ML19259B405
| ML19259B405 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 02/02/1979 |
| From: | Gilleland J TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | Varga S Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7902090255 | |
| Download: ML19259B405 (34) | |
Text
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, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY CH ATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 374o1 500C Chestnut Street Tower Il FEB 2 1979 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention: Mr. S. A. Varga, Chlef Light Water Reactors Branch No. 4 Division of Project Management U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555
Dear Mr. Varga:
In the Matter of the Application of ) Docket No. 50-327 Tennessee Valley Authority )
Enclosed are the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SNP) preoperational response time test procedures requested by the Instrument and Control Systems Branch (ICSB) reviewer, Don Lasher, during a telephone conversation on January ll, 1979. These preoperational tests measure response time from instrument bistable input to slave relay output (Enclosure 1) and from slave relay output to hardware actuation (Enclosure 2).
In response to a request by the Power Systems Branch (PSB), Enclosure 3 is a revision of the response to question Q8.33 in the SNP Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) which concerns the effect of sustained high or low grid voltage ccaditions on safety-related electrical equipment. The revision to Q8.33 commits TVA to incorporate a low voltage trip.
Enclosure 4 is a revision to FSAR Section 7.6.6 which concerns spurious actuation protection for motor operated valves. The revision specifies the removal of power to the accumulator isolation valves in accordance with Branch Technical Position (BTP) ICSB 18.
Amendment 60 will incorporate Enclosures 3 and 4 into the SNP FSAR.
Very truly yours,
\. h g.) 'J. E. Gilleland Assistant Manager of Power g
Enclosure (5) ry 9 0 2 0 9 0 S M by
\
An Equal Opportunity Employer
ENCLOSURE 1
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i
, PREOP TESTS FOR MEASURDIENT OF RESPONSE TIME W-8.13
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3/3/73 FROM INSTnUMENT BISTABLE INPbT TO SLAVE RELAY UUTPUT 5.22.16.2 Set the decade resistance boxes for the following:
RA = 414. 53 0 33 ' 4.08 C EC "414.20 0 Pc " 4.03 0 p- '
'IY
[Ui1 ;i u V ; u a,rti t u i ,' v li i
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5.22.16.3 Place 1TS/412D,1FS/5123and1FS/5223intri; position.
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5.22.16.4 Initiate a trip by closing S-1 of test circuit.
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5.22.16.5 Record data required on data sheet 5.22.
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5 22.16.6 Renove test circuit and verify en Appendix G.
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5.23 Lcv Pressuriner Pressure Coincident with Low Pressurizer Level -
Trip and Safegue.rds Actuation
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5.23 1 Low Pressurizer Pressure (lP%56D) 5.23.1.1 Set up the tes. circuit shown on sketch 5.23.1 of Appendix H and verif/' on Appendix G as the wires are connected to the following points:
(1) Temicals 11 and 12 of TE204 in 1-R-46.
(2) Tar-inals 11 and 12 of T3204 in 1-R L9 (3) Teminals 9 and lo of TE630 in 1-R-48.
(4) Terninals 1 and 2 of T3602 in 1-R-43.
(5) Teminals 1 and 2 of TE610 in 1-R 48.
(6) Teminals 9 und 10 of TE630 in 1-2-51.
(7) Tcminals 1 and 2 of T3602 in 1-R-51.'
(0) Teminals 1 and 2 of TE610 in 1-R-51.
1
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W-8.13 w .,. ......, ...-% ,...s- Page 154 J .. - - . .- --. . --
3/3/78 5.23.1.2 With S-1 of test circuit open, adjust R-1 for pressure reading of 1725 PSIC (11.25 !.'s at PP/4563). Close S-1 e.nd adjust R-2 for pressure reading of 1805 PSIG (15.25 Ma at PF/4563).
Reset all circuits..
VOD l t t i'~p n.
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ve in.oi.,s.s
[ -; I O E I O Mil \/ / -
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5.23.1 3 PlaceLS/4613intripposition. 8 #
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5.23.1.4 Initiate a trip by opening S-1.
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5.23.1.5 Record data called for on data sheet 5.23
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5.23.1.6 Rer.ove test circuit and verify en Appendix G.
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5.23.2 Lov Pressurizer Pressure (lP3457D) 5 23.2.1 Set up the test circuit shown on sketch 5.23.2 of Appendix H -
and veriP/ on Appendix G as the wires are connected to the following points:
(1) Teminals 3 and 4 of TB303 in 1-R k6.
(2) Teminals 3 and 4 of T3303 in 1-R-49 (3) Terminals 3 and 4 of T3622 in 1-R-48.
(4) Ter=inals 9 and 10 of T3629 in 1-R-48.
(5) Te minals 1 and 2 of TE615 in 1-R-48.
(6) Tereinals 3 and 4 of T3622 in 1-R-51.
(7) Ter=inals 9 and lo of TE629 in 1-R-51.
(8) Teminals 1 and 2 of T3619 in 1-R-51.
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5.23.2.2 With 0-1 of t<:st circuit open, adjust R-1 for pressure rer. ding of 1725 PSIC (11.25 Ma at PP/4573). Close S-1 and adjust R-2 for ,cucure reading of 1805 PSIG (15.25 t'a at PP/4573). Reset all :ircuits.
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W-8.13 Page 155 1., -
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3/e/78 5.23.2.3 PlaceLS/459Bintripposition.
TOO l ^ ! f /W ' S V.!!\/
2 Vi\ a i i i V i \ i . u i i aI vni '.F I (V' d I 1 / -
5.23 2.4 Initiate a trip by opening s-1.
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5.23.2.5 Record data called for on data sheet 5.23
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5.23.2.6 Re=cve test circuit and verify on Appendix G.
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5 23.3 Low Pressurizer Pressure (lP3455D) 5.23 3 1 Set up the test circuit shown on sketch 5 23.3 of Appendix H and verify on Appendix G as the wires e.re connected to the following pointa:
(1) Ter=inals 11 and 12 of TBIO4 in 1-R k6.
(2) Ter=inals 11 and 12 of T31C4 in 1-R-49 (3) Ter=inals 3 and 4 of T3603 in 1-R-48.
(4) Ter=inals 11 and 12 of T3618 in 1-R-48.
(5) Ter=inals 7 and 8 of T3621 in 1-R-48.
(6) Te_ inals 3 and 4 of Ts603 in 1-R-51.
(7) Terminals 11 and 12 of T3618 in 1-R-51.
(8) Terminals 7 and 8 of T3621 in 1-R-51.
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5.23.3.2 With S-1 of tes: circuit open, acust R-1 for pressure reating of 1725 PSIG ( 11.25 Ma at PP/4553). Close S-1 and adjust R-2 for pressure reading of1805 PSIG (15.25 Fa at PP/4553). Reset all circuits.
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5.23 3.3 PlaceLS/460Bintripposition.
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5.23.3.4 Initiate a trip by opening S-1.
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- W-8.13 Page 156 s,,--.-,
3/8/78 j , .. - s . . ,
- f. a .. .. . ..
5.23 3.5 Record data called for on data sheet 5.23
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5.23.3.6 Re=ove test circui; and verify on Appendix G.
GD ! ^ t " p ,' I f .l T ' /'\ ? '; O E. ! !
l{Ni k II'ik \.IlIIV'![~k I k bI 4 U A S k- /8 5.23.4 kw Pressurizer Level (1L34593) 5.23.4.1 set up the test circuit shown on sketch 5 23.4 of Appendix H and verify on Appendix G as the wires are connected to the following points:
(1) Ter=inals 3 and 4 of T3105 in 1-R-46.
(2) Ter=inals 3 and 4 of TE105 in 1-R-49 3)
(4) Ter=inals
( Terminals 1 and 7 and 8 of T3601 2 of T3623 in 1-R-48. in 1-R-48.
(5) Ter=inals 9 and lo of T3638 in 1-R-48.
(6) Ter=inala 7 and 8 of TE601 in 1-R-51.
(7) Tecnicals 1 and 2 of T3623 in 1-R-51.
(8) Terminals 9 and lo of Ts638 in 1-R-51.
