ML19262A543
| ML19262A543 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 04/30/1978 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| FRN-52FR10033 AA50-2-005, AA50-2-5, NUREG-0450, NUREG-0450-ES, NUREG-450, NUREG-450-ES, NUDOCS 7911140412 | |
| Download: ML19262A543 (11) | |
Text
NUREG-0460 Executive Summary REPORT OF THE. MATERIAL CONTROL AND MATERIAL ACCOUNTING TASK FORCE Executive Summary 2202 342 e
Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission N81114o fg
NOTICE The members of the Material Control and Material-Accounting Task Force, who are all NPC staff members, are solely responsible for-this report. The views expressed herein are those of the Task Force. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is reviewing this report and has taken no position on the conclusions or recommendations.
2202 30 Available from National Technical Information Service Springfield, Virginia 22161 Price: Printed Copy $4.00 ; Microfiche $3.00 The price of this document for requesters outside of the North American Continent can be obtained from the National Technical Informatinn Service.
N UR EG-0450 Executive Summary REPORT OF THE MATERIAL CONTROL AND MATERIAL ACCOUNTING TASK FORCE Executive Summary 2202 344 Manuscript Completed: March 1978 Date Published: April 1978 Test and Evaluation Branch Division of Safeguards Office of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safegu.irds U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555
CONTENTS ENECUTIVE
SUMMARY
Page Objecti ves and Scope of the Report............................
1 Speci al Consi derations Used i n the Study...................... 2 Fi n di n gs o f the Ta s k Fo rce.................................... 2 1.
The Role................................................. 2 2.
Goals...................................................
3 3.
R e g u l a t o ry B a s e.........................................
4 4.
Future Program.......................................... 5 Material Control and Material Accounting Upgrade Role................................................ 5 N RC Ope ra ti ons........................................
6 Research and Techni cal Assi s tance.....................
7 2, 2 d c.
_43 i
OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE OF THE REPORT in September 1977, the Director of the Division of Safeguards formed a full-time team to complete a study of the role of material control and material accounting in WRC's safeguards program. He asked this Task Force to do the following:
1.
Define the roles and objectives of material control and material accounting in the NRC safeguards program; 2.
Recommend goals for the material control and material accounting systems based on their roles and objectives; 3.
Assess the extent to which the existing safeguards regulatory base meets or provides the capability to meet the recommended goals; 4.
Provide direction for material control and material accounting development, including both near-term and long-term upgrades.
The study was limited to domestic nuclear facilities possessing significant amounts of plutonium, uranium-233 or high enriched uranium in unsealed form.
Such strategic special nuclear materials are of paramount importance in NRC's safegare p;up aa because of their potential for use in constructior. of a clandestine fission explosive. Low-enriched uranium and international safeguards were not included in the study except that some consideration was given to the role of the NRC safeguards program in supporting international safeguards. The safeguards program physical protection system was not examined in detail; however, pertinent aspects were considered in developing roles, objectives and goals for material control and material accounting and in developing recommendations for these two systems.
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SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS USED IN THE STUDY To aid in its deliberations, the Task Force developed a hierarchical structure for the NRC safeguards program. This structure was based on Commission guidance to the NRC staff stated in the " Safeguards Objective" and " Guidelines to Safeguards Purpose and Effectiveness." In the structure the primary safeguards functions of the NRC program were identified to be (1) deterrencd, (2) prevention, (3) response, and (4) assurance. Detection, in this study, was identified as a safeguards measure supporting, in varying degrees, all four of the primary functions.
Central to developing quantitative goals for the material control and material accounting programs was NRC's " Operating Assumption on Clandestine Fission Explosives." This assumption defines a conservative lower limit on the quantity of strategic special nuclear materials in any form that an adversary would need to construct a clandestine fission explosive.
FINDINGS OF THE TASK FORCEi The Task Force findings with respect to the four major objectives, listed above, are:
1.
The Role The primary role of material control in safeguards should be to provide continual cognizance of the status of nuclear material in a facility. Material control should provide a timely detection capability that activates the physical protection system to prevent bil bbb 2202 M7 a covert theft or diversion of nuclear material or that initiates response forces if thef t or diversion has already occurred. Material control plays a primary safeguards role in rapid assessment of losses or alleged losses. Material control also should provide assurance concerning the safeguards status of materiaI during the interval between physical inventories.
The primary rr ie of material accounting is to provide long-term assurance that material is present in assigned locations and in correct amounts. Through its measurements, records, and statistical analyses, material accounting should provide a loss detection capability to complement the more timely detection capabilities provided by material control and physical protection. Material accounting plays a primary safeguards role in the accurate assessment of losses or allsged losses.
2.
