ML19263D783
| ML19263D783 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Rancho Seco, Crane |
| Issue date: | 04/01/1979 |
| From: | Matsui R HOUSE OF REP. |
| To: | Hendrie J NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19263D784 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7904130253 | |
| Download: ML19263D783 (3) | |
Text
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April 1, 1979
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a0 Mr. Joseph M.
Hendric Chairman Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1717 H Street, NW Washington, D.C.
20555
Dear Mr. Hendrie:
On February 14, 1979, I contacted your office in writing expressing my concern for alleged safety defects with the Rancho Seco Nuclear Power Plant operated by the Sacramento Municipal Utilities District.
As of this date I have not re-ceived a formal response to this inquiry, a copy attached here-to.
Given the current emergency crisis at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant, I can no longer tolerate delay in determining whether the Rancho Seco Nuclear Power Plant is safe.
The citizens of Sacramento are entitled to your imme-diate attention to this critical matter.
As you well know, Rancho Seco Nuclear Power Plant was designed by Babcock-Wilcox based on the same theoretical models utilized for the construction of Three Mile Island.
Any system failure experienced by Three Mile Island therefore may poten-tially occur at Rancho 3cco.
The similarities in design in-crease this possibility.
This potential, coupled with past difficulties with the Rancho Seco cooling system, justify the intervention of your agency in the safety review of Rancho Seco.
At this time, the primary concern must be a definitive determination of the exact cause of the failure in the Three Mile Island cooling system.
It is alleged that either a generic defect with the Babcock-Wilcox reactor or human error was principally responsible for the breakdown.
Both the mechanical system and the training procedures must be subjected to an immediate evaluation to ascertain whether the deficiencies leading to the Three Mile Island disaster are present in other Babcock-Wilcox systems.
Rancho Seco officials must be advised as to interim emergency measures necessary to prevent any further nuclear mishaps with the cooling system.
790413oa53
Mr. Joseph M.
Hendrie April 1, 1979 Prudent policy decisions on this issue demand additional information.
I request detailed responses to the following questions:
1)
In the Rancho Seco plant, what is the possibility of voids being formed in the primary coolant system large enough to compromise the core cooling capability?
Can operator action be depended upon to ensure continued core cooling in the event that such voids are formed?
Furthermore, what assurances can be made that operators do not override automatic actions of engineered safety features without sufficient cause for doing so?
2)
The incident at Three Mile River conclusively demon-strated the possibility of a Class 9 accident--the release of radioactive material into the environment.
What steps are being taken by the NRC to include in the licensing process a review of the consequences of a Class 9 accident?
3)
How can we be assured that undesired pumping of radio-active liquids and gasses will not occur inadvertently in the transfer of potentially radioactive gases and liquids out of containment?
In light of Three Mile Island, what protective modifications must be made to existing operating modes and procedures for all systems designed to transfer potentially radioactive gases and liquids out of containment?
What is the NRC's time frame for developing these modifications?
4)
What alteration of plant reporting procedures for NRC notification is necessary to assure very early notification of serious events?
5)
The incident at Three Mile Island has raised serious questions as to the adequacy and availability of its emergency storage capability of nuclear wastes.
Three Mile Island re-quired the importation of lead bricks and holding tanks for surplus contaminated water.
If a similar accident occurred at Rancho Seco, is there safety equipment on site to meet all reasonable emergencies?
If not, can the emergency equipment be made available within the appropriate response time?
6)
Given the projected difficulties in evacuating the moderately populated region of Three Mile Island, can a re-alistic plan of evacuation be develcped for the dense area surrounding the Rancho Seco plant?
Arc state and local author-ities prepared for a Three Mile Island type accident?
What should be the role of the federal government should local resources be inadequate?
s Mr. Joseph M.
Hendrie April 1, 1979 We will not be served by a precipitous panic reaction.
Official response during this crisis period must be reasoned and responsive to known information.
As the federal agency charged with the responsibility to advise federal policymakers on nuclear safety questions, I appeal on behalf of my con-stituents and those who live within the shadows of the Rancho Seco Nuclear Power Plant for your guidance.
Very truly yours,
&MdW ROBERT T. MATSUI Member of Congress RTM:fe
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