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5.23.4.2 With S-1 of test circuit open, adjust R-1 for level reading of 0% of range (10 Ma at LP/4593). Close S-1 and adjust R-2 for_
_. level reading of 10% of range .(14 Ma at LP/4593). Reset all ;
circuits.
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5.23.4.3 PlacePS/457Dintripposition.
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5.23.4.4 Initia e a trip by opening S-1.
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5.23.4.5 Reccrd data called for on data sheet 5.23.
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, W-8.13 Page 157
, , , , . , . - . ., ,. .s. 3/8/78 t-r u..a .. - . . . . . <.. . . . .
5.23.4.6 Renove test circuit and verify on Appendix G.
g I P t -o n ? 0 A ~! O N I - !
g gjg ,i.. vs a.- - - -
5.23 5 LowPressurizerLevel(1PL4603) 5.23.5.1 Set up the test circuit shown on sketch 5.23 of Appendix H and verify on Appendix G as the wires are connected to the following points:
(1) Te=inals 3 and 4 of TE205 in 1-R-46.
(2), Terninals 3 and 4 of T3205 in 1-R-49 (3) Teminals 1 and 2 of T3637 in 1-R-48.
(4)- Terninals 7 end C of TE601 in 1-R-L8.
(5) Teminals 11 and 12 of T36L6 in 1-R-48.
(6) Teminals 1 and 2 of T3637 in 1-R-51.
(7) Te =inals 7 ands of T3601 in 1-R-51.
(8) Temicals 11 and 12 of TB646 in 1-R-51.
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5.23.5.2 With S-1 of test circuit cpen, adjust R-1 for level reading of 0: of range (10 Ma at LP/4603). Close S-1 and adjust R-2 for level reading of 10% of range (14 Ma at LP/4603). Reset all l circuits. 8
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5 23.5.3 PlacePS/4553intripposition.
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5.23.5.4 Initiate a trip by ,pening S-1.
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5 23.5.5 Record data called for en data shees 5.23
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5.23.5.6 Renove test circuit and verify on Appendi:c C.
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', LSCLOSURE 2 PRLOP TESTS FUd MEASURL:!ENT OF RESPONSE TIME FRO:i ULAVE RELAY OUTPUT TO LA"DUARE ACTUATION Page 103 3/7/77 q 5.4 CCP 1A-A AL'D 1B-B P2SPC:!SE TI!E SU MINI FLOW AND DUPlHG COLD LEG IUJECTION Section 5.4 determines CCP ' 4 and lE-E cysten response time to rated pressure
,,, y u e, ~ h , and then on the cold leg injection path. The differ-ence in response times may then be used in futuve curveillance testing when response time will be obtained on only the mini flow circuit. CCP 1A-A is lined up for mini flow diccharge through the seal water heat exchanger. A SI signal test switch is attached to the VCT suction isolation and EiST suction isolation Train A valves. This switch is tested to verify that it will move the valves. The CCP M-A SI start is added to the switch circuit.
A transient recorder is connected across the SI signal and acrosc pump discharge pressure signal. The test switch is used to start the transient and it is recorded. The pump is stopped. The test switch is attached to the Train A injection and isolation valves. They are tested for response without pump start. The pump start is returned to the switch circuit. The switch is used to start the inj ection transient and it in recorded. The pu=p is ctopped. The procedure is repeated for CCP 13-3 and Train B valves.
NOTE: The following procedure will produce a snil arount of temporary flow through the nor ' charging path and a small c. count of flow to the boric acid tank. These systems should be set up for this purpose.
CAUTION: During performance of thic section do not start any notor/ pump more than twice in a one hour period.
NOTE: The following section is written to be performed irmediately following Section 5.3 5.4.1 Verify the PldST is filled to the normal vperating level with Grade A water. The level and temperature instrumentation is in service.
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5.4.2 Position and/or verify the following on M-6:
VALVE POSITICU FCV 62-93 open /
FCV 62-89 Cloced 7 FCV 62-63 Cloted /
FCV 62-98 open /
FCV 62-99 open /
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U-6.lC Page 104 3/7/77 5.4.2 (Continuad)
VALVE POSITIO:!
FCV 62-132 Open /
FCV 62-133 open /
FCV 62-1.35 Closed /
FCV 62-136 Closed /
FCV 63-39 Closed /
FCV 63 -40 Closed /
FCV 63-25 Closed /
FCV 63-26 Closed /
FCV 63-38 Closed /
FCV 63-41 open /
FCV 63-42 open /
FCV 63-39 Closed /
FCV 63-40 Closed /
Hs 62-lo3A Pull to Lock /
HS 62-lO4A Pull to Lock /
5.4.3 Verify reciprocating charging pung 1C is not running and.is tagged with a hold order to prevent operation.
Hold Order
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5.4.4 verify 62-652, VCT ISOLATION is closed,62-253, VCT BYPASS is open, and 63-574, BIT BA RECIRC ISOL is open.
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w-6.lC Page 105 3/7/77 5.4.5 CCP 1A-A and CCP 1B-3 pump and seals, associated suction piping to the EWST, nini-flow lines, discharge piping through the BIT to the RCS are vented and filled in accordance with SOI .
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5.4.6 Connect the following equipment:
5.4.6.1 Connect a pair of normally open leads from the test switch to TB i 603-11 and T3 603-12 (R-48). This will give LCV 62-135 a SI i signal when switch is turned. Record temporary condition in Appendix E.
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5.4.6.2 Connect a pair of normally open leads from thetest switch to T3 602-9 and 23 602-10 (R k3). This vill give LCV 62-132 a SI signal when switch is turned. Record temporary condition in Appendix E.
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5.4.6.3 Connect cne channel of a transient recorder across T3 619-5 and TB 619-6 (R-48) to conitor SI signal to the pump. Record temporary condition in Appendix E.
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5.4.6.4 Connect one channel of a transient recorder across to monitor pump discharge pressure from .
Record temporary condition in Appendix E.
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5.4.6.5 If desired, the injection flow transient from FI 63-170 may be observed by connecting one channel of a transient recorder uith appropriate square root converter across T3 21F-1 and T3 21F-2 (R-21). Record te=porary condition in Appendix E.
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5.4.7 Turn test switch, then return, and verify LCV 62-135 opens and LCV 62-132 closes as verified by indicating lights on M-5
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. W-6.lC Page 106 3/7/77
, 5.4.8 Open LCV 62-132 using HS 62-132A, VOLU'G CO:!IROL TK OUTLET ISOL VLV (M-5).
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5.4.9 Close LCV 62-135 using HS 62-135A, CHARGr:G PU'e FLOW REAC. W STG TK (M-5) .
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1 5.4.10 Connect a pair of normally open leads fron the test switch to T3 619-5 and TB 619-6 (n-48). This will give a SI signal to the pung then switch is turned. Record temporary condition in Appendix E.
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5.4.11 Record initial data on DATA SHEET 5.4.11.
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CAUTIO.' : During the next step have unit operator read,:,' to trip CCP 1A-A using HS 62-103A if LCV 62-132 starts to close and LC7 62-135 does not start to open.
5.4.12 Start transient recorder and turn test switch, then return, to start transient.
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5.4.13 After para eters have stabilized stop the transient recorder. Record final data on DATA SHEET 5.4.11. ,
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5.4.14 Stop CCP L'i-A using HS 62-103A.
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5.4.15 Write test number, step number, pump designation, date, and scales on transient trace.
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5.4.16 Open LCV 62-132 using HS 62-132A, VOLU's CO::IROL TK OUTLET ISOL VLv (M-5).
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W-6.lC Page 107 3/7/77 5.4.17 Close LCV 62-135 using ES 62-135A, CHARGING PU:? FLOW REAC. W Si.
TK (M-5) .
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5.4.18 Set up the following conditions:
5.4.18.1 Disconnect the pair of leads from the test switch to T3 619-5 and TB 619-6 (R-48). This removes the SI sigral to CCP 1A-A from the test switch. Record removal of temporary condition in Appendix.E.
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5.4.18.2 Lift wire SEC7 from TB 602-4 (R-k8) and connect a normally closed pair of leads from the test switch to wire SEC7 and T3 602-4 (R-48).
This will give FCV 63-42 a SI signal when the switch is turned.
