ML19262A132
| ML19262A132 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07001113 |
| Issue date: | 10/03/1979 |
| From: | Kaplan A GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY) |
| References | |
| TASK-MP-711-4, TASK-OS NUDOCS 7910260401 | |
| Download: ML19262A132 (11) | |
Text
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G E N E R A 1. h E 1.E CT R I C NUCLEAR ENERGY PRODUCTS DIVISION WIL!,11NGTON f.iANUF ACTANG OEP A RT*3 ENT C A ST L2 9 A Y N E PC A C. P, O. 9 0 X ~2 0.
,*il L', s '. GT O *t 2, 23.;];., y; ;.;;.3;c; F'.ET NCER October 3, 1979 90r03ED RULE I~
Secretary of the Cor ission U.
S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.
C.
20555 Attention:
Docketing & Service Branch y [Q [373 Gentlemen:
MLS d.. %bCf-Q'sbt y(;9
Reference:
NRC License SNM-1097, Docket #70-1113
Subject:
COMMENTS ON DRAFT REGULATORY GUIDE Concurrent with publication of the new rule 10 CFR 73.47 in the Federal Register, Volume 44, No. 143, pages 43280-43285, 7/24/79, the NRC published a regulatory guide entitled, " Standard Format and Content for the Licensee Physical Security Plan for the Protection of Special Nuclear Material of Moderate and Low Strategic Significance."
Comments on this draft guide were due by 9/21/79.
On September 13, 1979, General Electric submitted a request for extension of this comment period until October 15, 1979, and on September 24, 1979, we were advised by a telephone conversation with Mr.
J.
A.
Prell of the Safeguards Standards Branch that the comment period was being extended until October 5, 1979.
Pursuant to this extended time limit, General Electric Company hereby submits comments on the draft guide, which are enclosed as an attTchment to this letter.
General Electric appreciates the opportunity to participate in the regulatory process concerning this guide.
We would be pleased to discuss any questions that you or 3our staff may raise related to our comments.
Very truly yours, GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY j f[
A h
.lD1 a-f
' Arthur L.
Kdplan, Manager Licensing & Compliance Audits M/C J26 ALK:bmw Attachment
.d!.q jp 3 7910 x 60 ho/
page 1 of 10 ATTACHMENT GE COMMENTS ON DRAFT REGULATORY Secretary of the Commission GUIDE TO 10 CFR 73.47 October 3, 1979 GE Wilmington Manufacturing Department has reviewed the refs enced draft Guide and offers the following general comments and specific recommendations.
General Comments Large-Scale Fuel Fabricators The Regulatory Guide appears to be directed to laboratories, research universities, and power reactors and overlooks guide-lines and examples appropriate for large-scale, high-volume, low-enrichment fuel fabrication facilities such as the General Electric Wilmington Manufacturing Department.
Acceptable compliance measures for large-scale facilities may consist of (1) responsive material control and accountability systems,
(2) disciplined access / egress controls, (3) perimeter barriers, and (4) personnel-oriented surveillance procedures as integral parts of an overall security system which collectively meets or exceeds the intent of the Rule 10 CFR 73.47.
The administrative necessitites of effectively controlling day-to-day large-scale production operations, when combined with realistic security system enhancements, can provide a security system superior to that attainable through strict interpretation of the Guide as currently proposed.
Appropriate Guide modifications have been proposed to enable this approach to a cost-effective security plan for large-scale, high-volume fuel fabrication facilities.
Modifications to the Regulatory Guide Since the Regulatory Guide directs the application of 10 CFR 73.47 to the licensees, GE-WMD feels that it is important to incorporate these recommended changes for large-scale, high-volume fuel fabricators directly into the Regulatory Guide rather than to rely on the premise that we can propose justified changes to it.
When a security compliance plan is evaluated, we are concerned that the specific Guide content will have a large influence on whether the plan is acceptable even though variations from the Guide requirements are apparently permissible (per general wording on page 5 of the Guide).
17 134 4
Page 2 of 10 Definition of Security Objectives It is generally accepted that the primary national security concern of nuclear material is control of high-enriched uranium and/or plutonium.
It is also generally accepted that low-enriched uranium does not represent a significant hazard to public health and safety nor does it represent a viable option as source material for clandestine bomb development.
It is important, therefore, that every effort be made to dif ferentiate between the security require-ments for these materials and not require unnecessary high levels of security for operations processing low-enriched uranium.
