional information and instruc-I tions to not rely u;on vessel level in3ication alone for l

manual actions, but to also exmine other plant par ancter indications in evaluating plc.nt conditions.

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flesponse i

j Dane as requested. Operation manuals have been t eviewed and necessat y

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i charges at e beiro made.

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Ibview all afety-related valve psitions, positioning a cquir ements and positive controls to assure that valves cr.ain rositioned (open of closed) in a manner to ensure the proper operation of engineered safety featutes. Also t eview related pt ocedures, such as those for i

saaint.enance, testing, plant and systen start-up, ary3 supervisoty i

pet f odic (e.g. daily / shift checks) sutveillance to ensure that such I

volves aie eturned to their con iect pasitions followirq necessary manipulations and ar e maintained in their pr oper positions during all operational mode" t

Response

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Reviews at e completed.

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i 7.

Deview your operating modes and pr ocedor en for all systems designed l

to transfer potentially :alicactive gases and liquids out of the

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pr imary containment to assur e that undesit ed prpirry, venting, or other releases of radioactive liquids and gases will not occur inadv.n tently, t

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In p1: ticulat, ensut e that such an occurience would rot be caused by the t esetting of engineered safety featur es instt umentation.

I. int all such systems and indicate:

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hhether interlocks exist to ptevent transfet when high l

t aliation indication exists.

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Y riKC' I RPI 318 (9 76) NFC.t 0140 Yr.

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hhether noch systems are isolated by the contairment s

..l icolatlan signal.

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We % sis on 5hich continued opet ability of the above c.

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fe nutes is assuted.

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Response

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We followirrj table sumat izes these renponses:

'1 Plant Tiansfer Lines Intet locks Isolation Coments

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,' 1 Iow reactor Coopet Floor drain

' water level Fijulpnent drain Ventila ion system or high dry-

-g well prescute

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Vetnont Floor diain None. Rely on CIAS

~l Yankee Equirraent drain aininistrative

'RIIR discharge control

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Millstone Floor diain Ibne. Rely on Irw reactor

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D3uirrient diain samplirrj before watet level Drywell vent transfer or high dry-l Suppt ecsion cham-well. pt ennut c ber vont I

I Pilgtim

. Containment cuaps ibne. Rely on Iow t cactor RIIR discharge samplirvj befor e watet level Contain aent atra.

transfer or high dry-conttol wall pressur SGTS

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9 a 7 liigh'd'3 51 Attot t

s yd ico-Di crAen Floor di ain

ibne, 1,263 Equipent diain P and low lation ie-teactot water cet stup Dryweli vent Quad Supptension cham-level (Gr oup pumps will 2 isolation) ctatt on Cities bet vent 1,2&3 high strap level it-respective Tf r r'in---

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i ACRS Member s May 9, 1979 Plant Tiansfer Lines Intetlocks Isolation Comnents

'l ll Oyster Dryc Il floor di ain ibne.

Iow water Creek D]uipient dr ain level or high l

Dryvnll en'] torus diywell pressure

'7 vent & put ge d.'( } l Oxygen sample

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. j Browns Diywell di ain ibne, except Irsw water Will ie-N retry Dluipr.ent dr ain for ventilation level or high view need Contairoent pnge system dr ywell pres-for high cure iadiation

,l interlocks for liquid lines

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Diunswick Drywll floor dtain ibne for liquid low water i

1 D]uipaent drain lines level or high Atnosphet e contt ol diywell pter.sure i

8.

Review and mvlify as necessary your maintenance and test procedures to ensure that they aequitc:

l Verification, by test or inspection, of the operability of l

a.

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.Iedundant safety-t clated systems prior to the caoval of any safety-ielated system ftom setvice.

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b.

Vet ificacion of the operability of all safety-r elated j

syatens Vacn they at e r eturned to scivice following main--

tenance or testing.

Explicit tx>tification of involvol t cactor open ational c.

per ronnel thenevet a cafety-t elated r,ystem is a moved i

ft or:t and ietur ned to set vice.

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2355 348 Done as tequested.

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thy 9, 1979 ICRS tiember s.

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1 9.

Review your pr ompt reporting procedur es for NRC notification to assure that trtC is notified within one icac of the time the reactor is not in a contt olled or expected coniition of oper ation.

Ibrther, at that time an open continuous camaunication channel chall be established and maintained with hTIC.

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_ Response All have cormnitted.

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10.

Peview operating trades and pt ocedures to deal with significant amounts l-of hydrogen gas that may be generated during a transient on, other accident that muld either remain inside the pt imat y systcc or be

' released to the containaent.

Response

,' l Cooper Primary containment is inct ted with N during operation.

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No mention of H in reactor vessel.

2 Vetmont Yankee H in reactor vessel can be vented thtotyh safety /t clief 2

valves or head vent.

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Containment Air Dilution Systen to pt event coabustible mixture formation in containment.

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-l tiillstone 1 H in icactor vessel can be vented throtch safety / relief 2

, i valves or head vent.

4 Containment atmosphere is U - inerted.

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Pilgtim 1b specific infotmation.

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.i Dresden and Pcactot head is contintr>usly vented to "A" main steam line, j

Ouad Cities can also be vented throtuh head vent.

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'Ihe containment is nitrogen - inct ted.

2355 349 li Oyuter Creek Reactor vessel can be vented throtch main stean line.

antainmentisinettedwithtf2*

Br oms Fet t y Reactot vessel can be vented throtch main steam t elief veuveu on um axu vent..

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.\\. j ACRS Members 8-tby 9, 1979 Brunswick Reactor vessel can be vented through safety valves or

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head vent.

In the containment, the containment atmosphere dilution system, hydrogen recombines and containx.ent purge throtyh SUTS may be used to contiol H

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Staff Engin2cr cc: ACRS Technical Staff H. Voress I. Catton B

W. Lipinski C. Michelson

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