Record tenporary condition in Appendix E. Reopen FCV 63-42 using ES 63-42A, 30RC:t InJ TK To CVCS EA TK (M-6) .
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5.4.13.3 Connect a nor-a'ly open pair of leads fro the test switch to TB 602-1 and T3 602-2 (R-48). This will give FCV 63-26 a SI signal when the switch is turned. Record tenporary condition in Appendix E.
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5.4.13.4 Connect a nor-'lly open pari of leads fron the test switch to T3 603-7 and TB 603-8 (R-48). This will give FCV 63-39 a SI signal when the switch is turr.ed. Record temporary condition in Appendix E.
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5.4.13.5 Connect a nor-,'7y open pair of leads from the test switch to TB 602-7 and T3 602-8 (R-48) . This will give FCV 62-90 a SI signal tihen the switch is turned. Record temporary condition in Appendix E.
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5.4.18.6 Connect a normally open pair of leads from the test switch to TB 603-5 and TB 603-6 (R-48). This will give FCV 62-98 a SI signal when the switch is turned. Record temporary condition in Appendix E.
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W-C..e Fage 103 3/7/77 5.4.19 veriey the refuel cavity is clear or persennel and equipnent and ready to receive water. The uater level is at the vessel flauge or above.
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5.4.20 Turn test switch, then return, ani verify LCV 62-132 closes, FCV 63-42 closes, FCV 63-26 opens, FcV 63-59 opens, FCV 62-90 closes and FCV 62-98 closes as verified by indicating lights on M-5 and I'-6.
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5.4.21' .Close LOV 62-135 using h.5 62-135A, CHARGI:!G FU'e FLC'4 EEAC W STG TK (M-5).
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5.4.22 Cpen LCV 62-132 using H3 62-1322, VOLU:E CC2 ROL TX C'ZLET ISOL VLV (M-5). ,
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5.4.23 Open FCV 63-42 using Hs63-42A, 3Cac:t nIJ TK TO CVCS BA TK (M-6).
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5.4.24 Close FCV 63-26 using HS63-26A, SIS E0ao:I.E:J TK SH'r0FF VLV (M-6).
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5.4.25 Close FCV 63-39 using HS63-39A, E0EC:7 E!J TK E!LET ISOL VL7 (M-6). .
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5.4.26 Open FCV 62-90 using HS62-90A, CHG FLCW ISOL VLV (M-6).
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5.4.27 Open FCV 62-93 using HS62-98A, CHAEGE:0 FUMp MEE:0M FLOW (M-5).
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5.4.28 Connect a pair of normally open leads from the test suitch to TB 619-5 and T3 619-6 (R-48). This vill give a SI signal to the pump whan switch is turned. Record temporary condition in Appendix E.
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u-6.lC Pace 109 3/7/77 5.4.29 Record initial data on DATA SIEET 5.4.29
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5.4.30 Fully open FCV 62-89 usind HIC 62-98A (M-5).
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CAUTIO:I: During the next step have unit operator ready to trip CCP 1A-A using HS 62-108A if LCV 62-132 starta to close and IIV 62-135 does not ctart to open. Also trip purp if FCV 62-98 closes and either FCV 63-26 or FCV 63-39 does not open.
5.4.31 Start transient recorder and t.u n test cwitch, then return, to start transient.
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5.4.32 After pare.neters have stabil1:ed step the transient recorder. Record final data on DATA SEEE 5.4.29
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5.4.33 Stop CCP 1A-A using HS 62-10SA.
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5.4.34 Write test number, step number, pump designation, date, and scales on transient trace.
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5.4.35 Close LCV 62-135 using HS 62-135A, CHARGING FU'S FLOW REAC U STG TK (M-5).
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- 5. 4.1.6 Open LCV 62-132 using HS 62-132A, VOLU'.'E COKROL TK OrLET ISOL VL, (x-5).
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5.4.37 Open FCV 63-42 using HS63-42A, BORO:i IUJ TK TO CVCS BA TK (M-6).
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5.4.38 Close FCV 63-26 using HS63-26A, SIS EORCII IIiJ TK SFUTOFF VLV (M-6).
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S U-6.lC Page 110 3/7/77 5.4.39 Close FCV 63-39 using Hs63-39A, BOR0:1 II!J TK I:!LET ISCL VLV (M-6',.
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5.4.40 Open FCV 62-90 using HS62-90A, CHG FLC'4 ISOL VLV (M-6).
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5.4.41 Open FCV 62-98 using Hs62-98A, CHARGII;0 PU:2 MIIIIM.IM FLO*4 (M-5).
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5.4.42 Dicconnect the following equipment:
5.4.42.1 Dicconnect test switch leads attached to TB 603-11 and TB 603-12 (R-48). Record removal of temporary ccndition in Appendix E.
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5.4.42.2 Disconnect test cvitch leads attached to TB 602-9 and TB 602-10 (R-48). Record removal of temporarf condition in Appendix E.
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5.4.42.3 Dicconnect transient recorder leads across TB 619-5 and TB 619-6 (R-48). Record removal of temporarf condition in Appendix E.
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5.4.42.4 Disconnect transient recorder leads acrocc and ,
. Record removal of temporary condition in Appendix E. ,
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5.4.42.5 Disconnect test switch leada attached to TB 602 4 and wire SBC7.
Replace wire SEC7 cn TB 602-4 (R-48). Record removel of temporarf condition in Appendix E. Reopen FCV 63-42 using Es63-42A, BORO:t IIiJ TK TO CVCS BA TK (M-6).
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i 5.4.42.6 Dicconnect test cwitch leads attached to TB 602-1 and TB 6C2-2 (R-48). Record removal of tempora f condition in Appendix E.
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U-6.lC Page 111 3/7/77 5.4.42.7 Disconnect test switch leads attached to T3 603-7 and T3 603-8 (R-48). Record renoval of tenporary conditien in Appendix E.
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5.4.42.3 Disconnect test cuitch lead; attached to TB 602-7 and TB 602-8 (R-48).
Record removal of temporary condition in Appendix E.
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5.4.42.9 Dicconnect test switch 3ead attached to TB 603-5 and T3 603-6 (R-48).
Record renoval of te porary condition in Appendix E.
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5.4.42.10 Disconnect pair of test cvitch leads attached to TB 619-5 and Ta 619-6 (R-48). Record renoval of tensorary co:. lition in Appendix E.
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5.4.43 Verify the FJJST ic filled to it normal operating level with Grade A water. If necessary adjust water levels and refill R4ST in accordance with SOI 74.1D.
l 5.4.44 Position and/or verify the following on "-6:
VALVE POSITIC:! -
FCV 62-93 open / -
FCV 62-89 Closed /
FCV 62-63 Closed /
FCV 62-93 Open /
FCV 62-99 Open /
FCV 62-132 Open /
FCV 62-133 Open /
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'd-6. lC Page 112 3/7/77 5.4.44 (Continued)
VisLVE POSITIO:I IL/ 62-135 Closed /
LCV 62-136 Closed /
FCV 63-39 Closed /
FCV 63-40 Closed __
/
FCV 63-25 Closed /
FCV 63-26 Closed / _
FCV 63-33 closed /
FCV 63-41 open /
FCV 63-42 open /
FCV 63-39 Closed /
FCV 63-40 Closed /
HS 62-lC8A Pull to Lotz /
Hs 62-104A Pull to Lock / -
5.4.45 Connect the following ecuipnent: -
5.4.45.1 Connect a pair of normally open 1 cads frca the test switch to T3 603-11 and TB 603-12 (E-51). This vill give LCV 62-136 a SI signal when switch is turned. Record tenporary condition in Appendix E.
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5.4.45.2 Connect a pair of normally open leads from the test switch to TB 602-9 and TB 602-10. This will give IfV 62-133 a sI signal when switch is truned. Record temporary condition in Appendix E.
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U-6.lC Page 113 3/7/77 5.4.45.3 Connect one channel of a transient recorder across TB 619-5 and TB 619-6 (n-51) to monitor SI signal to the pump. Record tem-porary condition in Appendix E.
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5.4.45.4 Connect one channel of a transient recorder across to monitor pump discharge pressure from Record temporary condition in Appendix E.
