ML19257C332
| ML19257C332 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 01/17/1980 |
| From: | Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19257C333 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8001280448 | |
| Download: ML19257C332 (31) | |
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MO UNITED STATES OF AMERICA T"U fFJCLEAR REGULATORY COTiISSION Mh JAllN Y( ' Q' Y, $ j h
0FFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
' E nca RAROLD R. DENTON, DIRECTOR In the Matter of
)
THE TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY AND Docket No. 50-346 THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING
)
{10 CFR 2.205)
COMPANY
)
(Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,
)
Unit No. 1)
)
DIRECTCR'S DECISION UNDER 10 CFR 2.206
'By letters dated April 24, May 23, June 12, and July 9,1979,
, Terry J. Lodge, on behalf of the Toledo Coalition for Safe Energy (TCSE),
petitioned for modification of the operating license for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1.
In these various letters, TCSE generally asserts that the Davis-Besse facility has inadequate emergency and evacuation plans.
TCSE requested in its June 12th letter that the Comission treat portions of TCSE's earlier letters as a petition for rulemaking to be consolidated with the petition filed by Critical Mass Energy Project, et, a_1_., in Do:ket No. PRM 50-23.
TCSE asked that the remaining portions of its April 24th, May 23rd and June 12th letters be treated as a request for action under 10 CFR 2.206.
As TCSE requested, the Staff referred TCSE's various letters to the Secretary of the Comission on June 27, 1979, for inclusion in Docket No. PRM S0-23. The Staff treated the remainder of TCSE's letters as a request for action under 10 CFR 2.206.E 1/ Notice that the Staff was treating TCSE's April 24th letter as a petition under 10 CFR 2.206 had been published in the Federal Register on June 8,1979.
44 Fed. Reg. 33192(1979). The Licensees responded to TCSE's April 24th request in a letter of June 8,1979, from their counsel.
8001280 948
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,2, TCSE's June 12th letter urged that the Comission hold hearings on TCSE's requests and further order the Licensees to show cause why emergency and evacuation procedures for the Davis-Besse plant should not.be modified prior to resumed operation of the plant. On June 12th, the Davis-Besse plant was shut down, subject to the Commission's Order of May 16, 1979, which required the Licensees to undertake certain corrective action prior to resumed operation.2_/
In accordance with the Commission's Order, the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation found on July 6,1979 that the Licensees had satisfied the conditions of the Order and could thereby resume operation of the Davis-Besse plant.
TCSE had
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Bedn informed prior to this authorization that a decisio.' on TCSE's petition would probably not precede the authorization to resume operation.S 2/
44 Fed. Reg. 29767 (1979).
3]
Letter from H. R. Denton to L. E. Roe (July 6,1979). Ing 44 Fed. Reg, 40987 (1979).
y Letter from H. R. Denton to T. J. Lodge (June 27, 1979).
Of course, final action on TCSE's petition prior to the authorization was not compelled by law.
In analogous circumstances, the Comission held that the pendency of proceedings on the May 16th Order did not legally bar resumed operation of the Davis-Besse facility on tenns consistent with the Order.
Toledo Edison Co. (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), Comission Order at 2 (Docket No. 50-346, July 5,1979).
If the pendency of proceedings on an Order does not bar restzned operation of a facility,it would follow that the Staff is not required to take final action on a 10 CFR 2.206 petition which raises matters unrelated to the shutdown under an existing order prior to authorization of resumed operation of the facility. More-over, as the D.C. Court of Appeals has recognized, the Staff is not bound to suspend operation of a facility and institute proceedings simply
[,
because the petitioner asks for such relief : "[An agency] may properly undertake preliminary inquiries in order to detennine whether the claim is substantial enough under the statute to warrant full proceedings."
hh Porter County Chapter of the Izaak Walton League v. NRC, No. 78-1556, Slip Op. at 11 (D.C. Cir., Sept. 6, 1979).
N
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3 TCSE then filed on July 9, 1979, (1) a " Motion" seeking action by the NRC to shut down the Davis-Besse facility pending revisions to the emergency plans, and (2) a " Complaint and Memorandum of Particulars" which detailed TCSE's allegations and bases for its " Motion"._ The Cemission referred TCSE's July 9th sutrnittal to the Staff for treatment under 10 CFR 2.206. On July 16, 1979, the Licensees filed a response to this latest filing from TCSE.
TCSE's July 9th submittal essentially reiterated its earlier requests but provided substantial elaboration on the bases for these requests.
