ML19261B813
| ML19261B813 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 01/02/1979 |
| From: | Sutton J, Whitesell D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19261B799 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-QA-99900289 NUDOCS 7903060277 | |
| Download: ML19261B813 (13) | |
Text
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSI0il 0FFICE OF INSPECTI0il AND ENFORCEMENT REGION IV Report No. 99900289/78-02 Program No. 51300 Company:
Nuclear Valve Division Borg-Warner Corporation 7500 Tyrone Avenue Van Nuys, California 91409 Inspection at:
Van Nuys, California Inspection Conducted: December 11-15, 1978 Inspectors:
h U).
O,h h
/8-2 N8 J.'W. Sutton, Contractor Inspector Date Vendor Inspection Branch i,f~h
/.2 - 78
. E. Whitesell,4dief, ComponentsSection I Date Vendor Inspec' ion Branch 9,!/hf/M
/-J 79 Approved by:
t D. E. Wh'itesell, Chi 6f, ComponentsSection I Date Vendor Inspection Branch Summary Inspection on December 11-15, 1978 (99900289/78-02)
Areas Inspected:
Implementation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criteria and applicable codes and standards including, action on previously identified items, calibration, welding procedures, and assess the cause, correctf ve actions and generic considerations relative to disc separation frcm a 3/4 inch valve stem. The inspection involved seventy-two (72) inspector-hours on site by two (2) NRC inspectors.
Results:
In the four (4) areas inspected, no apparent deviations or unre-solved items were identified in two (2) areas. The following were identi-fied in the remaining two (2) areas.
790306077/
Deviations:
1.
Calibration - Calibration inspector not reporting out of caliLration equipment as required by QA Procedure 16.9.1 (See enclosure item A.).
2.
Welding - Welding procedure specification (WPS) - (1) correct revision not at work station, (See enclosure item B), (2) electrical characteristics not being maintained (See enclosure item C.).
Unresolved Items:
None.
DetailsSection I (Prepared by J. W. Sutton)
A.
Persons Contacted Nuclear Valve Division - Parg-Warner Corcoration (tiVD)
B. Appleberry, Personnel Department B. Corbin, QA Material Review Engineer
- C. A. Dotter, President, General Manager
- N. J. Moore, QA Engineer
- P. L. Milinazzo, Manager, Fabrication Inspection B. Payock, Electronics Technician D. Tullis, Cclibration Technician
- V. M. Terrones, Manager, QC A. P. Tartaglia, level III
- W. R. Wheaton, QA Director M. Whelpley, Calibration Technician Kemper Insurance Comoanies, Lumberman Mutual
- M. B. Diana, Authorized fluclear Inspector
- Attended Exit Interview B.
Action on Previous Inspection Findings 1.
(Closed) Deviation (Report No. 78-01) The vendors QA organiza-tien did not clez-ly define the authority aad duties of personnel other than QA, performing activities affecting safety-related functions. The b pector verified that Revision H to the QA Manual delineates the duties of all personnel performing safety related functions.
2.
(Closed) Deviation (Report No. 78-01) Scrap materials not being disposed of as required by procedures.
It was verified by the inspector that nuclear Practice Bulletin 11-3 has been revised to control the disposition of all scrap material.
3.
(Closed) Deviation (Report No. 78-01) Training schedule not being maintained or audited. The inspector reviewed and verified that the current Training Schedule and all audits have been performed.
The corrective actions as stated in NV3W is letter of April 26, 1978, have been implemented.
C.
Calibration 1.
Objectives The objectives of this area of the inspection were to verify that calibration activities are controlled in accordance with the QA Manual and applicable flRC and ASME Code requirc.ments:
e That a system has been established, and is maintained, to assure that tools, gages, instruments and other measuring devices used in activities affecting quality are properly calibrated and adjusted at specified periods to maintain accuracy within the specified limits.
b.
That calibration records are kept for each instrument indicating the calibration results.
c.
That the calibration system is being properly implemented.
2.
Method of Accomplishment The preceding objectives were accomplished by:
a.
Review of the QA Manual, Sectic' 16, Revision H to verify that provisions have been included to assure that equipment requiring calibration is identified and a calibration fre-quency is specified. The calibration standards and trace-ability of standards is specified and a recall system is in effect.
b.
