ML19261B154

Informs of Status of Application by Transnuclear,Inc to Export 2.597 Kg Highly Enriched U to Canada,Amended in July to 5.297 Kg.License Should Be Granted

ML19261B154
Person / Time
Issue date:	01/25/1979
From:	James Shea NRC OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS (OIP)
To:
References
SECY-78-688A, NUDOCS 7902140081
Download: ML19261B154 (57)

Text

w SECY 78-633A January 25, 1979 COMMISSIONER ACTION For:

The Ccmmissioners From:

James R. Shea, Directcr Office of International Programs g [cf.

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Executive Director for Operations J. 9

Subject:

APPRO'/AL OF PROPOSED LICENSE TO EXFORT HIGH-E.' RICHEC URANIUM TO CANADA ( APPLICATION XSNM01339 - SECY-78-6ES)

Purcose:

Ccemission review of proposed issuance of sucject license to Transnuclear Incorporated.

Review Dates:

60-day period expires on February 17, 1979.

120-day period expires on April 18, 1979.

Discussion:

In June 1978, Transnuclear Incorporated subnitted an application for a license to export 2.597 kilograms of uranium, enriched to 93.3% U-235, to Canada.

In July, tne applicant amended the recuest te 5.297 kilograms uranium, enriched to a maximum 93.3%,

centaining a.912 kilograms of U-235.

The materiM, in the forn of uranium metal,.E1 be shipped to CERCA in France for fabrication into 24 MTR-type standard fuel assemblies fcr use in the McMaster University Nuclear Research Reactor at

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THIS DOCUi1ENT CONTAINS POOR QUALITY PAGES The McMaste-nuclear reactor (MNR), a 5 megawatt MTR open pool facility, is used for training,research and materials testing.

The reactor uses 34 standard fuel assemblies made uo of curved-plate MTR-type fuel consisting of 93.35 enricned uranium alleyec witn aluminum.

The Executive Branch has noted that:

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McMaster is seeking celivery of a-leas: 12 fuel M.

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, Discussion:

o Twenty-four assemblies are sufficient for about (continued) 2.5 years of normal reactor operation.

Fuel fabrication lead time ranges from 6 to 12 months.

o On hand at present are 3.142 kilograms of unirradiated 92.9',' enriched fuel; 6.699 kilograms of 93.15% material are now 'a the core.

There is no irradiated fuel in storage as 26 irradiated fuel assamblies were shipped to the Savannah River Plant on March 28, 1978 for reprocessing.

In a June 8,1973 letter from McMaster l'niversity (Appendix C), the staff was informed that upon witha awal of U.S. Nuclear, Inc. frca the manufacture of MTR-typ a fuel assemblies in March 1977, operations of the McMaster reactor were modified by a reduction in power to a basic level of one megawatt,and operating time was reduced frem 168 hours0.00194 days <br />0.0467 hours <br />2.777778e-4 weeks <br />6.3924e-5 months <br /> to 120 hours0.00139 days <br />0.0333 hours <br />1.984127e-4 weeks <br />4.566e-5 months <br /> par week. These changes were made to stretch out the lifetime of existing fuel supplies until an alternate supplier could be found.

The June 8 letter also noted that "the amount of unirradiated fuel in inventory shall never be allowed to contain more than five kilograms of U-235, thus placing the MNR facility in Security Category II as designated in the IAEA document INFCIRC/225.

Prior to delivery of new fuel, sufficient unirradiated assemblies in stock shall be activated, if necessary, to the required degree to remove them frcm the unirradiated category such that the U-235 content of new fuel delivered and of the unieradiated fuel on hand shall not exceed five kilograms."

In response to our July 7 and 18 requests for views, the Executive Branch has (1) concluded that issuance of the proposed license would not be inimical to the interests of the US, including the ccrmon defense and security; (2) confirmed that the material will be subject to the terms and conditions of the US-Canada Agreement for Cooperatf or and during the time it is in France, the US-EURATCM Additional Agreement for Ccoperation; and (3) noted that Canada has adhered to the provisions of its Agreement for Cooperation with the United States.

Although the quantity of material for this export (Category II) does not constitute a trigger-level quantity for physical security review, the cumulative amcunts of high-enriched uranium at CERCA do.

The physical security program in France, hcwever, is considered adeouate to protect trigger quantities.

. Discussion:

The written assurance (as required by 10 CFR 110.43(a)) that (continued) physical security measures providing as a minimum protection comparable to that set forth in INFCIRC/225/Rev.

1., will be maintained has not been obtained frcm the Government of France.

Instead, France has provided written assurances based on the Suppliers Group physical security guidelines.

The acceptability of these written assurances is now being considered by the Commission (SECY 78-563, Confidential and 78-563(C), Confidential).

Although the written assurance that physical security measures comparable to those set forth in INFCIRC/225/Rev. I has not been received, based upon US Government personnel visits and other information, the staff has verified that the physical protection measures in France are indeed comparable to that set forth in INFCIRC/225/Rev. 1.

As a result of these considerations, and in light of the fact that France is only an intermediate consignee, it is the staff's view that final licensing action need not be delayed until final resolution of the written physical security assurance issue.

Furthermore, in view of the urgency attached to this case, the staff recommends that the Commission grant an exemption to the requirement of 10 CFR 110.43(a) if this issue remains unresolved beyond January.

'With respect to the physical security program in Canada, the staff notes that a physical security determination for trigger quantities is not required in this case since the export would not cause the cuculative amount of unirradiated high-enriched uranium at Mc% ster to exceed 5 kilograms.

Nonetheless, as noted in the State Department memorandum, the Executive Branch has concluded that the US has assurance that Canada is committed to providing adecuate physical security for its nuclear programs, including a level of protection compatible with that envisioned by the recommendations in IAEA INFCIRC/225, Rev. 1.

Furthermore, the Government of Canada has provided the written physical security assurance as required by 10 CFR 110.43.

Application XSNM01339 does not differ in its merits frcm previous exports of high-enriched uranium to :anada approved by the Ccmmission. Upon review of the Executive Branch analysis and the supportive documentation, the staff concurs in the Executive Branch's determination that the export would be consistent with the recuiremencs of the Atomic Energy Act and the NNPA of 1973 and that the proposed export would not be inimical to the cccmcn defense and security of the US.

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Discussion:

The staff has also examined the question of whether it wculd (continued) be possible to operate the McMaster reactor on uranium of lower enrichment. The June S letter from McMaster notes that if the enrichment limit were restricted to 205, the MNR could not operate at all unless changes were made in either fuel element or reactor design.

Enrichment reduction requires use of very high uranium density fuels currently under development. Argonne National Laboratory recently conducted a study which concludes that while the MNR is a candidate for converting to reduced enrichment fuel, such conversion using current fuel fabrication technology would result in a significant reduction in reactor performance and increase the fuel cycle costs. Argonne suggests that the USG consider supplying the '4NR with HEU for the current and subsequent loadings until the high uranium density fuel with reduced enrichment has been demcnstrated and is com-mercially available.

Canada, as a party to the NPT, has accepted IAEA safeguards for its nuclear installations. On January 23,1979, the Executive Branch verbally informed the staff that a facility attachment for the McMaster reactor has been ccmpleted.

With respect to the CERCA facility in France, the staff notes that France, as a nuclear weapcn state, is not subject to IAEA safeguards. Although France will niuntarily submit facilities to Agency safeguards, tne staff is not aware that the CERCA facility is under a facility attachment.

EURATCM safeguards, nevertheless, will continue to apply to the CERCA facility.

The application at hand replaces a previous applicaticn (XSNM01040) submitted by U.S. Nuclear, Inc. in November 1975.

Following U.S. Nuclear's cessation of fuel fabrication operations in early 1977, that application was withdrawn, leaving McMaster University without a fuel fabricator. The University i=ediately reduced reactor operations to conserve fuel while a new fuel supplier could be acquired. McMaster spent several months attempting to obtain another U.S. source of supply, to no avail. The CERCA facility in France has been engaged for this purpose. McMaster expresses an urgent need for new fuel to continue reactor operations and to allow a return to higher operating power levels, and the staff believes that no furtner reasons exist at this time to delay issuance of the procosed export license.

The following documents are forwarded for Commission review of the subject application:

(1) staff review and conclusion that the prc::osed export meets statutory recuirements (ap-pendix A); (2) Executive Branch views of December 13, 1973 recccmending issuance ( A::pendix 3); (3) acclicaticn of June 29, 1973, and supplementary letters of July 22 and June S.1973

( Apoendix C); and (2) copy of procosed license (Appendix D).

. NMSS Technical Review:

Information concerning IAEA implementation in Canada is contained in Table III of a November 29, 1978 memorandum to Commissioner Gilinsky.

No additional information has been received with regard to Canada.

Classified Appendix E (to be transmitted separately) provides a description of the basis for Table III and the relaticnship to the proposed export. Concerning the implementation of EURATOM and/or IAEA safeguards in France, NMSS has no specific information on the adequacy of current EURATOM safeguards implementaticn nor the details of the possible IAEA safeguards program. Witn respect to physical security, MMSS has reviewed tne programs in Canada and France and fcund then =dequate for the purpose of the export.