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5.4.46 Turn test switch, then return, and verify LCY 62-136 opens and LCV 62-133 closes as verified by indicating lights on M-5
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5.4.47 open LCV 62-133 using Hs 62-133A, voLU:s Co::TacL TK ccTLET IsoL VALVE (M-5).
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5.4.48 Close LCV 62-136 using HS 62-136A, CHARGII:G PUW FLOW REAC.' W SIG TK (M-5).
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5.4.49 Connect a pair of nor 11y open leads from the test switch to T3 619-5 and TB 619-6 (R-51). This will give a SI signal to the pump when switch is turned. Record temporary condition in Appendix E. ,
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5.4.50 Record initial data on DATA SHEET 5.k.50.
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CAUTIOI: During the next step have unit operator ready to trip CCP IB-B using HS 62-104A if LCV 62-133 st:.rts to close and LCV 62-136 doea not start to open.
5.4.51 Start transient reco mer and turn test switch, then return, to start transient.
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W-6.lC Page 114 3/7/77 5.4.52 After parameters have stabilised stop the transient recorder. Record final data on DATA SHEET 5.4.52.
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5.4.53 Stop CCP ls-3 using Hs 62-lo4A.
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5.4.54 Write test number, step number, pump designation, date, and scales on transient trace.
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5.4.55 open LCV 62-133 using ES 62-133A, voLim: Co:rROL TK OUTLET ISOL VLV (M-5).
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5.k.56 Close LCV 62-136 using ES 62-136A, CHARGIUG FU?O FLCW REAC. W STG TK (M-5).
/
5.4.57 Set up the following conditions:
5.4,57.1 Disconnect the pair of leads frca the test switch to T3 619-5 and T3 619-6 (R-51). This removes the SI signal to CCP 1B-3 from the test switch. Record re= oval of temporary condition in Appendix E. .
/ .
5.4.57.2 Lift wire S337 from T3 602-4 (R-51) and connect a normally closed pair of leads from the test switch to zire S337 and T3 602-4 (R-51). This vill give FCV 62-41 a SI signal when switch is turned.
Record temporary condition in Appendix E. Reopen FCV 63-41 using HS63-41A, BORON IHJ TK To CVCS BA TK (M-6).
/
5.4.57.3 Connect a normally open pair of leads frca the test switch to T3 602-1 and T3 602-2 (R-51) . This will give FCV 63-25 a SI signal when switch is turned. Record tc=porary condition in Appendix E.
/
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W 6.lC Page 115 3/7/77 5.4.57.4 Connect a nornally open pair of leads fron the test suitch to T3 603-7 and T3 603-8 (R-51). This vill give FCV 63-40 a SI sign 11 when switch is turned. Record temporary condition in Appendix E.
/
5.4.57.5 Connect a normally.open pair of leads fron the test switch to T3 602-7'and T3 602-8 (R-51). This will give FCV 62-91 a sI signal when switch is turned. Record tenporary condition in Appendix E.
/
5.4.57.6 Connect a nornally open pair of leads fran the test switch to T3 603-5 and TB 603-6 (R-51). This will give FCV 62-99 a SI signal when switch is turned. Record temporary condition in Appendix E.
/
5.4.58 VeriP/ the rePaal cavity is clear of personnel and equipnent and ready to receive water. Th( water level is at the vessel flange or above.
/
5.4.59 Turn test switch, then return, and veriff ICV 62-136 opens, LCV 62-133 closes, FCV 63-41 closes, FCV 63-25 opens, FCV 63-40 opens, FCV 62-91 closes and FCV 62-99 closes as verified by indicating lights on M-5 and M-6.
/
5.4.60 Close LCV 62-136 using HS 62-136A, CHl.RGIEG PiJM? FLOW REAC '- STG TK (M -
5).
/
5.4.61 Open LCV 62-133 using Hs 62-133A, VOLU'c CC IRoL TK oi;TLET IsoL VLV (M-5).
/
' 5.4.62 Open FCV 63-41 using Hs63-41A, EORON INJ TK TO CVCS BA TK (M-6).
/
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W-6.1C Page 116 3/7/77 5.4.63 Cloce FCV 63-25 using HS63-25A, SIS BORO:! n:J TK SHUT 0FF VLV (M-6).
/
5.4.64 Close FCV 63-40 using HS63-40A, E0RO:I II J TK II:LET ISOL VLV (M-6).
/
5.4.65 Open FCV 62-90 using HS62-90A, CHG FLC'l ISO VLV (M-6).
/
5.4. 6 Open FC7 62-98 using Hs62-98A, CHARGII:G FU'? IEiDfJ'! FLCW (M-5).
/
5.4.67 Connect a pair of nor-ol'y open leads from the test switch to T3 619-5 and T3 619-6 (R-51). This will cive a SI cignal to the punp when switch in turned. Record tenporary condition in Appendix E.
/
5.4.68 Record initial data on DATA SHEEZ 5.4.63.
/
5.4.69 Fully open FCV 62 C, . 'ing HIC 62-29A (M-5) .
/
CAUTIO:7: During the next step have unit operator ready to trip CCP 13-3 using HS 62-104A if LCV 62-133 starts to close a'nd LCV 62-136 does not start to open. Also trip pump if FCV 62-99 closes and either FCV 63-25 or FCV 63-40 does not open.
5.4.70 start transient recorder and turn test switch, then return, to start trancient.
/
5.4.71 After parameters have stabilized stop the trancient recorder. Record final data on DATA SHEET 5.4.68.
/
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U-6.lc Page 117 3/7/77 i
- 5.4.72 Stop CCP 13-3 using HS 62-104A.
/
I i 5.4.73 Urite test neber, step number, pump designation, date, ani scales on trancient trace.
/ .-.
5.4.74 Close LCV 62-136 using Hs 62-136A, CHARGE G FUMP FLC'd REAC W STG TK (ti-5) .
/
5.4.75 Open LCV 62-133 using HS 62-133A, VOLIDE Cc:ITROL TK OUTLET ISOL VLV (M-5).
/
5.4.76 Open FCV 63-41 ucing Hs63-41A, BORO:I E:J TK To CVCS EA TK (M-6).
/
5.4.77 Close FCV 63-25 using Hs63-25A, sis 30Roli E!J TK SHUT 0FF VLV (M-6).
/
5.4.78 Close FCV 63-40 using Hs63-40A, E0R0?I EiJ TK HILET ISOL VLV (M-6).
/ .
5.4.79 Open FCV 62-91 using Hs 62-9M, CHG FLCPd. ISO VLV (M-6).
/
5.4.8o open FCV 62-99 using HS62-99A, CHARGE!G PU'? IT!DE4 FLCW (M-5) .
/
5.4.81 Disconnect the following test equipment:
5.4.81.1 Disconnect test switch leads attached to TB 603-11 and TB 603-12 (R-51). Record removal of temporary condition in Appendix E.
/
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U-6.1C Pace 118 3/7/77 5.4.81.2 Dicconnect test switch leads attached to TB 602-9 and T3 602-10 (R-5f). Record renoval of temporary condition in Appendix E.
/
5.4.81 3 Disconnect transient recorder lead across T3 619-5 and T3 619-6 (R-51). Record renoval of temporary condition in Appendix E.
/
5.4.81.4 Disconnect transient recorder leads across and
. Record removal of temporary condition in Appendix E.
/
5.4.81 5 Disconnect transient record leads across T3 21F-1 and T3 21F-2 (R-21). Record renoval of temporary condition in Appenlix E.
/
5.4 81.6 Dicconnect test switch leads attached to T3 602-4 and wire S337.
Replace wire S337 on T3 602-4 (R-51). Record removal of temporary condition in Appendix E. Reopen FCV 63-41 using RS63-41A, BORON IRJ TK TO CVC3 BA TK (M-6).
/
5.4.81.7 Disconnect test switch leads attached to T3 602-1 and T3 602-2 (R-51). Record renoval of temporary condition in Appendix E. .
/
5.4.81.8 Disconnect test suitch leads attached to T3 603-7 and T3 603-8 (R-51). Record renoval of temporary condition in Appendix E.
/
5.4.81 9 Dicconnect tect.cuitch leads attached to T3 602-7 and T3 602-8 (R-51). Record renoval of temporary condition in Appendic E.
