ML19261D402
| ML19261D402 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 04/03/1979 |
| From: | Kelley W, Whitesell D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19261D382 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-QA-99900053 99900053-79-1, NUDOCS 7906190074 | |
| Download: ML19261D402 (9) | |
Text
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT REGION IV Report No. 99900053/79-01 Program No. 51300 Company: Anchor /DarlingValvebompany One Belmont Avenue, Suite 320 Bala Cynwyd, Pennsylvania 19004 Inspection at: Williamsport, Pennsylvania
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Inspection Conducted: February 21-23, 1979 1spector:
2&
MS//9 William D. Kelley, C'ontractor Inspector, Date Vendor Inspection Branch Approved by ?
5 4/3/ff D. E. Whitesell, Chief, Components Date'Section I, Vendor Inspection Branch Summary Inspection on February 21-23, 1979 (99900053/79-01)
Areas Inspected:
Implementation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B and applicable codes and standards including, design document control, and manufacturing process control. Also, review vendors corrective action on a 10 CFR Part 21 report.
The inspection involved twenty (_20) inspector-hours on site by one (1)
NRC inspector.
Results:
In the three (31 areas inspected, no apparent deviations or unresolved items were identified in one (1) area. The following deviations were identified in the remaining two (2) areas.
Deviations:
Design Document Control (See Notice of Deviation Enclosure, Item A), Hanufacturing Process Control (See Notice of Deviation Enclosure, Item B).
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DETAILS SECTION (Prepared by Wm. D. Kelley)
A.
Persons Contacted Anchor / Darling Valve Comoany, Williamsport, Pennsylvania Plant (ADVC-W)
- W. G. Knecht, Technical Director
- G. W. Kneiser, Quality Assurance Manager.
- R. H. Luhta, Engineering Manager Commercial Union Insurance Comoany R. E. Montgomery, Authorized duclear Inspector (ANI)
- Denotes those persons who attended Exit Interview (See paragraph F).
B.
General Review of Vendors Activities 1.
ASME Certificates of Authorization i
ADVC-W's ASME Certificates of Authorization No. N-1712 and N-1713 authorized the application of the "N" and "NPT" stamps to Sec-tion III Class 1, 2, and 3 valves, valve parts and appurtenances.
The Certificates of Authorization do not specify or limit size or pressure class of the valves and valve parts to which the stamps may be affixed. The certificates expire April 15, 1980.
2.
. Manufacturing Capability ADVC-W has the engineering and machining capability to produce valves from 2b inches to 52 inches in size and 150 pound to 4500 pound, pressure classes. However, the size and pressure class of ASME Section III, "N" Class 1, 2, and 3, valves that have been produced for commercial nuclear services, range from 24 inches to 36 inches in size, and from 150 pound to 1500 pound pressure classes.
Approximately 90% of the present valve production is for commercial nuclear services.
3.
Authorized Inspection Agency The authorized inspection agency is Commercial Union Insurance
' Company and their Authorized Nuclear Inspector is a full time resident at ADVC-W.
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4.
Organization Changes There has been a reorganization of management as follows: The general manager and vice president positions at Williamsport, have been eliminated. The technical director at Williamsport reports directly to the corporate vice president of engineering at Bala Cynwyd, Pennsylvania. The Williamsport plant mana.ger, now reports directly to the corporate president at Bala Cynwyd, Pennsylvania.
C.
Design Document Control 1.
Objectives The objectives of this area of the inspection were to ascertain whether procedures had been developed and properly, implemented to control the review, approval, release and issuance, of design documents in a manner consistent with NRC rules and regulations, ASME Code requirements, and the vendor's QA program commitments.
2.
Method of Accomplishment The objectives of this area of the inspection were accomplished by:
a.
Review of the ASME accepted Quality Assurance Manual, Revi-sion P:
(1) Section 6.0, Order Planning, (2) Section 7.0, Engineering Documentation, (3) Section 13.0, Documentation Package, to verify that the vendor had established procedures to prescribe a system for design document control.
b.
Review of the following procedures:
(1) ES-10 Revision E, Preparation and Use of Shop Order Instructions, (2) ES-11 Revision C, Design Control Procedure, (3) ES-3 Revision H, Preparation of Master Drawing Lists and Material / Drawing List, 2308 182
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. (4)
ES-2 Revision F, Distribution and Control of Engi-neering Documents in Engineering, to verify that they had been prepared by the designated authority, approved by management, and reviewed by QA.
c.