Recommendation:

That the proposed license be issued to Transnuclear Incorporated.

Coordination:

GELD has no lecal objection.

NMSS views on physical protection adequacy and the effectiveness of IAEA/

EURATOM safeguards to deter and detect diversicn in Canada and France are as stated above.

k Ja s R. Shea, Director Office of International programs

Enclosures:

As stated DISTRIBUTICN:

Commissicners Commissicn Staff Offices Executive Directer for Operaticns Secretariat NOTE:

Ccamissioner comments shculd be provided directly to the Office of the Secretary, by c.c.b.

Fridav, February 2. 1979 Ccomissien staff cffice comments, if any, should be submitted to the Commissioners NLT January 31, 1979

, with an information copy to the Office of the Secretary. If :ne pacer is of sucn a nature :nat it requires additional time fer analytical review and comment, the Commissicr.ers and the Secretariat should be acorised cf wnen comments may ie excected.

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APPENDIX A

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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 JAN 15 '979 MEMORANDUM TO THE FILE STAFF CONCLUSIONS REGARDING PROPOSED LICENSE TO EXPORT HIGH-ENRICHED URANIUM TO CANADA (XSNM01339)

In June 1978, Transnuclear applied for a license to export 2.597 kilograms of uranium, enriched to 93.3% to Canada.

In July the applicant amended the request to 5.297 kilograms of uranium, enriched to a maximum 93.3%,

containing 4.942 kilograms of U-235.

The material, in the form of uranium metal, will be used in the McMaster University Nuclear Research Reactor (MNR). The MNR is the only full scale research reactor in a Canadian University and is a national facility.

In response to our July 7 and 18 requests for views, the Executive Branch has (1) concluded that issuance of the proposed license would not be inimical to the interests of the US, including the common defense and se:urity; (2) confirmed that the material will be subject to all the terms and conditions of the Aarsament for Cooceration hotwaan the US and Canada, and during the time it is in France for fabrication at CERCA, the US-EURATOM Additional Agreement for Cooperation; and (3) noted that Canada has adhered to the provisions of its Agreement for Cooperation with the United States.

These views and license application analysis by the Executi.e Branch were forwarded by the State Decartment analysis of December 18, 1978. Confir-mation of the applicability of the US-Canada Agreement for Cooperation was also set forch in the August 21, 1978 letter from the Atomic Energy Control Board of Canada. The September 7 letter from the Delegation of the Comnission of the European Ccmmunities confirms the applicability of the US-EURATOM Additional Agreement for Cooperation.

The staff has reviewed the subject application in light of the co.isidera-tions below:

o Safeguards.

The export will be subject to IAEA safeguards in Canada.

As a party to the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), Canada has undertaken an obligation to accept IAEA safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of Canada, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

In view of this, the staff believes that criterion (1) of the NNPA is met.

% France is not a party to the NPT, but is committed under the US-EUPATOM Agreement to use US-supplied material for peaceful purposes cnly. As a nuclear-weapon-state, France is not subject to the IAEA-EURATCM Safeguards Agreement and IAEA safeguards are not required under Article III(2) of the NPT.

However, EUoATOM safeguards, which may be regarded as equivalent to IAEA safeguards, will be applied to the material while in France.

Furthermore, the State Department memorandum notes that seme, if not all, US supplied material and material oroduced through the use thereof may be subject to IAEA safeguards under Gov /1875, a France-EURATOM-IAEA Agreement approved by the IAEA Board of Governors on February 13, 1978 which has not yet entered into force. The agreement provides for the applicaticn of IAEA safeguards on source or special fissicaable material to be designated by France in facilities or parts thereof within France. Therefore, it is possible that IAEA safeguards ultimately may be applied to the proposed export by virtue of an appropiiate designation by France when its agreement is implemented.

In view of the fact that the material covered by this export may be transferred within the European Community without specific US approval, the staff notes that the material will also be subject to EUPATOM safeguards. The ncn-nuclear weipons state (NNWS) members of EURATCM, along with the United Kingdom, (a nuclear weapon state) as parties to the NPT have undertaken the obligation to accept IAEA safeguards on all scurce or special fissicnable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within their territories.

The State Department memorandum also notes that (1) the IAEA-EURATCM safeguards agreement has come into forca and these subsidiary arrangements not yet ccmoleted are now beinU negotiated to bring IAEA verification into practical effect; and (2) the IAEA has the right to apply the verification procedures of the safeguards agreement prior to ccmpletion of the subsidiary arrangements.

[ No Nuclear Explosive Use.

Also, as a party to the NPT, Canada nas uncertaken tne coligations not to receive the transfer frem other nuclear any transferor whatsoever of nuclear wea:: ens er explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explcsive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistan e in the manufacture of nuclear weapons er other nuclear ex;1csive cevices. The staff therefore, believes that criterion (2) of the NNFA is ret.

% In addition, under the US-EURATOM Agreement, the Ccmmunity guarantees that (1) no material, including equipment and devices transferred pursuant to the agreement, ant'. no source or special nuclear material utilized in, recovered from, or produced as a result of the use of materials, equipment or devices transferred pursuant to the agreement, will be used for atomic weapons, or #ar research on or development of atomic weapons, or for any other miiitary purpose; anc (2) no materia: transferred pursuant to the agreement will be transferred to unauth rized persons.

o Physical Security.

Although the quantity of material for this export (Category II) does not constitute a trigger-level quantity for physical security review, the cumulative amounts of high-enriched uranium at C'.RCA do. The physical security program in France, however, is considered adequate to protect trigger quantities.

The written assurance (as required by 10 CFR 110.*3(a))

that physical security measures providing as a minimum protection comparable to that set forth in INFCIRC/225/

Rev. 1, will be maintained has not been obtained from the Government of France.

Instead, France has provided written assurances based on the Suppliers Group physical security guidelines.

The acceptability cf these written assurances is now being considered by the Commission.

Although the written assurance that physical security measures comparable to those set forth in INFCIRC/225/Rev. 1 has not been received, based upon US Government personnel visits and other information, the staff has verified that the physical protection measures for Category I Material in France, are comcarable to that set forth in INFCIRC/225/Rev.1.

If the Commission is unable to resolve the written physical security assurance issue an exemotion frcm this requirement will be issued pursuant to authority under 10 CFR 110.10(a).

With respect to the physical security program in Canada, the staff notes that a physical security determination for trigger quantities is not required in this case since the export would not cause the cumulative amount of unirradiated hich-enriched uranium at McMaster to. exceed 5 kilograms of U-235.

Nonetheless, as noted in the St&te Department memorandum, the Executive Branc:t has concluded that the US has assurance that Canada is committed to providing adequate physical security for their nuclear programs, including a level of protection ccmoatible with chat envisioned by the recomendations in IAEA INFCIRC/225, Rev.1.

Furthermore, the Government of Canada has provided the written physical security assurance as recu' red by 10 CFR 110.43.

% o Retransfer and Recrocessing. The US-Canada Agreement prohibits the rfransfer of any material supplied by the US, beyond the jurisdiction of Canada without US approval to such retransfer, and then only if it is within the scope of an agreement for cooperation between the US and the other nation or group of nations. Similarly, it prohibits the transfer of special nuclear material produced through the use of US-supplied material or facilities withcut US approval and the US-Canada exchange of notes confirms this understanding.

Thus, it is the staff's view that criterion (4) of the NNPA is met.

The US-Canada exchange of notes also confirms the understanding that any reprocessing or alteration of US-supplied material shall be performed only upon prior approval of the US.

The staff therefore concludes that criterion (5) of the NNPA is met.

With regard to retransfer and reprocessing in EURATOM, criterion 4 of the NNPA requires, among other things, that prior approval of the Unitad States be obtained for the retransfer of US-supplied material, facilities or sensitive technology, and special nuclear material.

Criterion 5 of the NNPA requires that the U.S. be given the right of prior approval over the reprocessing of US-supplied material and SNM produced through the use of such material.

By note dated July 7,1978 EURATOM agreed to negotiations as called for in Section 404(a) of the NNPA, leading to renegotiation of the US-EURATOM Agreement for Cooperation.

The State Department advised the Commission of the receipt of this note and its determination that the note constituted an agreement to renegotiate on July 20, 1978.

(Inder Section 126(a)(2) of the NNPA, exports to EURATCM are, therefore, exempted from criteria 4 and 5 of the NNPA until March 10, 1980.

o Sensitive Technology.

The proposed export does not involve sensitive tecnnology.

As more fully developed in its memorandum dated December IS, 1978, the Executive Branch has determined that Canada and France currently meet all the criteria of P.L.95-242, including the requirements of Section 126(a)(1) and the specific criteria of Sections 127 and 128 and that Canada and France have adhered to all the provisions of their Agreements for Ccoperation with the US.

The staff is of the opinion that EUPATOM meets criteria (1), (2), and (3) of Section 127 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended by the NNPA, or their equivalent.

