ML19259B043
| ML19259B043 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07002738 |
| Issue date: | 01/05/1979 |
| From: | Nosenzo L STATE, DEPT. OF |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7901160009 | |
| Download: ML19259B043 (10) | |
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 9
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Docket No. 70-2738
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(Agent for the Government of
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License No. XSNM-1222 India on Application to Export
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WRITTEN COMMENTS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE These written comments are filed by the Department of State on behalf of the Executive Branch, in response to the Commission's request for comments as set forth in the Com-mission's Orf.3r of December 8, 1978.
The Exccutive B ranch's position on export license application XSNM-1222 is detailed in the Executive Branch judgment and export license application analysis submitted to the Commission on September 15, 1978.
Moreover, in view of the Commission Orders of March 6, 1978, and June 22, 1977, con-solidating application XSNM-1222 with XSNM-1060 and XSNM-845, and because of the similarity of the issues raised, the Depart-ment understands that the Commission is treating the record concerning export license applications for the Tarapur reactors in India as part of the same consolidated procer ding.
The Department further understands that the Commission does not consider it necessary for the Department to resubmit information and views already provided since early 1976.
These comments, therefore, focus on the issues specifically raised in the Commission's Order.
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.~ Further, the Department calls the-Commission 's attention to the confidential briefings and submissions that have been provided the Commission, which are not part of the hearing record, as well as the detailed review of nuclear exports to India during Congressional consideration of Executive Order 12055.
(1)
The sufficiency, for purposes of the NNPA, of Indian Prime Minister Desai's Assurances that "he will not authorize nuclear explosive devices or further nuclear explosions Criterion (2) in Section 127 of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended by Section 305 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, states the applicable provision of law and Section 126 a (2) of the Atomic Energy Act, added by Section 304 (a) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, provides the Commission may find an export criterion met based on an equivalency standard.
As indicated in the current and previous export license application analyses, the Government of India has given the United States the written assurance that -
"...the special nuclear material that has been or is hereafter made available for, or used, or produced in the Tarapur Atomic Power Station located at Tarapur will be devoted exclusively to the needs of that Station unless our two Governments hereafter specifically agree that such material be used for other purposes."
Since this provides the functional equivalent of the requirement of export ~ criterion (2), the Executive branch view is that this criterion is met.
In this respect, the President, in transmitting
- Under 10 CFR 110.120 (b) such communications are allowed outside the hearing record and under 110.113 (b) licensing decisions are to take into account all relevant information, including informa-tion which might go beyond that in the hearing record.
. Executive Order 12055 to the Congress, stated:
"The Government of India has given us its commitments to use our exports only at the Tarapur Atomic Power Station and not for any explosive or military purpose, and I have the highest confidence that it will honor these commitments."
In this context, Prime Minister Gesai's statement provides a supplemental but not, for purposes of the statutory criterion, a necessary assurance.
(2)
The adequacy, for purposes of the NRC's determination under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, of the safeguards applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency at the Tarapur facility, and of USG information on those safeguards.
Under Criterion (1) in Section 127 of the Atomic Energy Act, safeguards must be applied to the proposed and previous supply of Tarapur fuel.
As indicated in the export license application analysis, it is the Executive Branch view that Criterion (1) is met.
While it is our view that criterion (1) does not require a judgement on the adequacy of the application of safeguards, it is obvious that in mtking its overall judgment as to whether an export is inimical to the common defense and security, the NRC may consider safeguards implementation.
The Executive Branch has provided information requested by the Commission in this area.
Specifically, for example, we addressed this question on page 32 of the comments submitted by the Department
- It could be argued that, while not constituting an agreement, tPis assurance has the character of a legal undertaking.
See Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), Judgment of 20 December 1974, I.C.J.
Reports 1974, page 253 (in particular, paras 43 and 46).
. on July 8, 1976.
Further, this matter is addressed in Section 3 (A) of the export license application analysis.
The matter has also been addressed in confidential communi-cations to the Commission.
The Executive Branch notes that available information indicates that the IAEA considers that it has been able, for some time, to conduct satisfactorily all of the safeguarding activities at the Tarapur reactors called for by the Agency's procedures applicable to light water reactors, and that the facility operator and the Indian authorities have cooperated fully in the Agency's efforts there.