As its request for relief, TCSE asked that the Commission:
a.
Find that the plant is not safe to operate and is an imediate threat to health and safety.
b.
Suspend operation pending correction of deficiencies alleged and other necessary action.
c.
Order the licensees to conduct full-scale emergency drTl'is.
d.
Order posting of emergency and evacuation infonnation in public places within 50-mile radius of the plant.
e.
Order the licensees to enclose emergency instructions in billings to customers at least annually.
I have considered the substance and the bases of the TCSE allegations, and I find that the TCSE has a fundamental misunderstanding of the relationships among regulatory requirements, regulatory guides, and NRC report recomendations.
At the present time, the Davis-Besse emergency plan meets all current regula-tory requirements.
As such, a finding that the plant is not safe and poses an imediate threat to the public health and safety is not appropriate.
In light of the events following the Three Mile Island Unit 2 accident, however, 1826 106
the NRC is taking inTnediate steps to upgrade emergency preparedness for all nuclear power plants, including Davis-Besse.
Among the steps to be taken will be the implementation of the requirement that emergency plans include provisions for periodic dissemination of emergency planning information to occupants around the plant who could be directly affected by a release of radioactivity.
Also, requiremnts for periodic drills will be upgraded.
A discussion of current NRC requirements and guidelines on emergency planning, current efforts to upgrade emergency planning requirements, and specific allegations forwarded by the TCSE are contained in Appendices A through D, which are attached hereto and made a part of this decision.
In light of the Commission's current effort to upgrade emergency planning and on the basis of the staff's review of TCSE's petition, I have concluded that no modification of the Davis-Besse operatinp license is required at this time and that public hearings on the Davis-Besse emergency plans should not be convened.E The request for relief by the TCSE is denied.
A copy of this decision will be placed in the Connission's Public Document Room at 1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, D. C 20555, and the local Public Document Room for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No.1 located at the Ida Rupp Public Library, 310 Madison Street, Port Clinton, Ohio 43452.
A 5/
In addition to its request for issuance of an order to show cause, TCSE asked that the Commission hold hearings on its petition to modify the Davis-Besse operating license. See TCSE Letter of June 12, 1979.
TCSE is not entitled to a hearing on its petition, because the consideration of a petition under 10 CFR 2.205 is not a proceeding within the meaning of Section 189a. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.
Illinois v. NRC, 591 F.2d 12, 13-14 (7th Cir.1979).
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. copy of this decision will also be filed with the Secretary of the Conmission for its review in accordance with 10 CFR 2.206(c) of the Connission regulations.
As provided in 10 CFR 2.206(c), this decision will constitute the final action of the Co=11ssion 20 days after the date of issuance, unless the Commission on its own motion institutes the review of this decision within that time.
I n
Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this 17th day of January,1980.
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Appendix A Present Comission Requirements and Guidelines on Lneroency Precaredness Current Comission requirements concerning Emergency Preparedness are set forth in 10 CFR 50, Section 50.34 and Appendix E.
These regulations require that an applicant for a construction permit or operating license submit information to allcw the staff to assess the capability of the applicant to deal with emergencies at the proposed facility.
Section 50.34 (a) (10) requires that the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) contain:
"A discussion of the applicant's preliminary plans for coping with emergencies.
Appendix E sets forth items wnich shall be included in these plans."
Section II of Appendix E establishes the minimum requirements for the contents of the PSAR. At this stage, the applicant is not required to submit a final proposed Emergency Plan, but is required to forward " sufficient information to assure the compatibility of proposed emergency plans with facility design features, site layout, and site location with respect to such considerations as access routes, surrounding population distributions, and land use."
Paragraphs A through G of Section II detail the items which, as a minimum, shall be included in the PSAR.
In order to assist applicants in providing sufficient information to allow the staff to properly assess that the requirements of 10 CFR 50 are being met, the Comission has issued " Regulatory Guides" via its Office of Standards Development.
Regulatory Guide 1.70,' Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for Light Water Reactors" Section 13.3, provides current guidelines concerning information relating to Emergency Planning that should be provided in the PSAR.
Regulatory Guide 1.70, as well as all other Regulatory Guides, was issued not as a statement of 1826 109
regulatory requirer ts, but rather as an acceptable rethod of implementing the Commission's requirements.
Methods of compliance r.ot set out in the guides can be found acceptable if they provide a basis for the findings requisite to the issuance or continuance of a pen-it or license.