Reviewofthedocumentreferencedinparagrapha.(2)above, to verify that the personnel responsible for preparing, reviewing, approving, and issuing design documents are identified; and that the review and approval of significant changes are performed by the same personnel, Also to ascertain whether minor changes to design documents, that do not require review and approval, are identified.
d.
Review of ES-2 Revision F, Distribution and Control of Engineering Documents in Engineering, to verify that the distribution lists are current and that the proper docu-ments are identified, accessible, and are being used.
e.
Review of drawings numbers D-9486, Revision 0; C-1596-8; C1596-9, and F-5000; to verify that the control of design documents is being implemented.
f.
Interviewing personnel to verify whether they are knowl-edgeable in the procedures applicable to design document control.
3.
Findings a.
Deviations Enclosure, Item A.
b.
Unresolved Item Within this area of the inspection no unresolved items were identified.
D.
Manufacturing Process Control 1.
Objectives The objectives of this area of the inspection were to verify that the vendor's manufacturing processes were:
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3 Performed under a controlled system which meets the NRC a.
rules and regulations, ASME Code requirements, the vendors commitments in his ASME accepted Quality Assurance Program, and contract requirements.
b.
Effective in assuring product quality.
w 2.
Method of Accomolishment The objectives of this area of the inspection were accomplished by:
Review of the ASME accepted Quality Assurance Manual, a.
Revision P:
(1) Section 8.0, Manufacturing Planning, (2) Section 11.0, Upgrading, (3) Section 12.0, Process Control, to verify that procedures had been established to prescribe a control system of the manufacturing processes.
b.
Review of the following documents:
(1) US-1 Revision G, Upgrading Procedure for Cast Valve
- Parts, (2) MES-3 Revision J. Distribution and Control of Engi-neering Documents, to verify the control system requires shop travelers or a process control checklist be prepared containing document numbers and revisions to which the process must confom and requires all processes and tests to be perfonned by quali-fied personnel using qualified procedures.
Review of the shop traveler or process control check list c.
to verify it has spaces for reporting results of specific operations or reference to other documents where results are maintained, it includes provisions for signoff by the vendor indicating the date on which the operation or test was performed, and it provides for signoff by the authorized nuclear inspector for those activities which he witnesses, including the date of witnessing.
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d.
Review of these selective production release tickets (shop travelers) and inspection records:
(1) 6318-014-001(1),
(2) 6288-019-001,
(.3) 6318-030-001(.1),
to verify their compliance with the above referenced pro-cedures and the overall QA program documentation require-ments, including establishment of mandatory hold points by the authorized nuclear inspector, e.
Twelve (121 socket welds joining 3" schedule 160 by-pass pipe, to a Class II, 30" x 24" x 30," Steam Valve, serial number NN 26908, shop order number E6210-21, were inspected to verify that the weld sizes were in conformance with the sizes specified on the drawings identified in C.2.e.
above.
f.
Interviews with personnel to verify they were knowledgeable in the procedures applicable to manufacturing process con-trol.
3.
Findings a.
0,eviations See Enclosure, Item B.
b.
Unresolved Item Within this area of the inspection no unresolved items were identified.
E.
Follow-up on 10 CFR 21 Report 1.
Background Information The Technical Director, ADVC-W reported to NRC-IE that ADVC-W, had shipped one 6" 150 pound gate valve, and three 12" 150 pound gate. valves, to each of two nuclear facilities, Wolf Creek Unit 1, and Calloway Plant 1.
He had been informed that these valves were, or would be, installed inside the reactor i
' containment building.
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However, the operators for these valves had electric motors with Class B insulation on the windings, and may not function since Class B insluation has not been qualified for containment service. Class H or RH insulation is recommended for this service.
2.
Objectives The objectives of this area of the inspection were to ascertain whether the evaluation, corrective action, and reporting was performed in compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 21.
3.
Method of Accomplishment The foregoing objectives were accomplished by the following:
a.
