ML19261A362
| ML19261A362 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 12/13/1978 |
| From: | Moore N NRC OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS (OIP) |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS (OIP) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7901110344 | |
| Download: ML19261A362 (3) | |
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,,e' DEC 131973 MEMORANDUM TO THE FILE STAFF CONCLUSIONS REGARDING PROPOSED LICENSE TO EXPORT HIGH ENRICHED URANIUM TO CANADA (XSNM 1292)
In March 1978, Transnuclear applied for a license to export 299 kilograms of uranium, enriched to 93.3% to Canada.
In July the applicant amended the request to reduce the amount to 198 kilograms of uranium, enriched to a maximum 93.3%, containing 185 kilograms of U-235. The material, in the form of uranium metal, will be used in the NRX, NRU, and Slowpoke reactors over a three year period.
The reactors are all owned and operated by Atomic Energy of Canada Limited at the Chalk River Nuclear Laboratories, Chalk River, Ontario.
In response to our March 28 and August 3 reouests for views, the Executive Branch has (1) concluded that issuance of the proposed license would not be inimical to the interests of the US, including the common defense and security; (2) confirmed that the material will be subject to all the terms and conditions of the Agreement for Cooperation between the US and Canada; and (3) noted that Canada has adhered to the provisions of its Agreement for Cooperation with the Unitad States.
These views and license application analysis by the Executive Branch were forwarded by the State Department analysis of November 24, 1978.
Confirnation of the applicability of the US-Canada Agreement for Cooperation was also set forth in the May 18, 1978 letter from the Atomic Energy Control Board of Canada.
The staff has reviewed the subject application in light of the considera-tions below:
o Safeauards. The export will be subject to IAEA safeguards.
As a party to the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), Canada has undertaken an obligation to accept IAEA safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of Canada, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.
In view of this, the staff believes that criterion (1) cf the NNPA is met.
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< Memorandum to the File o
No Nuclear Exolosive Use. Also, as a party to the NPT, Canada nas uncertaken the obligations not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
The staff therefore, believes that criterion (2) of the NNPA is met.
o Physical Security.
Based on visits of physical security review teams, and subsequent exchanges and reviews, the physical security program in Canada is considered adequate to protect trigger quantities of special nuclear material.
- Moreover, as noted in the State Department memorandum of November 24, the US has assurances that Canada is committed to providing a level of protection for their programs fully compatible with that envisioned by the recommendations in IAEA INFCIRC/225, "The Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials."
In view of the above, the staff believes that criterion (3) of the NNPA is met.
It should be noted that the Government of Canada has provided the~ written physical security assurance es required by 10 CFR 110.43(a).
o Retransfer. The US-Canada Agreement prohibits the retransfer of any material supplied by the US, beyond the jurisdiction of Canada without US approval to such retransfer, and then only if it is within the scope of an agreement for cooperation between the US and the other nation or group of nations.
Similarly, it prohibits the transfer of special nuclear material produced through the use of US-supplied material or facilities without US approval and the US-Canada exchange of notes confirms this understanding.
Thus, it is the staff's view that criterion (4) of the NNPA is met.
o Reorocessing. The US-Canada exchange of notes also confirms tne understanding that any reprocessing or alteration of US-supplied material shall be performed only upon prior approval of the US. The staff therefore concludes that criterion (5) of the NNPA is met.
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,. Memorandum to the File o
Sensitive Technolocy.
The proposed export does not involve sensitive tecnnology.
As more fully developed in its memorandum dated November 24, 1978, the Executive Branch has determined that Canada currently meets all the criteria of P.L.95-242, including the requirements of Section 126(a)(1) and the specific criteria of Sections 127 c d 128 and that Canada has adhered to all the provisions of its Agreement for Cooperation with the US.
The Executive Branch has also concluded that fueling the NRX, NRU, and Slowpoke reactors is compatible with US nonproliferation objectives at this time since conversion to less than fully enriched or even low-enriched fuel, using current fuel fabrication technology, would result in a significant reduction in reactor performance and increase the fuel cycle costs.
The staff has concluded that issuance of the proposed license would be consistent with the recently enacted Nuclear Nonproliferation Act.
In addition, the State Department has noted that the proposed export was approved by the President and is consistent with policy measures governing high-enriched uranium exports as set out in the White House Fact Sheet of April 27, 1977.
In view of all the considerations above, and as required by Section 57 of the Atomic Energy Act and 10 CFR 110.44, the staff has also concluded that the export to be made pursuant to the proposed license (1) would be subject to the US-Canada Agreement for Cooperation and (2) would not be inimical to the common defense and security of the United States or constitute an unreasonable risk to the public health and safety.
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. ieal Moore Senior Licensing Officer Export / Import and International Safeguards Office of International Programs
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