Section 50.34 (6) (6) (v) requires that a Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) contain:
" Plans for coping with emergencies which shall irclude the items specified in Appendix E."
Section III of Appendix E states that the FSAR need not contain details of the emergency plan, nor details of the methods of implementation.
Rather, the plan submitted must include sufficient description of elements set forth in Section IV of Appendix E to provide reasorable assura ce that appropriate measures can and will be taken in the event of emergencies to ;;rotect public health and safety and to prevent damage to property. Regulatory Guide 1.70 states that, although details of the plan need not be included in the FSAR, a comprehensive plan should be submitted. Regulatory Guide 1.101, "Energency Planning for Nuclear Power Plants," has been provided to applicants to further assist them in developing emergency plans. This guide provides ar. acceptable method to the NRC staff for complying with the Comission's regulations with regard to the content of emergency plans.
The above requirements and guidelines specifically deal with an applicant's or licensee's plans for dealing with emergencies. Although no Federal regulations exist that detail requirements for the contents of State and local agencies' emergency plans, many of the responsibilities in dealing with emergencies lie with these agencies.
In this connection, a Task Force of NRC and Environmental Protection Agency representatives was o d
. in 1976 to provide a basis for Federal, State, and Local government emergency preparedness organizations for deteminino the acoropriate decree of emergancy response planning efforts for the areas surrounding nuclear power plants.
The Task Force report, " Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Lightwater Nuclear Power Plants" (NUREG-0396, EPA 520/1-78-016), was issued in December 1978. The Commission recently endorsed the guidance contained in the NRC-EPA Task Force P,eport as NRC policy.
44 Fed. Reg. 61123 (October 23,1979).
In sumary, Sections II and III of Appendix E contain the requirements for the contents of a Safety Analysis Report with regard to a proposed facility's emergency plan.
Regulatory Guide 1.70 has been provided to assist an applicant in fulfilling these requirements.
In the case of the FSAR, the details of the emergency plan need not be submitted.
The FSAR need anly contain a comprehensive scope of the emergency plan and a description of how regulatory requirements are to be carried out at the proposed facility.
Some of the information to be contained in the FSAR, as called for in Regulatory Guide 1.70, is not required to become part of the emergency plan itself.
This information serves as background to the NRC staff in assess-ing the adequacy of the proposed emergency plan.
The content of the emergency plan implemented at the proposed facility must at least satisfy the requirements stipulated in Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50.
A presently acceptable method of implementing these requirements is described in Regulatory Guide 1.101.
Currently, no NRC regulations exist that stipulate the contents of
' State and local emergency plans around a nuclear facility.
A discussion 1825 111 i
of the NRC's intent to implement the recommendations of NUREG-0396 and to backfit the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.101 to operating plants such as Davis-Besse is contained in Appendix B to this decision.
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ju.
Appendix 8 Current Efforts to Upgrade Emergency Plans Although all licens. es meet present regulatory requirements regarding plans, activities are currently taking place which would result in a significant upgrad-ing of regulations as well as the degree of emergency preparedness at nuclear power plants. These activities include:
1.
A rule change proceeding.which would resuit in an interim upgrade of NRC emergency planning regulations to provide prompt clarification and expansiun in areas that have been perceived to be deficient as a result of past experi-ences.
44 Fed. Reg. 75167 (December 19,1979).
The proposed rule changes are deemed interim because the NRC staff anticipates that further changes in the emergency planning regulations may be proposed as more experience
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is gained by implementing these revised regulations.
Also, changes may be proposed as the various Three Mile Island investigations are concluded and the results become available for efforts in such areas as ins.rumen-tation and monitoring and generic studies of accident models.
The proposed 4--
rui changes involve:
a)
A requirement that the utility emergency plans, including State and Local plans, be submitted to and concurred in by the NRC as a condition for license issuance.
For operating plants, this requirement may be a condition for continued operation.
b) A requirement that emergency planning considerations be extended to
" Emergency Planning Zones" as defined in " Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Lightwater Nuclear Power Plants" (NUREG-0396, December 1978.)
c) A requirement that detailed emergency planning implementing procedures of both licensees ard applicants be submitted to the NRC for review.
This i
review would determine the acceptability of such procedures in providing
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reasonable assurance that emergency measures can be taken to protect the 1825 113
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public health and safety in the event of a radiological emergency.
2.
Immediate steps to improve licensee emergency preparedness at all operating power plants.
