ML19261A722
| ML19261A722 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 11/17/1978 |
| From: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| References | |
| ACRS-1584, NUDOCS 7902080029 | |
| Download: ML19261A722 (31) | |
Text
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Meeting Date: 9-26-78 Date Issued 11-17-78 y
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SEPTEMBER 26, 1978 WASHINGTON, D.C.
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On September 26, 1978, the ACRS Subcommittee on Safeguards and Security held a meeting in Washington, D.C. to review the NRC Research Program on Safeguards and Security.
The notice of the meeting appeared in the Federal Register on Monday, September 11, 1978. A copy of the notice is Attachment A.
A list of attendees and participants is Attachment B.
Attachment C is the schedule f?r the meeting.
No re-quests to submit oral or written statemer cs were received from i.1 embers of the public, and none were made at the meeting. This meeting was entirely open to the public. The meeting opened at 8:30 A.M. and was adjourned at 5:00 P.M.
7902080029
Subcommittee on Safeguards Meeting Date: 9/26/78 and Security
==
Introduction:==
F. Arsenault, Director, Division of SAFER, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research Mr. Arsenault made a few comments concerning the relationship of the safeguards research program to the rest of the agency.
He noted that the subject of safeguards is one which is dealt with by all of the offices within NRC.
Each of these offices has identified research requirements for which the Office of Research has established research projects. The principal user requirements have arisen in the Office of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards.
It was noted that, unique within the agency, an organization has been established to coordinate the contractual activities of the NRC in the area of safeguards. This is done by a group called the, " Safeguards Technical Assistance and Research Coordinating Group," o " STAR" Group.
This group, consisting of members from each of the principal offices of the agency, reviews each proposed contract in the area of safeguards, to consider whether it involves duplication of effort among the offices or with other agencies, and also reviews projects with respect to their programatic relevance and prioritization.
Dr. Lawroski requested information regarding the number of people in the management area for safeguards research, especially in relation to the number of contracts that have to be maintained. Mr. Arsenault agreed to supply this information.
Overview: Jay Durst, Assistant Director for Safeguards Research After briefly reviewing the agenda, Mr. Durst touched on the action that had been taken with respect to the Comittee's recomendations contained in last year's report to Congress.
With regards to increased research
Subcormiittee on Safeguards Meeting Date: 9/26/78 and Security in the field of protection against diversion, he noted the work on material control and accounting at Livermore Lab.
The subcommittee was told that the program has advanced considerably since last year.
Research results are being looked at in two specific ways in order to speed their application to the job of protecting against diversions:
(1) A field application at a site designated " Site X", and (2) Material control and accounting (MC&A) upgrade development.
This second item deals with new rules for MC&A to be developed by NMSS.
Research and NMSS are examining the research program to identify those areas of research which have reasonabl.e and rapid applicability to upgrading MC&A rules.
The NMSS development of upgraded MC&A regulations is directed to fuel facilities.
Mr. Durst said that no action had been taken in safeguards research for alternative fuel cycles. This is due to an NRC policy decision that research in this area be deferred until the present study of alter-native fuel cycles, being carried on by other groups, is better developed.
In the area of search and recovery techniques it was noted that DOE has primary responsibility both for operational action when it is required and for the development of the supporting physical equipment. NRC remains cognizant of the DOE research and follows it closely..but supports no research in this area.
Police and military experience has also been taken account of in connection with research, at least informally.
Research now uses police consultants, including the California Specialized Training Institute.
Research has also incorporated, in tenns of military experience, the results of " black hat" assessments made by the NMSS staff who were assisted by special forces teams from Fort Bragg. SAFER also maintains close contact with security people from the licensees themselves. This includes security managers and guards.
This effort was characterized as design research to reduce vulnerability to sabotage.
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Subcomittee on Safeguards Meeting Date: 9/26/78 and Security In the area of international safeguards, SAFER has taken no research initiatives. They have found that there is considerable interest demonstrated in their research program by various other nations.
Mr. Durst went over the objectives of Safeguards research:
they are effectiveness evaluation, and strategy evaluation. The current program is funded at a level of about $6 million. Most of the program is carried out through governmelt labs as contractors.
Major programs includs: MC&A, Physical Protection, Support of Inspection Method, and Reactor Design.
Since last year there has been a decrease of about 10% in the funding level.
It is expected that a continued ramping down of the Safeguards and Security budget will occur. The basis for this expectation is that the development of effectiveness methodologies has passed. The current effort is on improvement of techniques which have already been chosen and developed.
Material Control and Accounting:
W. Murphy, NRC Hr. Murphy addressed the evaluative method for material control and secounting.ystem. The project is directed towards a basic objective set by the Comission. This is, to protect the public against unaccept-able risk of death, injury, or property damage from nuclear events produced by malevolent use of nuclear materials or sabotage of nuclear facilities.
As a general objective, the Lawrence Livermore Lab. is focusing on four questions:
1.
What is the degree of protection afforded by a licenseet MC&A system?
Subcommittee on Safeguards Meeting Date: 4.6/78 and Security 2.
What process information should be incorporated ince the MC&A System for prompt diversion detection and how should that information be used?
