ML19260C293
| ML19260C293 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 10/30/1979 |
| From: | Agee J, Hunnicutt D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19260C288 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-QA-99900378 99900378-79-1, NUDOCS 7912260159 | |
| Download: ML19260C293 (6) | |
Text
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT REGION IV Report No.
99900378/79-01 Program No. 51400 Company:
NAMCO Control Division Acme - Cleveland Corporation 149 Cucumber Street Jefferson, Ohio 44047 Inspection Conducted:
August 8-9, 1979
/d[.70 7
Inspector:
A Jj/ R. Ageef Contractor Inspector Date ComponentsSection II Vendor Inspection Branch Approved:
h2 D. M. Hunnicutt,' Chief Date ComponentsSection II Vendor Inspection Branch Summary Inspection on August 8-9, 1979 (99900378/79-01)
Areas Inspected: Special inspection conducted to ascertain if implemented QA program complies with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B criteria. The inspection involved twelve (12) hours on-site by one (1) NRC inspector.
Results:
In the areas inspected three (3) deviations and one (1) unresolved item were identified.
i Deviations: QA Program Implementation - (1) Certain purchase orders to vendors did not require Certificate of Comformance as required (See Notice of Deviation, Item A). (2) Instruments had not been calibrated although used in the inspection and testing of manufactured products (See Notice of Deviation, Item B).
(3) No training sessions had been conducted as required (See Notice of Deviation, Item C).
l Unresolved Item: NAMCO does not appear to have a fully implemented QA program i
that is consistent with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B criteria.
(Details l
Section paragraph C.3.c.)
i l
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/.[
7912260
2 DETAILS SECTION A.
Persons Contacted J. A. Bentley - Manager, Administration and Supply
- J. Buzogan - Chief Engineer J. V. DiGiacomo - Production Manager D. J. Hetzer - Manufacturing / Engineering Manager B. E. Kovarik - Controller
- R. D. Lesher - Plant Manager
- R. E. Loomis - Quality Control Manager
- D. E. Russel - Quality Assurance Engineer
- N. E. Swanson - President
- Attended the exit interview.
B.
Preinspection Conference A preinspection conference was held August 8, 1979, with personnel listed in paragraph A. above. The NRC inspector defined the scope of this inspection as being limited to the follow-up of construction deficiency report (CDR) concerning NAMCO limit switches, and a review of the NAMC0 currently implemented QA program. The CDR contained a 10 CFR 50.5S(e) and a 10 CFR 21 report received from South Carolina Electric and Gas Company (SCE&G) indicating the NAMCO limit switch problems may be generic.
The equipment in question is a NAMCO limit switch manufactured by the NAMCO Control Inc., Jefferson, Ohio. The limit switch may be used inside the containment vessel, especially for installation on control valves. The non-conformity is that NAMCO had not provided proper QA document controls while supplying the limit switches to specific purchase order quality control requirements.
C.
QA Program Implementation 1.
Objectives The objectives of this inspection were to:
Ascertain that NAMCO had implemented the QA requirements imposed a.
on them by the applicable purchase orders from control valve companies who were buying NAMCO limit switches for use by SCE&G.
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3 b.
Ascertain whether the control valve companies had imposed adequate QA requirements on NAMCO.
c.
Evaluate NAMCO's actions following SCE&G's efforts in late 1978 to help NAMCO upgrade their QA program.
d.
Evaluate NAMCO's actions concerning the recall of suspect limit switches from control valve companies, namely Anchor Darling, Rockwell International and American Warming.
e.
Ascertain that NAMCO limit switches had been designed and qualification tested to meet required codes and standards.
2.
Method of Accomplishment The preceding objectives were accomplished by:
a.
Review of a random selection of purchase orders issued to NAMCO from control valve companies. Those P.O.s include the following:
(1) Rockwell International P.O. No. 36-48435-6, dated March 2, 1979,. for EA-180-32302 limit switches qualified to IEEE Standards 344-1975, 324-1974, and 383 '_972.
(2) Anchor Darling P. O. No. P-1262, dated May 24, 1978, for EA-180-31302 32302 limit switches to be qualified to IEEE Standards -323 and -382.
(3) American Warming and Ventilating Company P.O. No. 4425 dated June 21, 1978, for EA-180-11302/12302 limit switches which must be seismically qualified.