Under Section 126(a)(2), exports to EURATCM

% are exempted from criteria (4) and (5) until March 10, 1930.

Therefore, the staff concludes that issuance of the proposed license would be consistent with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act.

The Executive Branch has also concluded that fueling the McMaster reactor is compatible with US nonproliferation objectives at this time since conversion to less that fully enriched or even low-enriched fuel, using current fuel 'abrication technology, would result in a significant reduction in reactor performance and increase the fuel cycle costs.

In view of all the considerations above, and as required by Section 57 of the Atemic Energy Act and 10 CFR 110.44, the staff has also concluded that the export to be made pursuant to the proposed license (1) would be subject to the US-Canada Agreement for Cooperation, and during the time it is in France, the US-EURATCM Additional Agreement for Cooperation; and (2) would not be inimical to the common defense and security of the United States or constittue an unreasonable risk to the public health and safety.

R. N al Moore Senior Licensing Officer Export / Import and International Safeguards Office of International Programs 9

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EXPORT LICENSE APPLICATION ANALYSIS XSNM-1339 Country:

Canada Transaction:

The export of 4.942 kilograms of U-235 contained in 5.297 kilograms of metallic uranium enriched to 93.3 percent to be fabricated into fuel elements by Companie pour L' Etude et la Realisation de Cem-bustibles Atomiques (CERCA), France Applicant:

Transnuclear, Inc.

Applicant's

Reference:

Misc. 230 78-135/S Date of Application:

June 29, 1978 Purpose of Exports This highly-enriched uranium is to be shipped to France for fabrication into 24 MTR-type standard fuel assemblies fur' elements for the McMaster University Nuclear Research Reactor at Hamilton, Ontario, Canada.

McMaster is seeking delivary of at least 12 fuel assem-blies before February 23, 1979 in order to restore the re-actor from its current reducr.d duty cycle to its normal power level and operating schedule.

Twenty-four assemblies are sufficient for about 2.5 years of normal reactor opera-tion.

Fuel fabrication letd time ranges from 6 to 12 months.

The McMaster Nuclear Reactor is a 5 megawatt MTR open pool facility for training, research and materials testing.

It uses 34 standard fuel assemblies made up of curved-plate MT3-type fuel consisting of 93.3 percer" enriched uranium alloyed with aluminum.

On hand at present are 3.142 kilo-grams of unirradiated 92.9 percent enriched fuel; 6.699 kilo-grams of 93.15 percent material are now in core and there is no irradiated fuel in storage as 26 irradiated fuel as-semblies were shipped to the Savannah River Plant (SRP) of USDCE on March 28, 1973 for reprocessing.

CANADA -- EXPORT LICENSE APPLICATION ANALYSIS 1.

Applicable Agreement for Cooperation The proposed export is subject to all of the terms and conditions of the Agreement f - Cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Canada concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy which entered into force on June 15, 1955, as subsecuently amended.

This fact has been confi: ed by a letter from the Atomic Energy control Board or Canada, a copy of which follows the description of the license application.

The provisions of this agreement are amplified by an exchange of notes between the two governments dated November 15, 1977, copies of which are enclosed. ' (y-c,- e ;; _ '

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s Canada has adhered to all provisiens of its agree-ment with the United States.

The intermediate transfer of uranium to France for the manufacture of fuel elements is subject to all of the terms and conditions of the Additional Agreement for Cooperation between the United States and the Euro-pean Atomic Energy Community (EU RATCM), as amended.

This was confirmed in a letter from the Delegation of the Com-mission of the European Communities, a copy of which is enclosed.

The European Atomic Energy Community has adhered to all provisions of this agreement with the United States.

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Extent to Which Export Criteria Are Met A.

Section 127 Criteria As provided in Section 127 of the Atomic Energy Act, the following criteria govern exports for peaceful nuclear uses from the United States of sourc e material, special nuclear material, production or utilization facilities, and any sensitive nuclear technology:

Criterion (1)

"IAEA safeguards as required by Article III(2) of the Treaty will be applied with respect to any such material or facilities proposed to be exported, to any such material or facilities previously exported and subject to the applicable Agreement for Cooperation, and to any special nuclear mate-rial used in or produced through the use thereof."

Canada is a Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and deposited its instrument of rati fi-cation on January 8, 1969.

Canada's NPT safeguards agree-ment sith the IAEA entered into force on February 21, 1972.

Thus, IAEA safeguards are applied in Canada to all materials or facilities proposed to be exported, as well as to any such material or facilities previously exported pursuant to the U.S.-Canada agreement for cooperation and to any U.S.-

supplied special nuclear material used in or produced through the use thereof.

This understanding is confirmed in the exchange of notes between the Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada and the Ambassador of the United States, signed en November 15, 1977.

Therefore, it is the Executive Branch view that cri-terion (1) is met with respect to Canada.

Since France is a nuclear-weapon-state (NWS), Article III(2) of the Treaty does not require the maintenance of IAEA safeguards in France.

Therefore, it is the Executive Branch view that criterion (1) is met with respect to this export to France.

Nevertheless, the material proposed for export will be subject to safeguards while in France.

Under Article V of the Additional Agreement for Cooperation of 1960, as amended, which incorporates Article XI, XII and Annex 3 of the November 8, 1958 Joint Prcgram Agreement, as amended, the Community undertakes the respcnsibility of establishing and implementing a safeguards and centrol system designed to give maximum assurance that any material supplied by the

US or generated from such supply will be used solely for peaceful purposes

(" EURATOM Safeguards System").

The Com-munity is bound to consult and exchange experiences with the IAEA with the objective of establishing a system reasonably compatible with that of the latter.

The Com-munity is respo.sible for establishing and maintaining a mutually (with respect to the US) satisfactory and effective safeguards and controls system in accordance with stated principles.

EURATOM safeguards are being applied to material and facilities previously exported and subject to the US-EURATOM Cooperation Agreements and to special nuclear material used in or produced through the use thereof.

These agreements require these safeguards to be applied to such material and facilities and to the proposed ex-port and special nuclear material produced through its use.

Furthermore, some -- if not all -- U.S.-supplied source and special nuclear material and special nuclear material generated through the use thereof may be subject to the application of IAEA safeguards under GOV /1875, an agreement between France, EURATOM and the IAEA which was approved by the IAEA Board of Governors on February 13, 1978.

This agreement has not yet entered into force, however.

The agreement provides for the application of IAEA safeguards on source or special fissionable material to be designated by France in facilities or parts there-of within France.

This concept is different from that of the U.S.

and U.K. " Voluntary Offers," under which the IAEA is permitted to apply safeguards on all nuclear facilities, excluding only those facilities associated with activities with direct national security signifi-cance.

However, a French official has indicated that, in principle, the French offer is no more limited than that of the U.K.

and the U.S.

but that, in practice, a higher proportion of material in France may be excludad because of its proportionately larger number of facilities which process materials for both military and civil use.

It is, therefore, possible that IAEA safeguards ultimately may be applied to the proposed export by virtue of an ap-propriate designation by France when its agreerent is im-plemented.

In view of the fact that source and special nuclear material may be transferred within the European Ccmmunity without specific approval of the United States, it is also necessary to consider how crir.erion (1) is met with respect to the other member states ef the Community.

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The agreement calls for the parties to make every effort to achieve the entry into force of the " Subsidiary Arrangements" within 90 days of the entry into force of the agreement proper.

Extensicn of that pericd recuires agreement accng all the parties.

During the period since February 21, 1977, the parties have been negotiating the Subsidiary Arrangements, in-cluding Facility Attachments for the 205 facilities and locations "'ich currently come within the purview of the agreement.

The general part of the Subsidiary Arrange-ments has been completed and is in effect.

As of September 15, 1978, approximately 145 of the Facility Attachments have entered into force and serve as the basis for IAEA safeguards activities at such facilities.

About 15 others had been agreed at the negotiating level and the remainder were under active discussion.

The parties have agreed to several extensions of the period for ccmpletion of the Subsidiary Arrangements, in accordance with the agree-ment.

The latest such extension runs until February 20, 1979.

INFCIRC/193 provides, as does every safeguards agree-ment with the IAEA pursuant to Article III(l) of the NPT, the right to the IAEA to apply in all non-nuclear weapon states party to such an agreement, the procedures laid down in the agreement, including inspections, as soon as the acreement enters into force, even if the Subsidiary Arrangements are not in force.

The agreements do not impose on the IAEA any limitations of access, or fre-cuency, of these inspections prior to completion of Facility Attachments (see e.g.:

Articles 71 and 76 of INFCIRC/193, increasingly exercised this right to apply procedures and inspections.

In summary, it is clear that each of the non-nuclear weapons state members of EURATOM is a party to the NPT, has fulfilled its obligation under Article III(l) of the NPT, and has an agreement in force with the IAEA in accordance with Article III(4) of that treaty under which the IAEA has clear rights, which are being exercised, to apply safeguards in all relevant facilities.

Therefore it is the Executive Branch view that cri-terien (1) is met with respect to all NNWS cf the Ccemunity.