3.
What is the sensitivity potential of various MC&A measures?
4.
Is the protection provided by a licensee's safeguards system adequate? How to set criteria?
The methodology of this project can be applied to any fuel cycle facility.
The regulations being developed apply only to those sites where the materials designated as strategic special nuclear raterial exist.
The two principal products expected from Lawrence Livermore Labs (LLL) are (see Slide 1 ) a methodology for looking at the appropriate criteria for MC&A.
The second rajor product is a method for analyzing the diversion protection afforded by the MC&A system. An example would be the use of simulators.
The MC&A system is being evaluated as it contributes to the total facility safeguards system.
It is looked at as a detector with input to the physical protection system.
The detection is then judged as to whether or not it was timely enough to prevent an adversary from completing his act.
It was noted that in an attempt to overccme limitation in mass balance accounting with regard to sensitivity and tirreliness a move is made away from large raterial accounting areas towards unit processes. As the unit size becomes smaller the mass balance becomes almost a con-tinuous process.
Field Acolication - Site X:
R. Shepard, NRC Dr. Shepard rioted that the material control and accounting methodolog is currently being field tested at a real operating facility (Site YJ/
Subconcittee on Safeguards Meeting Date: 9/26/78 and Security The objective of the Site X assessment is to demonstrate the practi-cality of the LLL MC&A assessment procedure at an operatina licensed facility.
The assessment is being performed ia two phases. Phase I will use only Site X data presently required by NRC regulations and available at NRC headquarters or its regional offices. Phase I will be used as a baseline determination of the present state of MC&A.
Phase II will use all the data in Phase I, plus additional data in existence at the facility, such as process data. Phase I is expected to be completed in November of this year.
In December a decision will be made on the impact the use of process data would have in supporting operational reviews and evaluation tests. This could lead to an upgrade of the MC&A rule.
Physical Security (Fixed Site and Transoortation):
R. Robinson, NRC The objective of this program is to provide techniques for evaluation, designing or inspecting nuclear facilities, or in transit systems. There are four major elements in the physical protection evaluation project for fixed facilities. The overall approach on modeling was to look at the actual physical facility first.
Next, the paths an adversary might take through a facility are studicd. A data base pertaining to hardware items and personnel training levels is combined with the path analysis into an evaluation model.
The user can give input and receive output at a remote computer terminal.
The facility data analysis includes a vital area analysis for nuclear facilities. The objective of this program is to develop systematic procedures for identifying and characterizing the targets and the associated vital areas at nuclear facilities. This technique has been applied by Los Alamos Labs to five PWRs and two BWRs.
Reports are being written. Sandia has applied this technique to a reprocessing plant.
t Subcomittee on Safecuards Meeting Date: 9/26/78 and Security The adversary paths are found on a graphical facility layout.
Paths are found from off-site to the targets and from the targets to off-site. Paths are selected on the basis of minimum time to a target or minimum probability of detection and a timely-detection combination
( !inimum probability of detection to the target and minimum time to get away).
The data base element is a component performance characterization.
The data on hardware and personnel is based upon relevant conditions, such as site operational status, environmental conditions, and what an adversary has in the way of equipment. There is a joint effort with DOE to completely computerize all the data collected on this project.
The evaluation models are fixed site simuir. ion models.
The models simu-late the detection, assessment, comunication, delay, and neutralization functions of the physical protection syster.
Three fixed-site simulation models were completed this year. They are:
1.
FESEM - Forcible Entry Safeguards Effectiveness Model 2.
ISEM - Insider Safeguards Effectiveness Model 3.
FSNM - Fixed-Site Neutralization Model Sandia-Livermore has done most of this year' work on transportation s
evaluation programs. The model looks at the initiating event, (the ambush),
the ability to send out a comunications sicnal, and local law enforcement availability. A further model is used to simulate an encacement and cive an estimate of the outcome relatino to the number of survivina cuardsycars and transporters from a convo.y.
Integrated Safeguards Information System Mr. Arsenault sumarized the program as being an attempt to consolidate all of the information required from numerous reports into one reporting requi rement. A contract has been given to the Boeing Corporation, on the basis of competitive bidding, to perform Phases I, II, and III of
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Subcommittee on dateguards
-S-Meeting Date: 9/26/78 and Security the project. These are:
I.
Review and Analyze Requirements II. Assess Existing Systems III.
Develop General System Design The ultimate objective will be a computer based system of infomation storage and retrieval. Boeing completed its work and issued a report in May 1978 (as yet unpublished).
The NRC Staff is reviewing the report and formulatinc a recommendation regarding implementation of such an integrated infomation system.
Inspection Methods for Physical Protection Mr. Arsenault describad a project performed in support of NRC inspection efforts.
It involved the cataloging of the many varieties of physical protection equipment used by or available to NRC licensees.
The catalog includes a description of the equipment and its characteristics as well as methods for testing its perfomance in the field.
The documents have been issued to the field offices and the response has been favorable. A number of suggestions have been made for improvements and a follow on effort is underway to improve the contents and to develop more specific test techniques.