While the Agency has in general had difficulty safeguarding bulk handling facilities, we note that the Indian fuel fabrication facility for the Tarapur reactors handles only low enriched uranium and the Agency has indicated no particular difficulty with respect to this facility as compared to most others.
In light of this and other factors associated with the proposed export, the Executive Branch believes the framework of commitments, assurances, and safe-guards is adequate for the purposes of this export.
(3)
The status of U.S./ India negotiations regarding the return of spent fuel from Tarapur to the United States for storage.
On December 4, Dr. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Deputy to the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology, and other Department officials, briefed the Com-mission on a classified basis on this matter.
This matter was also addressed extensively in the Department's unclassified March 6, 1978, memorandum to Mr. Gossick.
, As the Commission is aware, no active negotiations on this subject are underway at the present time.
We have, however, studied this matter extensively within the Executive Branch over the last year and have found significant logistic and economic problems related to such return.
Among the major logistic considerations are availability of (a) suitable casks, (b) adequate land and sea transport and (c) suitable storage sites in the United States.
It is estimated that even under the most opportune conditions, initial fuel returns could not begin for a year or two after agreement was reached with India on the terms and conditions and that it would take an additional four to six years until all U.S.-supplied fuel actually could be returned.
From the economic standpoint, it has been estimated that the cost of return would be from $40 to $100 million, exclusive of any value attributed to the special nuclear material contained in the spent fuel.
This matter is now being addressed in the context of overall U.
S.
spent fuel storage planning which includes acceptance on limited basis of foreign spent fuel and emergency return of spent fuel.
In parallel with our internal reviews, we have concentrated on assisting India in expanding its spent fuel storage capacity in the Tarapur Atomic Power Station storage basins.
India is currently adding storage which will permit uninterrupted scheduled discharges of spent fuel, thereby relieving potential pressures toward reprocessing which might have resulted had congestion of the storage basins prevented or delayed' reloading of the reactors.
. In addition, we have assisted India in contracting for necessary design studies to permit expansion of Tarapur pool capacity.
Additional storage can be provided to accommodate full discharge through about 1985 at a nominal cost.
The Tarapur Atomic Power Station storage basins are under IAEA safeguards, including surveillance by continuous camera monitoring.
(4)
The need for the fuel reauested We note that Article II C of the U.S.-India Agreement for Cooperation contemplates that fuel will be provided on a basis that will permit the " efficient and continuous operation" of the Tarapur Atomic Power Station.
As indicated during the previous hearings in this proceeding, see e.g., Hearings on X5NM-845, July 21, 1976, transcript p.
201, it is our view that judgments regarding the need for fuel should be responsive to this provision.
Moreover, this provision must be understood to include supplying fuel on a sufficiently timely basis for fabrication of fuel elements.
The Appendix summarizes the relationship of the proposed export to India's conversion / fabrication operations and Tarapur fuel requirements.
As indicated in that paper, the Indian conversion / fabrication facility is now out of fresh feed material.
Our nuclear dialogue with India provides the context both for the safeguards goals we are seeking and for finding the most acceptable arrangements, consistent with broad foreign policy and overall non-proliferation considerations, with respect to a discontinuation of U.
S.
supply if this were to become necessary.
The basic need for the proposed export relates to
. this dialogue.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act establishes a future full-scope safeguards criterion with a view toward clarifying our resolve on the importance we attach to such safeguards in a manner which recognizes that the negotiations to achieve this require time.
With respect to the application of this future criterion, therefore, the law grants a " grace period" to provide an opportunity for seeking such safeguards with any cooperating country that has not accepted them.
Recognizing that a moratorium on our cooperation in the meantime would not serve our objectives, the law is predicated on continuation of normal supply during this " grace period."
As stressed in Executive Branch testimony during the May 1978 Congressional hearings on nuclear supply to India, the Executive Branch believes that our dialogue with India can move forward only within a cooperative atmosphere, one which does not entail a moratorium on U.
S.
cooperation and disruption of normal operations or accusations of bad faith during negotia-tions to achieve strengthened controls.
Thus, the Executive Branch believes that continued and normal supply of Tarapur low enriched fuel to India, during the statutory period provided for negotiations, is not only consistent with the law, but also essential to continuation of the U.S.-India dialogue on nuclear cooperation and safeguards.