This will involve a review of licensee emergency plans against the most recent guidance given in Regulatory Guide 1.101 as well as additional areas wnere improvements in emergency planning have been highlighted as particularly significant by the Three Mile Island accident.
Acceptance criteria that will be used in this review are attached hereto as Appendix C.
In this regard, the present schedule calls for a staff review and site visit to the Davis-Besse facility in January 1980, with a final report to be issued describing the incorporation of the acceptance criteria into the Davis-Besse emergency plans by April 1980.
The interim rule, for plants such as Davis-Besse, would require the submission of detailed utility, Stats and local emergency plans to the NRC for review. Approval of the utility plan and concurrence in the State and local plans may be required for continued operation.
The plans will be reviewed against criteria that embody the presently accepted minimum standards for emergency plan content.
A condition would be eventually added to the Davis-Besse license that would require the licensee to main-tain in effect and fully implement the provisions of the Commission approved emergency plan.
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Appendix C Emercency Plannino Ac:ectance Criteria for Licensed Nuclear Power Plants INTRODUCTION Licensees will submit updated facili'ty plans either before or after the site visit by the NRR review team, together with the appropriate State and local plans, which will be evaluated collectively against the requirements of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, the positions set forth in Regulatory Gui,de 1.101, and the acceptance criteria contained herein.
The criteria contained herein will be used in conjunction with the aforementioned regulations and guidance to assure that the following emergency planning objectives have been achieved.
(1) Effective coordination of emergency activities among all organizations having a ruspense role.
(2) Early warning and clear instructions to the pcpulation-at-risk in the event of a serious radiological emergency.
(3) Continued assessment of actual or potential consequences both onsite and offsite.
(4)
Effective implementation of emergency measures in the environs.
(5) Continued maintenance of an adequate state of emergency preparedness.
It should be noted that the planning herein identified for the Emergency Planning Zones (NUREG-0396) need not be fully implemented at this time in order to meet the acceptance criteria.
Evaluation of the planning for the plume exposure pathway should be based on what is feasible on the time scale 1825 115
2 of these reviews with firm commitments to extend such provisions throughout the entire Emergency Plancing Zone by January 1, 1981.
Also, the Commission has not yet spoken on the "50 mile" aspect of the Emergency Planning Zone associated with the ingestion pathway.
Hence, the use of the relatid accept-anca criteria in the. evaluation need not be applied to the full extent implied in NUREG-0396.
However, the plans must demonstrate that a' capability exists to protect the public from exposure via the ingestion pathway.
ACCESTANCE CRITERIA I.
To assure effective coordination of emergency activities among all organizations having a response role A.
Licensee plans will:
1.
Provide for an emergency coordinator at all times, including an individual onsite at the time of an accident, having the authority and responsibility to initiate any emergency actions within the provisions of the emergency plan, including the exchange of information with authorities responsible for coordinating offsite emergency measures.
2.
Provide for the augmentation of the minimum onsite emergency organization within 60 minutes for all classes of emergencies above the " alert" level.
3.
Iden+.ify and define by means of a block diagram the interfaces between and among the onsite functional areas of emergency activity, licensee headquarters support, local services ~'oport, and State and local government response organizations.
nie 1826 116
i 3
above shall include the onsite technical support center and the operational support center as discussed in NUREG-0578.
Describe the location and role of the onsite technical support 4.
o See item 3 of Section 3.3.3.b of Appendix A to cantar.
NUREG'0573 (e.g., co=munications with NRC and the offsite emergency operations center).
Describe the location and role of the onsite operational support 5.
See item 3 of Section 2.2.2.c of Appendix A to center.
Provide for the dispatch of a representative to tne principal 6.
emergency operations center established by the offsite agencies (not required if licensee's offsite emergency operation center is at the same location as that described in ite: I.B.4).
B.
State / local plans will:
Identify authorities responsible fcr coordinating offsite 1.
. emergency activities for the Emergency Planning Zones discussed in NUREG-0395.
Designate the authority and specific responsibility for each 2.
coordinating authority.
Describe the concept of operations from the perspective of each 3.
official having a coordinating role, including the operational interrelationships of all receral, State, and local organiza-tions providing emergency support services.
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4 4.
Identify the predetermined location of the Emergency Operations Center to be used for the coordination of all offsite emergency support activities.
5.
