ML19260D244
| ML19260D244 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 09/19/1979 |
| From: | Agee J, Barnes I, Hunnicutt D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19260D233 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-QA-99900324 99900324-79-1, NUDOCS 8002080180 | |
| Download: ML19260D244 (21) | |
Text
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT REGION IV Report. No.
99900324/79-01 Program No. 51300 Company:
Westinghouse Electric Corporation Industrial & Government Tube Division Westinghouse Circle Horseheads, New York 14845 Inspection Conducted:
July 9-13, 1979 Inspectors:
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gComponentsSectionII
. R. Ag(e, Contractor Inspector Ifatd Vendor Inspection Branch LMh
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O' \\@ ~Q]
w I. Barnes, Cont'ractorl Inspector i
Date ComponentsSection II Vendor Inspection Branch l
P Approved:
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() 7 j D. M. Hunnicutt, ' Chief Date ComponentsSection II Vendor Inspection Branch Summary:
Inspection on July 9-13, 1979 (99900324/79-01)
Areas Inspected:
Implementation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B criteria and applicable code and standards including: Action on previous inspection findings; deficient EPA soldered pin connectors; design control - electrical penetration assemblies; design control - nuclear components - radiation detectors; audits /
training; procurement of electrical cable; control of welding; procurement document control; nonconformances and corrective action; nondestructive exam-ination (personnel qualification and dye penetrant); and equipment calibration.
The inspection involved sixty-one (61) inspector-hours on site by two (2) NRC inspectors.
~
8002080f
2 Results:
In the eleven (11) areas inspected, no apparent deviations or unresolved items were found in six (6) areas.
Four (4) deviations and five (5) unresolved items were identified in tne remaining five (5) areas and are described as follows:
Deviations:
A.
Control of Welding - Welding compliance with approved welding procedures and traveler instructions not in accordance with Criterion V of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, and Section VIII of the Quality Program Manual (Notice of Deviation, Item A).
Incorrect recording of identity of issued welding materials not consistent with Criterion V of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, and Section VIII of the Quality Program Manual (Notice of Deviation, Item B).
B.
Procurement Document Control - Absence of material specification requirements in a purchase order is not consistent with Criterion V of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, and Section V of the Quality Program Manual (Notice of Deviation, Item C).
C.
Nonconformances and Ccrrective Action - Release of material to manufac-
.turing prior to receipt of Material Review Notice copy containing re-quired disposition approvals is not in accordance with Criterion V of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, and QC Procedure No. 8-4 (Notice of Deviation, Item D).
Unresolved Items:
Deficient EPA Soldered Pin Connectors - deficient soldered pin connectors require repair. The company sh-11 provide evidence of analyzing the problem to preclude recurrence and to determine the need for reporting the incident to their responsibilities under Part 21 to 10 CFR 50 (Details I, C.3.c).
Procurement of Electrical Cable purchase order failed to adequately and coherently identify all required codes and standards requirements for procurement of electrical cable for electrical penetration assemblies (Details I, 3.3.b).
Control of Welding - Absence of temperature measurement equipment in pro-duction welding area to provide capability for measurement of preheat and interpass temperatures (Details II, B.3.b.).
Procurement Document Control - Inadequate definition of scope of QA program procurement controls applicable to different categories of electrical pene-tration assembly items (Details II, C.3.b.).
Nondestructive Examination (Personnel Qualification and Dye Penetrant) - Near distance acuity test card used for vision examinations of NDE personnel could not be clearly established as being the required Jaeger J-l (Details II, E.3.b.).
~
3 DETAILS SECTION I (Prepared by J. R. Agee)
A.
Persons Contacted
- E. L. Dana - Senior Engineer Quality Control D. D. Doughty - Manager, Electronics and Penetrations Department W. Gillies - Engineering Manager, Special Purpose and Industrial Tubes
- J. B. Kessing - Quality Assurance Manager R. L. Korner - Project Engineer, Electrical Penetrations
- W. F. Massey - Senior Quality Control Engineer K. C. Playfort - Project Engineer, Nuclear Components G. N. Rieger - Senior Engineer, Quality Control
- W. II. Roach - Manager, Engineering
- R. C. Tranchon - General Manager R. II. Underwood - Scnior Engineer, Nuclear Components Engineering
- Indicates those who attended the exit management meeting.
