ML19263B135
| ML19263B135 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07001143, 07001684 |
| Issue date: | 11/07/1978 |
| From: | Bissett P, Cohen I, Shaub E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19263B134 | List: |
| References | |
| 70-1143-78-16, 70-1684-78-01, 70-1684-78-1, NUDOCS 7901050339 | |
| Download: ML19263B135 (6) | |
Text
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I 78-16 Report No.
7 8- 01 70-1143 Docket No.
70-16&4 SNM-ll20 Pu License No.
XSNM-510 Priority 1
Category Licensee:
Westinghouse Electric Co.
P. 0. Box 355 Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15235 Facility Name:
Westinghouse P.F.D.L.
Inspection at:
Cheswick, Pa.
Inspection conducted:
September 18 to October 25, 1978 Inspectors:
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. H. Joyng Chief, Nuclear Material Control date signed and Support Section, Safeguards Branch 7901050339
Inspection Summary:
Inspection on September 18 to October 25, 1978 (Report Nos. 70-1143/78-16 and 70-1684/78-16 Areas Inspected:
Routine announced inspection by regional based inspectors of a planned export shipment to Japan.
The inspection involved:
inde-pendent nondestructive assay of mixed oxide fuel rods, physical verifica-tion of fuel assembly loading, and a records review.
The inspection involved 197 inspector-hours onsite by six NRC inspectors.
Results: Of the areas inspected, no items of noncompliance were identified.
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- J. Bastin, Manager, PFDL
- D. Petrarca, Safeguards Representative
- R. Lange, Sr. Engineer R. White, QC Supervisor J. Reese, Lab Technician J. Bollinger, Lab Technician L. Williams, MBA-7 Custodian A. Stephenson, QC Technician A. Blanford, QC Technician
- designctes those present at exit meeting.
2.
Independent Measurements The export shipment consists of four power reactor fuel assemblies containing UO Pu02 pellets.
A total of 732 rods were manufactured.
2 The 716 rods which comprise the four assemblies contain four differ-ent plutonium enrichments:
458 rods with 3.14% Pu,176 rods with 2.76% Pu, 80 rods with 2.11% Pu and 2 rods with 3.37% Pu.
The remaining 16 rods will remain at the licensee's facility as archive samples.
Except for the 3.37% Pu rods (which were manufactured in Japan), two of which remain as archive samples, all other rods were manufactured by the licensee.
Nondestructive assay (NDA) measurements were performed on the mixed oxide fuel rods using the Region I Neutron Rod Coincidence Counter.
An attribute test was performed, comparing all rods of the same plutonium enrichment with a randomly selected standard from that enrichraent. The selected standard was measured 10 times to estab-lish an average value, standard deviation and limit of error for an individual measurement.
The resulting limit of error was calculated to be +10%.
NDA measurements of 618 of the 732 fuel rods were performed as part of the independent verification effort.
For each of the rods, the individual measurement was within 10% of the established standard value. Based on this information, the NRC concludes with 95%
confiderme that not more than 2 of the fuel rods are in the unaccept-able range (greater then 10% difference from the licensee's reported plutoniumloading).
No items of noncomplianca were identified.
4 3.
Verification of Fuel Assembly Loading The inspectors physically verified the hand loading of the mixed oxide fuel rods into four (4) fuel assemblies:
E37P, E38P, E39P and E40P.
During the loading, each fuel rod's serial number was verified to the assembly loading schematic for position and accur-acy. After loading, the assemblies were placed in shipping casks, two assemblies per cask,and tamper-sealed with Type "E" seals (assemblies E40P and E39P, Container No. 001: Seal Numbers W 2791 and 2792 and USNRC/AEC 1721 and 1722; assemblies E38P and E37P, Container No. 002-Seal Numbers W 2793 and 2794 and USNRC/AEC 1723 and 1724).
No items of noncompliance were identified.
4.
Records Review The inspectors, during the course of the inspection, reviewed nuclear material accountability records, process records, quality control records and operating procedures.
This review was made to determine compliance with the FNMCP and site operating procedures.
During this review, the inspector tried to verify the disposition of each rod number on the licensee's rod listing. The inspector considered rods from four categories:
a.
Rods never loaded with plutonium, according to production records; b.
Rods loaded but scrapped, according to quality control records; c.
Rods loaded and placed in assemblies, as witnessed by NRC representatives; and, d.
Rods loaded but held by the licensee as retainer samples, as verified by the inspector.
These were all checked against the licensee's rod listing.
Rod 306 could not be accounted for during this initial check.
It was determined that the rod had been fabricated and this precipitated addi-tional inspection effort.
5 During' fabrication of the mixed oxide fuel rods, a QC checklist was prepared and signed off for each fuel rod.
The checkli.sts for 16 rods, which were rejected for a variety of reasons, had a written notation that the rod was to be scrapped. A QC document dated December 21, 1971 showed that the final 00 check for red 306 was performed February 24, 1972.
The rod passed all of the QC checks and there 5:as no notation that the rod was scrapped.
However, a gamma scan trace dated May 22, 1972, indicated that rod 306 had a U02 pellet among the UO Pu02 pellets.
The licensee stated that the 2
presence of the UO2 pellet would have caused the rod to be rejected and that the rod would have been scrapped.
A physical inventory was taken by the licensee on May 31, 1972.
The rods were not listed by identification numbers, but it was determined that a total of 728 mixed oxide rods were inventoried.
The licensee received an additional 4 rods from Japan on May 7, 1974, and this total of 732 rods is consistent with the present inventory.
In February 1975, the rods were placed in 5 shipping containers, the containers welded shut and placed in 2 locked, tamper-safed containers in a vault-type room.
The seals were applied February 11, 1975 and not broken until September 14, 1978.
A QC document prepared when the rods were placed in storage listed rod 306 among a total of 733 mixed oxide rods placed in the shipping containers, whereas tne accountability records transferring the material in the rods into the vault area show the total amount of plutonium trans-ferred as 48,942 grams (March,1978 value-corrected for decay),
which is equal to the amount in only 732 rods.
Also, the internal transfer documents generated in September 1978, after the tamper-safe seals were rc:oved, list the rod identification numbers.
Only 732 rods were present and transferred out of the vault-type room.
Rod 306 was not among them.
The inspector noted a few other in-consistencies between the QC records and the accountability records (e.g., the QC list double listed rod 501 and failed to list rod 587.
However, the accountability records of transfer generated after breaking the tamper seals listed rod 501 once and rod 587 as present).
6 The inspector found that accountability documentation was not available to determine the outcome of the scrapped fuel rods (rod 306 and 16 other rods).
It was the licensee's policy to cut up the rods and recover the material (the licensee operates a scrap re-covery system at the site).
However, the time frame in which these rods were apparently scrapped (prior to May 31,1972), is outside the 5 year retention requirement for accountability records.
In addition, in 1972 the facility's MBA's were structured in such a manner that a transfer from the production line to the scrap line would not have been required to be documented. The licensee's pro-cess records for the scrap system were reviewed.
However, these documents were not of sufficient detail for the inspector to estab-lish 'the disposition of the material from the apparently scrapped fuel rods.
A mass balance for the project prepared by the inspector agreed with the licensee's current project inventory.
It was determined tnrough this mass balance that the licensee had an overall inven-tory difference of (110) grams of plutonium for the project for the period between the initial receipt (July 1971) and the tampersafing in February 1975.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
5.
Exit Interview The inspector met with the licensee's representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) on October 19, 1978. The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection.
Inspection effort subsequent to October 19 was performed to tamper-safe the shipping containers.
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