ML19260B272

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Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 13 to License NPF-5
ML19260B272
Person / Time
Site: Hatch Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 11/23/1979
From:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML19260B270 List:
References
NUDOCS 7912070505
Download: ML19260B272 (1)


Text

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  • UNITED STATES e,,

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i.h i j

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 YYE

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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION SUPPORTING AMENDMENT N0.13 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-5 GEORGIA POWER COMPANY OGLETHORPE ELECTRIC MEMBERSHIP CORPORATION MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC ASSOCIATION OF GEORGIA CITY OF DALTON, GEORGIA EDWIN 1. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NO. 2 DOCKET NO. 50-366 INTRODUCTION By letter dated July 27, 1979 as amended by letter dated October 2, 1979, Georgia Power Company (licensee) requested a change to the Technical Spec-ifications for Hatch Nuclear Plant Unit No. 2.

The proposed change relates to inoperable suppression chamber to drywell vacuum breakers which are known to be closed and would permit (1) continued operation and startup with up to two vacuum breakers inoperable and (2) continued operation with three inoperable vacuum breakers provided the remaining vacuum breakers are demonstrated operable at an increased frequency. The licensee's submittal indicated that raaintenance on these vacuum breakers cannot be performed safely in the HOT SHUTDOWN CONDITION. Therefore, the change was reauested to ninimize unnecessary burdens on plant operation which would require the plant to go to COLD SHUTDOWN for repair of any inoperable vacuum breakers each time the reactor is shutdown.

EVALUATION We have reviewed the licensee's request and determined that the request is acceptable on the following basis.

Vacuum in the drywell is relieved by 12 vacuum breakers between the drywell and the suppression chamber. As stated in the HNP-2 FSAR (Section 6. 2.1. 2.1. 6.1 )

the vacuum relief capacity should be no less than one sixteenth of the total main vent cross sectional area. Accordingly, the FSAR supports continued operation with 9 operable valves and 3 inoperable valves which are known to be closed. Therefore, the current Specifications authorize. continued oper-ation under these conditions and do not require initiation of reactor shutdown tu affect repairs of the inoperable valves.

The staff requires that repair to such inoperable components be rade at the earliest practicable opportunity. With one or two inoperable vacuum breakers the vacuum relief capacity is adequate such that the failure of a sirgle active component can be tolerated without compromising the relief capacity.

Accordingly, we agree with the licensee that the current Specifications which would require the unit to go to COLD SHUTDOWN to repair one or two inoperable valves places an unnecessary burden on plant operations, and that reactor startup with up to two inoperable' vacuum breakers should ce permitted.

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, Based on the above, we find the licensea's request to be acceptable.

Further, we have determined thal this finding will be incorporated into the staff's Standard Technical Specifications for Boiling Water Reactors (NUREG-0123).

Consequently for consistency, we have developed a wording of the Specifica-tions which differs from that proposed by the licensee. This revised wording was discussed with the licensee and he agrees.

dNVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS We have determined that the amendment does not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact.

Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendment involves an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and pursuant to 10 CFR Section Sl.5(d)(4) that an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

CONCLUSIONS We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:

(1) because the amendment does not involve a significant increase in the pro-bability or consequences of accidents previously considered and does not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assur-ance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) su:h activities will be conducted in compliance with the Conmission's regulat'ons and the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the commen defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Dated:

November 23, 1979 1515 148