B.
Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Unresolved Iten) Closed (Inspection Report 78-01): Medium voltage electrical penetration assemblies (EPAs) with anti-tracking material applied require additional testing to complete final qualification testing.
The inspector verified that the medium voltage EPA, with anti-tracking material, Limitrak, applied, had been retested under LOCA steam conditions for six (6) hours without voltage breakdown across the module.
This test data has been added to the Technical Report PEN-TR-78-22 as addendum No. 2, entitled " Test Report on the Performance of Limitrak as a Method of Preventing Tracking, Revision 1, dated July 3, 1979."
C.
Deficient EPA Soldered Pin Connectors 1.
Objectives Verify the status of poorly soldered connections to pin a.
connectors on EPAs shipped to the Washington Public Power Supply Systems, WNP-2 project, Richland, Washington.
b.
Verify the adequacy of production and quality control practices during manufacture and shipment of the suspect EPAs.
4 Examine QA documentation and soldering practices for c.
connections to pin connectors.
d.
Determine if the identified poorly soldered connections to pin connectors represent generic deficiencies in the pro-duction of EPAs.
2.
Method of Accomplishment The preceding objectives were accomplished by:
Discussions with the Westinghouse Plant, QA management a.
representatives, Horseheads, N.Y., who verified by telephone with Westinghouse west coast representatives that:
(1) The EPAs with the poorly soldered connections to pin connectors, identified at the Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS), WNP-2 Project, Richland, Washington, had not been repaired as of the period, July 9-13, 1979, of this inspection.
(2) The defective EPAs had been identified to Westinghouse west coast representatives by WNP-2 site personnel during early 1978 and at that time Westinghouse issued purchase order number 95N02470 dated April 27, 1978, to the WNP-2 site electrical contractors, Fishback and Lord, to repair the defective soldered pin connectors.
(3) As of the period, July 9-13, 1979, of this inspection, the above P.O. was outstanding and retained Westinghouse approval to complete the repair service on a timely
- basis, b.
Review of the QA package for the EPAs that were shipped to the WPPSS, WNP-2 Project to determine if the subject EPAs were manufactured, inspected, tested to approved procedures and practices prior to and including shipment.
c.
Review of the Process Specification No. 205-4-12, dated January 28, 1974, entitled, " Soldering Techniques." This specification describes materials and soldering techniques for EPA pin connectors.
It was reviewed to verify that Westinghouse had adhered to these practices and procedures during the manufacture of the EPAs for the WNP-2 Project.
- w
5 d.
Review of training records to determine that operators who performed soldering functions on the WNP-2 EPA pin connectors were adequately qualified and had been adequately trained.
3.
Findings a.
Comments (1) The history of the WNP-2 Project EPAs was traced primarily via the QA packages.
The QA packages revealed:
(a) Each EPA had been manufactured to standard approved practices and each proved to be satisfactory during its final production tests.
(b) Each EPA had been tested to production functional test criteria of IEEE standards - 323 and -344.
(c) Each QA package had been inspected and signed-off by the QA department.
(d) Each QA package contained a Certificate of Compliance certifying that each EPA had been satisfactorily tested to applicable codes and standards criteria imposed by the customer.
(c) A customer representative had examit.m. and signed-off on the QA packages authorizing final packaging and shipment.
(2) Soldering practices for soldering done on the defective EPA pin connectors could not be examined since the pin connectors on the WNP-2 Project EPAs were the only pin connectors of that type that have been installed on West-inghouse EPAs. According to Westinghouse QA management representatives, the WNP-2 Project contract required the use of the type of pin connectors used.
(3) Training and personnel records attesting to the workman-ship of the operators who performed the soldering functions could not be traced, since according to the QA management representatives, those operators had left the Company.
However, a review of the current training records revealed the soldering operators are trained to the same solderingi-
" Process Specification No. 205-4-12, Soldering Techniques" as were the operators who performed the soldering on the WNP-2 Project EPA's.