Review of the customers purchase order number 10466-M-225, Revisions 1 through 5, dated. August 14,-1975, for two 6" 150 pound gate valves; one, Serial No. (SN) 6118-5-1, for Calloway Plant No.1; and one, SN 6118-5-2, for Wolf Creek Unit 1; and four 12" 150 pound gate valves; two, SN 6118-4-1 and 6118-4-2 for Calloway, and two, SN 6118-4-3 and 6118-4-4 for Wolf Creek. Also the customer's P0 No. 10455-M-223A, for two, 12" 150 pound gate valves; one, SN 6207-2-1 for Calloway; and one, SN 6207-2-2 for Wolf Creek.
Both procurement documents included the customers Electric Motor Data Sheet No. 10466 E 025, Revision 3, which specified the Actuator motor data to be: Reliance, squirrel cage, 1.6HP{12" Valves),.66HP(.6" Valves)/1700 RPM, Temperature Rise 75 C, Insulation Class B.
b.
The requirements of 10 CFR 21 were made a part of P0 No. 10466-225 by Revision 8, dated March 2, 1978, and P0 No. 10466-M 223A by Revision 4, dated June 27, 1978.
c.
It was verified that ADVC-W had posted Section 206, Public Law 93-438, as specified, and had implemented procedures for notifying, and reporting, defects in compliance with 10 CFR 21.
d.
Discussions with the cognizant personnel concerning the actions initiated by the vendor to determine whether the valves in question are considered to be " basic components" as defined in 10 CFR 21, and the proposed corrective action.
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4.
Findings The following infomation was obtained from the vendor's cognizant personnel.
a.
The identification that valves had been installed inside the containment, with motor operators insulated with class B insulation (which has never been qualified for service inside the containment), was initially identified by a Limitorque service representative to a Bechtel representative, on site at one of the involved nuclear facilities. The exact site and date of the initial identification of the problem was not known to ADVC-W personnel.
b.
ADVC-W was notified concerning this prcblem by Bechtel Power Division, of Gaithersburg, Maryland (Bechtel-G) initially by phone followed by a Twix, on or about November 14, 1978.
c.
ADVC-W was aware that Limitorque had perfomed tests to qualify class H, and class RH, as being acceptable insulation for service inside the reactor containment building under operating and accident conditions. Also, ADVC-W in con-junction with Limtorque had determined that class B insulation would be considered unacceptable for containment service.
This determination was reached by ADVC-W in 1976 or 1977 exact date unknown.
d.
The necessary information was not available to ADVC-W, to permit them to evaluate the safety significance of this problem, and they do not know whether Bechtel made such an evaluation in conformance with 10 CFR 21. However, they did receive information from Bechtel that the valves in question, are required to perform safety functions. This information was the basis for their report.
5.
Generic Implications a.
To ascertain whether this problem might be generic to any nuclear facilities, other than Calloway and Wolf Creek, the vendor audited its nuclear contracts to ascertain whether actuator motors might have been supplied with class B insulation for installation inside the containment.
o b.
As a result o_f this audit, ADVC-W infomed the inspector that it is reasonably sure that this problem is generic only to Calloway and Wolf Creek facilities.
'n y,
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-g-6.
Corrective Action ADVC-W informed the inspector that four of the valves are installed at the sites, and the remaining four are to be returned to ADVC, Williamsport. The proposed corrective cetions are as follows:
a.
ADVC-W has ordered 8 replacement motor operators insulated with class RH insulation. Class RH insulation has been qualified by Limotorque, to be acceptable for nuclear service inside containment.
Review of purchase order R-9136, dated February 19, 1979, verified that the order for eight new motor operators had been placed, and that the purchase documents specified that the motor insulation was to be class RH.
b.
ADVC-W will replace and test the new operators on the four valves being returned to their plant. The remaining four operators will be shipped to the respective sites, where they will be installed and tested on the valves in situ, under the supervision of ADVC-W Service Department.
c.
The date for the corrective will be scheduled to accanmodate the March, 1979 shipping date of the replacement motor operators.
7.
Conclusions From the documents reviewed and information obtained it appears that the reporting of the potential significant safety hazard was accurate and complete and was reported in a timely manner.
No deviations from the requirements of Section 206, PL-93-438, or 10 CFR 21 were identified.
F.
Exit Interview At the conclusion of the inspection February 23, 1978, the inspector met with the company's management, identified in paragraph A, for the purpose of informing them as to the results of the inspection.
During this meeting, each identified deviation and their 10 CFR Part 21 report was discussed and the evidence which supported the findings were identified.
The company's management acknowledged the findings and supporting evidence as being understood, but had no additional comments.
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