ML19260D810

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Interrogatories Directed to Met Ed Re Location of Operational Gaseous & Liquid Effluent Filtration Devices. Requests Identification of Responses to NUREG-0560 & Steps to Be Taken Re Offsite Radiation Monitoring
ML19260D810
Person / Time
Site: Three Mile Island Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 01/21/1980
From: Bowers J
ANTI-NUCLEAR GROUP REPRESENTING YORK
To:
METROPOLITAN EDISON CO.
Shared Package
ML19260D804 List:
References
RTR-NUREG-0560, RTR-NUREG-560 NUDOCS 8002120410
Download: ML19260D810 (3)


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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA T f'O NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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-BEFORETHEATOMICSAFETYANDLICENSINGB0j g

$ g In the Matter of '

r A o7 METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-289 (Three Mile Island )' (Restart)

Nuclear Station, Unit One) )

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INTERROCATORIES OF IMtuvtKOR ANGRY TO LICENSEE Intervenor Anti-Nulcear Group Representing York (ANGRY) hereby propounds pursuant to 10 C.F.R. g2.740b the following interrogatories to Metropolitan Edison Company.

These interrogatories are deemed to be continuing, and shall be supplemented in accor-dance with 10 C.F.R. 2.740(s).

1. Identify by name and location all gaseous and liquid effluent filtration devices which will be operational at the time of THI-l's restart,
a. State the filtration capacity of each such device.in terms of radionuclide(s),:.u concentration of effluent, and saturation levels.
b. Identify each case in which the filtration capacity of equivalent devices at' THI-2 was exceeded during the March, 1979 accident. For each such case specify the amount by which such capacity was estimated to.have .been exceeded, and the duration of the inadequate filtration,
c. State the basis for the Licensee's belief that the devices listed under int.11 will provide filtration capacity adequate to protect public health and safety,
d. What percentage of the total fission product inventory of the TyI-1 reactor core, assuming total release.into effluent pathways, would such capacity be able to prevent reaching offsite areas? Provide breakdown by radio-isotope,
e. What percentage of the fission product releases estimated in the following accident scenarios from WASH 1400 would such capacity be able to prevent raaching offsite areas:(provide breakdown by radio-isotope):

1} PWR 5

2) PWR 4
3) PWR 2 195.4 151
2. Identify the measures the Licensee has taken in response to the criticisms of reactor control room design found in NUREG 0560 (pp. 8-11, 8-12) and in the report of the President's Comission on the Accident at TMI (p. 29: #8(b)(1) and (ii) and
p. 72: #1).
a. What is the basis for the Licensee's belief that the present TMI-1 control room design is adequate to assure safe operation of the facility.

. s002120 Wd

3. Identify the provisions in the Licensee's E=ergency Plan which either singularly or collectively are intended to prevent damage to property such as livestock in the area surrounding the plant site. Explain how each contributes to the achievement of this goal.
4. Explain the difference between a " major radiation e=ergency drill" (EP (4.8.1.2(5)(a))

and a " joint exercise radiation emergency dr111"" (g4. 8.1. 2 (5) (b) (1) ) .

a. State whether either or both will be performed before restart.
b. If a " joint enercise" is not so scheduled, give reason.

5 NUREG 0560, at p. 4-5, refers to a study perfor=ed by the Hu=an Resources Research Organization which documents the poor performance of trained personnel under c=ergency conditions. In light of this study what is the basis for the Licensee's belief that persons with e=ergency response responsibilities will.in fact discharge such responsibilities under the conditions of a nuclear accident.which results in atmospheric releases.

6. Identify each step that must be taken from the time an.offsite radiation monitoring survey team is dispatched to the time the findings of such a monitoring effort are made available for dose assessment calculations. ,
n. How much time is required for the above-described process to take place?
b. How would the answer to #6(a) be affected by the installation of offsite monitoring devices that could be remotely read onsite?

c.EgggainthebasisfortheLicensee'sbeliefthatoffsitemonitoringdevices cannot be remotely read onsite provide adequate accident assessment capability.

7. How many " Radiological Analysis Support Engineers" will be onsite at any given time?
a. What is their training and background in the area of radiological assessment relative to that of the " Group Leader - Health Physics / Chemistry Support and his staff" identified as part of the Offsite E=ergency Support Organization,
b. What capability does the offsite Health Physics / Chemistry su rport group add that is not already present onsite?

c What is the potential for erroneous dose projections and/or protective action recocmendations prior to mobilization of offsite Health Physics / Chemistry Support personnel? Explain in detail.

8. Identify en of the " radiological and meteorological instrumentation readings" (EP g4.6.2.3(3)) that is required for dose assessment.
a. What is the time required for .he gathering of this information?
b. Identify each step that must be taken to convert such information into a dose assessment / projection,
c. What is the time required for such conversion process,
d. How would the answer to #8(c) be affected by the installation of an Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability system (ARAC)?

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e. What information additional to that generated by the proceso described in answers to #8-8(c) would ARAC provide?

fi. Explain the basis for the Licensee's belief that an ARAC system is not necessary for adequate dose assessment / projection capability.

9. State whether an ARAC system was placed into operation at Three Mile Island during the accident,
a. Who make the decision to install this system and what was the basis for such decision?
b. What decisions were made on the basis of information provided by the ARAC system? Could such information have been generated in its (ARAC) absence?
10. Does the Licensee agree with the statement in NUREG 0475, p.10, that "the calculation of doses to individuals at specific locations near the site are best carried out using environmental measurement data obtained at these locations.'

If no, explain. If yes, explain how this principle is incorporated into Licensee's dose assessment procedures,

11. What is the time required for the evacuation of each of the seven " hospitals located within a 10 mile radius of TMI" as listed in Table 3 of Licensee's Emergency Plan. Explain fully the reasons f6rathe time given in each case.

12 Explain how the estimates provided by Licensee in answer to UCS interrogatory

  1. 171 would be affected by each of the fo11 ewing conditions:

A. Inclement weather

b. Ruch-hour traffic congestion
c. Traffic accidents
13. Identify all institutions other than hospitals containing non-ambulatory residents,such as prisons or nursing homes, within a 10 mile radius of THI.

14.

It antify all documents and studies relied upon by the Eicunsvecinhanswering the foregoing interrogatories.

Respectfully Submitted, Anti-Nucle r Gro Representing York By - b'i '

.fo Q owers 245 tr. Phildelphia St.

York, PA 17404 DATE: January 21, 1980 1954 i53

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