Nuclear Power Plant Desien Concents for Sabotace Protection: W.H. Intnerman, NRC Mr. Immeman described the work being done at Sandia Laboratory in Albuquerque to assess the value of various plant design and damage control measures in providing protection against sabotage.
The study will compare the various measures with their estimated cost and imoact on the operability and safety of a plant. The objective of this effort is to develop safe-guards criteria that can be addressed during initial plant design that will provide improved security w chout degrading operation or escalating costs severely. Specific designs are left to industry o~r DOE.
Physical protection (perimeter defense) is not included in this study.
A program
Subcommittee on Safeguards Meeting Date: 9/26/78 and Security plan has been developed but is not yet published. A baseline plant has been selected (one of the SNUPPS units) and a sabotage fault tree is being developed.
From this will come an identification of vulner-abilities and from that will come some design options.
Sone options include " hardening" of critical systems or locations, modification of the plant arrangement, system design changes, and the addition of systems.
The question of the NRC's ability to protect information, such as the sabotage actions most likely to produce severe consequences, was again raised and Mr. Arsenault assured the Subcomnittee that specific vulner-abilities would be protected.
Department of Energy (DOE) Program:
B. Newmark DOE Mr. Newmark gave a broad presentation on the DOE technology base program, concept development program, and the systems test and evaluation program.
Part of the technology base program includes the exterior sensor laboratory at Sandia where various types of sensors are tested and the results cor-related with outside factors such as weather. Work is being done on personnel entry control and devices to detect metal, special nuclear naterisis (SNM), explosives, etc. as well as positive personnel identi-fication. Guard equipment and duress alarms are also being studied.
Samples of equipment are being put into everyday use at some DOE facilities to aid in evaluating their effectiveness, reliability, and durability.
DOE is working with the IAEA on the development of safeguards devices. To disseminate this information to private industry, DOE publishes handbooks on various aspects of the technology.
Concern was expressed that the handbooks included information on hcw to defeat the various protection systens; but DOE believes that publication provides a significant deterrent since the potential saboteur does not know what combination of devices he is going to have to face and he is aware of the wide range of capabilities opposing him.
Subcommittee on Safeguards Meeting Date: 9/26/78 and Security DOE is also concerned that the safeguards systems have a minimal impact on facility operations and is looking at hardware / guard force tradeoffs.
Mr. Newmark described DOE's work on developing an integrated system of physical protection and materials accountability and control to provide protection in depth for a wide range of threats wit'1out affecting operations significantly.
Safeguards effectiveness, costs, hardware, guard force, and operational acceptability are evaluated. An effective system will provide detection of adverse action, delay of an adversary after detection, provide timely response, and deter potential adversaries.
The effort is not limited to power reactors but extends to LMFBRs, pro-cessing plants, spent fuel storage, transportation, srall research facilities, and alternate fuel cycles.
A stats-of-the-art plutonium protection system was assembled at Hanford and Mr. Newmark invited those at this meeting to visit it in October or November to see what can actually be done.
(This was actually a working mock-up that was to be dismantled ~1n early No'vember ).
Mr. Newmark gave a detailed description of this facility.
DOE will also set up a demonstration of an initial containment and surveillance system for spent fuel storage and transportation by the end of FY'79.
Mr. Newmark described DOE's concept of a safeguards central control system which would provide an efficient, effective, and reliable evaluation of all safeguards (physical security as well as materials accountability) information for a facility. The system would take many inputs, process them and provide a display in sufficient detail to provide an adequate response to an adverse action. This would be a computer based, real time system. The problems of computer security were mentioned and a number of approaches were suggested.
Mr. Newmark next discussed an integrated physical protection system (entrance cubicle) for a small research reactor.
The system provides
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i Subcomittee on Safeguards Meeting Date: 9/26/78 and Security both the identification and contraband detection functions.
It utilizes SNM detectors, closed circuit television, weight scales, coded switches, motion detectors, and a badge reader.
The DOE representatives conceded that there is no really good way of searching vehicles, particularly emergency vehicles, for contraband except by hand by an experienced person.
Mr. Newmark discussed some of the problems associated with international safeguards where the concem shifts from individuals or small groups to national governments. Options range from full time international in-spectors to totally automated remote systems. A conceptual design for a portal system to meet both domestic and international safeguards objectives was discussed.
Mr. Newmark noted that DOE had completed a preliminary safeguards concept for light water power reactors (identification of vital systems) including physical protection. options.
A report of this work has been submitted to the NRC but no response has been received. A vulnerability analysis has been completed and a draft report will be sent to the NRC in the near future.
Members of the Subcomittee, the NRC Staff and the DOE discussed the problems associated with disseminating classified information to the proper industry people.
It appeared that a number of utility people are now cleared to review classified information and should have access to the classified reports prepared by DOE.
Mr. Newmark sunrarizea DOE's conclusions regarding perimeter protection, building design and vital area control (see Slide 2).
It is their view that vital areas can be systematically identified, the number of areas and components is not prchibitively large, state-of-the-art hardware can provide adequate control, additional development of certain aspects is required, and the costs are not prohibitive (see Slide 31.