/
5.4.81.10 Disconnect test switch leads attached to'T3 603-5 and T3 603-6 (R-51). Record renoval of terporary condition in Appendix E.
/
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W-6.lC Page 119 3/7/77 5.4.81.11 Disconnect pair of test switch leads attached to TB 619-5 and T3 619-6 (R-51). Record re= oval of temporary condition in Appendix E.
/
5.4.82 notify operations to:
5.4.82.1 Return EWST to the desired level.
/
5.4.82.2 Return vessel and refuel cavity to the desired level.
/
5.4.82.3 Ret, urn valve lineup to the configuration desired 'oy operating requirements.
/
5.4.82.4 P. move hold order from Reciprocating Charging Pump if desired.
/
5.4.83 Recove the following test equiscent.
5.4.83.1 Rec.ove test gage installed in Step 5.3.1.2 fron PI 62-110 (L-loS).
Record removal of te=porary condition in Appendix E.
/
/ .
5.4.83.2 Recove test gage ins +.alled in Step 5 3.1.3 from PI 62-106 (L-112) .
Record removal of temporary condition in Appendix E.
/
5.4.83.3 Remove test gage installed in Step 5.3.1.4 from PI 62-109 (L-loS).
Record renoval of temporary condition in Appendix E.
/
5.4.83.4 Remove test gage installed in Step 5.3.1.5 from PI 62-los /L-112).
Record removal of temporary condition in Appendix E.
/
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W-6.1C Page 120 3/7/77 5.4.83.5 Remove temperature recording equipment inctalled in Step 5.3.1.6.
Record removal of temporary condition in Appendix E.
/
5.483.6 Re ove ter.perature recording equipment ir. stalled in step 5.3.1.7.
Record removalof temporary condition in Appendix E.
/
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ESCLU:>URE 3
, REVISION TO FSAR QUESTION Q8.33 8.33 With regard to t he e f f ec ts on the safety related power system and saf ety related equipment and loads caused by sustained low or high grid voltage condit;ons we will require that your design of the safety related electrical system meet the following staff positions. Supplement ir the FSAR the desc ri ption o f your design to show how it mee t s thesa positions and provide appropria e analyses to justify any n:n-conformance with these positions.
POSITIONS
- 1) Position 1: Additional Level of Under-or-Over Voltage Protection with a Time Delay We require that an add i t iona l level of voltage protection for the onsite power system be provided and that this addi-tional level of voltage protection shall satis fy the follow-ing criteria:
a) The selection of voltage and time set points shall be deter.ained f rom an analysis of the voltage requi remen ts of the safety related loads at all onsite system dis-tribution levels; b) The voltage protection shall i.nc l ude coincidence logic on a per bus basis to preclude spurious trips of the o f f site power source; c) The time delay selected shall be based on the following conditions:
(1) The allowable time delay, including margin, shall not exceed the maximum time delay that is assuming the FSAR accident analyses; (2) The selec ted t ime delay shall minimize the ability of short duration disturbance s to reduce the avail-ability of the o f f site power source (s); and (3) The allowed time duration of a degraded voltage condition at all d istributioa system levels shall not re sul t in failure of safety systems or compo-nents; d) The voltage sensors shall automatically taitiate the
-lisconnection of o f f site power sources whenever the
, voltage set point and time delay limits have been exceeded; QS.33-1 July 28, 1978
e) ..e voltage sensors shall be designed to sat isfy the applicable re qui reuen t s of IEEE Std. 279-1971, "Crite-ria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations;" and f) The Techncial Specifications shall include limiting c ond i t.i ons for operation, surve illance requirements ,
trip set points with minimum and maximum limits, and a llowable va nes for the additional level of voltage i
protection sc 'rs and their associated time delay devices.
GDC-17 requires that the safety function of each a.c. system (assuming the other system is not functioning) shall be to provide sufficient capacity and capability to assure that:
(a) specified acceptable fuel design limits and the design conditions for the reactor coolant pressure boundary are not exceeded as a result of anticipated operational occurrences; and (b) the core is cooled and containment integrity and other vital functions are maintained during any of the pos-tulated accidents.
Exist ing undervoltage monitors automatically perform the required function of switching f rom o f f site power, the pre-ferred powe r source , to the redundant onsite power sources when the monitored voltage degrades to a level of between 50 to 70 percent of the nominal rated safety bus voltage. This h is usually accomplished af ter a one-half to one second tim:
delay. These undervoltage monitors are designed to function on a complete loss of the o ff site power source.
'"he of f si te powe r system is the common source which normally pplies power to the redundant saf ety-related buses. Any transient or sustained degradation of this common source will be re flec ted onto the onsite system's safety-related buses.
A sustained degradation of the of f site power system's voltage could result in the loss of capability of the redundant safety loads, their control circuitry, and the associat ed elec trical components required f or perf orming safety functions.
Even though the operating procedures and guidelines utilized by elec tric utilities and their interconnected cooperative organizations minimize the probability for the degraded conditions to occur, the degradation of the offsite power system that could lead to or cause the failure of redundant sa f ety-re lat ed elec tr ical equipment is unacceptable. There-fore, we re qui re the additional safety margins associated with implementation of the protective measures detailed above.
Q8.33-2 July 28, 1978
- 2) POSITION 2: Interaction ci Onsite (Standby) Power Sources with Shed ienture
[#'N We re qui re that the current system de s ign , automatically prevent load shedding of the emergency buses once the standby sources are supplying power to all sequenced loads
~
on the emergency buses. The design shall also include the capability of the load shedding feature to be automatically reinstated if the standby source supply breakers are tripped. Th is automatic bypass and reinstatement feature shall be verified during the periodic testing identified in Position 3.
In the event an adequate basis can be provided for retaining the load shed t eature when loads a re energized by the standby power system, we will require that the setpoint value in the Technical Specifications, which is currently specified as " . . . equal to or greater than . . ." be amended to specify a value having maximum and minimam limits. The licensecs' bases for the setpoints and limits selected must be docanented.
CDC 17 requires that provisions be included to minimize the probability of losing elec tric1 power f rom any of the remaining supplies as a result of or coincident with the loss of power generated by the nuclear power unit, the loss p of power from the transmission network, or the loss of power I f rom the onsite electric power supplies.
Thc functional safety requirement of the " loss-of-offsite power sensors" is to detect t he loss of voltage on the off-site ( pre ferred ) power system and to initiate the necessary actions required to transfer the safety-related buses to the standby system. The load shedding feature, which is required to function prior to connecting the standby power sources to the ir re spec t ive buses can adversely interact with the standby power sources if the load shedding eature is not bypassed af ter it has performed its requi-a3 runc-tion. The load shed feature should also be re it, ited to allow it to perform its function if the standby sources are
, interrupted and are subsequently required to be reconnected to their respective buses.
- 3) POSITION 3: Standby Power Source Testing We require that the Technical Specifications include a test requirement to demons trate the full functional operability and independence of the standy power sources at least once per 18 months during s hutdown.
Q8.33-3 July 28, 1978
6 The Technical Specifications sPall include a requ i reme nt for
[#'N te st s : (1) simulating loss of offsite power; (2) simulating loss of offsite power in conjureton with a safety f eature actuation signal; and (3) simelating interruption and sub-sequent reconnection of standby power sources to their respec tive buses. Proper operation shall be determined by:
a) Ver ifying that on loss c ,ffsite power the emergency buses have been de-energi >.ed and tha t the loads have been shed f rom the emerget buses in accordance with design requ i reme n ts ,
b) Verifying that on loss of off site power the diesel generators start er. the au to s t a rt signal, the emergency buses are energized with permanently connec ted loads, the au to-connec t ed s hu t down l o ad s a re energized th ro ugh the load sequencer, anc the system operates for five minu tes while the genera tors a re loaded with the shut-down loads.
c) Verifying that on safety features actuation signal (without loss of off site power) the diesel genera tors start oa the autostart signal and operate on standby for five minutes, d) Ver fying that on :oss of offsite power in conjuction p with a safety f eatures ac t ua t i on signal the diesel I generators start or the autostart signal, the emergency buses are energized with permanent ly connec ted loads ,
the au to-connec ted emergency (accident) loads are energized through the load sequencer, and the system opera te s for five minutes while the generators are loaded with the emergency loads.
e) Verifying that on interruption of the standby sources the l o ad s are shed f rom the emergency buses in accor-dance with design requirements and that subsequent loading of the standby sources is th rough the load segr encer.