Becar.se the Rule and Guide are addressed to both moderate and low stracegic significance, the Guide should clearly emphasize the different security requirements.
We are concerned that appropriate clarifying statements are not included in the introduction of the current Guide.
A second need is for a clear definition of the objectives for security requirements for SNM of low strategic significance.
What are we trying to accomplish?
It is apparent that a thef t/
diversion may take placc as a large quantity (of uranium) being removed in a single event, or as a small quantity being removed in many events over a long period of time.
No single security component / procedure is adequate to prevent and/or detect both of these types of diversion.
Practically speaking, for low-enriched uranium facilities, zero risk of diversion is an unrealistic goal.
However, reasonable security practices complemented by effective on-going control systems can provide satisfactory levels of security.
Objectives need to be defined which are based not only on the general category of material (i.e.,
low-enriched uranium of low strategic significance) but also based upon the relative vulnerability (to diversion) of the various physical forms of SNM and on the relative value of the material for unauthorized activities.
For example, finished fuel bundles, UF6 cylinders, process scrap and plated items are unlikely targets for diversion because of their physical and/or chemical characteristics.
If specific objectives are not defined, it is our concern that licensees will be subjected to unrealistic interpretations by reviewers who will naturally be biased towards the more con-servative " total security" requirements of SNM of moderate strategic significance.
Specific Comments and Recommendations 1)
Chapter I, Use and Storage Area - Introductory Comments "Thus a CAA can be an approved security cabinet...a vault...or a laboratory..."
e This paragraph should be modified to read:
1?17 135 "Thus a CAA can be an approved security cabinet...a vault...
or a laboratory...or a fuel fabrication process area
~
Page 3 of 10 involving large quantities of SNM of low strategic significance.
A CAA may also be a secured facility, building or area utilizing appropriate perimeter protection, access control and material accountability systems."
Relevant comments:
Large-scale, high-volume, low-enriched fuel fabrication facilities should be recognized as discrete nuclear operations which must be addressed in the Guide.
The specific definition of a CAA in paragraph 73.2 (z) permits flexibility in scoping a CAA in a manner appropriate to the operation.
In the case of a large-scale fuel fabrication facility, a relatively large CAA, properly monitored and controlled, may be the most effective security plan.
The techniques and systems used for proper response to security requirements for these large-scale operations may differ from those appropriate to operations of more limited scope, e.g.
laboratories, research reactors, and university research activities.
2)
Paragraph 1.1, Areas Where Material is Used ( 7 3. 47 ( f) (1) ) - Intent "In this case, the more likely choice would be permanent physical barriers... (for)... laboratory or reactor containment structure...
(for) SNM continuously in use."
e This paragraph should be modified to read:
"... reactor containment structure or secured fuel processing f acility... (for)...SNM continuously in use. "
Relevant comment:
This specifically identifies fuel processing facilities as an area in which SNM is in continuous use.
e Additional sentence:
"In the case of large-scale fuel processing facilities, licensees may rely on access controls, a physical barrier system and material control and accounting procedures to ef fect the required protection. "
Relevant comment:
}9j7 j}
It appears inappropriate to discuss security implementation techniques in a section which is addressed to description of a " Control Access Area".
However, given that the Guide is so prepared, the addition of a reference to large-scale fuel fabrication facilities is appropriate.
Page 4 of 10 3)
Paragraph 1.1, Areas Where Material is Used (73.47(f)(1)) - Content
"...may be used are laboratories, process areas, reactor rooms..."
e This paragraph should be modified to read:
"...may be used and/or stored are laboratories, process areas and facilities, reactor rooms..."
Relevant comments:
The probability that an area may serve for process or storage is referenced in the statement of Intent for this paragraph as are examples of " spent fuel pools", " Fenced-in areas".
Addition of a reference to a process facility as a typical CAA would include large-scale fuel fabrication operations in the examples.
4)
Paragraph 1. 2, Areas Where Material is Stored (73. 47 ( f) (1) ) - Intent e
Add an example as follows:
"6) Fabricated fuel storage facility - Storage of nuclear fuel from fuel processing facilities should require a physical barrier system such as security fence and/or building structure, a system to control access to the facility, a material control and accounting system, and surveillance systems for times when the facility is not operated."
Relevant comments:
In some instances, non-contiguous areas may be employed to store nuclear fuel from fabrication facilities (e.g. fuel in a warehouse awaiting shipment) and, by definition, these areas represent discrete CAAs requiring security systems.