DOE ha-lieves tha+ +ha
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Subcomittee on Safeguards Meeting Date: 9/26/78 and Security facilities.
Mr. Newmark also outlined DOE's planned a::tivities for FY'79 and future years (see Slide 4
).
Mr. Newmark referred to the problem of international safeguards at spent fuel storage facilities and the DOE program to attack these problems.
The objective is to be able to detect diversion, on a real time basis, at the reactor, in transit, and at a remote storage site.
Information desired includes custody, location, and integrity of the fuel. Timeliness is of greatest importance.
A baseline description of a system has been completed as well as a conceptual design (see Slide 5).
DOE is also doing woi,c in support of international safeguards for fuel reprocessing complexes and enrichment facilities (see Slides 6 and 7).
The total DOE budget for Security and Safeguards is in excess of $30M with about $18M of that devoted to the physical protection portion of the program.
NRC Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safecuards (NMSS) Procram:
P. Baker Mr. Baker described the formal NMSS research requirements that have been forwarded to Research, the Technical Assistance programs administered by NPSS itself, and the Safeguards Technical Assistance Research (STAR) coordinating group.
To date, NMSS has made five formal requests to Research for specific actions:
1.
Evaluate Methods for Fixed Site Theft and Sabotage Prevention (3/2/77 and12/8/77).
2.
Automated Content Analysis and its Application to Nuclear Threat Assessment (6/10/77).
3.
Transportation Safeguards (3/28/78).
4.
SSNM Use-Denial Techniques (7/18/78).
5.
Vulnerability of Spent Fuel Shipments to Malevolent Events (7/25/78).
s.
Subcomittee on Safeguards Meeting Date: 9/26/78 and Security Copies of each of these requests were provided to the Subcomittee members.
Mr. Baker discussed tne technical assistance projects and pointed out that most of them were relatively small efforts, of $100,000 or less.
The biggest expensa is the contribution to the joint NRC-DOE development of a safeguards information system at Oak Ridge.
Mr. Chambers pointed out that NMSS is responsible for safeguards in the fuel cycle but not at the reactors; the reactors are the responsibility of NRR.
Dr. Lawroski noted that safeguards research for alternate fuel cycles was funded for FY'78 but not for FY'79 or '80.
Mr. Arsenault said that this was based on written guidance provided for program planning and agreed to provide the Comittee with copies of that guidance.
To assist the Director of NMSS coordinate the contracts and expenditures for work in support of safeguards the STAR group was established consisting of six members. One each from each of the major program offices and one from the Controller's office.
The group reviews all proposed contracts to avoid unnecessary duplication and overlap.
NRR Safecuards Technical Assistance and Research Reauests:
W. Pasedag, NRC Mr. Pasedag described the work being done at NRR's request in the areas of physical security and potential design features to reduce vulnerability.
The first effort is to review the security of operating power and non-power reactors while the second is aimed at enhancing the security of reactors being built or planned for the future.
(See Slide 8 ).
The Subcomittee discussed the funding of these efforts and the staff size that NRR was devoting to these efforts.
It was noted that the effort appeared to peak in FY'80 and to decline into FY'82.
This was a function of the current effort to review all operating reactors by the end of February 1979 and the decline of new license applications.
Subcomittee on Safeguards Meeting Date: 9/26/78 and Security The Subcomittee discussed the need for research on portal explosive detectors. Mr. Arsenault noted that it is clear that existing de-vices will not detect some explosives very effectively but he questioned the implication that they shnid not be used. He pointed out that they can detect some explosive materials and their presence offers some degree of deterrence. A number of agencies are interested in the development of better explosive detectors but promising ideas are few and far between.
InsHctier, and Enforcement (I&E) Safeauards Research:
- 0. Chambers, NRC Mr. Chamoers described the research work that I&E felt was needed to support its inspection program.
The effort has resulted in the issuance of several reports useful to inspectors in the field. There are on-going efforts to detect the covert removal of SNM and to improve inspection methods for evaluating physical protection. There are five technical assistance contracts dealing with analytical and technical aspects of material accountability, I&E response capability, and inspection methods.
Mr. Arsenault agreed to send the budget figures to the Committee.
Safeguards Standards Technical Assistance:
R. Jones, NRC Mr. Jones provided a list of eleven technical assistance contracts relating to eterial control and a list of thirteen relating to physical protection (see Slides 9 and 10).
Caucus (Ocen)
The Subcommittee held an open. caucus to explore the views of individual members and consultants.
Mr. Michelson expressed his concem regarding the ability to adequately search large, complex pieces of transportation equipment that must peri.odically enter the plant site and approach vital areas. He felt that
Subcommittee on Safeguards Meeting Date: 9/26/78 and Security prohibited articles could be made to appear to be part of the nornal equipment of such vehicles. Mr. Arsenault agreed to relay this concern to the cognizant NRC office.
Mr. Woodcock reiterated his concern for adequate security during the construction phase to preclude the placement of devices that could be actuated at a later time, when the plant was operating.
The Subcommittee concluded that it did not need to meet with the Research staff again in order to prepare this year's research report on safeguards and security.