Goals Goals developed for material control emphasize, but are not limited to, the following:
Through continuous vigilance over material, separation of functions, conscientious custodial control, item control, and process monitoring, the material control system should be capable of:
- Detecting the loss of a significant quantity of SSNM in item form within one shift and in bulk form within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />;
- Detecting the cumulative loss of a significant quantity of SSNM during the inventory period in which it occurred;
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- Providing for rapid assessment of safeguards alarms, such as those arising from alleged losses;
- Providing assurance that, had any significant loss of SSNM occurred, it would have been detected in a timely manner.
Goals developed for material accounting emphasize, but are not limited to, the following:
By means of physical inventories and shipper /receivar comparisons based on measurements, accounting records, and statistical analysis, the material accounting system should:
- Provide an after-the-fact detection capability for significant ic3ses occerring both over the short-and the long-term.
- Provide a precise loss assessment capability to determine the extent and nature of a supposed or actual loss.
- Provide long-term assurance that no significant loss has occurred.
3.
Regulatory Base A comparison of the Task Force's recomended goals to current requirements and practices indicates that the current regulatory base addresses many of the goals developed for material accounting, but in less specificity.
The goals for material control closely parallel current requirements with respect to separation of functions and custodial responsibilities; however, the goals are more stringent in the areas of loss detection, alarm assessment, and rapid loss assessment.
The material accounting goals are similar to current practices in the areas of physical inventories and accounting records; however, the goals are considerably more demanding for loss detection capability, validation v. accounting data, alarm assess-ment, and long-t rm control of inventory difference per ce.
4 Future Program The Task Force recommendations follow from the goals and the assessment of the capability of the cerrent regulatory base to meet them.
The recommendations fall into three basic catcgories: a Material Control and Material Accounting Upgrade Rule, HRC Operations, and Research and Technical Assistance. Major recommendations in each category follow.
Material Control and Material Accounting Upgrade Rule The Task Force reccamends that NRC promulgate a material control and material accounting upgrade rule, following appropriate value-impact analysis, to implement the goals contained in this report.
The rule should be issued in two phases: the first to be implemented in 18 to 24 months from NRC appt aval of the goals as acceptabir targets for the safeguards program for SSNM; and the second to be implemented within five years as technology and procedures are demonstrated.
To implement phase one, NRC should take action to have licensees utilize process monitoring data and information for the safeguards program, maintain shif t inventory controls over items and containers, provide for verification or overcheck of waste discards and intraplant transfers, improve traceability of records, develop response plans for performing demand physical inventories, upgrade custodial and scrap controls, reconcile shipper / receiver differences in a more timely manner, perform random audits three times per year, and select and train key personnellin accordance with specified criteria.
2202 350 To implement phase two, NRC should require licesees to:
1.
Maintain systems of records meeting designated performance standards, 2.
Maintain daily controls over the status of bulk quantities of
- SSNM, 3.
Provide NRC with additional accounting and measurement error data for analysis purposes, 4.
Establish inventory difference control limits at the material balance area level as required to achieve the Task Force goals, 5.
Take prescribed investigative and corrective acti;ns for excessive inventory differences and cumulative it.ventory differences (this action should be keyed to absolute limits rather than based on a percentage of material processed),
6.
Reduce measurement uncertainty associated with scrap containing strategic special nuclear material, 7.
Conduct vulnerability analysis of the material control and material accounting systems.
NRC Operations The Task Force recommends that NRC develop specific quantitative goals and objectives for the total safeguards program and monitor safeguards systems in terms of these goals using a broad based set of evaluative techniques.
Establishment of a strong centralized NRC pro-gram for monitoring and analyzing licensee accounting and measurement error data is recommended as well.
To support this monitoring and analysis program, the Task Force recommends a major upgrade of NRC's 2202 $5I y'
c
.- a safeguards information systems, including creation of a secure computer capability for safeguards data.
Also, NRC should formulate an approach to combating collusion, with specific consid1 ration given to the contri-butions from the material control and material accounting systems. Last, the Task Force recommends that NRC improve its program for providing safeguards information to the public in a manner that emphasizes the effectiveness of the overall program.
Research and Technical Assistance There are several projects that the Task Fcrce believes should be pursued through NRC's research and technical assistance programs to support the goal-oriented approach described in this report. Specifically, the Task Force recommends that the highest priority should be given to the develop-ment of process monitoring techniques for timely detection of material losses. The Task Force also recommends the development of an effective evaluation methodology to assess licensee capabilities in a goal-oriented regulatory framework.
An information system is recommended that provides the data necessary for NRC to monitor the material accounting performance of licensees across the fuel cycle. Finally, the Task Force recommends improvements in measu-ement methods, calibration procedures, and statistical techniques to provide cost-effective means or achieving the goals proposed in this report.
The Task Force believes that this report provides a solid foundation upon which future regulatory development in material control and material accounting can be based.
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UNITED STATES I
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