Wnen fabricated fuel facilities are unattended, i.e. evenings or weekends, additional surveillance systems should be considered.
5)
Paragraph 1. 2, Areas Where Material is Stored ( 73. 4 7 (f) (1) ) - Content
"... to secure the material (see Chapter 3 in Part I of the Guide for guidance on locking mechanisms)."
e This paragraph should be modified to eliminate reference to Chapter 3, Part I
!?17 137
Page 5 of 10 Relevant comments:
Part I refers to protection of SNM of moderate strategic significance; the requirement for a similar locking mechanism for material of low strategic significance is not warranted by the need.
The statement of Intent cle'arly exempts Part I equivalent requirements.
The Part I reference in the Content statement implies the need for conformance to locking mechanisms.
e Add the following sentence:
"If the CAA is not occupied at all times, describe the surveillance system and/or material control / accounting procedures and/or access control procedures used to control the material."
Relevant comment:
In other portions of the Guide, the use of authorized personnel to effect require protection is clearly stated.
However, when a storage f acility is unattended (i.e. not in operation, such as on weekends or evenings), additional surveillance systems should be considered.
This may be through the use of a wacchman or automated / electronic devices.
6)
_ Chapter 2, Detection Devices or Procedures - Introductory Comments
"... e i th e r (1) intrusion alarms or other devices or (2) security procedures are needed."
This paragraph should be modified to read:
w
...either (1) intrusion alarms or other devices or (2) procedures or (3) a combination of both are needed."
Relevant comments:
Inasmuch as the Rule states either alarm devices or procedures are required, the term " security procedures" is unduly restrictive.
It connotes watchman or surveillance rather than a procedural control, per se.
For instance, a licensee may elect to implement security requirements by way of a total integrated security system encompassing access control, physical barriers, material control and accounting system, as well as security procedures, per se.
l'17 138
Page 6 of 10 7)
Chapter 2, Detection Devices or Procedur+g - Intent "However, material left temporarily unattended should be protected by a motion detector... that incorporates adequate tamper-resistant features."
This paragraph should be modified to read:
e
... that incorporates adequate tamper-resistant features or a proper detection / control system which includes access controls and material control and accountability proccdures."
Relevant comment:
Licensees should be given flexibility in designing systems to meet the security requirement for unattended areas other than the unique requirement for motion detectors.
The following paragraph should be added:
e
" Detection devices may be included as a vital component in an overall security system.
When a licensee has designed and implemented a security system which utilizes other security-related systems such as perimeter controls, access / egress control and material accountability and control procedures, the use of motion detectors may be minimal.
A large-scale, high-volume, low-enriched fuel fabrication operation which operates almost continuously may find the need for motion detectors limited to areas lef t unattended for long periods of time when the plant is vacant, i.e. weekends."
Relevant comment:
Large-scale fuel fabricators processing large quantities of SNM of low strategic significance may elect to develop a tot'al security assurance system to protect their diverse process areas.
Licensees with adequate detection / control systems should not be required to install motion detection devices for all temporarily unattended areas.
8)
Chapter 2, Detection Devices or Procedures - Content "This descriptica should include..."
i This paragraph should be modified to read:
e "This description sr.uld include...
- 9) Material control and accountability procedures
- 10) Access and exit controls ll) Personnel oriented procedures" l?!7 139
Page 7 of 10 Relevant comment:
Exclusion of procedures from the detection devices description may lead to the conclusion that devices, per se, are a security requirement.
The Intent clearly indicates that procedures or devices can be used to satisfy the detection capability requirement.
9)
Paragraph 2.2, Detection Procedures (73.47 (f) (2) ) - Intent The following paragraph should be added:
e "For large-scale processing facilities using and storing large quantities of SNM of low strategic significance throughout the CAA at all times, an overall detection /
control system employing a strong perimeter barrier, with adequate access / egress controls, a responsive material control and accountability system, and disciplined personnel-oriented procedures may be utilized."
Relevant comments:
Guidelines and examples which are practical and appropriate for large-scale, high-volume, low-enriched fuel fabrication facilities should be included in the Guide.
Many large-scale fuel fabricators have operating systems for production control, quality control, work measurement, and uranium safeguards which may provide a strong basis for continual control of low-enriched uranium.
In many instances, these systems already provide responsivc detection capability which may be complemented to meet the overall security detection requirements.
10)
Chapter 4, Response Procedures - Intent "Some types of incidents...are :
1.
Civil strife such as student demonstration or employee
- strikes, 2.
- Fire, 3.