Copies of all visual aids and hands :ts provided during this meeting are on file in the ACRS office. A transcript of the meeting is on file at the NRC Public Document Room at 1717 H Street, N. W., Washington, D. C.,
or can be obtained from ACE Federal Reporters, Inc., 415 Second Street, N.
E., Washington, D. C. (202-547-6222).
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40'330 NOTICIS made a psrty to the proceedJng: (2) spection at the Commiss!on's Public It may be necessary for the subcen th'e nature and extent of the petition-Document Room 1717 H Street NW.,
mittee to hold one or more closed %
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cr's property, financ!al, or other inter. Washington D.C., and at the Ocean sions for the purpose of exotor,,
est in the proceeding: and (3) the pos-County Library. Brick Township matters involving proprietary infc-s sible effect of any order which may be Branch. 401 Chambers Bridge Road, tion or matters specifically exc....,;
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entered in the proceeding on the pett-Brick Town. N.T. 037:3.
from disclosure in the interest of r.
I tiener's interest. The petition should Dated at Bethesda. Md this 15th 'acco*rdance with subsection 10(di,'g also identify the specific aspect (s) of day of September 1973.
Pub. L 92-4G3 that, should such sei.
4 the subject matter of the proceeding as to which the petitioner wishes to in.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Com. s!ons be required, it is necessary a 1
tervene. Any person who has filed a mission.
close these sessions to protect preen.
j petit!cs for leave to intervene or who Demets L 212 NAM.
etary information (5 U.S.C. 552bscs o a j
has been admitted as a pa.rty may Chief.
Operating Recetors or in the interest of national secura amend his petition, but such an Brcnch No. 2. Dtetsfon of Op.
(5 U.S.C. 55:b(cX1)).
t amended petitica must satisfy the crating Recetors.
Further information regarc.. r topics to be discussed. Whether tre i
speci!! city requirements described IFR Doc.18-25402 FUed 9-4-78; 8:45 aml meeting has been canceled or revr.,.
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l above. Not later than fif teen (15) days duled. the chairman's ruling on re.
I prior to the first prehearing confer-qu sts for the opportunity to prewnt enee schedujed in the proceeding the [7590-01]
oral statements and the time allo :ec petitioner shall file a supplement to therefore can be obtained by a pre::w f
his petition to intervene, which must ADVT 102Y COMMITTif Cri 25ACTCt SME.
include a list of the contentions which GUA801 Succ0M/AITTEI CN $UlGUAED$ telephone call to the designated Fe-L eral employee for this meeting. Nr.
t he seeks to have litigated Ln the AKp SEcutrTY John C. McKinley (telephone 202-634 I
matter, and the ba.ses for each conten.
Me+Has 3265), between 8:15 a.m. and 5 pts.
tion set forth sith reasonable specific-e.d.t.
ity. A petitioner who falls to file such The ACRS Subcommittee on Safe-9 a supplement which satisfies these re-guards and Security will hold a meet.
Dated; September 6.1978.
f quirements with respect to at least one ing on September 26, 1978 In Room Jon C. Hoyt.r I
Advisory Committee i
contention will not be permitted to 1046,1717 H Street NW., Washington.
participate as a party.
D.C. 20555. to review the NRC Re-Afanagemenf O//scer.
i Those pertrutted to intervene search Procram on Safeguards and Se-a me.N5m N M R m W j
become parties to the proceeding, sub-curity. Notice of this meeting was pub-ject to any limitations in the order lished at 43 FR 30531 and 36152. July l
gre.nting leave to intenene. and have 17 and Augu.st 15,1573. respectively.
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the opportunity to participate fully in In accordance wit.h the procedures the conduct of the hearing. including outlined in the FrozmAz. Rtc2sTra on SECURIT!!S AND EXCHANGE the opportunity to present evidence October 31,1977 (42 FR 5G372), oral or COMMISSION nnd cross-e.umine witnesses.
Written statements may be presented i
3 A request for a hearing or a petition by members of the public, recordings IFtle No. 1-53451 i
I for lesve to intenene shall be filed will be permitted only during those Puttio rJco ittIPHONE CO.
with the Secretary of the Commissicn. portions of the meeting when's tran-script 1.s being kept, and questions may Apphetion Te Wi& drew From the sad
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55 At e n.
be asked only by members of the sub-gegierswen Docketing and Se-dees Section, or conunittee,1:s consultants.. and staff.
Strrorstx 5,1978.
t may be delivered to the Commission's ons e m
o Public document Roo=,1717 H Street The above. named issuer has filed an g
de ate V., Washington, D.C by the above app!! cation Mth the Securttles and Federal E:rpicyee as far in advance as a o be sent to he se ut ve D
practicable so that* appropriate ar.
Exchange Corr ission (th
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rangements can be made to allow the rector. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Com, nece+.sary time during the meeting for mission. Washington. D.C. 20555, and g
such statements, to G. F. Trowbridge. Esq., Shaw. Pitt-der, to withdraw the specified securu The agenda for subject meeting ties from listing and registration en i
man, Potts & Trowbridge,1800 M Street NW., Washington. D.C. 20026 shall be as fo110ws:
the New York Stock Exchange. Inc.
attorney for the licensee.