The te st ing requirements identified in Position 3 will demon s t ra te the capability of the st andby power system to per form its re q ui re d fr action . The tests will also ident ify unde sirable interac tion be tween the s " site and onsite emergency power systems.
4)
POSITION 4: Optimization of Transformer Tap Settings The voltage levels at the saiety t : lated buses should be opt imized f or the full load and min imum load conditions that are expec ted throuf! out the anticipated range of voltage Q8.33-4 July 28, 1978
SNP-)>
variations of the power source by appropriate adjustment of the voltage tap settings of the intervening transformers.
We requi re that the adequacy of the design in this regard be verified by actual measurement, and by correlation of =ca-sured values with analytical results. Provide a description of the method for making this verification and before ini-tial reac tor power operation provide the documentation required to establish that this verification has been accom- -
plished. ,
Response
I. Staff Position 1 - Additional Level of Underrar-Over Voltage Protec-
_ tion with a Time Delay.
The present design for Sequoyah does not include a second level of under or over voltage protection; however, TVA will modify the design to comply with Staff Position 1 and will install it during the first refueling outage of Unit 1.
ANALYSIS OF Tile SEQUOYAll NUCLEAR PLA!iT D:t,xGENCY POWER SYSTEM WITil RECARD TO DECRADED VOLTAGE CO:iDITIONS AT Tile OFFSITE POWER SOURCES
- 1. Description of Existing System The TVA Transmission System consists of a 500-kV and a 161-kV grid. One of the two nuclear units is connec ted to the 500-kV transmission sy stem, and the 'other unit to the 161-kV transmis-sion system.
Four 500-kV transmission lines connect one generating unit into the 500-kV system. Two of these lines a re to TVA's Wa tts Bar Nuclear Plant Switchyard, and one line each . to Widows Creek and Georgia Power Company's Bowen Plant Sw it chy ard s .
Pre ferred power to the emergency busses and to start up and shutdown the generating units at Sequoy ah is supplied by two physically and electrically independent connections from the 161-kV switchyard to the onsite elec trical distribution system.
The 161-kV switchyard is the terminus for the second nuclear unit, the 500-kV intertie bank, a nd ni ne 161-kV t ran sm i ss i oa lines. Two lines each are to TVA's Chickamauga llydro Plant Switchyard and Charle ston sub stations, and one line each to East Cleveland, Moc. .mu, anuc, concord substations and TVA's Watts Bar !!yd ro Plant Switchyard. Five of the 161-kV t ran sm i s s ion lines terminate on one bus section and the other four terminate on the other bus s ec t i on. As a result, any one of the 161-kV transmission lines terminating at Sequoyah has sufficient capacity to supply essential shutdova power.
Q8.33-5 July 28,1978
. In add i t i on to the n i ne connections with the TVA 161-kV grid, the 161-kV switchyard is connec ted to the unit 2 generator via the main trans f ormer bank 2 and to the 500-kV switchyard via a 1200 MVA, 500-161-kV intertle transformer. The Preferred <upply is also connec ted at the 6.9-kV unit board level to units 1 and 2 generators via the four unit station service t ra ns formers .
O M I T' Thehttachch Key Diagram ot the Stat ioa Auxiliary Power System (FSAR Eigure 8.1-2), shows the arrangement, source connections, -
and source ratings of the standby auxiliary power system, which includes the safety-related buses. Under normal plant operating l c o nd i t ion s , all safety and non-safety-related auxillaries asso-l ciated with the reac tors and turbine generator sets are supplied f rom the 22.5/6.9-kV unit station service t rans f ormers , which f are connec ted to each unit generator's output leads. Station aux i ii arie s consisting of nonsafety loads and systems a ssociated with the rest of the plant and common to both units are supplied
, f rom the L61/6.9-kV common station service t rans f ormers which are fed from the TVA system.
One common station service trans f ormer alone is capable of providing cont inuous power to the station cocaon auxiliaries plus one of the fo ll owing loads:
- a. All the auxiliaries of one gcnerating unit in the starting mode,
- b. All the auxiliaries of one generating unit in the shutdown mode.
Both common station servi.ce transformers collectively are capable o f providing continuous power to the stat ion co;maca auxiliaries plus all the auxiliaries of one genera ting unit operating at full load without its unit station service t r ans -
former together with all the auxiliaries of another unit in the starting mode, shutdown mode, or accident mode.
Safety related portions of the standby auxiliary power system for unit 1 (unit 2 identical) consist o f diesel genera tors IA-A and IB-B; 6.9-kV shutdown boards lA-A and IB-B; 6.9-kV/480V transformers lAl-A, IA-A, IA2-A, IB1-B, IB-3, and IB2-B; 480V Reactor MOV boards lAl-A, IA2-A, 131-B, as 4 IB2-B; 4SOV control and auxiliary building vent boards lAl-A, lA2-A, IB1-B, and IB2-B; 480V reac tor vent boards lAl-A and IB-B and 480V diesel auxili- ry b oards lAl-A, lA2-A, IB1-B, and IB2-B. The 6.9-kV shutdown boards supply the safety related loads of the standby
- auxiliary power sy stem. The unit 1 or unit 2 boards can receive power from any of the four following sources:
Q8.33-6 July 28, 1978
+ .. ,
- 1. The main genera tors th rough the unit station service trans-formers,
- 2. The 500-kV offsite power system through the common station transformers,
- 3. The 161-kV offsite power system through the common station service transformers. .
- 4. The onsite diesel-generators.
The shutdown boards receive power f rom the main genera tors af ter the generators are connected to the 500-kV grid for unit I and the 161-kV grid f or unit 2. The common station service t r ans-formers provide power to the shutdown boards when the main gene ra to rs a re s hu td own and p r i or to sy nch ron iz a t i on during startup. The of f site and onsite power supplies to the safety-related buses meet the requirements of General Design c ' terion 17.
The design of the Sequoyah .mxiliary power system is based upon ANSI Standard C84-1-1970, " Voltage Ratings f or Elec tric Power Sys te ms and Equipment ( 60 liz) ." The volt.nge range over which the sa f ety-rela ted components , and nonsa f e ty-rela ted components can operate continuously in the per formance of the ir design fu nc t i on is de fi ned in this standard. The minimum operating voltage for the 6900V system is 6560V and for the 480V syscem is 440V.
- 2. Voltage Conditions During !;ormal Unit Operations Q 6.M- 3. F igu re 08.34-1 shows the range of voltages at the safety-related buses during periods of narmal operation when those busses are being s upplied from the main generators. The lower curve shcas the normal voltage obtainable with the unit I main generator supplying a normal system load o f 1124 Mw plus 126 MVARS l e ad-ing. The upper curve is for the unit 2 main generator when supplying a normal system load of 1124 MW plus 29 MVARS lead-ing. The unit operator has this voltage control under his co= mand at a ll t imes .
- 3. Preferred Power Voltage Conditions TVA me e s t e ady- s ta te and transient studies to de t ermi ne the e f fec t on the 161-kV switchyard but-voltage and instantaneous f requency f or a sudden loss of both Sequoyah generating units.
Pre fau l t conditions determined from the typically normal trans-mission grid, transient and post fault c ond i t i ons follusing the loss are listed in the following table.
^9.33-7 July 28, 1978
- SNP- 58 Postfault Prefault Transient Condition 0 Conditions Conditions Steady State System Frequency 60 Hz 59.9 Hz 60 Hz -
161-kV Switchyard 1.052 pu '1.015 pu 00+sec 1.04 pu Bus Voltage 1.0 pu G .6 sec 24-kV Generator 1.09 pu 0.0 pu 0.0 pu Terminal Voltage QY.33 -1. G833-L T4Nhi Figures Q8.34-2 and -Qfrale-3 demons t rate that the 161-kV of f site power sout ces are adequate to supply the power necessary for safe shutdown. These figures show the voltage profile at the safety-related buses for the worst case 161-kV system degradation.