Rc /icw of calibration procedures manual, Nuclear Practice Bulletin No. 7-1, Revision D.
c.
Review of qualifications of calibrators.
d.
Review of the inspection equipment use log.
e.
Review of the recall system.
f.
Review of calibration due notices.
g.
Review of the index system Calibration Record Cards.
ri.
Review of equipment certification standards for:
(1) Dead Weight Testers - Numbers 800-1581, 801, 559 and 47.
(2) Tongtester 3129
. (3)
Pyrometer 22970 (4) Gage Blocks 3124, 555 and 1488 1.
Inspection of the calibration facilities for mechanical, electrical and instrument calibration.
J.
Review of the calibration records for the following:
(1) Micrometers, 582-291-100-103-80-3-489 86-6 (2) Dial indicators, 495 (3) Electical meters (weld machine), SNZYFW1406, 256-774-1006, 71563070, AH054050, 70556118, C273B828, (4) Surface plates, 2126, 9107, 1384, 1499, 1288, (5) Heat treat furnaces. Honeywell 575 and 15, (6) Vernier calibrator 76-4, (7) Pressure gages 763,1579,i577,1378,and1479, (8) Thermometer AB17, (9) Plug gages #2-4 and 6, (10) Height indicators #4-#5, 1429, 1381 (11) Profilometer 1940 (12) Hardness tester (13) NDE equipment certificaticr.
The above equipment includes both company and personally owned tools used for final acceptance.
k.
Discussions with cognizant personnel.
3.
Findings From the documents and records reviewed, and observation of the nuclear work in progress, it was determined that the system prescribed for control and calibration of gages, tools and instruments is consistent with the i;RC Rules and Code require-ments with the following exception.
a.
Deviations See enclosure item A.
b.
Unresolved Items None.
D.
Control of Special Processes, Welding Procedure Soecifications Use and Control 1.
Objectives The objectives of this area of the inspection were to verify that welding procedure specifications used for production welding were controlled and used in accordance with NVD QA program and NRC and ASME Code requirements.
2.
Method of Accomplishment The preceding objectives were accomplished by:
Review of the QAM Sections 11.7.2 and 13.0 Revision J, a.
titled " Welding Material and Welding."
b.
Observation of welding activities at three (3) welding
- stations, c.
Examination of the following shop orders: 56820, 52837, 53412-40, and 57680.
d.
Examination of welding procedures, used in witnessec welding operations, Nuclear Procedure Eulletin (NP8) numbers 53 Revision C, 5-12-58 Revision E, and 5-1-G.
Review of the current list of qualified weldors and system e.
used to maintain qualifications.
f.
Review of certification data for welding caterials, rod heat numbers 902507000, 902594002, 081173, 5141', 58539-F81931, and 57957-F81423. Flux 231. Ht. No. 03 SIC 1523.
g.
Review of the Generic Index list for approved drawings and procedures.
h.
Examination of material storage areas and review of welding materials aoproval and release system. Review of control log.
i.
Review of temperature control and electrode segregation in electrode ovens.
j.
Review of calibration status of meters on weldinp equipment utilize.d for operations witnessed.
k.
Discussions with cognizant personnel.
3.
Findings a.
Deyiations See enclosures items B-C.
b.
pnresolved Items None.
E.
Exit Interview The inspector met with management representatives (denoted in para-graph A) at the conclusion of the inspection. The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection. The management representa-tives had no comment in response to the items discussed by the inspector.
The inspector reviewed the format to be used by the company when responding to inspection findings which require corrective action to be initiated.
. DetailsSection II (Prepared by D. E. Whitesell)
A.
Persons Conticted
- Mr. W. R. Wnaaton, Director, Quality Assurance
- Ms. N. J. Mcare, Engineer, Quality Assurance
- Mr. P. L. Millinazzo, Manager, Fabrication Inspection Mr. G. A. Willis, Value Engineering Specialist Mr. Jose Murillo, Assembly & Test Mr. Larry Gill, Nondestructive Examiner, Level II
- Attended Exi t Meeting.
B.
Special Inspection 1.