Each operator is audited on each
6 project on which they perform, therefore, each operator's capabilities are rechecked during each production project.
Thus, according to the QA manager, the capabilities of the soldering operators who performed the soldering on the WNP-2 Project EPAs were audited on each project and their competence was maintained satisfactory.
(4) Documentation reviewed at the Westinghouse Plant, Horscheads, N.Y., had not analyzed the defective EPAs for determination of the cause or for establishing activities to preclude recurrence of such incidents. No documentation was displayed indicating the Westinghouse Company intended to report the incident to the NRC under their responsibilities to Part 21 of 10 CFR 50.
b.
Deviations None.
c.
Unresolved Items This item will remain open pending evidence of final install-ation, repair, and checkout of the EPAs at the Wl: 3S, WNP-2 Proj ec t. Evidence shall be provided indicating the Westinghouse Company has analyzed the defective EPAs and has initiated activities to preclude occurrences of this type. Also Westinghouse shall review the WNP-2 Project EPA deficiencies and determine the need to report the incident under Westing-house responsibilities to Part 21 to 10 CFR 50.
D.
Design Control - Electrical Penetration Assemblics 1.
Objectives The objectives of this area of the inspection were to verify that:
EPAs that had previously experienced tracking problems had a.
been retested with anti tracking material applied and that test results had been published.
b.
Required technical reports and qualification data had been compiled for the EPAs that have been identified as production --
models and that have been qualified to applicable IEEE standards for safety related applications.
7 2.
Method of Accomplishment The preceding objectives were accomplished by:
Discussions with the EPA p. oject engineer who is responsible a.
for the final design and qualification of candidate EPAs as nuclear safety related products.
A part of the discussion concerned the EPA anti tracking problem which is described in paragraph B, Action on Previous Inspection Findings.
b.
Review of documentation issued by the Westinghouse facility, Horscheads, New York, concerning qualifications of EPA pro-ducts to meet current applicable codes and standards for Class IE safety related equipment.
Two (2) of the documents reviewed includes the following:
(1) Technical Reports and Qualification Data for Low Voltage Control and Instrumentation Electrical Penetrations, PEN-TR-79-07, dated January 25, 1978. This document contains several separate reports which cover additional technical data some of which includes the following:
(a) Qualification of modular type electrical penetrations.
(b) Rated maximum duration of rated short-circuit current tests.
(c) Low voltage seismic vibration.
(d) Exposure of modular type electrical pentrations to gamma radiation.
(e)
Insulation resistance of penetration modules following testing to IEEE Standard 317-1976.
(f) Predicting thermal life of modular penetrations.
(g) Dielectric strength and insulation resistance tests while subjected to accelerated heat aging.
(h) Effect of humidity on insulation resistance.
(i) Pressure tests.
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8 (2) Technical Reports and Qualification Data for Medium Voltage Modular Electrical Penetrations, Pen-TR-79-05, Revision 2, dated July 3, 1979.
This document contains several separate reports which cover additional technical data some of which includes the following:
(a) Qualification of modular type medium voltage electric penetrations.
(b) Expoxy sealed bushing.
(c) Performance of Limitrak as a method of preventing tracking.
(d) Seismic qualification of modular medium voltage penetration assembly.
(e) LOCA test on medium voltage primary module.
3.
Findings Within this area of the inspection no deviations or unresolved items were identified.
Comments With the publication of the documents identified in paragraphs b(1) & (2), above, Westinghouse has provided data indicating their low voltage control and instrumentation and their medium voltnaa modular electrical penetration assemblies have been fully qua'.ified to meet the electrical, aging, LOCA, and seismic requirements of applicable IEEE standards for Class 1E products.
E.
Design Control - Nuclear Components - Radiation Detectors 1.
Objectives The objectives of this area of the inspection were to verify that:
Nuclear components / radiation detectors including in-core and a.
ex-core detectors are designed, manufactured, tested to specific codes and standards, and operating conditions.
b.
Procedures had been a roved and implemented for the design, manufacture and testing of nuclear components.