Describe the communication plan for emergencies, including titles and alternates for both ends of the communication links and the primary and backup means of comunication. Where consistent with the agency function, these plans will include:
a.
provision for prompt and assured activation of the. State / local emergency response network.
b.
Provision for administrative control metnods for assuring effective coordination and control of Federal, State, and local emergency support activities.
c.
Provision for comunications with contiguous State / local governments within the Einergency Planning Zones.
d.
Provision for communications with Federal emergency response organi;:atiens.
e.
Provision for cc::munications with the nuclear facility, State and/or local emergency operations centers, and field assessment teams.
II.
To assure early warning and clear instructions to the population-at risk in the event of a serious radiological emergency A.
Licensee plans will:
~
1.
Provide an emergency classification scheme as set forth in Regulatory Guide 1.101.
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5 2.
Establish specific criteria, including Emergency Action Levels (EAL) as appropriate, for declaring each class of emergency.
a.
EAls for declaring a " site emergency" will incidde instrument readings and system status indications corresponding to an airborne fission prod;.a inventory within containment
'which, if released, could result in offsite doses equivalent to the lower limit of the EPA Protective Action Guides (PAG) for exposure to airborne radioactive materials.
b.
EALs for declaring a " general emergency" will include instrument readings and system status indications corresponding to an airborne fission product inventory within containment which, if released, could result in offsite doses equivalent to the upper limit of the EPA Protective Action Guides (PAG) for exposure to airborne radioactive miterials.
3.
Provide a clear and explicit methodology for relating EALs to PAGs.
4.
Identify the onsite capability and resources to properly assess and categorize accidents including:
a.
Instrumentation for detection of inadequate core cooling.
See item 3 of Section 2.1.3.b of Appendix A to NUREG-0578.
b.
Radiation monitors.
See item 3 of Section 2.1.8.5 of Appendix A to NUREG-0578.
5.
Provide for recoc=ending protective actions to the appropria*.e State and local authorities, based e rejected dose to the population-at-risk, in accordance with the recommendation set forth in Table 5.1 of the Manual of Protective Action Guides 1825 119
6 and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents, EPA-520/1-75-001.
Upon declaration of a " general emergency", immediate notification shall be made directly to the offsite authorities responsible for implementing protective measures within the Emergency PlannkngZoneasdiscussedinNUREG-0396.
6.
Describe the onsite cdmmunications capability for assuring contact with the offsite authorities responsible for implementing protective measures including a primary and backup means of communications.
7.
Provide for periodic dissemination of educational information to the public within the plum exposure Emergency Planning Zone regarding the potential warning methodology in the event of a serious accident.
B.
State / local plans will:
1.
Identify authorities having a response role within the Emergency Planning Zone as discussed in NUREG-0396.
2.
Designate the authority and specific responsicility for each cf the responding authorities.
3.
Provide for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> / day manning of communication link by authorities responsible for implementing offsite protective
~
measures.
4.
Provide an emergency classification scheme that is consistent with that established by the licensee.
5.
Describe the resources that will be used if necessary to pro /ide early warning and clear instructinns to the populace within the 1826 120
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Emergency Planning Zone associstad with the plume exposure pathway (NUREG-0395) within 15 minutes following notification from the facility operator (e.g., tone alert systems, sirens and radio /TV).
6.
Provice for posting information regarding the potential warning
' methodology and expected response in areas visitad by transients within the Emergency Planning Zone (e.g., recreational areas).
7.
Identify prewritten emergency messages for response organi::ations and the public consistent with the classification scheme.
8.
Provisicns for testing the overall communications link to assure that the criteria specified in item 5 aoove is met on a c:ntinuing basis.
III. To assure continued assessment of actual or potential consequences both onsite and offsite A.
Licensee plans will:
1.
Identify the onsite capability and resources to provide valid and continuing assessment throughout the course of an accident including:
a.
Post-accident sampling capability. See item 3 of Section 2.1.8.a of Acpendix A to NUREG-0578.
b.
In plant iodine instrumentation.
See item 3 of Section 2.1.8.c of Appendix A to NUREG-0578.
c.
Plots showing the containment radiation monitor reading vs. time following an accident for incidents involving s
1~825 121
8 100% release of coolant activity,10C% release of gap activity,1% release of fuel inventory, and 10% release of fuel inventory.
2.
Ident,ify the capability and resources for field monitoring in the environs of the plant including the additional dosimetry specified in the revised technical position issued by the NRC Radiological Assessment Branch 'for the Environme. ital radiological monitoring program.