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Louis /V. Nosenzo Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Nuclear Energy and Energy Technology Affairs Washington, D.
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January 5, 1979
APPENDIX IFPACT OF XSNM-1222 on TARAPUR NUCLEAR FUEL COMPLEX AND PCACTOR REQUIREMENTS The Executive Branch analysis setstout the need for the slig'.itly enriched uranium covered by XSNM-1222 with respect to operation of the Nuclear Fuel Corplex at Hyderabad, where the Tarapur Atomic Power Station fuel is fabricated.
However, this now needs to be updated since the initial analysis was predicated on receipt of the material under XSNM-1222 at Hyderabad before exhaustion of the fresh feed furnished under XSNM-1060.
The last such material actually was fed into the Nuclear Fuel Complex on December 10, 1978.
The 16.8 metric tons of uranium under XSNM-1222 will permit normal operation of the Nuclear Fuel Complex for almost ten months.
Under the schedule for the public proceeding set out in the Order, and assuming that oral presentations are not orderea and that the Commission acts to issue the license by mid-February, then the earliest time at which this material could be available at the Nuclear Fuel Complex following air shipment would be about mid-March.
Thus, in this case, the uranium covered by XSNM-1222 would permit operation of the Nuclear Fuel Complex until about mid-January 1980.
As a consequence, for a minimum period of three months, Nuclear Fuol Complex production will be stopped or significantly cartailed by the lack of fresh feed.
(We do not know whether
any scrap recycling has been undertaken since December 10; during periods of such recycle Nuclear Fuel Complex output is reduced to about 20 percent of that under normal operation.)
The normal 3 month production is about 47 fuel elements.
Insofar as operation of the Tarapur Atomic Power Station is concerned, the material provided under XSNM-1222 wf Il permit the production of about 115 finished fuel assemblies, or enough for annual reloading of one reactor and 0.35 of the second under the optimum mode of reactor operation (i.e.,
85 assemblies per reactor).
However, because of uncer-tainties regarding long-term fuel supply, the Tarapur Atomic Power Station reactors have been operating at less than rated power, thereby reducing the annual reloading rate to approximately 60 assemblies, assuming no abnormal fuel failures.
At this latter rate, when the present inventory of finished and partially finished fuel assemblies as well as material in process at the Nuclear Fuel Complex are taken into consideration together with the slightly enriched uranium under XSNM-1222, the total quantity should permit reloading of Tarapur Atomic Power Station through the periodic refueling scheduled to begin in September 1981, but appears to fall slightly short of the estimated requirements for the refueling scheduled to commence in February 1982.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of
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)
EDLOW INTERNATIONAL COMPANY
)
Docket No. 70-2738
)
(Agent for the Government of
)
License No. XSNM-1222 India on Application to Export
)
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing " Written Comments of the Department of State", was mailed this 5th day of January 1979, to the following:
Mr. Chase Stephens, Chief
- Leonard C. Meeker, Esquire Docketing & Services Branch James N. Barnes, Esquire Office of the Secretary Center for Law & Social Policy U.
S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1751 N Street, N.W.
Washington, D.
C.
20555 Washington, D.
C.
20036 Howard Shapar, Esquire
- Thomas B.
Stoel, Jr., Esquire Executive Legal Director S.
Jacob Scherr, Esquire U.
S. Nuclear Regulatory Natural Resources Defense Commission Council Incorporated Washington, D.
C.
20555 917 15th Street, N. W.
James L. Kelley, Esquire Acting General Counsel Mr. Charles Clusen U.
S. Nuclear Regulatory Washington Representative Commission Sierra Club Washington, D.
C.
20555 324 C Street, S.E.
Washington, D. C.
20003 Ms. Diane Wright Harmon Assistant to the Vice President Daniel F.
Fcrd, Esquire Edlow International Company Executive Director 1100 17th Street, N.W.
Union of Concerned Scientists Washington, D.
C.
20036 1208 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138 Honorable Richard L. Ottinger U.
S.
House of Representatives Mr. Herbert Scoville, Jr.
Washington, D.
C.
20515 6400 Georgetown Pike McLean, Virginia 22101 Honorable Clarence Long c3, c,
U.
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