Terscar.Szmxsnt 26.1978
("NYSE").
t Noctimely filings of petitions for The reasons alleged in the applirs-Icave to intervene, amended petitions, s:so ax mm.m coaston or sesmss tion for withdraMng these securitws supplemental petitions, and/or re-The subcome.!: tee may meet in executive from listing and registration include a
quests for hearing will not be enter-session. htth any of tts cor.sultants sho mmy the following" l
in.ined abknt a determination by the be present, to esplore and excha.nse their The 7.40 percent. 8.70 percent. cnd i
8.10 percent debentures of Puerto Rico 4
Commission. the presiding officer or prehnary osmons recstdbr matters the Atomic Safety and Licensing [e
,e Telephone Co. (the ** Company") are 5
s sh d e Boaru des:gnated to rule on the pet 1*
pre;v. radon of a report to the full commit. being withdrawn from listing and rff f
tion and/or request, that the petition tee on re:etor secsuards and securtty.
istration because the Company be and/or request should be g anted At the conctu.slon of the executive sesston. lieves that due to the limited distribw based upon a balancing of the factors the subcommittee stl hear presentations by tion of its securitles. the expense of specified in 10 CM 2.714La) tD-(v) and and hold di.scussions s7th representathes of complying with the Commission's re-2.714( d).
the NRC Staff, the Department of Enercy. porting requirements is not justified.
For further detal'.s Mth respect to y l' g y Q S, g g",C"*,,,', th The Company has reported that tnerc
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are Icss than 300 recordholders f0f i
this action, see the appil.:stion for caucus to determine shother the matters annend.:nent dated May 30.1978, and identified in the tuittsi session have been cach of the above listed debenture i' supplement thereto dated Jttne 8 a tequately covered and shether the proje:t issues. The NYSE has posed no ob;ce-1978, sitici.a are avr** for public in-La ready for revacw or the fu!1 committee.
tion in this matter.
FEDEaAt REG 157EE Vol. 43. NO.1%. MONDAY, StPTDABit 11,1978
.k/ /0CHMEur
1 i.
5,.
ATTENDEES LIST - continued
', 1 L
l Engr. Security Ofy.
PUBLIC.
Noe E. Guerra - Stone & Webster Eng. Corp. Boston James R. Pendland - Florida Power and Light William E. Hunicke - Bechtel Power Corp. Arthur C. Biv j
W. Bruce Taylor Jim Quinn - International Energy Assoc.
Loren Evensen - Operational Systems J
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1
MINUTES OF THE ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE ON SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY SEPTEMBER 26, 1978 WASHINGTON, D. C.
if:h;[
s f[,('s ATTENDEES LIST ACRS S. Lawreski, Chairman C. Park l
e J. C. McKinley, Designated Federal Emp oye M. Bender b hiegg or, Staff j
S. Woodcock, Consultant C. Michelson, Consultant NRC Paul Baker W. Bruce Taylor Dick Robinson Robert L. Shepart William H. Imerman William M. Murphey H. Michael Hawkins Jay B. Durst Eugene W. Richard Ormon E. Bassett E. Perchenck Owen Chambers
- p0_E, B. Newmark' I
SANDIA J. Stresler 0
1 nw Ama
NUCLEAM heuvm...
ADVISORY COMMITTEE OfJ REACTOR SAFEGUARDS 3s,
'W.N[/ 8 WASHINGTON. D. C. 20555 J-1' Septenber 12, 1978 i
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J. Carson Mark, Chairman ACRS Safeguards and Security Subco=nittee IEE MEETII;G SCHEDULE FOR THE ACPS SAFEGUARDS AND SECU t on Septeder 26, The ACPS Safeguards and Security Subcornittee will meeH Street, N ther in-1978 in Room 1046, 1717 formation to aid in the preparation of the 1978 ACES ReportThe tentati on the I;RC Safety Research Program.
September 26 is presented below.
Times are accroximate_:
Executive Session (CPD1) 8:30 a.m.
I.
Presentation by 1;RC-RES, Division of SAFER.
II.
(CPE!!/CLCSED) update Review of current programs including:
of research reported last year (highlighting j
any significant changes), new research under-I way in the past year, and s posed research.
l l
Among the areas to be covered with regard to work to enhance the (1) evaluation and I
l (2) application of safeguards are:
Physical Security of Nuclear Facilities (pawer reactors and fuel fabrication 1.
8:45 a.m.
facilities)
Transportation of Special Nuclear Materials 2.
9:45 a.m.
(SE)
- BREAK 10:30 a.m.
Alternate Fuel Cycles 3.
10:35 a.m.
4.
Acccunting of S G 10:50 a.m.
0 77/9c HME ur
2-rI and n ~.
- 1. es are coroximate:
with industry (vendors
.p.-
y kpx SAFER interaction S'.
operators) if['-
/
S.
11:20 a.m.
International programs******************
6.
LUNCH 11:40 a.m.
Division Depart:mnt of Energy, 12:00 p.m.
(OPEN/ CLOSED)
III. Presentation by theof Safeguards and Secur ty curity of nuclear i
R&D relating to physical se
' facilities t ct, sri at nuclear 1
urrent 1:00 p.m.