Background Information On November 3, 1978, the Resident Inspector at Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO), reported that the disc on a 3/4 inch globe valve, had separated from the valve stem. The cause was attributed to failure to tack weld the disc to the retaining out. Since several 3/4" and 1" globe valves had been supplied to ANO by the Nuclear Valve Division - Sorg-Warner (NVD), and since a outine inspection had previously been scheduled, it provided he opportur.ity to gather additional information concerning this problem.
2.
Objectives The objectives of this inspection were as follows:
a.
Determine the cause and generic implication of this problem, b.
Ascertain the corrective action implemented to prevent recurrence, and c.
Ascertain what steps have been, or will be taken, O correct tne specific problem.
3.
Method of Accomolishment The foregoing objectives were accomplished as follows:
a.
Cj use and Generic Imolication The probable cause, scope, and generic aspect of the problem was discussed with the vendor's personnel involved with the proble.n, and the following information was obtained.
_g.
(1) At the time these assemblies were fabricated, NVD subcontracted its welding operations, including the tack weld of these specific sub-assemblies, which meaat that it was necessary to interrupt the assembly operations, and remove the parts from the assembly area to complete the required tack welds, and then return the sub-assemblies to the assembly area to complete the assembly of the valve. These sub-assemblies were sent to welding and received from welding in lots of several (6-50) sub-assemblies at a time.
(2) To determine the scope of the problem, an audit of the serial number (S/N) log book for part number 70346 (disc) was performed to obtain the total number of these discs that had been manufactured, and the N-Code number (Material Heat No.).
The part number and N-Code number, enabled the data processing system to be searched to obtain the S/N of the completed valve, the customer's name, and the quantity of completed valves that had been shipped to the customer's nuclear facility.
The results of the S/d log book audit and computer search resulted in the following information:
(a) A total of 2029 discs (part No. 70346) had been manufactured, accepted, and assigned a unique serial number.
(b) The disc was only used in the disc and stem assembly number 70348, which in turn was used only in 3/4 inch ard 1 inch globe valve assembly.
(c) The only customer for this specific valve was Bechtel Power Corporation, San Francisco, for Arkansas Nuclear One, Purchase Order Number 6600-M-2114-B; and Bechtel Power Corporation, Gaithersburg, Maryland, for Millstone Point, Unit 2, P0 No. 7604-M-408, dated December 18, 1974.
(3) An audit of the welding records, which provided evidence that the required tack weld and been acccmplished, was performed. The weld records for all but 91 of the sub-assemblias were found. The 91 sub-assemblies for which weld records could not be found became suspects.
(4) Additional records, such as Shop Orders, Stock Tickets, Material Revi u Reports, receiving and inspection records,
. were checked and evidence was obtained that 45 of the 91 suspected assemblies had been tack welded. Of the 46 suspect assemblies, 45 had been shipped to AN0 and one to Millstone.
(5) An flVD representative was sent to ANO and of the 45 suspect assemblies shipped, 7 were inspected and only two (including the original discrepant valve S/N 703) were found to have not been tack welded. The inspec-tion of the other 38 valves is continuing and NVD will be notified concerning the findings.
(6) NVD has notified Northeast Utility that one of the two 1" globe valves shipped to Millstone, may not have been tack welded. They identified the valve as being a 1" stainless steel globe valve, serial number 4096, Bechtel Equipment No. - HV-4193 and has requested the site personnel inspect this valve to ascertain whether the tack weld required to stake the nut to the disc had been performed.
(7) The inspector verified the foregoing discussions by:
(a) Reviewing the S/N log to verify that uniqua serial numbers are assigned to each part manufactured, and that the N-Code number for each serial number is-recorded.
(b) Reviewing the computer print-out, to verify that the customer's identification, identification and description of the item, the serial number of the valve, the quantity and date shipped, and the facility to which they shipped, can be obtained from the data processing system by inputting the part number, and N-Code numbers.
It was verified that the computer prints this information.
(c) Reviewing the customer's P0 and Design Specifica-tion (DS) number 6600-M-2114 for Arkansas Power, and P0 and DS number 7604-M-403, for Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 2, to verify the quan-tity of 3/4" and 1" globe valves ordered.