9 Quality control procedures had been implemented verifying c.
quality of detector produced.
2.
Method of Accomplishment The preceding objectives were accomplished by:
Discussions with project and engineering management personnel a.
regarding design, development and manufacture of nuclear com-ponents and radiation detectors.
b.
Verify'ag the status of implemented IEEE standards applicable to to the detector portion of radiation detectors.
Review of the following QA Procedures:
c.
(1)
No. 3-2, Design Control for Nuclear Components, dated December 15, 1977, which outlines a program for design, design verification, engineering development, document control, quality control for nuclear components.
(2)
No. 1-2, quality plan for movable in-core detectors, dated September 19, 1976 (3)
No. 1-3-11, Quality Plans for QCS-1 Detectors, dated September 0, 1977.
(4)
No.1-3-14, integrated manufacture and quality plan WL-14023, Control Channel Ion Chamber, dated February 2, 1979.
(5)
No. 2-1, Certification of Test or Inspection Personnel to QRC-82H, July 2, 1974.
d.
Review of the document, Gamma Sensitivity Verification Test for the WL-23708 Uncompensated Ionization Chamber for the Westinghouse Atomic Power Division, September 15, 1977.
Review of Standard Specification for Ex-Core Safety Channel e.
Neutron Flux Detector and Preamplifier Assemblies for.
Specification No. SYS 80-IOE-3013, Revisica 00, dated March 11, 1977.
f.
Review of Customer P.O. 9772795 dated September 12, 1977, for the development of ex-core detectors to meet the operating param-eters of a Class IE system. Development data for these detectors is being accumulated and is scheduled for completion in late 1979.
10 3.
Findings Within this area of the inspection no deviations or unresolved items were identified.
Comments This company's prime customer previously assumed responsibility for the final qualification of radiation detectors and did not identify the detectors as Class IE safety related. Recent contracts to the company have identified certain radiation detectors as Class 1E safety related with the stipulation the detectors be qualification tested to the criteria of IEEE standards - 323 and -344.
Delivery of these detectors, which involve special nuclear materials, is currently scheduled for late 1979.
Production of these Class IE detectors places the responsibility for seismic and qualification testing of the radiation detectors on the company (supplier). This is.a new trend in the industry.
The design of the detectors mentioned above have been proven electrically while the sensitivity of the units have been proven at two (2) separate rt "ation laboratory test facilities. The development data fcc these detectors is currently scheduled for completion in fall of 1979 while the preliminary qualification report is scheduled for completion in late 1979.
Those reports will be reviewed in a subsequent inspec-tion.
F.
Audits, Training 1.
Objectives The objectives of this area of the inspection were to verify that:
Measures have been established for performing periodic systematic a.
audits of the QA program and that such measures are effectively implemented, b.
Audit personnel are trained and qualified.
Training is provided for personnel whose activities affect c.
quality.
2.
Method of Accomplishment The preceding objectives were accomplished by:
Review of the Quality Control Manual sections a.
(1) 10.0 Auditing, dated August 30, 1974
11 (2) 2.2 Qualifications and Training of Personnel, dated August 26, 1977 b.
Review of the QA Manual Section 13.2.5, Department and Function Audits, which identifies eleven (11) functions for auditing throughout the Special Products Department. A review of the files for these functions revealed that each of the functions had been audited annually, in compliance with commitments.
Examples of the identity of audit functions and dates audited include the following:
(1) Design, Manufacturing Information and Engineering November 1978, 1977, and 1976.
(2) Feeder (machining, clean and fire) November 1978, 1977, 1976 aad 1975.
(3) NDE & Certification April 1979, 1978, and 1977.
(4) Feeder (Glass Ceramics) November 1978, 1977, 1976, 1975.
(5) M.inagement Audits February 1979 (6) Detector Manufacturing April 16, 1979; May 17,1978 (7) Cable and LPRM Manufacturing October 26, 1978 Each of the above audits had been conducted by use of the Audit Checklist, Form GT 2040.
Whereas several deviations had been identified in the audit reports all deviations reviewed had beer reaudited or complied with and closed out.
c.