Research programs to pro eand in transit including c 2
facilities 1:45 p.m.
of prompt detection
- status, Accounting of S a - means of diverted S:
01.
3 2:00 p.m.
BREAK RES Fasearch and 2:45 p.m.
on Users Needs:ams (Current & Pred PresentationTechnical Assistance Progr IV.
(OPEN/CLC5ED) of Safeguards Reactor 00'SS) - Division of Operating Reactors -
1.
2:50 p.m.
ER) - Division G
2.
Safeguards of Safeguards Inspection 3:20 p.m.
(I&E) - Division ds & Standards 3
(Standards) - Safeguar 3:50 p.m.
4.
4:20 p.m.
CAUCUS 4:50 p.m.
AtuCUE:0ENT U
S:00 p.m.
I 2-
{
and aproximate:
with industry (vendors kyn' f
1:nes are
- e_
SAFER interaction u
operators) 27
/
5 11:20 a.m.
International programs******************
f 6.
LUNCH 11:40 a.m.
i ision 12:00 p.m.
Department of Energy, D v
)
III. Presentation by theand Security (OPEN/CLCSE.0 of Safeguards l security of nuclear R&D relating to physica facilities ct,504 at nuclear 1.
luding current 1:00 p.m.
Fasearch programs to protefacilities and 2
1:45 p.m.
f prompt detection
- status, Accounting of SS;4 - means o of diverted S 01.
3 i
2:00 p.m.
BREAK RES Pasearch andPredicted) 2:45 p.m.
on Users Needs: s (Current &
PresentationTechnical Assistance Program IV.
(OPEN/CLCSED) of Safeguards Reactor (E'.SS) - Division of Oparating Reactors -
1 2:50 p.m.
(NRR) - Division 2.
Safeguards of Safeguards Inspection 3:20 p.m.
(I&E) - Division
& Standards 3
(Standardc) - Safeguards 3:50 p.m.
4.
4:20 p.m.
CAUCUS 4:50 p.m.
ADJCUE:01ENT o
5:00 p.m.
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PROD'JCTS EXPECTED 1.
METil0D FOR Tile EVALUATION OF MCRA SYSTBiS IN TERMS OF DIVERSION DETECTION PROBABILITY.
2.
TOOLS TO ASSIST IN Tile ANALYSIS OF MC8A SYSTEMS:
MCSS:
MATERIAL CONTROL SYSTEM SIMULATOR ~
DYNSYL:
DYNAMIC PROCESS SYSTEM SIMULATOR FTAP:
FAULT TREE SOLVER AND MANIPULATOR (FOR VERY llIGil0RDER CUT SETS)
PIPE:
ACCESS N0DE IDENTIFYER FOR LIQUID SYSTcf1S DTFC:
DIGRAPil TO FAULT TREE CONVERTER 3.
METil0D FOR ASSESSMENT OF CRITERIA Cl10lCE IMPACTS ULIDE
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liluku trrcLilvt rmdital rnusa,nud didttrl Urtlun:
3 LEVEL PROTECTION HARDWARE ELEMENTS CUARD DEPLOYMENT PERIMETER e
TWO FENCES WITil VElllCLE BARRIER e
TWO GUARDS IN PERIMETI
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e INTRUSION DETECTORS BETWEEN FENCES e
PERSONNEL PORTAL WITH PERSONAL IDENTI-e GUARDS ON PATROL IN FICATION, METAL DETECTION, AND llIGH PROTECTED AREA
- EXPLOSIVES DETECTION
~
. BUILDINGS o
PERSONNEL PORTAL WITH PERSONAL IDENTI-e TWO GUARDS IN BUILDINC FICATION, METAL DETECTION, AND HIGli PORTAL
'EXPL0SIVES DETECTION e
ALARMED TURNSTILE ONE-WAY EXITS o
GUARDS ON CALL IN MAD COMPLEX
- VITAL AREAS e
PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION
.AND e
OPERATIONS CONTROL ELEMENTS COMPONENTS e
C0-WORKER MONITORING IN FREQUENTLY OCCUPIED AREAS TOTAL COST OF INSTALLING llARDWARE FOR 31 VITAL AREAS AND 11 VITAL COMPONENTS:
$5 HILLIO I
NUMBERS DEPEND ON NUMBER OF OUTSIDERS TO BE PROTECTED AGAINST
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SPENT FUEL SAFEGUARDS COMPLETED BASELlilE DISCRIPT10fl FOR SPENT FUEL IN STOR e
COMPLETED PREllMINARY CONCEPTS FOR TIMELY DETECTI e
OF SPENT FUEL COMPLETED CONCEPTUAL DESIGN OF C0ftTAlljM{NT AND SURVEILLANCE SY e
IlllTIATED INSTALLATION OF ECTED CONTAINMENT AND SURVEILLANCE ELEME e
AT OPERATillG FACILITIES FOR TEST AND EVALUATION COMPLETE SAFEGUARDS PERFORilAtlCE CRITERIA FOR SPEilT FUEL AT REACTO e
STORAGE FACILITIES AND DURING TRANSPORTATION - FOURTil O COMPLETE OPERATIONAL EVALUATION OF If!!TIAL C0flTAINME e
SYSTEM - FOURTH QUARTER FY 79 SL)DE 5
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4 SRL SUPPORI OBJECTIVE:
TO EVALUATE Tile DUPONT/SRL FUEL REPROCESSING COMPLEXES TO IDENTIFY SAFEGUARDS CONCERNS AND SAFEGUARDS SYSTEt1 PERFORMANCE CRITERIA WHICH WILL PROVIDE PROTECTION AGAINST A RANGE OF SUBNATIONAL OR NATIONAL THREATS.