Discovery that some SNM is missing, and 4.
Bomb threats" e
Items 1, 2 and 4 should be deleted and two new items added:
" Discovery that security system has been breached."
" Threat of impending diversion."
[
l40
Page 8 of 10 Relevant comments:
The Rule is specifically addressed to the threat of thefts or the actual theft of (nuclear) material; inclusion of non-diversion incidents in the Guide is inappropriate.
Many licensees currently have regulatory requirements for emergency planning and the NRC is currently considering an upgrade in control of these plans.
Any intent to include licensees response (for emergency situations) in this Guide is redundant and unnecessary.
11)
Paragraph 5.4, Inspection (73. 47 (g) (1) (iv) ) - Intent
... integrity of material container's seals just prior to shipment..."
e This paragraph should be modified to read:
... material container's seals prior to shipment..."
Relevant comments:
This change is in accord with the specific requirement in the Rule.
Current requirements for quality assurance and uranium safeguards for some licensees dictate the need for checking containers and seals in an effective manner prior to shipment.
Evidence of compliance to these requirements should be sufficient for the security plan.
Implication of seal-checking immediately prior to shipment places an undue burden on the licensee.
12)
Paragraph 5.4, Inspection ( 7 3. 47 (g) (1) (iv) ) - Content
"... containers or seals is checked just prior to shipment."
e This paragraph should be modified to read:
... containers or seals is checked prior to shipment."
Same comments as presented in Intent (above) 13)
Paragraph 5.5, In-transit Physical Protection (73. 47 (g) (1) (v) ) -
Intent "The intent of this paragraph is to require that either the shipper or receiver be made responsible... and that the responsible person has acknowledged this responsibility by written agreement."
1217 141
Page 9 of 10 o
This paragraph should be modified to read:
"The intent of this paragraph is to require that the shipper be made responsible...unless the receiver acknowledges this responsibility by written agreement, or unless the shipper is not a licensee.
Relevant comments:
Current guidelines, which apparently require negotiation and written agreement of responsibility for in-transit SNM physical protection, are confusing and place an undue administrative burden on both parties.
Automatic identification that the licensee shipper has in-transit protection responsibility, unless specifically negotiated with the receiver, places the burden where it belongs, i.e. with the party who initiates the shipment.
e Add the following sentence:
"Small quantities of fissile material specified in 49 CFR 173. 396 (a) are exempt from this requirement."
Relevant comments:
A de minimis exemption is clearly called for in this requirement.
~
The frequency of transactions involving small quantities of nuclear material will result in an administrative monstrosity if each requires written agreement as proposed in the Guide for all shipments of SNM.
Federal DOT regulations permit the shipment of small quantities of nuclear material via normal government and commercial carriers.
Establishing and tracking physical protection of these materials while in-transit is unworkable and unreasonable.
14)
Paragraph 5.5, In-transit Physical Protection (73. 47 (g) (1) (v) ) -
Content
"... shipper should either acknowledge responsibility...or ensure that a written agreement... "
e This paragraph should be modified to read:
"... shipper has responsibility...unless a written agreement..."
1917 142
Page 10 of 10 Relevant comment:
This change is in accord with comments made above in Intent.
15)
Paragraph 6.2, Notification ( 73. 47 (g) (2) (ii) ) - Content Add the following sentence:
e "Certain license conditions may allow the licensee as the receiver to notify the shipper within 10 days af ter a material shipment has been received by sending a completed copy of Form NRC-284, "SS Material Transfer Receipt" followed by a completed copy of Form NRC-741 within 30 days after receipt."
Relevant comments:
The above procedure is in accord with license provisions of some licensees.
In many cases, the requirement to transmit a completed copy of Form NRC-741 within 10 days of material receipt is an administrative impcasibility.
16)
Paragraph 7.1, Response Procedure (73. 47 (g) (3) (i) ) - Content
... duties and re'sponsibilities of the security organization and management..."
This paragraph should be modified to read:
e
"... duties and responsibilities of the licensee's security organization and mancgement... "
Relevant comments:
Precise interpretation of the Guide as currently proposed requires that rerponse procedures be developed for security organizations involved in each event; thus if an event occurs in another State, the shipper is responsible for describing the actions to be taken by the out-of-town security function, e.g. State Police.
Chapters 8 and 9 also refer to this section, further implying the need to develop response procedures for foreign security organizations.
Specific identification that the licensee's security organization and management must respond to various events is logical and precise.
1217 143 4