Review of the QC Manager Training files which revealed that training sessions are conducted on a random, as-need-to basis for both professional and non professional personnel. Examples of the training includes the following listed by date, subject, number of trainees, length of training session.
(1) June 4, 1979, Training for Final Visual Inspection to QCP 2-1-27, 11 professionals, 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
(2) March 15, 1979, Resistance Welding, 15 professionals, 2\\ hours.
12 (3) April 18, 1978, Welding, 1 Technician, I hour.
(4) April 21, 1978, Welding, I technician, I hour.
(5) June 29, 1978, Crimping of Leads, 13 operators, I hour.
(6) June 30, 1978, Crimping of Leads, 13 operators, I hour.
(7) July 17, 1978, Visual Inspectors of Arc Welds per Process Specification 213-1-14, 15 welders, I hour.
(8) July 6, 1978, Quality Program Manual, Revision 9, 20 professionals, 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.
(9) March 24, 1978, Corporate Specification 090A15, PDS & M Cards, Procurement Practices, 158 Admin';-
trative, inspectica and professionals, I hours.
(10) April 21, 1978, Quality System Auditing, ANSI N45.2.12, Appendix B, Mil-Q-9858A, 8 professionals, 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.
3.
Findings Within this area of the inspection, no deviations or unresolved items were identified.
G.
Procurement of Electrical Cable 1.
Objectives The objectives of this area of the inspection were to review the status of procurement documentation and identify of cabling that was delivered to Westinghouse, Horseheads, N.Y., for use in EPAs for a specific customer.
2.
Method of Accomplishment The preceding objectives were accomplished by:
a.
Review of customer Inquiry No. CR-0241-0379 and customer specification 3E269E SO 29D for cabling which required cabling to be supplied in compliance to IPCEA Standard S-19-81.
4 The P.0 narrative description of the cabling requested the jacketing material to be Hypalon (which is a chlorosulfanated polyethelene) and the insulation material to be ethylene propolene (EP).
13 b.
Review of the wire and cable company documentation delivered with cable shipped to Westinghouse.
This documentation identified the cable as being manufactured to meet the criteria of IPCEA Standard S-68-516.
The cable was further identified as M Durasheath EP type use or RHl! or RHW FR-1.065" EP X.065 Ilypalon.
Note:
During the inspection the inspector cited the differences in identity of the IPCEA standard required by Westinghouse versus the one identified by the wire and cable company as a possible finding, pending further review of those standards and review of additional documents such as Certificates of Compliance, test data, and flame resistance data.
3.
Findings a.
Deviations None.
b.
Unresolved Item Eubsequent to the inspection a review was made of selected portions of the IPCEA standards, namely S-68-516 concerning jacketing materials and 9-19-81 concerning insulating materials.
Whereas Westinghouse had ordered cabling to the identify of IPCEA Standard S-19-81 plus the identity of jacketing material, Hypalon and ins 1ating material EP, the cable manufacturer shipped docuientation with the cabling by reference to IPCEA standard S-68-516 plus identity of the jacketing / insulating materials as.065" liypalon X.65" EP.
Thus the cable manufacturer supplied the required cabling.
However, both the Company and the cable manufacturer appear to have referenced incomplete specifications to assure that the proper cabling is supplied for the intended use.
This item shall remain open as an unresolved item pending review of corrective data for the related P.O. and review of additional similar purchase orders in a subsequent inspection.
H.
Exit Interview The inspectors met with management representatives (denoted by an asterisk in paragraph A) on July 12, 1979, prior to the conclusion of the inspection at the Horscheads, New York, facility.
The inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspection relating to the following areas.
14 1.
Action on previous inspection findings.
2.
Deficient EPA soldered pin connectors.
3.
Design Control - Electrical Penetration Assemblics.
4.
Design Control - Radiation Detectors.
5.
Audits / Training.
6.
Procurement of Electrical Cable 7.
Control of Welding.
8.
Procurement Document Control.
9.
Nonconformances and corrective action.
10.
11.
Equipment Calibration.
tlanagement acknowledged the statements made by the inspectors.