3.
State /lecal plans will:
1.
Iden-ify the agencies having a radiological assessment role witnin the Emergency Planning Zones as discussed in NUP.EG-0395, including the lead agency for data coordination.
2.
Designate the specific responsibilities for each agency having an assigned assessment role.
3.
Describe the arrangements established with the Department of Ent.rev Recional Coordinating Office for radiological assistance under the RAP and IRAP programs.
4.
Designate a centralized coordination center for the receipt and analysis of all field monitoring data.
5.
Describe the methods and equipment to be employed in determining the magnitude and locations of any radiciogical ha:ards following liquid or gaseous radioactivity releases.
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9 IV.
To assure effective implementation of emerga; icy measures in the environs A.
Licensee :lans will:
1.
Provida writtan agreements with each Federal, State, and local agency and other support organizations having an emergency response role within the Emergency Planning Zones as discussed in NUREG-0395.
The agreements will identify the emergency measures to be provided and the mutually acceptable criteria for their implementation.
B.
State / local plans will:
1.
Designate protective action guides and/or other criteria to be used for implementing specific protective actions in accordance with the recommendations of EPA regarding exposure to a radioactive gaseous plume (E?A-520/1-75-001) and with those of HEW /FDA regarding radioactive contamination of human food and animal feeds as published in the Federal Register of December 15, 1978 (43 FR 58790).
2.
Designate the informational needs (e.g., dose rates, projected dose levels, contamination levels, airborne or waterborne activity levels) for implementing the protective actions identified in item 1 above.
3.
Describe the evacuation plan and/or other protective measures for the Emergency Planning Zone associated with the plume exposure pathway (NUREG-0396) including:
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10 a.
Maps showing evacuation routes as well as relocation and shelter areas.
b.
Population and their distribution around the nuclear facility.
c.
Means for notification of all segments of the transient and resident population.
d.
Plans for protecting those persons whose mobility may be impaired due to such factors as institutional confinement.
Provisions for the use of radioprotective drugs, particularly e.
for emergency workers, including quantities, storage, and means of distribution.
f.
Means of effecti_ng relocation.
g.
Potantial egress routes and their projected t af.fic capacities under emergency use.
h.
Potential impediments to use of egress routes, and potential contingency measures.
4.
Describe the protective measures to be used for the Emergency Planning Zone associated with the ingestion pathway (NUREG-0396) including the methods for protecting the public frem consumption of contaminated foodstuffs.
5.
Provide for maintaining dose records of all potentially exposed emergency workers involved in response activities.
)f
11 V.
To assure continued maintenance of an adequate state of emergency preparedness A.
Licensee plans will:
1.
Provide, in addition to the drills and exercises identified in Regulatory Guide 1.101, a joint exercise involving Federal, State, and local response organizations.
The scope of such an exercise should test.as much of the emergency plans as is reasonably achievable without involving full public participation.
Definitive performance criteria will be established for all levels of participation te assure an objective evaluation.
This joint test exercise will be scneculed about once every five years.
B.
State / local plans will:
1.
Provide for emergency drills and exercises to test and evaluate the response role of the agency, including provisions for
~
critique by qualified observers.
2.
Provide for participation in the joint Federal, State, local and licensee e::ercise described in A.1 above.
3.
Describe the training program for those individuals having an emergency response assignment.
4.
Provide for periodic review and updating of the emergency response plans of the agency.
1826 125
Appendix D Discussion of TCSE Allegations as Contained in its Filing of July 9,1979 I.
Alleaation The Planning Radius known as the LPZ in the Davis-Besse Emergency.
Plan is insufficient and inappropriate to guarantee public health and safety.
A.
The LPZ has a radius of 2 miles from the plant, whereas the NRC/ EPA
" Planning Basis" (NUREG-0396) recommended that a 10 mile zone be used for the LPZ.
B.
The current LPZ is inconsistent with 10 CFR Part 100.
Discussion The use of a 2-mile radius in determining the uPZ for Davis-Besse has been found to meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 100 as documented in the staff's Safety Evaluation Report (NUREG-0136) of December 1976.
Also, the LPZ as determined in accordance with 10 CFR Part 100, and the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) as recommended by NUREG-0369 in connection with State and local emergency plans, are not necessarily identifiable with each other.
In the staff's forthcoming review of the Davis-Besse emergency plans, the recommendation to use a 10 mile radius in establishing evacuation plans or the plume exposure pathway will be incorporated.