- 4. Consequences of Sustained Degraded Voltage Conditions of the 161-kV Offsite Power Sources on the Safety-Related Euses During Normal Operation.
Voltage degradation of the 161-kV offsite power systen would 58 negate its capability to effect a safe shutdown and to mitigate the effects of an accident. This degradation of the 161-kV system can be caused by any of several events, including the loss of the two offsite circuits, an unstable power system, or any condition that renders off site power unvailable for safe shutdown and emergency purpcoes. However, the voltage of the main generators would not be affected directly by degradation of the 161-kV offsite power. All systems necessary for safe opera-tion of the plant would continue to be powered from their normal onsite sources (the main generators). Sequoyah is designed to remain operating if the 161-kV offsite power sourc s are degraded. The plant could be shutdown gradually without requir-ing immediate dependence on the emergency diesel generators, a course of action in accordance with the philosophy expressed in Regulatory Guide 1.93. The diesel generators would bc availabic if degradation of offsite power occurs since there are voltage sensors that would initiate a start of all four diesels upon detection of voltage degradatien of the 161-kV offsite power system,
- 5. Consequences of Sustained Degraded Voltage Conditions of the Offsite Power Sources on the Safety-Related Buses sing the Staff Position 1 The Staff Position 1 is based upon the following:
"The offsite power systen is the common source which nor-cally supplies power to the redundant safety-related buses. Any transient or sustained degradation of this common source will be reficcted onto the onsite system's safety-related buses."
qs.33-8 December 22, 1978
.he Sequoy ah dr < i gn d oe s not utilize the 161-kV o f f si te power system to normally supply power to the redundant safety-related buses. The addit ion o f vol tage moni tors on the 161-kV o f f si te powe r sou rce s to au tomatically initiate the transfer of the sa f ety-re la ted buses to the onsite emergency power sy stem would, when actuated, cause a reac tor scram, containment isolation, an immed ia te need for decay heat remov a l , and immed ia te dependence upon the emergency diesel generators.
TVA be lieves that under ce rtain cond i.t ions , it will be safer to continue operation at full or reduced powe r for a limited time t han to e f f ec t an immed ia te s hu t d own due to deg radat ion of the 161-kV offsite powe r system. Since the main generators are ie normal source of power f or the redundant safety-related buses, shu tdown of the plant would remove this source. With the 161-kV .
o f f site. power sources deg rad ed , the plant would oe required to rely solely on the diesel generators. Therefore, TVA believes it is much more de s i rab le and safer to continue operation so that the normal power sources are retained. The diesel genera-tors would remain available as a backup, whereas plant shutdown would force reliance on the diesel generators with no further backup available.
- 6. Conclusions The addition of the second level of voltago pro;ec tion with a t ime delay is not nece ssary f or Sequoyah because:
- a. Adequate capabilities and protec tive fe a t u re s have been incorpora ted in the or iginal de s ign.
- h. It vould be safe to continue operation for a limited time than to e f f ec t an immed ia te s hu t d own oa the loss or degrada t ion of the 161-kV offsite power sources which are not normally supplying the safety-related buses.
- c. The reactor operator has full control of the main generator that s upp lie s the safety-related buses during normal opera-tion.
- d. The main generator has the capabili.ty of providing adequate voltage for the f u il range o f norma l op e ra t i on c ond i t i on s .
- e. The offsite 161-kV power sources remaia stable and are capable of supplying the power nece ss ary for a safe shut-down after a two unit simultaneous loss of generation.
((. 4t_aff position 2 - Interaction of Onsite Power Supplies with Load Shed Feature.
The Sequoyah design fully complies with this position.
QS.Ja-9 July 28, 1978
[tt. Staff Position 3 - Onsite Power source Testing
' Technical Specifications will be prepared to comply with Staff Position 3.
IV. Staff Position 4 - Optimization of Transformer Tap Setting,s
- 4. Fi gu re QS .34-2 shows the voltage pro file at the s a fe t y- re la t ed -
buses for full-load conditions and Figure QS.34-3 shows the no load voltage p ro file. Prior to plant operation, p re-op te s ts will be conduc ted to verify the adequacy of the design. During plant operation the system and bus voltages will be monitored to en su re proper range. Some of the measures that were used are summarized as fo ll ows :
- 1. TVA has selec ted voltage limits based upon ANSI Standard C84-1-1970.
- 2. The design of the system has been in accordance with the limi ts e stablished by C84.1.
- 3. Ut ilization equipment has been designed and rated to give fully sat is f ac tory per f ormance th ro ughou t the voltage range o f C84.1.
4, Grid stability studies have been performed to assure the limits of C84.1 are not exceeded.
- 5. The control room operator has been provided adequate information to keep the plant within acceptable operating limits in the form of lights, meters and annunciators.
- 6. Design changes will receive tl.a same review as the original design.
- 7. As s u ra nce that all these factors have been incorpora ted is provided by TVA's Quality Assurance Plan.
Q8.33-10 July 28, 1978
ENCLOSURE 4
- r. .
REVISION TO FSAR SECTION 7.66 In addition single f a ilu re has been considered on the par t of the oper-ator.
The design modification includes easy access, clear protective covers attached to the main control board panel over each respective control room switch except FCV-63-1. The operator would be required to -
open this protective cover before he operates the control switch.
Jor FCy--6J-1, 67, 80, 98 and 118, opera ting instruc t ions specify t(he removal of valve actuator power during nor.ul operation. Af ter rec. oval of j>oser, redunsiant valve position indicatioa is t.cuvi ka to I.nu operator in accordance uith Branch Technical PoJi',ica (BW) IC& 18.
7.
6.7 REFERENCES
l.
The Institute of Electrical and Elec t ron ic Engineers, Inc.,
"IEEE Criteria for Class IE Electrical Systems for tiuc l ea r Powe r Gene ra t'i ng St a t ion s ," IEEE Standard 308, September, 1971.
2 The Institute of Elec trical and Elec t ron ic Engineers, Inc.,
"1EEE Standard: Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Powe r Gene ra t i ng Sta t ions," IEEE Standard 279-1971.
3.
'I h e Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers, Inc.,
"I EEE Tra il-Use Criteria for the Periodic Te s t i ng o f t;uc le a r Pawer Generating Station Protectica Systens," iEEE Standard 336, 1971.
1 '. ,s f.Q.A POWBf it
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COnSumBIS C0mpany General Offices: 212 West Michigan Avenue. Jackson, Machigan 49201 o Area Code 517788-0550 February 2, 1979 Mr Jerome Saltzman, Chief Antitrust & Indemnity Group Nuclear Reactor Regulation U S Nuclear Regulatory Commission h shington, DC 20555 ANI BINDER EB-20 MAELU BINDER XB-20 DOCKET NO 50-255 Attaahed are two copies of Endorsement No 2 to ANI Binder EB-20 and Endorsement No 2 to MAELU Binder XB-20, for the Palisades Nuclear Plant. These endorsements reflect the fee due for the secondary financial protection binder for the 1979 calendar year.
S C Foster Insurance Coordinator l
79020907s5I (l (
d
'I 1 Nuclear Energy Liability Insurance NUCLEAR ENERGY LIABILITY INSURANCE ASSOCIATION
- 2) SUESCRIBIf;G C0!!PANIES AllD THEIR PF.0-PORTICMATE LIABILITY Ef;CORSEf:EllT Calendar Year 1979
- 1. ANf:UAL PREF 1IUM: It is agreed that the Annual Prcmium due the companies for the period designated above is: ( 4,650.00 .
- 2. It is agreed that with respect tn (i) bcdily injury or prcoerty darace caused, during the efective period of this encorser.ent, by the radioactivc, toxic, explosive or other hazardous properties of nuclear raterial, ar.d (ii) contingent liability as provided in Condition 4 for excess incurred losses because retrospective premium due under one or more binders with respect to such bodily injury or procerty darace is no' paid:
- a. The word " companies" wherever used in the policy means the subscribing corpanies listed on the reverse side of this endorserent.
- b. The policy shall be binding on such companies cnly.
- c. Each such ccmpany shall be liable only for its proportion designated next to its nace of any obligation assumed or expense incurred under the policy.