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15 DETAILS SECTION II (Prepared by I. Barnes)
A.
Persons Contacted J. B. Kessing, Manager, Quality Control and Reliability W. F. Massey, Senior Quality Control Engineer M. W. Franke, Manufacturing Engineer, Penetrations J. W. Newton, Incoming Inspection Supervisor J. O. Robbins, Supervisor, Penetrations Manufacturing E. E. Selby, Senior Engineer, Technical Services R. Oppenheim, Senior Quality Control Engineer B.
Control of Welding 1.
Objective The objective of this area of the inspection was to verify that a system had been established and implemented, which provided controls for welding that were consistent with NRC and ASME Code requirementr.
2.
Method of Accomplishment The preceding objective was accomplished by:
Review of Section VIII of the Quality Program Manual a.
Revision 10, " Welding."
b.
Observation of shielded metal arc production welding assembly operations.
Review of shop travelers and welding log book for operations c.
witnessed and for a sample of four (4) completed welds.
d.
Examination of welding procedure specifications used in pene-trations manufacturing and the supporting procedure qualifi-cation records.
Review of procurement and certification data for shielding c.
metal arc and gas metal arc consumables used in penetration manufacturing.
f.
Review of system and records applicable to assuring accuracy of meters on welding equipment.
16 g.
Visual examination of selected finished welds for compliance to ASME Code requirements.
h.
Observation of welding material storage practices and review of welding materials approval and release system.
i.
Review of temperature control and electrode identification /
segregation practices in electrode ovens.
j.
Review of welder qualifications with respect to welding procedure specifications used in penetrations manufacturing.
k.
Interviews relative to system or practice used to determine welder compliance with the requirements of welding procedure specifications.
3.
Findings a.
Deviations from Commitment (1) Criterian IX of Appendix B to 10 CFR 50 states in part, " Measures shall be established to assure that special processes, including welding.
. are con-trolled and accomplished.
. using qualified pro-cedures.
Paragraph 8.3 in Section VIII of the Quality Program Manual states in part, ".
. Quality Control...
will determine that the weld is performed... in compliance with the approved welding procedure and the instructions on the traveler.
Contrary to the above:
(a) The QA program did not address methods, criteria to be used, documentation requirements, or frequency of determination of compliance with approved welding procedures.
(b) The following examples of failure to comply with the approved welding procedure and the instructions on the traveler were noted by the inspector:
~~
I Operation 3 of the bulkhead extension assembly traveler for Order No. CL-49450-ET(S/N 45 Bulk-head to S/N 41 Bulkhead Extension) requirer,
17 deposition of the root pass to be made in accordance with welding procedure specification PS 213-6-2, which stipulates the use of a 1/16 inch diameter Type 309 filler wire.
Actual deposition was noted as having been made with a 3/32 inch diameter Type 309 filler wire.
II Operation 3 of the bulkhead assembly traveler for Order No. 13-PLA-364-LC, S/N 102, requires welding to be performed in accordance with welding procedure specification PS-213-3-20 and Schedule 4.
Schedule 4 requires tack welds to be made at 45 intervals.
Actual tack welding was observed being performed at 90 intervals.
It was further noted by the inspector, that initial tack welding was performed at 5 to 10 amps above the range permitted by Schedule 4.
(See Notice of Deviation, Item A).
(2) See Notice of Deviation, Item B.
b.
Unresolved Items Absence of temperature measurement equipment in the production welding area to provide capability for determination of com-pliance with the preheat and interpass temperature requirements of welding procedure specifications.
C.
Procurement Document Control 1.
Objectives The objectives of this area of the inspection were to verify that:
A system had been established for procurement document control, a.
which would assure the inclusion of applicabl.e quality assurance requirements in procurement documents.
b.
To determine that the system was being properly and effectively implemented.
2.
Method of Accomplishment The preceding objectives were accomplished by:
Review of Section V of the Quality Program Manual Revision 10, a.
" Control of Purchases."
18 b.
Examination of fourteen (14) purchase orders for items used in penetration assemblies and applicable incoming inspection and Certified Material Test Reports.
