ML19263C457
| ML19263C457 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07001113 |
| Issue date: | 01/19/1979 |
| From: | Kaplan A GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | Sutherland J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19263C456 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7902220275 | |
| Download: ML19263C457 (5) | |
Text
..
- 3 GENERAL h ELECTRIC NUCLEAR ENERGY l ;*
PRODUCTS DIVISION WILMINGTON VANUF ACTURING CASTLE HAYNE ROAD e P. O. BOX 780 e WILMINGTON. N, C. 28401 + (E19. Sf3.h
~
January 19, 1979 Mr. J. T.
Sutherland, Chief Fuel Facility & Materials Safety Branch U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection & Enforcement, Region II 101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100 Atlanta, Georgia 30303
Dear Mr. Sutherland:
References:
(1) NBC Inspection Report RII:JBK, 70-1113/78-23, dated December 21, 1978 (2) NRC License SNM-1097, Docket 470-1113 Thank you for your letter referenced above which reported the results of the inspection of our fuel fabrication plant by Mr. J. B. Kahic of your office on December 5-8, 1978.
Pertaining to the it$m of apparent noncompliance with NRC requirements in your letter, the.~ reply to this item is given in the attachment to this letter.
We appreciate your inspector's comments and suggestions related to our employee safety and environmental protection promrams.
These comments and suggestions are helpful to us in our constant efforts to improve these programs, ensure the continued health and safety of plant personnel, and ensure our compliance with NRC regulations and license condition.
We also welcome further discussion with your staff on the items in your letter and in our related reply, if necessary, for further clarification of these items.
Your inspection report ieferred to above does not contain information which we believe to be proprietary.
Very truly yours, GENERAL ELECTRI COMPANY A
J 790222 ca 15 h
thur L. Kap a, Manager Licensing & Compliance Audits M/C J-26
/sbl HS D-I
, ~.
Mr. J. T. Sutherland January 19, 1979 ATTACHMENT The information given below refers to an item in Appendix A,
" Notice of Viol ation",
in the NRC Inspection Report RII:JBK, 70-1113/78-23, dated December 21, 1978.
The corrective actions detailed below have already been implemented or will be implemented by the dates shown.
" Condition 9 of the license requires that licensed material be used in accordance with statements, representations and conditions of Appendix A, as contained in the licensee's application.
Appendix A, Section 4.1 requires that operations and activities shall be directed by the designated area manager who shall establish written operating procedures.
Written operating procedure, PROD No. 10.05, Vaporization, paragraph 3.2.9, of the Equipment Operating Instruction requires that the main line block valve be closed after the nitrogen purge.
Contrary to the above, the main line block valve was not closed causing an accidental release of special nuclear material on December 3, 1978.
This is an infraction."
The consequences of this UF6 gas release included the following:
o
$600 loss of equipment e
Contamination of the vaporization room and the unrestricted area immediately adjacent to it Shutdown of parts of the UF -UO2 conversion equipment for 6
e up to 65 hours7.523148e-4 days <br />0.0181 hours <br />1.074735e-4 weeks <br />2.47325e-5 months <br /> e
Minor acid burn injuries to twc employees e
Release of airborne uranium from a stack in excess of internal action limits Due to the timely actions by operating personnel, there were no major consequences associated with this incident, such as:
No severe injuries to personnel and no associated work e
restrictions or loss of time from work for anyone No exposure of anyone to airborne uranium in excess of e
regulatory limits
- "~
~
No release of airborne uranium to an unrestricted area e
in excess of regulatory limits e
No major property loss The following actions have already been taken to prevent the recurrence of this situation:
1.
A pigtail plug has been installed into each vaporization chamber.
Whenever an operator disconnects a pigtail from a cylinder, he attaches the pigtail to the plug, to prevent the pigtail from remaining open inside the vaporization chamber.
This action was completed by December 4, 1978, within 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br /> after the accidental release of UF6 gas.
2.
An additional operator has been assigned to the vaporization area, to be present during operation of the vaporization process.
This operator is to observe, review and (if necessary) correct the actions of the process operator, relative to such operations as opening or closing line valves, securing the pigtial with the special plug within the vaporization area, etc.
This operator is also to look for early signs el a UF6 gas release and take immediate action if one occurs.
This action was taken at the time of resumption in operation of the vaporization process, the first of which took place at 1600 on December 4, 1978, about 27 hours3.125e-4 days <br />0.0075 hours <br />4.464286e-5 weeks <br />1.02735e-5 months <br /> after the accidental release of UF6 gas.
3.
Defore resumption of vaporization process operations, the following actions were taken to assure that virtually all of the SNM released could be recovered, to assure that there were no unusual accumulations of uranium in any area which could possibly lead to a criticality safety problem; and to allow accountability for the SNM released:
~
e All areas contaminated from the accidental release of UF6 gas were cleaned.
High ef ficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters e
in the exhaust stack from the UF6-UO2 conversion (chemical) area were changed and the water solution from the scrubber in this stack was drained and collected.
e Ventilation ducting was inspected to assure that there was no visible accumulation of SNM in the ducts.
Accountability for all the SNM released for the e
UF6 cylinder during the accidental UF6 gas release was completed prior to resumption of vaporization operations.
Agreement was reached between the actual amount released f rom the cylinder as
~
+
. obtained by comparing cy"inder weights before and after the incident, and the amounts measured and determined to be in each of the release pathways, within variances associated with these measurements and determinations.
4.
All operators who work in the vaporization area were instructed and cautioned about placing valves in their proper positions and utilization of the pigtail plug.
5.
Relevant procedures have been reviewed and revised to assure consistency among them in the instructions to workers for operating the vaporization process equipment.
This action was completed by December 8, 1978, within 5 days after the accidental release of UF6 gas.
6.
An investigation team was established on December 7, 1978 for the following purposes:
e Determine the cause of the incident e
Document the relevant events occurring during and after the incident e
Assess the effects on personnel and property resulting from the incident Specify any weaknesses in procedural operations e
or equipment which might have led to the occurrence of the incident e
Recommend corrective actions to prevent recurrence of an incident of this type.
7.
As a result of the incident investigation, a report containing the above information was published and sent to the NRC, Region II, office.
The following corrective actions, in addition to those already taken, were recommended by the investigating team and documented in this report:
e Install three-way valves in UF6 piping such that only one cylinder at a time (of the two which into each vaporization / hydrolysis line) pipe UF6 can be connected to hydrolysis, Upgrade and maintain smoke detectors located in o
each UF6 vaporization chamber, for one vaporization line to determine if some mode of operation, maintenance or redesign could result in reliable operation.
e Search for alternate methods of detecting the release of UF6 gas within a vaporization chamber which would be more reliable than those currently
_4_
Connect the output of the live-time air samplers e
located in the vaporization room to produce an alarm in the UF6-UO2 conversion control room.
Conduct a comprehensive study to assure the o
adequacy of the roof scrubber in the chemical area exhaust stack to handle large quantities of UF6 gas without a release to the environment.
The appropriateness and practicability of these recommended actions will be reviewed by January 31, 1979, and actions determined to be useful and feasible will be taken on a schedule which will also be determined by January 31, 1979.
1.
_...