Criterion (2)

"No such material, facilities, or sensitive nuclear technology proposed to be experted or previously exported and subject to the applicable Agreement for Cooperation, and no special nuclear material produced through the use of such materials, facilities, or sensitive nuclear tech-noloc.v, will be used for any nuclear ex=.1osive device or for research on er development of any nuclear explosive device."

As a party to the NPT, Canada is cc==itted not to develop nuclear explosive devices for any purpose.

Therefore, it is the view of the Executive Branch that cri-terion (2) is met.

With regard to the two nuclear-weapons states (NWS) of the Cc== unity, the UK and France, the proposed export and any special nuclear material produced through its use, if trans-ferred to a NWS member, is subject to the continuing applica-bility of the US-EURATOM Agreements for Cooperation.

Article XI(l) and (3) of the November 8, 1958 Joint program Agree-ment, as amended, which is incorporated into the Additional Agreement for Cooperation by virtue of Article V of the Additional Agreement, provide that "no material, including equipment and devices, transferred pursuant to this Agree-ment" and "no source or special nuclear material utilized in, recovered frc=, or produced as a result of the use of material, equipment or devices transferred pursuant to this agreement...

will be used for atc=ic weapons, or for research or develop-ment of acc=ic weapons or for any other military purpose."

The US--with the support of = cst other major nuclear supplier states--censistently has taken the position that nuclear explosive devices are "atc=ic weapons", within the meaning of this guarantee, regardless of the intended end use of such devices.

Both the UK and France, as members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, have agreed as a matter of national policy to authorize the export of trigger list items "Only upon formal governmental assurances frc= recipients ex-plicitly excluding uses which would result in any nuclear explosive device" (underlining supplied) and have eacn nc: fied the IAEA to this effect.

This undertaking, to-gether with other statements and actions, evidences the fact that both nations equate any nuclear explcsive device, regardless of function, as essentially equivalent to an "atc=ic weapen".

Therefore, it is the Executive Branch view that the equivalent of criterion (2) is : net with respect to WS of the CcIn:nunity.

Criterion (3)

" Adequate physical security measures will be maintained with respect to such material or facilities proposed to be exported and to any special nuclear material used in or pro-duced through the use thereof.

Following the effective date of any regulations promulgated by the Commission pursuant to Section 304(d) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, physical security measures shall be deemed adequate if such measures provide a level of protection equivalent to that requirtd by the applicable regulations."

In 1975, a team of U.S. Government experts visited Canada for an exchange of views on physical security including visits to facilities at which highly-enriched uranium is stored and utilized.

The fixed site reviews included:

(1) security forces, (2) physical barriers, (3) detection and alarm ap-paratus, (4) communication and response capabilities, (5) ac-cess and exit controls, (6) accountability and reporting pro-cedures and equipment for protecting nuclear materials in transit were also examined.

The Team judged Canada's physical protection system, equip-ment and procedures, including transportation security arrange-ments, adequate to physically protect the type of material (i.e. highly-enriched uranium) requested in the license ap-plications.

In the exchange of notes between the Secretary of State for External Affairs and the Ambassador of the United States, sicned on November 15, 1977, Canada confirmed the under-standing of the U.S.

that both parties..."have committed themselves to ensure that adequate physical protection is applied to all such materials or equipment taking into ac-count the measures set forth in INFCIRC/225 (Revised).

Moreover, on August 24, 1978 the Canadian Eepartment of Exrernal Affairs provided the following assurance in the form of a note to U.S.

Embassy Ottawa:

"The Department of External Af f airs presents its com-pliments to the Embassy of the United States of America and has the honour to acknowledge receipt of its note no.

208 of July 31, 1978.

"The Cepartment has noted that paragraph 3 of the Nu-clear Supplier Group Guidelines, to which the Government of Canada and the United States subscribe, indicates that the implementation of physical protection in a recipient country is the responsibility of the Gover.cment of that country.

"In this regard, the Department confirms that physical security measures providing, as a minimum, a level of protection comparable to those set forth in both the Nuclear Supplier Guidelines and the International Atomic Energy Agency document INFCIRC/225/Rev 1, will be maintained with respect to nuclear materials and equipment exported to Canada from the United States and with respect to nuclear material used in or produced through the use of such mate-rial and equipment."

Therefore, it is the view of the Executive Branch that criterion (3) is met with respect to Canada.

It is the judgment of the Executive Branch that each member state of the Community has established physical se-curity measures which, as a minimum, meet those recommended in the IAEA's INFCIRC/225/Rev.1, "The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material".

In addition, all states in the Community (except Den-mark, Ireland and Luxembourg) also are members of the Nu-clear Suppliers Group and, as such, have agreed to levels of protection consistent with INFCIRC/225/Rev.

1, to be ensured with respect to nuclear materials and equipment and facilities containing these materials, which are detailed in transmissions of the Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines to the IAEA.

During 1975, a team of U.S.

Government experts visited France for an exchange of views on physical security with concerned government authorities and to visit certain major government and private industry facilities at which nuclear material is processed, stored and utilized, including the Cadarache Nuclear Research Center.

The fixed site reviews included (1) security forces, (2) physical barriers, (3) de-tection and alarm apparatus, (4) ccmmunication and response capabilities, (5) access and exit controls, (6) accounta-bility and reporting procedures, and (7) physical security organization.

In the area of transportation, procedures and equipment for protecting nuclear materials while in transit were examined.

The U.S. teams judged the French physical protection system, precedures and equipment for transportation security adequate to physically protect the material subject to this license application.

The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs by note dated September 11, 1978 delivered to U.S.

Embassy, Paris, pre-vided the follcwing assurances regarding the maintenance of physical security protection:

"The French Government con-

firms that a level of physical protection at least equal to that defined in Annex B of the Nuclear Supplier Guide-lines published by the IAEA under reference INFCIRC/254, will be assured for all nuclear material and installations imported from the United States as well as all nuclear material used or produced by use of such material and installations.

"The French Government can equally confirm that the same level of protection is assured for material and in-sta11ations already imported frc= the United States."

The Executive Branch by le tter to the Ccmmission dated October 6, 1972 expressed the view that the above-cited French assurance meets the requirements set forth by the Cc= mission under Part 110.43, pursuant to Section 304(d) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, in that the levels of protection called for in the Supplier Guidelines were derived directly from INFICRC/225/ Revision 1 and were specifically designed to achieve levels of protection consistent with the physical protection measures in INFCIRC/225/ Revision 1.

Therefore, it is the view of the Executive Branch that criterion (3) is met with respect to France.

Criterion (4)

"No such materials, facilities, or sensitive nuclear technology proposed to be exported, and no special nuclear material produced through the use of such material, will be retransferred to the jurisdicticn of any other nation or group of nations unless the prior approval of the United States is obtained for such retransfer.

In addition to other requirements of law, the United Stetes may approve such retransfer only if the nation or group of nations des-ignated to receive such retransfer agrees that it shall be subject to the conditions required by this section."

Article XI C.

of the 1955 U.S.-Canada Agreement for Cooperation, as amended, stipulates that:

"No material including equipment and devices, or any Restricted Data transferred to the Government of Canada or authorized persons under its jurisdiction pursuant to this Agreement will be transferred to unauthorized parsons or beyond the jurisdiction of the Government of Canada except as the Com-mission may agree to such a transfer to another nation or group of nations, and then only if the transfer of the material or Restricted Data is within the scope of an Agreement for Cooperation between the United States of America and the other nation or group of nations."

In the exchange of notes between the Secretary of State for External Affairs and the Ambassador of the United States, signed on November 15, 1977, Canada confirmed the U.S.

understanding that, "(1) Source materials, special nuclear materials, production facilities, utilization facilities, equipment and devices, and heavy water, here-after transferred pursuant to the 1955 Cooperation Agree-ment, and all materials transfarred pursuant to the Agree-ment embodied in the Exchange of Notes which entered into force on March 25, 1976, or as may otherwise be agreed and any special nuclear materials produced therefrem including subsequent generations derived from such special nuclear materials shall not be transferred beyond the jurisdiction of either party to the Agreement, unless the prior approval of the other party is obtained;"

These articles give the U.S.

an unqualified approval right over the retransfer of material from Canada supplied

by the U.S. or produced through the use of such material and allow retransfers only if it is determined to be with-in the scope of an agreement for cooperation with the re-cipient country.

Therefore, it is the Executive Branch view that, as the U.S. has the right of prior approval over retransfer of U.S.-supplied material and material produced through the use of U.S. material, criterion (4) is met with respect to Canada.

Article XI(2) of the November 8, 1958 Joint Program Agreement, as amended, which is incorporated in the Additional Agreement for Cooperation, as amended, by Article V of the latter Agreement, provides that no material (including equip-ment and devices) may be transferred beyond the control of the EURATOM Community, unless the United States agrees.