(d) Reviewing the Assembly Drawing number 70348, Revi-sion A, dated August 2,1973, to verifi that part number 70346 (disc) was incorporated in the disc-stem assembly number 70348. Also to verify whether the tack weld requirem at was called out, and the welding procedure specification (WPS) to be used was identified.
It was verified that tack weld in 3 places was specified to be accomplished using WPS number NPS 70106.
(e) Reviewing NPS 70106, Revision L dated September 10, 1976, it was found to be a general WPS for joining P8 material which was approved to be used by sub-contractors in conjuction with the WPS parameters established by NPB-5-1 for GTAW process.
It was verified that flPBS-1 was oroperly qualified in accordance with Section IX of the ASME codes.
(f) Review of copies of letters from NVD to Ari0 dated October 31, 1978, reporting the serial numbers of all (45) suspected valves shipped to ANO, and from flVD to Northeast Utilities, dated flovember 8 1978, identifying by serial number and Bechtel's tag number, the one (1) suspect valve that had been shipped to Millstone Point.
Also a copy of the letter from flVD to At!0, dated December 13, 1978, requesting an update of infor-mation concerning the status of AN0's inspection of its suspect valves.
(g) Findings It was determined from the documents reviewed and discussioni with NVD cognizant personnel that this problem was not generic to any nuclear facilities other than Arkansas Nuclear One, and Millstone, Unit 2.
In discussing the probable.:ause of the problem with the NVD cognizant personnel, it was learned that the probable can e was two-fold. One reason was attributed to the fact that the disc and nut threads were designed as rict.t hand threads, which permitted line pressure to provide sufficient contact friction between the disc nut and stem shoulder to permit the disc nut to come unscrewed from the disc. Had the threads been left-handed, any binding friction would have resulted in the disc nut being tightened in its proper position.
The second cause was attributed to the fact that the operation of the assembly of this specific disc-stem sub-assembly had to be interrupted and the assembly sent out for the tack weld operation to be performed.
These sub-assemblies were sent to and received from welding in lots of several (6-50) at a time.
It is postulated that inter-ruptions in the inspection of the assemblies could have resulted in a few of the assemblies not being properly inspected.
It is also postulated that a few sub-assemblies that were to be sent out for tack welding, may have inadvertently become com-mingled with a lot of sub-assemblies which had been received from welding and inspected and found acceptable.
b.
Corrective Action to Prevent Recurrence During the discussion concerning the corrective action that had been, or would be, taken to prevent the recurrence of a similar problem, the inspector was informed that in 1977 the design engineers had redesigned this disc-stem assembly.
The new design eliminates the disc nut and the tack weld operation, and retains the disc to the stem with a ring key inserted into machined keyways in both disc and stem. Once the key is in place it cannot be removed.
Assembly Drawing number 78036, dated September 1977, was reviewed to verify that the disc (part number 70346) was used in the new disc-stem sub-assembly. The new design eliminated the disc-nut, the threading operation of the disc and nut, and the tack weld operation, with the neces-sary inspections for each operation.
It can be postulated that the new design will permit t'.e assembly operations to progress in nomal operation sequences without interruption, or the need to remove the sub-assemblies from the assembly area, and will materially reduce, if not eliminate, the possibility for unacceptable sub-assemblies being inadvertently incorporated into a finished valve.
c.
Actions to Correct the Problem The inspector was informed by NVD that the corrective action proposed by NVD gives the customer the option of making field repairs, at NVD's expence, of all valves with missing tack welds, oc the valves can be returned for NVD to make the tack welds. The two valves with missing tack welds found at ANO were repaired in the field. Millstone had not reported to NVD as to whether the suspect valve was found to be acceptable, or the tack weld was missing.
. It was ascertained that NVD had not received an update report as to the status and results of the inspection of the suspect valves that had been ship)ed to ANO.
There-fore, the total number :f valves with missing tack welds has not been determined.
NVD also requested that both AND and Millstone provide NVD information concerning the " Safety Related" function of each valve found with missing tack weld, so that NVD may evaluate its reporting responsibilitics under 10 CFR 21.
d.
Deviations None.
e.
Unresolved Items None.