This will not, however, alter the size and the purpose of the Davis-Besse LPZ with respect to 10 CFR Part 100.
~
II.
Allecation Licensees have failed to consider more than one possible offsite accident sequence in selecting an adequate evacuation radius, placing nearby residents outside the present radius in unr.ecessary danger.
A.
NUREG-0396 states that more than one accident sequence should be considered for credible emergency / evacuation planning.
B.
The Utility Plan does not utilize either the " plume exposure pathway" or the " ingestion exposure pathway" as described in NUREG-0396.
1825 12f>
Discussion As stated in the discussion of Allegation I above, the 2 mile LPZ was determined by the licensees in accordance with the siting requirements of 10 CFR Part 100, and.
this LPZ was found acceptable by the NRC staff.
NUREG-03g6 discusses the use of a spectrum of accider.ts in determining The recommendations ec9.rgency planning bases for State and local emergmicy plans.
requirements, will be used as of NUREG-0396, although they do not represer.t license guidelines in assessing the adequacy of the utility, State, and local emergency plans in the upcoming review.
III.
A11ecation Licensees' provisions for offsite treatment of radiation victims are inadequate, unworkable and do not definitively provide for transport and treatment.
Reg. Guide 1.70 advises licensees to identify and formulate arrange-A.
ments with 2 hospitals for treatment of radiological accident victims and to provide other medical planning in utility emergency plans.
The licensees' plan includes contractual arrangements with several B.
parties, but these arrangenents are inadequate:
- 1) No guarantee that even one physician will be available in case of an accident.
Coordination of emergency transportation arrangements for medical 2) services are inadequate.
No changes in medical support procedures have been entered in the 3)
Utility Plan since October 1975.
1825 127
-3 C.
The Ottawa County Board of Health plan is inadequate witn respect to the Board's assumed responsibilities concerning radioactive material, accidental spills, and fall-out procedures.
Discussion Requirements related to offsite treatment of radiation victims are described in Appendix E to 10 CFR 50.'
In compliance with these requirements, the licensees' emergency plan currently contains arrangements for the services of a physician, for transportation of victims to offsite treatment facilities, and for treatment of victims at offsite facilities.
Regulatory Guide 1.70 contains guidelines for the submission of information in a Safety Analysis Report (not the emergency plan) and its contents do not represent regulatory requirenents.
The licensees' emergency plan meets current requirements in this regard.
Although arrangements with offsite support organizations were reviewed and found acceptable prior to the issuance of the Davis-Besse operating license, the arrangements will again be reviewed against presently accepted criteria during the Spring 1980 review.
Written agreements with all offsite support organizations will be reviewed to assure adequate capability for handling emergencies.
This review will include emergency transportation arrangements and medical services.
Although current regulations do not require the NRC to review State and local plans, these will also be included in the upcoming review.
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IV.
Allegation The licenses assign excessive tasks and responsibilities to the plant shift foreman which could not be realistically performed in an emergency.
A.
Too much responsibility is delegated to one person.
B.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E (IV) (H) requires proper training of employees and offsite personnel to carry out their responsibilities in an emergency. The Utility P'.in includes no arrangements for training of off-sita personnel.
Discussion Current NRC requirements concerning organization for coping with radiological emergencies anc training of personnel involved are contained in Section IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50.
In compliance with these requirements, the Davis-Besse emergency plan describes the emergency organization including assigned auth-orities, responsibilities, and duties.
Also, the emergency plan includes provisions for training of onsite as well as offsite personnel whose services might be required in an emergency.
There are no NRC requirements or guidelines which limit the amount of authority which can be placed upon a single individual within the emergency response organization.
l'owever, it is reasonable and prudent that a single person be made responsible for emergency response actions at a nuclear facility.
This does not mean that this individual would personally carry out all of the actions under this responsibility, but that the authority for many actions would be delegated to others as conditions dictate.
The NRC considers that the TCSE is in error in believing that the shift fore-man would be responsible for personally performing all of the actions spelled out in its allegation.
1825 129 In the upcoming review of the licensees' emergency plans, compliance with the guidelines of Regulato ry Guide 1.101 concerning onsite emergency organization and coordination with offsite support organizations will be ac ored.
In addition, training requirements of the plans will be reviewed to assure that all potential participants in a radiological emergency maintain an acceptable level of erergency preparedness.
V.
Allegation Licensees have failed to comply with NRC guidance concerning identifi-cation of milk processing plants in the EPZ.