Article 1 bis D of the Additional Agreement for Coopera-as amended, provides that special nuclear material pro-tion, through the use of US-supplied material may be exported duced to any nation outside the Community or to a group of nations, provided that such nation or group of nations has an appro-priate Agreement for Cooperation with the United States or guarantees the peaceful use of the produced material under the United States.

safeguards acceptable to the Community and The European Community's interpretation of this language--as from in an April 15 letter to the Department of State set out Fernand Spaak, Head of the Delegation of the Commission of the European Communities--is that the European Community Supply Agency prior to any proposed transfer will consul t wi th the United States to find out whether, in the view of the US, nuclear the proposed recipient of such produced special material has an Agreement for Cooperation with the United States which is " appropriate".

During discussions with representatives of the Community held in Washington on November 1, 1978, the European Com-to Article 1 bis D munity confirmed that material subject could not be transf erred outeide of the Community unless

.ient countries or group of the U.S.

agreed that the rec nations had an appropriate Agreement for Cooperation with the U.S. or safeguards acceptable to both parties.

Therefore, it is the Executive Branch view that, with regard to the proposed export and special nuclear material produced through its use, criterion (4) is met.

With respect to transfers within the.Cc=munity, it should be noted that the use of the words " group of nations" in criterion (4) makes clear that no retransfer consent right is required within a group of nations under this cri-teria.

With respect to this provision, the Senate report states:

"It should be noted that under the US-EURATOM Agreements, the US does have a right of prior approval on retransfers of certain material outside of the EURATOM Community.

It should also be noted that paragraph 4 does not require prior approval with respect to trans-fers within the EURATOM Community, con-sistent with US policy of treating that Community as a (single) entity."

The Congressional intent not to require US consent rights for transfers within the Community is also clear in Section 123 a.(5) of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended, since it re-quires that the US seek a guarantee "by the cooperating party" (which in this case is EURATOM as a whole).

It should be noted that since the US-EURATCM Agreements for Cooperation were authorized in accordance with Section 124 of the Atomic Energy Act, the Commission may continue to issue export licenses until March 10, 1980 pursuant to the authority in the first proviso in Section 126a(2), even if criterion (4) were not met.

Criterien (5)

"No such material proposed to be exported and no special nuclear material produced through the use of such material will be reprocessed, and no irradiated fuel ele-ments containing such material removed from a reactor shall be altered in form or content, unless the prior approval of the United States is obtained for such reprocessing or alteration."

In the exchange of notes between the Secretary of State for External Affairs and t',e Ambassador of the United States, signed on November 15, 1977, Canada confirmed the under-standing of the U.S.

that, "(3) Source materials and special nuclear materials transferred hereafter pursuant to the 1955 Cooperation Agreement, and all materials transferred pur-suant to the Agreement embodied in the Exchange of Notes which entered into force en March 25, 1976, or as may other-wise be agreed, and special nuclear materials produced through the use of such materials shall not be reprocessed, and irradiated fuel elements contained in the foregoing special nuclear materials removed from a reactor shall not be altered in form or in content by either party, unless the prior approval of the other party is obtained for such re-processing or alteration."

As the November 15, 1977 exchange of notes clearly dces not allow reprocessing or other alteration of

'J.S.

origin material without the agreement of the United States, it is the view of the Executive Branch that criterien (5) is met.with respect to Canada.

EURATOM is expressly exempted from Criterion (5) by vir-tue of Section 126(a)2 of the Act for a period of two years frem March 10, 1978, since the Department of State notified the Nuclear Regulatory Ccnmission en July 20, 1978, that EURATOM has agreed to negotiations with the United States as called for in Section 404 (a) of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Act of 1979.

However, this exemption in no way derogates from the rights which the United States has under the US-EURATOM Agreements for Cooperation.

Criterion (6)

"No such sensitive nuclear technology shall be ex-ported unless the foregoing conditions shall be applied to any nuclear material or equipment which is produced or con-structed under the jurisdiction of the recipient nation or group of nations by or through the use of any such ex-port sensitive nuclear technology."

The proposed export does not involve the transfer of sensitive nuclear technology.

Criterion (6) is, therefore, not applicable.

B.

Section 128 Crit < ion Section 128 a.(1) of the Atomic Energy Act establishes the following additional criterion:

"As a condition of continued United States export of source material, special nuclear material, production or utilization facilities, and any sensitive nuclear technology to non-nuclear-weapon states, no such export shall be made unless IAEA safeguards are maintained with respect to all peaceful nuclear activities in, under the jurisdiction of, or carried out under the con-trol of such state at the time of the export."

As,a Party to the NPT, Canada has accepted IAEA safe-guards on all its nuclear activities thereby satisfying this criterion.

As France and the United Kingdom are nuclear weapons states, this criterion is not applicable to them.

As Parties to the NPT, all non-nuclear weapon states that are members of the European Atomic Energy Community have agreed to accept IAEA safeguards on all their nuclear activities.

Therefore it is the Executive Branch view that this criterion is met with respect to the non-nuclear weapon member states of the European Community.

3.

Additional Factors A.

Safecuards Implementation The IAEA Secretariat has noted in its Special Safe-guards Implementation Report that with regard to nuclear material subject to IAEA safeguards, wt ? e some de-ficiencies exist in the system, no diversion of a signifi-cant quantity of nuclear material was detected in any of the 45 states in which inspections were carried out.

Al-though recognizing the need to correct existing deficiencies in safeguards implementation, the Executive Branch has no reason to believe that the IAEA Secretariat's report is not valid.

In the light of this and other factors associated with the proposed export, the Executive Branch believes the framework of commitments, assurances, and safeguards is adequate for the purpose of this export.

3.

Special Non-Proliferation and Other Foreign Policy Considerations In a report dated August 1, 1978 Argenne National Labor-atorv exe.rrssed the view that the McMaster Nuclear Reactor (MNR) is a candidate for use of reduced enrichment fuel when this fuel is available either cc==ercially or through DOE subcontractors.

The MNR currently utilizes U-Al alley fuel containing 21 wt-% uranium enriched to 93.15% in U-235.

The currently qualified maximum uranium content in fuels produced with pcwder metallurgr techniques is 42 wt-% U.

With this 2

maximum loading, the enrichment of the fuel used in the MNR can be reduced to about 45% with little detriment to reactor performance or fuel cycle costs, and no changes in the mechanical or hydraulic design of the reactor.

Since the fuel currently beine, souc,ht bv MNR (UAlx-Al with 21 w/o U, 93.3%

enriched) is tv uc fabricated with powder metallurgy techniques, the change-over to feel with 42 wt-% uranium loading and reduced enrichment (approx. 45%) might more easily be acccm-plished when this fuel has been demonstrated and is ccamercially available.

Enrichment reduction to less than 20% requires use of very high-uranium-density fuels currently under development.

Wit? 20% enriched uranium in powder metallurgy fuels (UALxAl or U308-A1), a loading of approximately 75 wt-% U is necessary to maintain core reactivity without redesign of the fuel assembly.

Present long-term goals of the RERTR fuel develop-ment program are to increase the uraniam leadings to 60 wt-%

U in UALx-Al fuel and to 70 wt-i U in U303-Al fuel.

Thus, design =cdifications to the MNR fuel assemblies and core thermal-hydraulics may be necessary to maintain performance levels and fuel cycle costs with 20% enriched uranium in pcwder metallurgy fuels.

The optimal fuel element design for MNR cperating conditions might be studied in a joint program between ANL and McMaster University.

If development of ultra-high density (approx. 95 wt-% C) uranium fuels such as U3Si and C-10Mc is successful, enrichment reduction to less than 20% might be accceplished without redesign of MNR fuel assemblies or core thermal-hydraulics when this fuel has been demonstrated and is available commercially.

Argonne suggested that the U.S.G. might consider supplyinc

. tut with EEU for the current and subsequent loadings until the high-uranium-density fuel with reduced enrichment has been demonstrated and is commercially available.

4.

Inimicality Jude.ent Based on review of the proposed export, it is the judgment of the Executive Branch that the proposed export will not be inimical to the co=.on defense and security, and that the license should be issued.

4 APPENDIX C

i's A Et 1 U.S. ATCMIC EN ERGY ~ Coul551CN F* rm oppoved (2 6h 33,,c co 7, Budget Bureau No.

10 CF R 33. 40 d a sh.ng to n, v. C.

40545 APPLICATION FOR LICENSE TO EXPORT NSNMO BYPRODUCT, SOURCE, OR SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERI AL Sue"f ts sn Trtphcate Carefully Read 1 ts:~actuans an Back 1 C ATE Cr Appt C a TION 2 A ppuC AN T'S A EF E AENC E NC 3 CCUNTAV CF ULTiM AT E O ES TIN ATION June 29, 197E Liis'Y.W30 78-135/S Canada

& N AME OF A ppuC AN T

~

'JL71M A TE C ONSIGNE E IN FC A E LGN COUN tav Transnuclear, Inc.