(4) American Warming and Ventilating Coy.iny P.O. No. W-QW80290 dated July 20, 1979, for limit switches.
(5) Anchor Darling P.O. No. A0 683 dated May 8, 1979, and P.O.
Nos. R-816, R-1219, R-1229 and R-1294 for EA-180-XXXX safety-related limit switches that must be manufactured to the QA-2-101 QA procedure; shall be qualified to IEEE Standards -344-1975, -323-1974, and -382-1972; and must be labeled stating it was produced under the QA-2-101 program.
b.
Inspection of approximately one hundred twenty eight (128) limit switches stored in a controlled area stock room. These switches were purported to be the limit switches that had been recalled from three (3) control valve companies who had purchased the switches for SCE&G.
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4 c.
Review of the procedure QA-2-101 dated February 7, 1979, which SCE&G had helped NAMCO develop.
d.
Inspection of the manufacturing, inspection, and test facilities for the production of limit switches.
e.
Review of..the Acme-Cliveland Development Company document
" Qualification of NAMCO Controls Limit Switch, Model EA-740 to IEEE Standards 344(75), 323(74) and 382 (72), dated February 20, 1978.
3.
Findings a.
The following P.O.s, from paragraph 2.b. above, imposed no QA requirements on NAMCO:
Rockwell International No. 36-48435-6 Anchor Darling No. P-1262 American Warming and Ventilating Company No. 4425 and W-QW80290.
It could not be determined from records available at NAMCO if these limit switches were to be used in safety related applications; however, the imposition of IEEE standards on certain of these P.O.s would indicate so.
The recalled switches inspected in the NAMC0 stockroom were intact. There was no indication that NAMCO management had any plans for testing these recalled limit switches.
The QA procedure QA-2-101 was incorporated in the QA Manual to be used as an interim QA program until a more complete QA program could be developed.
Limit switches manufactured under the QA-2-101 program were expected by NAMC0 to be acceptable by the SCE&G. At the time of this inspection, the QA-2-101 program had not been completely implemented in the areas of:
calibration of test and inspection instruments, audits, and material certification.
NAMCO personnel stated they generally used a single source supplier for their raw materials. They had used this supplier exclusively for years without fault and failure of materials.
They had not required material certifications because:
(1) the parts and materials have historically proven satisfactory.
(2) the raw materials supplied are not customarily traceable materials so the supplier's records are not maintained for traceability.
(3) NAMCO had not requested the supplier to provide traceability of the materials for the reasons listed 1616 318
5 above, (4) NAMCO would not be able to provide traceability of the materials in the limit switches that have been recalled; however, they could provide NAMCO records identifying the lot and date on which the limit switches were manufactured.
NAMCO had outlined a vendor audit program but had not implemented the activity.
In a NAMCO letter to the NRC (
Subject:
Report of Deviation -
10 CFR 21) dated June 14, 1979, NAMCO stated they could provide qualified safety-related limit switches in approximately forty-five (45) days, but as of August 9, 1979, no qualified replacement switches had been provided nor were there any available for shipment that could be identified as qualified to QA-2-101.
Every section of the QA Manual had been revised at least once during the period leoruary 7-June 25, 1979. These changes grossly revamped the proposed QA program criteria. Much of the program had not been implemented, however implementation was in progress.
b.
Deviations See Notice of Deviations, Item A, Item B, and Item C.
c.
Unresolved Itam 1
NAMCO appeares to have taken initial steps to preclude shipment of limit switches that do not meet QA program requirements and steps to implement the required QA functions; however, they have not:
(1) Fully implemented a QA program comparable with the contents of QA procedure QA-2-101, dated February 7, 1979.
(2) Requested that their suppliers provide certifications for the materials used in the limit switches already shipped.
(3) Issued P.O.s to suppliers for additional traceable materials for manufacture of replacement limit switches.
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6 In light of the incompletnesses of the NAMCO QA program at the time of the August 8-9, 1979 inspection, a subsequent inspection will be scheduled to verify that NAMCO has complied with its commitment to provide qualified safety-related limit switches to its customers under a QA program that meets 10 CFR 50, Appendix B criteria.
D.
Exit Interview The inspector met with management representatives denoted in paragraph A.
on August 9,1979, at the close of the inspection, and discussed the scope and findings of this inspection.
Management acknowledged the statements by the inspector.
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