A.
NUREG-0396 sets a 10-50 mile radius to advise protective actior.s to minimize milk and food contamination.
B.
Utility Plan makes no mention of existence of a milk plant within 10 miles of the plant.
Discussion NUREG-0396 generically suggests the use of a 50 mile radius for the EPZ in connection with the ingestion exposure pathway.
Present NRC regulations do not require a 50 mile radius EPZ nor identification of milk processing
~
plants within this EPZ.
It is recognized, however, that the existence of such plants is an important element to be considered in determining action to be taken in the event of a radiological emergency.
Although it is not expected that identification of milk plants or other food processing plants will be appropriate for the utility plan, the use of the recommended 50 mile radius EPZ and the identification of these plants within the EPZ will be used in assessing the adequacy of-State and local emergency plans in the upcoming-review.
1825 130 VI.
Allegation Licensees have failed to conduct emergency drills, in contradiction of NRC guidelines and licensees' own arrangements.
A.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E (IV) (I) requires licensees to periodically hold drills.
B.
The l' ensees have never conducted any drills with cooperating federal, State and local officials and other parties.
Discussion The licensees' emergency plan, in accordance with Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, includes provisions for periodic drills.
These drills have been conducted annually by the licensees to include onsite and local offsite personnel.
Compliance with the guidance of Regulatory Guide 1.In! that the annual drills be conducted to include participation of State agencies will be incorporated in the upcoming review of the licensees' emergency plans.
Provisions for a periodic joint exercise involving Federal, State, and local response organizations will also be incorporated.
The review will ensure that these drills nrovide continued maintenance of an adequate state of emergency preparedness.
VII.
Allegation The licensees have failed to quantify estimated evacuation times and expected required times to notify the population in the LPZ.
A.
The licensees' emergency plan does not contain information required by Appendix E, Sections IV(C) and (D), to 10 CFR 50.
B.
The licensees' emergency plan does not contain information required by Regulatory Guide 1.70 concerning estimated evacuation times and the time required to. notify the population in the event of an accident.
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7-Discussion As previously stated, the licensees' emergency plan meets all of the current requirements of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50.
Concerning the alleged deficiencies of the licensees' emergency plan to coatain requirements of Regu-latory Guide 1.70, the guide does not contain any requirements for the contents of emergency plans.
Rather, Regulatory Guide 1.70 contains guidelines that an applicant for a license would use in submitting infonnation in a Safety Analysis Report ('not an emergency plan).
This information would be used as background by the NRC staff in assessing the adequacy of the proposed emergency plan.
The information would not necessarily be incorporated into the emergency plan itself.
In the case at point, estimated evacuation times and time required to notify the population in the event of an accident are not currently required to be part of the emergency plan.
In the upcoming review of the licensees' emergency plans, guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.101 will be used in assessing the adequacy of the plans.
In particular, the plans will be reviewed to assure that they contain the means and time required to warn or advise persons within the EPZ.
Also, State and local plans will be reviewed to assure the capability to provide early warning to the populace within the EPZ as well as the capability to evacuate and take other protective measures.
VIII.
Allegation Licensees have omitted from the utility plan any identification of egress routes and their capacity characteristics and have failed to identify LPZ residents having special evacuation needs.
A.
Regulatory Guide 1.70 requires utility emergency plans to specify i825 132
I 8-potential routes and their capacity, B.
Neither the Utility Plan nor the County Plan specifies such routes.
Neither plan identifies special evacuation problems.
Discussion Regulatory Guide 1.70 does not stipulate any requirements for the content of emergency plans, The information identifie'd as not being present in the current utility plan is appropriate for State and local plans since evacuation, when necessary, is the responsibility of the State and local authorities.
In the upcoming review of the licensees' emergency plans, the State and local plans will be reviewed to assure that they contain potential egress routes with their projected traffic capacities under emergency use.
These plans will also be reviewed to assure capability of protecting persons whose mobility may be impaired.
IX. Allegation Licensees' plant has a poor operating record and hence a greater need for workable plans.
A.
Region III rates Davis-Besse poorly on operator performance, B.
Other recent problems Discussion In those situations in which an event at Davis-Besse involved safety-related concerns, immediate action has been undertaken to correct any deficiencies.
Although there is no correlation between the operating history of Davis-Besse and the need to upgrade emergency plans, the review of the plans has been given a high priority.
The present schedule calls for completion of the review by April 1980.
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