D'"""""

sTaEET AOORE55 ICMaster University Nuclear Feactor 5:'05 Leesburg Pike Hamiltan, Cntario CiTv. ST A TE. ANo :in CCet Canada L854K1 Falls Church, 'E.rginia 22041 4 IN T E EiME DI A T E C ON SIC,N E E IN F CR EIGN C OU N T A Y Ice te mene 7 lF p';nCH A$ EA eq F Q e EI GN C 0 y q T 4 y t$ Q Tr8 E 84 TM A N sid iidress. l/ sarne as titimate consigner, state "Sarae. ")

ULT:M A TE CONSION E E. GivE N A ME AN O AOC #ESS. ~

Cerca, 41 Avent.e I'.ontaigne

'f/ sar"e. state "Sar'e ">

Paris, France

- "Same" S f a) C a N TITY To et $reippEO is) CouMConTV O ESCR e pTION (Irac!We chemical 2-J p hsical /m. %r stre:a! e.:.cl*ar armi rd i See ac tructions on back)

Merod.ct mate

• ai also nectly esotopte contert; t! tn a ars sce, tie-:st!y the det ice. matt.!act:sce, and moael norher.)

2.507 Kg U Uranium in the form of Uranium L'.etal.

This caterial will be 2.423 Kg U235 packaged and supplied by Union Carbide, Corp., Oak Fidge,TN for shipment as soon as license is i ssued.

(c) $H.D Df NG A N D P AC KIN G PR OC Y.CU M E S (79qusrea for special *Lcl ear ma;ertal. See snutr*.ctions on bact. )

I.A.E.A. Certificate of Ocmpetent Authority nurber USA /5274/AF

, EN: usEcrC:MuccitiEs C:vEar : ev T-is A p=u: A TiCN (cescreer ialv. s tatt n e., -ae, t. l ae

.,at.ce a.,, -ay.. a, t. r,s. s..,,,, c r ts f e e he

• Ft.te'ed. Or the nal:.r* Gl t *e r*seGrCb t at u1Al be p er/ owe 2.1 t See E Nst*tetiv'Is On Act lor C ectal f*l c.fM *atm %.

Will be used as fuel for the McMaster Nuclear Peactor GNR) it Hamilton, Ontario, Canada (See supporting Cata attached).

to The arriicant, and any of ficial executin e this certificate on behalf of the applicant named in ! tem 4. certify tnit enis 2, rb c ation is prerated in conformity wita Title 10. Code of FeJeral Reculaticn s. Parts 30 and % tif for bs product materish or P irt 10 c i f for unrec material), or Part 70 tif for special nuclear material), and Pirt 'l (far transrort of ra.lioactive material, if arrlicablet and char all in form ation con tained herein, inciadin.t any su rriem en t s irtat hc I hercro is triac and werect to the best at c'wir k aowled.;c and belief.

This material is privacely cyrgd.

Please issue for period of:!cN.,d.!*/ ear Transnuclear, Inc.

.... ~

frc date of issuance.

Wp nca t a =~ed ' I tc~ ~

Vicki MatsCn / ;/

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• e 6-i.t n a W3 re i n g: 13 U.S C Section 1001: Act of June 25, 1943: 6 2 Stat. 74?: mu es it 2 ermin al aben se to mne a dibu y bi se seste, ment or represen tation to env decarttn ere or cQency of ?%e United Ste'es a s -o any matter..ema it s iuri sd. c tee n

4 M

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_2 June 29, 1978 Mr. N. Moore Nuclear Regulatory Cc:=:ission Office of International Programs 7735 Old Georgetcwn Foad Bethesda, :taryland 20014 Fe : Export License Application for 2.597 Kg U-TN: 78-135/S (:tisc. 2 3C )

Export License Application for 2.571 Kg U-TN 78-135/S (Misc. 229)

Cear Mr. Mcore:

Enclosed are two ( 2,' Export License Applications, in triplicate, for your handling, each application is accc=panied by supportive documents.

Thanking you in advance for your help and cooperation.

Sincerely,

. /,,

' ?,

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. '[-.'

Vicki Matsen Traffic Ccordinator

Enclosure:

?ao (2) applications for Export License Two (2) Ccpies of supporti>/e docu.ents

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July 24, 1975

$ 5 M M C 13 ~1 "1

)\\c oo TO Mr.

N.

M0 ore

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Cffice of International Programs 7735 Cid Georgetown. cad Sethesda, Maryland 20014 Re:

Application for 2xpert License for 2.597 K-U at 93.3 rercent v

T'I Ref: 73-135/S (Misc.-230)) (Reference our application dated July 5, 1973)

Dear Mr. Mccre:

"his letter is being written to request that the quantity of nacerial as listed on our original application dated July 5,1978, (i.e.

2.597 Kg U, 2.423 Kg C235 at a =aximum of 93.3 percent c235) he amended to read as folicws :

5.297 Kg U 4.942 Kg U235 93.3 percent All other infor.ation on our original application remains unchanged.

Thankin2 you in advance for your help and cecperatien.

Sincerely, shD & ~

^

. ~.

Vicki Matsen

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~r, SKYLIN E OENTER. !:*5 LEE 58URO P1 AE. F ALL'., ONURCH. vtRGINI A 041 TELEPwCN E: 7*.3.cc.2454 0A A LE: TP. ANSNUC FSCH. TELEX: Ik k63

McMASTER uni \\'ERSITY e

M35d NUCLEAR RE ACTOR e

k9 H AMILTON tir, O NTA RIO, CAN AD A 4

L85 4K1 f tli, HONE (416)w 525-9140 - Ext. 4279 July 21, 1978, Miss V.

Matsen, Traffic Coordinator, Transnuclear, Inc.,

Skyline Center, 5205 Leesburg Pike, Falls Church, Virginia 22041, U.S.A.

Dear Miss Matsen:

This is to confirm and to authorize en this date our request to Transnuclear, Inc. to withdraw Applicatica Misc. 229 78-135/S re a license to export highly enriched uranicm in the form of fuel elements and to amend item (8) of Application Misc. 230 78-135/S from 2.597 kg U and 2.42 3 kg U-235 to read 5.29 7 kg U and 4.942 kg U-235 Yours truly, l

Ihtb h ek

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d J3: /ec John 3.

c cugall, Eeac cr Superintendenc.

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McMASTER UNIVERSITY I

NUCLEAR REACTOR h,Ed

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HAMILTON E ONTARIO CANAD A L85 4K1

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TELEPHONE (41.),samuins 525-9140 - Ext. 4279 July 24, 1975

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?!. Tioo re,

Senior Licensing Of ficer, O f fi ce of International Programs, U.S. Iluclear Regulatory Commission,

'i AS H I :GT0 :, D. C. 20555, U.S.A.

De a r 't r.

toore:

With reference to our letter of July 21st, the estimated cost of AI-produced fuel, exclusive of uranium contained therein, should have been 525,000 (Can.) cer element.

listed at >

CERCA-produced fuel, speci fied in similar terms, is expected to be about one-fifth of that amount.

Item (c) in the application data report sent to you on June 8, 1973 is a retransfer recuest for 24 elements to be consistent with the chance in ITe application referred to in item (b).

Yours truly, i,.

[h l%: E a:$5 2

John 3. McDougall, Reactor Superintendent J 3:1: dm IICIiVED U.S.,%:

S OL ?S FM 2 33 J U :.U /? p:37

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N E.EMAI'L$7GRg3

e MCMASTER UNIVERSITY M'3i NULLEAR REACTOR

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HAulLTON s. otJARio, CAN AD A 4CD

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TtLEPMOa I (416) Jammes

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525-5140 - Ext. 4279 Il O ~ e o ~

July 21, 1978,

Ir.

N.

Moore, Senior Licensing Officer, Office of Internatienal Programs, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commissien,

Washington, D.C.

20555, U.S.A.

Dear Mr. I:

ocre:

As shown in the enclosed letter to Transnuclear, Inc.,

we are having them withdraw the application referred to as item (a) in the data report sent to you en June 8, 1978 in support of the applications.

In addition, we are having them amend the application referred to as item (b) in the report, changing the quantities listed in item 8 (a) frcm 2.571 kg of U and 2.399 kg of U-235 to 5.297 kg U and 4.942 kg U-235 respectively.

These latter quantities allcw for 3% scrap and icsses in the fabricatien of 24 standard elements which contain a ncminal centent of 196 g of U-2 35 each and a maximum variacion of : 2%.

The reason for the change is that we cannot afford the estimated cost of fuel prcduced at Atcmics Internaticnal a:

> S25,000 (Can.) del vered to :::R, exclusive of uranium ccsts.

e are forwal_ine two extra ccpies of the

R Eesearch Report under separate ccver.

Yours truly, m

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I J3 :/ec Jchn 3.

IcCcugall, Reacter Superintendent, cc: :. Js V.

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Transnuclear, Inc.

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O Atc.NtASTER UNIVE RSITY 8

d'M i NUCit AR REACTOR

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H AsuttON t6. ON T ARIO, C AN AD A g

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525-9140 E::t. 4279 June 8th, 1978,

r. tl. :: core,

Genior Licensing Officer, Office of Internaticnal Proc. rams, U.S. :uclear Regulatory Commission,

':ashington, D.C.

20555, O.S.A.

Cear l1r. :Icore:

The data which we sent to yc,u en ': arch 2 0, 1978 te re developed to support an applicatica for an c:.gort license frcr EG & G Idaho, Inc. relating to IIEU in fuel assettlics to Le fabricated bv Atomics International (AI) and subse wentiv.

shipped to our reactor f acility in !!amilton.

