ML19261E941
| ML19261E941 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 06/18/1973 |
| From: | Faulkner H US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | Deyoung R US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7910170994 | |
| Download: ML19261E941 (4) | |
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A. Schwencar, Chiaf PWR Branch f4, L MEETING WITH NETEOPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY AED CENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES G RPORATION CONCEREIMG TEE OPE 21 TING LICENSE APPLICATION POR THREE MILE Tsulm UNIT 1
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Ehclosed is a etsseary of the meeting hald at Esthesda, Maryland, on May 9, 1973, with Metropolitan Edison Company and General Public Utilities Corporation.
An ate==da=re list-is also anela==d.
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'gr METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPA';Y - THREE MILE ISLAND U'!IT 1 DOCKET No. 50-239 SU)DLGY OF MEETING - MAY 9, 19 7 3
SUMMARY
A ceeting was held in Bethesda, Maryland on May 9,1973 to discuss Amendment 38, the General Public Utilities Service Corporation (GPU) reply to the AEC request of December 15, 1972 for information concerning the effects of piping system failures outside containment.
Although GPU had presented caterial the reactor could be safely shut down without in su==ary form stating that the use of any feedwater, this claim was not supported by confirmatory anmlyses.
the addition of cooling water to the primary system appearea We stated that attractive as a secondary means of mitigating the consequences of a high However, GPU should consicc. modifications which would energy line failure.
insure the integrity of the intermediate building and the availability of emergency feedwater.
DISCUSSION Tn Amend ent 28 GPU replied to the AEC letter of December 15, 1972 concern-ing general information for considerations of ef fects of piping 370 0 breaks outside containment for Three > Ele Island Unit 1.
In their response GPU claims that the reactor can be safely brought to a cold shutdown con-any energy renoval through the steam generators; i.e., without dition without This cooldown would be accomplished by pumping water from the feedwater.
borated water storage tank by ceans of the makeup and purification system (high pressure injection system) into the primary reactor coolant system.
As the water is heated from the decay heat of the reactor core, boiloff occurs through the pressuriser relief valves. The increased building pressure is accommodated by the reactor building coolers and sprays. This process continues until the tenperature and pressure of the primary system are low removal system. We noted enough to permit use of the normal decay heat confirmatory this process is described in summary form only, and that that this claim were not provided.
analyses to support the possibility of localized overpressurization in the sub-We stated that to the reactor containment building compartments immediately adjacent Such overpressurization potentially exists in the intermediate building.
lead to a sequential or propigating type of accident which could might The in the failure of other high-energy lines or system components.
result are extremely difficult propigation and consequences of such an accident to predict.
the exterior surfaces of the intermediate building are de-GPU stated that consequently, all exterior walls and the roof signed for aircraf t i= pact; 1483 292
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' <r-are five feet in thickness. The interior subcompartment walls are three feet in thickness. The reactor containment building was designed for localized aircraft impact. Based on these design features, the applicant stated that the containment building and the external boundary of the intermediate building could withstand the failure of any high-energy line within the intermediate building without structural failure. Also, the the present all of the structures have been built applicant stated that at and all of the high-energy lines are in place.
We informed GPU that if properly confirmed and documented, the primary system feed and blecd concept could be used as a backup or secandary means of aitigation, but CPU should consider the modifications which would acciden*
provide increased assurance against the uncertainties of sequential type accidents and the corresponding potential loss of all feedwater.
Modifications that =ight be considered to mitigate consequences of the high-These energy line failure in the. intermediate building were suggested.
included encapsulation of the high stress locations of the lines, increasing the vent areas of the subcompartments, or some combination of both.
R. Bosnak of the Mechanical Engineering Branch reviewed the AEC tentative criteria for encapsulation of Class I piping syste=s.
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4 ATTENDA';CE LIST'*
MAY 9, 1973 AEC A. Sclwencer H. J. Faulkner R. J. Bosnak R. W. Ylecker A. L. Gluck=an Pickard, Lowe & Associates F. Schwoerer CPUSC D. H. Reppert J. P. Moore R. tJ. Heward R. L. Williams 3G" G. F. Glei W. S. Delicate C. D. Russell b
hh4 B. E. Miller GAI S. Hunt F. L. Moreadith P. W. Baranowsky R. H. Gronwood W. Sailer i
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