PRELIMINARYSAFEGUARDSCONCEPhS ACTIVITIES:
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' CONSULTATIONS ON ESS DESIGN AND EVALUATION e
COMPARISON OF FUEL CYCLE ALTERNATIVES ON THE BASIS OF PERFORMANCE CRITERIA O
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/
r MAJOR ACTIVITIES FOR SAFEGUARDING ENRICHMENT FACILITIES COMPLETE A C0flCEPTUAL SAFEGUARDS DESIGN FOR GENERIC GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANTS JULY 1978 UNION CARBIDE COMPLETE A CONCEPIUAL SAFEGUARDS DESIGN FOR GENERIC GAS CENTRIFUGE PLANTS JULY 1978 UNION CAR 0lDE COMPLETE PLANfilNG DOCUMENT FOR COMPONENT Afl0 SUBSYSTEM TEST AND EVALUATION JULY 1978 UN10fl CARBIDE ASSIST UNION CARDIDE IN DEVELOPMENT OF A CONCEPTUAL DESIGN OF AN INTEGRATED AUGUST 1978 CONTAINMEllT/SURVEILEANCE SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM FOR IMPLEMENTAT!0ft AT THE PGCEP SANDIA LABORAIORIES PERIORM REN: ARCH, DEVELOPMEfiT, TESTING AND EVALUAT10ft 0F NDA ASSAY METHODOLOGY SEPTEMBER 19 FOR INC01<FJRAT10fl INT 0 SAFEGUARDS SYSTEftS FOR EXISilflG AND ADVANLED ISOTOPE SEPARAlluta PROCESSES LOS ALAMOS SLIENilflC LABORATORY AS$1ST IN DEVELOPflENT AND EVALUATION OF PRELIMINARY CONCEPTS FOR INTEGRAIED ONG0ING SAFEGUAllDS SYSTEMS JUR ENRICHMENT PLANTS OF BOTN GASE0US DIFFUSION AND GAS CENIRIiUGF l'ESIGil GROOKHAVFN Nail 0NAL LABORATORY l
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NRR SAFEGUARDS TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE & RESEARCH REQUESTS i
i A.
PHYSICAL SECURITY 1.
ASSISTANCE IN REVIEW OF PHYSICAL SECURITY, GUARD IRAINING, CONTINGENCY PLANNING (LASL - A7098)
A.
PHYSICAL SECURITY EXPERTISE B.
VITAL AREA (FAULT IREE) ANALYSIS C.
EFFECTS OF EXPLOSIVES IN SABOTAGE SCENARIOS 2.
NON-P0wsR REACTOR VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT CLASL - A7104) 3.
RESEARCH REGUESTS BARRIER DATA EVALUATION, STRESS MONITOR SURVEY B.
DESIGN STUDY (TAP A-29)
RESEARCH REQUEST TO EVALUATE DESIGN ALTERNATIVES FOR REcuCTION IN VULNERABILITY TO SABOTAGE d
0LIDE.
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SAFEGUARDS STANDARDS TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE C
MATERIAL CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING PROJECT
'FY-78 FUNDING ($K)
Methods of Accountability Handbooks 29 I
Specifications for Ge(Li) Detectors for Safeguards Applications 50 Controllable Unit Accounting 305 Safeguards Measurement-Handbook 244 65 Dynamic Nondestructive Assay Calibration Working Calibration Testing Material Handbooks 65 Huclear Material Control & Accounting Procedures 90 Standard Containers for SNM Storage, Transfer and Measurement 100 Evaluation of Loss Esticators Analysis of Estimation Methodology National Bureau of Standards Measurement Quality Assurance 900 MC&A Totals:
1,848 l
I
SAFEGUARDS STANDARDS TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PHYSICAL PROTECTION PROJECT FY-78 FUNDING ($K) l i
Security Personnel Training Manuals 8
Vehicle Access Control and Search Procedures 65 Explosive and Metal Detectors 47 Facility Operations Response to Safeguards Incidents 100 Remote Response Mechanisms 36 Duress Alarms 16 Communications Procedures 20 Security Personnel Training Options 15 Central Alarm Station Procedures Security Lighting Computers for Management and Control of Site Security Systems Behavioral Observation Programs for Security Personnel Standards for Psychological Tests of Security Personnel Phys. Prot. Totals:
307 MCAA Totals:
1,848 SAFEGUARDS STANDARDS TOTALS:
2,155 SGS Proposed Funding for FY-79 2,505 0 LIDE
.