After four rentho of waiting for the Idaho cersonnel to c:.gedite said apsl:. cation L

we..c re advised to engage our cwn a".nlicant since AI d:.d not L

':.sh to be an applicant and neither USDCE-ID or EG

& G Ic

.o Oro perritted to be applicants.

Finally, af te r ano t'.e r threc eks of d:.ligent '.:ork,'te *e e able to arrar.ge for 'J ran s;.acle a r Inc. to submit an applicaticn thrcugh their ialis Ch..rch, V:rc. inia office.

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s.53 o. 9 ;,3 l' a g o.

u. t,..,.u

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earlier, for a nuri.or of reasons.

First, to-ause cf ccst,:n-c._.

sideratirns,'e zich to arrange f abricatica of re ;u_ rca fuel st.pplica by t'.to suppl:.e: s :

AI in California and J KA in 'rance l'" n c e ! the data covers two annlications for e:pcrt o'~

HE; 'rca s

t he U.:. A.

Secondly the decision han Lt en.aGo for I.

".c a r l'n i ve rs.:. t" to purchase a l l 110 0 f re n A t o'. ii c : n e t o. ',.

2 e:

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t. ' t a. c o.l.T c -...e n '."' P .".'.n.'

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".a r ch 1978 to S I'.P in Scuth Carcl:na for r e.: i :.. c e s... n o.

m r

Lelong to Ic::aste: University and w:.ll sut.ol a l.ao:.: t u J i, e - the total requests for e:. port, p.,.

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1.. e

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a m.~.o

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i '. : 3.

.~;.c.

' r ch Pe p s r t dated January, 19 73 zhich acc:r,.,_e.. the

?%rch 20, 1978 data sub:,insion.

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. We do not know when the application for an e:: port permit referred to in item (b) en page one of the attached su' scission vill be made by agents for CERCA.

We have not rece' ad the

.orcposal premised by Mr.

J. Coumerc cn his visit 5 are on April 26th but expect it shortly.

Plence proceed with th'c iten (a) application as soon as possible.

As you arc well aware, our ef forts to obtain replacement fuel has been thwarted repeatedly to the pcinc where we cannot plan a firm schedule of desired reactor operations.

You indicated on. April 28th that the iten (b) a.nn. lication r when received, would prococd in the re'.iew process even though the French government had not made the required accomnodaticn to U.S.

government requirements but that final approval of the license could not be forthcoming until agreement between the governmen ts had been reached.

Thank you for your advice and co-operaticn, Yours truly,

(

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fit:

N :.tte

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V JU:!;ec John D.

IIcCougall, Reactor Suce rintendon.

Enclosurc (1)

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rs.

B.

Josephs (Transnuclear, Inc.)

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Data Supuertinc Acclicaticns f o r C:. cort Licenses for Michi, Enriched Uranium (I!EU) Relatinc to the ".c" aster University "uclear Reactor at Ilamilton, Cntario, Canada.

The data presented herein are in support of:

(a) ene application by Transnuclear, Inc. of Falls Church, Virc. inia for an excott' license for hEU in 12 ::TF.-type r

standard fuel assemblies, to be fabricated by the Atomics International Division of Rockwell International in California, for the McMaster ::uclear Peactor (:4U R) at liamilton, Ontario, Canada, and n-(b) one application by Pechiney Develcpment Inc. of Me., York

City, N.Y.

or by Transnuclc tr, Inc. of Falls Church, Vircinia for an export license for IIEU to ce shipped to r

France for fabrication into 12 ::TR-type s tandard f uel J

/

assemblies by Companic pour L' Etude et la Realisation de ConLustibles Atomiques (CERCA), for the :*.NR at IIanilto n,

and (c) one retransfer request for the ship:.:ent of the lieu in the 12 completed fuel assemblies listed in iten (b) above and of the IIEU in any scrap left ever from the fabrication of the essemblies listed in ite:.1 (b) above, fron CURCA in France to l'.:IR at liamilton, Cntario, Canada.

The above applications and retrans fer request are to raplac_

a previous application, identified cy re fe rence aurbe rs XS:..:-10 4 ar.d S-531, which had coen submitted to the US::RC on. cre:. ;er 15, 1976 by U.S.

Nuclear, Inc. and subsequently withdrawn en July 15, 1977 without the knowledge of the foreign connic nee.

The p re vi c.,

application ecvering the lieu in a batch at 20.:ew standard fuel a c u e:au lic a scheduled for fabricatica and dell /ety my.;e ce ri;e r,

19 77 to the : NR in liamilton, Catario, Canada, had been ander r..:e cutive uranc.'. review from Decarber 21, 1976 unti the un-fortunate cancellaticn seven mcnths later.

Upcn withdrawal of U.S.

.;uclear, Inc. frcm t:.c anufactare of MTR-type fuel asse:blies in " arch, 1977, cycraticus

.et_

redified at the "': R facility, first si a reducticn in pc er tc a basic level of one rea.awatt inre d i a cc i.e and secondi' L.. a

- 2 reduction in operating time frcm 168.ours per *eeck to 120 hours0.00139 days <br />0.0333 hours <br />1.984127e-4 weeks <br />4.566e-5 months <br /> pe r wee' s tarting about mid-19 7 7 These changes ecre :ade to y

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ab e : _.. prcposed fabricaticn batch could be replaced by an al-a t. p.,.4 e. o -

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u requ. red at it'R as scen as'p'essible to allcw a return to hicher cueratinc power levels to provide the neutron f lu:<c a s

L J

necessar.v for much of the research work perforced there.

Cccas-icnal periods of operation at five rega.eatts are strictly 1.mited in uuratica until :r. orc ~ fuel is assured.

Atcmics International, California, is setting ap a facility to :aanuf acture MTR-type fuel assemblics for Training, Ecsearch and Test (T RT) reactors in the United States and Canada.

IIcwe ve r postulated costs for delivered fuel assc:-l: lies, exclusive of the value of the I!CC contained therein, are escimated to be almost a factor of ten over these paid for assembl.es purchased in li?4.

CERCA in France can produce identical fuel acaemblics at a del:...

ccut, again exclusive of the ccntained ::CU, cf about fcur to five 4...

u,.

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vu--.

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There is currently no new fuel being fabricated for TG althouch tentative arrangements are.;eing sCught for the anufacture of needed fuel asserblies which are the subiect of the an.c li c a ti C n s J

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k the two f abrication batches discussed earlier is 3.0G9 ;g centai.

2.863 kg of U-235 or almost 60% of the current total requests.

T balance of requirements will be purchased from USDOE.

B.

The fuel inventory necessary to assure continuity of reactor operation at a basic power level of 2.0 tiU five days per week wit short periods of 5.0 !W as required for special research is as follows:

Purchases of new fuel in the past have been in batches of 27 to 36 assemblies.

The tentative current proposed purchases that are the subject of the re ferenced applicatiens aro. for 2 4 standard assemblies.

This numbe r is su f ficient for slightly more than 2.5 years of the proposed schedule of operation.

The araount of unirradiated fuel in inventcry should not be allowed to drop below two to three assemblies as an emergency backup in case of cladding failures in asserrlies at or shortly af ter installation in the core.

It is anticipated that six to niae standard and two control assemblics of the e:.13.

stock of new fuci currently en aand will be placed in core ;ervic by the delivery date of the new fuel purchases.

The seven extra control assemblies, which were purchased as part of a rrcu.a of ten a few years ago to reduce unit costs, eliminate the need to purchase control asse.nclies at this t i r.'c.

The amo un t of unirradiated fusi in inventory shall never ce alicwed to contain more than fi/c kilegrars of U-235, thus glacin the

'.'R facility in Security Cater.cr.v II as de s i c, n a te c in the I TtC A docu:c.en t I:ECI RC/2 2 5.

Prior to delliery of new feel, sufficient unirradiated asnomblics in 'tock shall cc a c t i'. c t e u,

if neccusary, to the required J.: gree to r e:- vo "' tera Cs'.

the unirradi.ited category such that the U-2 35 ca n 's_ a t o f a c., f ue l delivered and of the unir radia te d fuel cn hand shall c.ct a: cacc fi-/c i: 21cg rams.

Peroval of fuel frcm the core

.en U-235. rn-up in s

individual asseralics has reached 3 5 'c -4 0 i cver a.ericd ci the last five fears has resulted in a ccre sica cf 24 to

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Current and Planned :'eactor-Use Prom in A.

The data presented in the MNR Research Peport dated January 1978, a copy of which is enclosed herewith, provide a ecmprehensive revieu of current and planned reactor use orograms as reu.uc s ted unde r Section A.

B.

The report also describes the varicus reactor facilities and.:.ost of the other data reques,tcd under Section 3 C.

Essentially acne of the programs involving beam tubes, tangential tubes scecial facilities or simple target irradiaticas 9

producing very short-lived radioisotopes could be accor.modated at AECL reactors at Chalk River, Ontario, or at Pinawa, "anitoba; mostly as the result of unavailability of the required facilities and partly due to the inconvenience factor, if available.