- 3. It is acreed that the effective pericd of this endorsement is frcm the beginning of the effective date of this endorsement stated below, to the close of Cecer,ber 31st of the Calendar Year designated in the caption above, or to the tire of the termination or cancellation of the Draft l' aster Policy, or this binder, whichever first occurs, eastern standard time.
(see reverse side for list of subscribing companies)
This is to certify that this is a true copy of the original Endorsement having the endorsement number < d be g made part of the binder for insurance coverage under the DRAFT MASTER POLICY-lyCLDR NE Y IABILITY_ POLICY (Secondary Financial Protection) as designated hereon. No Insu'a ei a forded h reunder. _
f .
Chatles R. arde , ice President-Liability Underwriting, American Nuclear Insurers
' January 1, 1979 II[s E dor nt To forrn a part of Binder No. EB- 20 12:01 A.M. Standard Time Con \sumers Power Company issued to anuary 12. 1979 For the su scribing co panies Oate of tssue b ^ l D
By lI ,"
/ General' Manager Endorsement No 7 Countersigned by _ _ _ _
e e
I
. t 51.!$C8'!P C C%cs%!!$ P20 sat?Mi rF 1 eat ae tes Casaalty aas 5er ety Co. . Tre.151 Fareinctea 8ve. . Fartford, CT C6156 13.114a78 Aetra lrsurance Ccecaaf, 55 EN 5t.. kartfore. CT C6115 2.523520 Allstate lesutaace Co.. Allstate Stara. 'tortetreek. IL 60062 4.214119 ~
A?ert:an acee Asspaace Co.. '02 Pa f fei La. . Ae= Vork. h7 10C05 .834122 A erican *ot:rtsts Insurance Co.. '.ces Grove. IL 6C049 42142G Bttepous casualty C:rporatton, 32018t's !t.. Sect Islaad. IL 61201 421420 Centevtal resurance Co. , 45 ball S t. , *.e. 'ork. NY 1055
.579452 Correccial Laian Insetace Co.. Cne fencen St.. Bcstoa . "A C2103 3.034224 Conrecticat Inde-nt ty Comcaev 'Pe.1000 Asylum Ave. . hartford. CT C6101 1.01140 $
Contineatal Caswalty Co.. C%A Plata. Chicano. !L Cf35 4.214199 Coetinental Irswearce Co., ?>e. 80 Faf:en La. New ve rt . W 10036 6.742719 Feeeral Insaraace Co. 51 Joen F. een-ea., sk v. , pert nt11s. 4J C7073 1.517112 Fire-af s F#J ;essaace Co.o 3333 Cat tfernia 5t.. San Francisco. CA 94119 5.057039 Ceneral Acetteet Ftre and Life Assurae:e Corp.. Ltd.. Fo.rts & haleat 5ts..
Pet ta:elceta. 54 19105 1.243544 Oreat A. erican lesraece Co. 530 .aleat it.. Cincinnatt CH 45201 1.349544 Hano ve* lrs araece Co. . *>e. 440 Lincoln S t. , .o rc e s t e e. PA vi"C5
.5057".4 Part*3rd AcC1:eet 4*3 Iedemitt Co.. Part'ord Pf are. Par!'3rs CT C6115 7.164139 Hartford S tes* Bo t ter ins =.. & las. Co., ?he. 56 Prossect St . Hartfsed. CT C6102 .5C5704 Wore 'r ceretty Co. . The 89 Paiden La.. hew York. %Y 10C33 3.708495 Insara*ce Co. cf $cet'i Arerica. IGO Arc'i Street. Fhila:elenia. PA 19101 3.371359 Menarcn Irswraate Co. of Ceto. The 19 Pectae St. New form. hY 10006 .337136 Nort era lestraace Cercaaf cf New fort. 59 .'enn Street, New York. NY 1C033 1.854248 horta=es tern hat t oral Ins. Co. ,131 No. .:ackson S t. . *tl.awnee. =1 53201 .674272 Chio Cassalty lasarance Ceecaey. Tae.136 Orts Third St.. eamilton OH 45025 .163563 Pacific In:emitya Co. 3200 .tisnire 21vd., Los Acceles. CA 90010 .337135 Peerless Irsurs ce Co., 62 Paole Ave.. reeae. $H C 3431 .126426 Pecents assurance Co. of New TSrt, f 0 Pa t ten La.. New York . NY 10033 .5057C4 Fratective Inssece Co. 3100 No. *eridian 5t., Indiaanpolts. I's 46203 .163563 Previcerce easning'. n IPs rance Co. 20 '.asnington Place. Proviceace, RI C2903 .105 55 Puritan Irssance Carcaay, 1515 Se er 5t., Itaef ors. CT 069-5 .If0352 Reitance insu"nce CcPcany, 4 Peen Cent ** plaza P911delcola. FA 19103 1.491527 Royal Giote Insura-ce Ccnar.y.110 W1111a* Street. %ew Yort, f.T 10038 3.371359 St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. 325 hasningt:n 5t., St. Psal. t 551C2 4.773345 5eaccara Sur ety Co. 90 W1111at St . . f.ew Yera , .h r 1C038 4214 3 State f are fire 6 Casssity C:rcaay,112 East 'aas " gton St. 8?cc-1wten. It $17a,1 .842?43 Traasarerica fesursace Co. 1150 So. Olive St.. Los Anceles. CA 9C015 .842S43 Traveiers *ndemity Cor:any. T*e. Ore To.ee Savare, eart* crc. CT 06115 10. 9H117 Unite 2 States Fidelity aad " araats Co. 100 Licht Streete 931t1Nre . VO 212?2 10.114073 United States Fire lesarance Co.o adison Ave., at Canfield ed. Parristown NJ 07960 2.697038 Zurtcri lascarce Ca. 111 hest Jackson alvs.. Cnicago. IL 606C4 1.264:60 NE-79 i
Nucleat 1 nergy Liability Insurance
. MUTUAL ATOMIC r.NERGY LIABILITY UNDERWRITERS
- 1) ANNUAL PRi.MIUM ENDORSEMENT
- 2) SUBSCRIBING COMPANIES AND THEIR PROPORTIONATE LIABILITY E"DORSEMENT Calendar Year 1979
- 1. ANNUAL PREMIUM: It is agr cd that the Annual Premium due the companies for the period designated above is: $1,350.00.
- 2. It is agreed that with respect to (i) bodily injury or property damace caused , during the effective period or thic endorsement, by the radioactive, toxic, explosive or other hazardous properties of nuclear material, and (ii) contingent liability as provided in Condition 4 for excess incurred losses because retrospective premium due under one or more binders with respect to such bodily injury or property damane is not paid:
- a. The word " companies" wherever used in the policy means the subscribing companies listed on the reverse side of this endorsement.
- b. The policy shall be binding on such cos.2 panics on1'f.
- c. Each such .ompany shall be liable only for its proportion designated next to its name of any obligaticn assunnd or expense . icurred under the policy.
- 3. It is agreed that the effective period of this endorsement is from the beginning of the effective date vi this endorsement stated below, to the close of December 31st of the Calendar Year designated in the caption above, or to the time of the termination or cancellation of the Draft Master Policy, or this binder , whichever first occurs, eastern standard time.
Effective Date of this Endorsement January 1, 1979 Ta form a part of Binder No. XB-20 12: 01 A.M . Standard Time Issued to Consumers Power Company Date of Issue December 22, 1978 By Endorsement No. >
Countersigned by
Subscribing Companies PROPORTION OF 100%
American Mutual Liability Insurance Company, Wakefield, MA 15.0000000 Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Company, Wausau, WI 15.0000000 Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Boston, MA 30.0000000 Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company, Long Grove, IL 30.0000000 Michigan Mutual Insurance Company, Detroit, MI 5.0000000 Sentry Insurar.ce, A Mutual Company, Stevens Point, WI 5.0000000 This is to certify that this is a true copy of the original endorsement, bearing the number designated herecn, for insurance coverage under the DRAFT MASTER POLICY -
NUCLEAR ENERGY LIABILITY POLICY (Secondary Financial Protection) dated June 24,1977. No insurance is afforded by this copy.
( -
~ Mutual Atomic Energy Liability Underwriters}}