Verification of use of approved vendors with documented quality c.
assurance programs.
3.
Findings a.
Deviation from Commitment See Notice of Deviation, Item C.
b.
Unresolved Items The Westinghouse Industrial and Government Tube Division quality assurance program for electrical penetration assemblies requires clarification of the scope of procuremer.t controls applicable to different categories of penetration items i.e.
pressure boundary materials, non pressure boundary (safety related) and non pressure boundary (non-safety related). The present program is unclear with respect to definition of appli-cable procurement document controls, vendor approval and receiving inspection criteria for each of these categories.
D.
Nonconformances and Corrective Action 1.
Objective The objective of this area of the inspection was to verify that a a ystem for the control of nonconformances and for assuring effective
<;orrection action has been established and implemented.
2.
Method of Accomplishment The preceding objective was accomplished by:
a.
Review of Section XII of the Quality Program Manual Revision 10, " Corrective Action for Nonconforming ltems."
b.
Review of Quality Control Procedure No. 8-2, dated July 28, 1978, " Material Review Notices."
19 Review of Quality Control Procedure No. 8-4, dated February 1, c.
1979, " Material Review Notice Penetrations."
d.
Examination of five (5) Material Review Notices with respect to:
(1)
Identification of item and descript. ton of nonconformance.
(2)
Identification of reporting party and personnel responsible for resolution.
(3) Disposition of nonconformances in accordance with program commitments.
(4) Evidence of management participation in nonconformance report and corrective action review.
(5) Analysis of nonconformances and determination of required corrective action.
(6) Assigned responsibilities are carried out in an effective manner.
3.
Findings a.
Deviation from Commitment See Notice of Deviation, Item D.
b.
Unresolved Items None.
E.
Nondestructive Examination (Personnel Qualification and Dye Penetrant) a.
Objectives The objectives of this area of the inspection were to verify that:
The employer has developed a written practice for control and a.
administration of NDE personnel training, examination and certification in accordance with applicable NRC and ASME Code requirements.
b.
Personnel performing nondestructive examination are qualified for the methods used and have current eye examinations as defined in SNT-TC-IA.
20 c.
Dye penetrant procedures meet the requirements of the ASME Code and work is accomplished in accordance with the procedures.
2.
Method of Accomplishment Tae preceding objectives were accomplished by:
Review of Section IX of the Quality Program Manual Revision 10, a.
" Personnel Certification fer Inspection and NDE."
b.
Review of specification, PS 212-250-3, " Certification and Training Procedure."
Review of three (3) NDE personnel certification and qualifica-c.
tion record packages including results of eye examinations.
d.
Review of specification, PS 212-250-2, " Penetrant Test for Surface Flaws."
Observation of liquid penetrant examination being performed e.
utilizing the specification referenced in d. above.
3.
Findings a.
Deviations from Commitment None.
b.
Unresolved Items Use of near distance acuity test card in vision examinations that could not be clearly established to contain the required Jaeger J-1 letters. Prior to the end of the inspection a further test card was obtained with identified Jaeger J-1 letters.
This item will remain unresolved pending verification of completion of visual examinations to the required standard.
F.
Equipment Calibration 1.
Objectives
21 The objectives of this area of the inspection were to ascertain that a system had been established, documented, and maintained to assure that tools, gauges, instruments, and other measuring devices used in activities affecting quality are properly controlled, calibrated and adjusted at specified periods to maintain accuracy within stipulated limits.
2.
Method of Accomplishment The preceding objectives were accomplished by:
Review of Section VII of the Quality Program Manual Revision 10, a.
" Gauge and Instrument Control."
b.
Review of master gauge calibration and control program.
c.
Examination of calibration status and records for:
(1) Dimensional gauges located in the incoming inspection area.
(2) Electrical test equipment in the penetrations manufacturing area.
(3) Meters on welding equipment in the penetrations manu-facturing area.
d.
Review of procedure used for assessing affects of use of discrepant gauges on previously inspected items.
3.
Findings Within this area of the inspection, no deviations or unresolved items were identified.
-.