Limited programs involving simple activation of targets producing relativelv. icng-lived radicisotopes might bc cssible at the Chalk River reactors but at considerable ccst and inconvenience.

The :-:cMaster f acility is the only full scale researen reactor in a Canadian university and is a national facility.

Statement of Imoact of Limits en Uranium EnricPment A.

If the enrichment limit were restricted to 20%, the ::':R reactor could not cperate at all unless changes were "ade in citi.or fuel element or reacter design.

According to recent studiesl2 by Dr.

R.A.

Lc'.. i s of Argenne ::aticnal LaLoratory, even i

usina uranium enriened to 201-301 and CA1..-Al meat at the

.s hie.icst currenti"1 oroven uranium icadino density (421 bv.

i a

'te i gh t) a greater nurber of fuel cler. cats wculd be required in the core.

This would result in a possible 501 degraduation of rea cto r pe r f err?.nce and a 501-1001' increase in fuel cycle cauts.

3 As indicated in A abcve, it is e:;ected that the reactor could not be made critical esing 201 enrichec uraniur in fuel asserblies of current design.

Thus, t h e :"2: P facility ucula :_ e forend to close down.

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t'ac level is Ecpt at approximately five feet abcVe the pocl ficcr

level, The primary water pump returns the water to the pool system via the shell sides of two 2.5-megawatt heat exchangers.

The flow through the core is maintained as required to insure that fuel plat ~e surf ace tempe ra tu re n never reach the boiling

.coint of 'zater, i.e. 240c? at the elevatica cf the centerline of the core.

At five megauatts, with a flow rate of 2000 -

2100 U.S.

gym, the temperature rise across the core is 160F -

17 F.

'The heat picked up by the primary water is transferred to the secondary water passing through the tubes of the heat exchangers.

Circulation of the water by pump in the s e con da ry water system to two 2.5-megawatt cooling teuers dissipates the heat to the atmosphere.

~

Flcw through the core at poue.r levels of 100

'U and above is dcunuards to piping leading to a holdup tank.

Iie re a 7-10 7-minute passage time allows - N produced in the cooling water as it passes through the core to decay before the tater enters the heat exchangers in the accessible purp recm.

At power levels below 100 kW, cooling can be by thermal convectica currents tc a s s i n c. through a fla>nger valve in the plenum charter attached to the under side of the grid plate and thence up..*ards through the fuel assemblics.

Ecactor support facilities are shown in Figure 3.1 en Loage 18 of the ";R Pescarch Recort.

There is a 5 "- thick x 30" x 30" slab of lead adjacent to the,.est face of the core, whica is not :., h e v n in the figure.

This cans that t :. s L mp os c a le tc increase the grid plate sine on all sides of the core.

Core size can Le expanded en the

.n re s e n t c. rid cniv. in the southerly directicn (towards tcp of figure) and that c: pansicn is limi *.e d to eight asserblics.

The graphite and berylitum a wcb bes on the scuth face of the core are provided. r. h cont:.al he: :s to a c cc:e.cd a t e suple : rradiation facilities.

B.

The MTR f ue l as serblics are of two r.ain tjpes-standard a s s e rb l ie s and cnntrol a s s e mb lie s.

All have curved 'uel plates suppcrted in t.co grcoved side plates, 0.ljS" thich, and e c; fc. is provided with a bcttom end fitting to suppcrt the a n _ e.-b i f ;n ene

/

of tl.e openings in the 5"-thick grid plate.

The individual fueled plates are 0.050" thick with a 0.020"-thick meat made up of 211 uranium, by weight, uranium-aluminum alloy.

Cladding is aluminum.

Each plate contains 12.25 grams 3.0% of U-235 distributed uniformly over a width of approximately 2.4 inches an d a length of 23.6 inches.

Uranium enrichment is curren tly at least 931 initially.

The standard f uel acce:nbly i.s. made up of 18 curved plates in the stack:

plates 1 and 18 being aluminum only, containing no fuel, and plates 2 to 17 centaining in total 196 grams 2%

of U-235 The cooling gap between plates is 0.123" t 0.010" giving a maximum stack heic.ht of 3.018".

Assembly uidth is 2.996" maximum and overall length (height) is 34.625".

The control fuel assembly has cnly 9 curved plates, all fueled, in stach grooves 1 to 5 and 15 to 18 Two straight guido plates are located in the central area of the stack to provide a channel in uhich the control absorber operates.

The cooling gaps between curved plates are the same as in the standard assembly but the gaps adjacent to the guide plates are irregularly chaped.

The outside dir:.ensions of the cross sectional area of the control a.suembly are the s a r,'e as in the standard assenbly but the overall length (he igh t) is greater, 37.5", due to the check ebsorbe r seat at the top which is provided to accor r odate the con t rol absorbe r.

A partial fuel asserbly, cne of which is still in use, is idere:ical to a standard asserialy c:: cept that shore is fuel only in plates 1 to 9, the other nine being aluninum d u mn.y (ncn-f uc ie d) plates.

The f uel plates are made by the picture frame t e chn i clue in which the appropriately siacu uranium-aluminun alloy fuel butten is fitted into the contral craning of an a l uni n um frame.

This corbination is then placed ;etween tuo layers of al ur n nun cladding und the whole asnerbly is rolled, first at an ele.ated te. W rature and finally in the cold state, to achieve the des' red final thickness.

Integ rity c f the Lend bet'.:Nn clan.ing and fuel r: cat is deterr.ned by a bl2< te r test in ;hich the fuel 0

plates are heat 0d tC app rC S.~.Fa t e ly 000 r fcr a pericd of c.e hour.

_ 9 _

The various plates (fuel, dummy and guido) are fastened into the grcoves in the side plates by a swaging process.

The bottcm end fitting is welded to the fuel section as is a lifting handle at the top of the standard fuel asserbly.

The shock absorber seat is fastened to the top of the centrol fuel assembly with machine screus.

All fuel f abricators of ::!R fuel asse:rblics have been U.S.

firms s t artine..ith S.vivania-Corning 'uclear Coruoration in i

1958, then ::ational Lead Ccepany, United I;uclear Corporatien, Gulf United and finally U.S.

uclear, Inc. in 1974 The next proposed fuel fabricators are Atomics International (AI) and C1'RCA, each of whom uses uranium aluminide fuel

r. eat instead of an alloy.

To accorrodate the requircrents of a nurbcr of dif ferent reactor f acilities at-minimum cost, AI has recem-mended that cer=cn materials and dimensions be used herever co-ble.

This vill rec.uire these I': R fuel asserblies to be

?

wide instead of 2.996" as at present.

C The initial critical loading in April, 1959, comprised 11 standard asserblies and six centrol asserblies ith fresh fuel o f 9 31 en rich:r.cnt.

The reasured critical mass as 2650 g of U-235.

P.aximum burn-up cbjective was 25% in 1964.< hen the first shiprent of assemblies irradiated to that average level 'tas

.ade to the Idaho :' alls USAEC nrocessinc..olant.

Core size was then 25 assem'olies:

19 standards and six centrols.

3ase pcwor icvel of 2 : /.! started in late 19G4 The' barn-up cbjective.as raised to 3 TS - 3 5 3 by 1968 and to 351-40% bv 1970 to le n c. the n the f ue l cv. ele therebv re du cin c. the 3

. rec.uency c:. rue nurc.tases and t.ne nrocess:.ng c:. arractatec a s s e:rb lie s.

' lith the burn-up range still at 351-40%, core sine has stabilized at a c c ro:. ima te lv. 34.assertlics.

There is a sacrif'cc of neutron flux asacciated with the larger core that can be ccr.i:en s a te d for bv c n. e r a t in c. at a hic.her.cc.er.

The increase in

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be. a:ce' the purchaser.

the III'U, all cprocessir-contracts have been between AECL and the USAEC (USir 7A in 1974 and 1975 and USDCE in 1973).

0 R subleased the !!I:.U from AECL u:itil recently.

As indicated on page 2, arrangements are currently ceing made for

c:-: aster University to cbtain title to the IIEU that was in inventcry at :U:R cn ::cverber 2 3, 1977.

Full assemblies removed frcm the core are stored in nine undereater racks each of which has six stcrage pockets in a straight line with six inches between pocket centerlines.

Spent fuel assem-blies are ccoled for a minimum of 90 days be fore

• sh pment for re-

r c Ce s s in c..

E.

The ccst of U.S.-f abricated new f uel asserblies has increased by a f actor of at least nine-since the last purchase in 1974 the I

cost of I!EU has ore than tripled in the same time anc the cost of reprocessinc. s c. e n t fuel has increased by a f actor of three since the last recrocessing in late 1975.

Any f urther sic.nifican t ccst inc. eases brouc.ht about by limitinc. fuel enrichtent to 201 U-235 exc2u. t en a fully connensated basis as cutline n Cr.

Le'.c s '

opticas 1 and 3 could ;4cen.ardine the centinued existence of the

'::h facility.

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APPENDIX D

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