ML19257B601
| ML19257B601 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 04/03/1961 |
| From: | Pitzer K US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | Seaborg G US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19257B598 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8001170706 | |
| Download: ML19257B601 (3) | |
Text
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GE!!EIIAL II"IEO.;Y CCZI:'ITEE Alipendix C to the U. S. Atomic Encrcy Comission P. o. Box 3528 Unshington 7, D. C.
[~
April 3, 1961 64 tJ k.i!.
Dr. Glenn T. Scatorg, Chaircan U. S. Atomic Encrcy Ccanission Uashington 25, D. C.
Dear Clena:
The 73rd cecting of the Cencral Advisory Ccmittec uns held in "ashington, D. C. on March 22, 23, and 24,1961.
~
With the exception of Dr. i'ornan Ramsey who attended only the corning session on 1; arch 24, all other cembers were present during all ser.sions.
Tacse ucre Philip H. Abelson, W. F. Libby, E er V. burphree, J. C. I.'arner, Manson Denedict, 3
Eugene P. Uigner, John H. Uilliams, and K. S. Pitzer, as Chairran.
Also present ucre Robert A. Charpic, Secretary, and Anthony A. Torci, Assir. tant Secretary.
The follouing reccccandations aEd actions of the Comittee are herewith presented:
(1)
Safety Poliev y d Ornani7ation The CAC devoted cost of its tiec during this nceting to briefings and discussions on the AEC's safety policies and practices.
Uc vish to record our appreciation of the efforts of the AEC staff in preparing and presenting these briefings.
~
The Ccemittee devoted particular attention to the Comission's new organizatien scheme for licensing and regulatory activitics. The Cc mittee also cet with the Chaircan of the ACRS in order to understand the relationship of the ACRS to the Ccroission's staff activitics associated with safety.
On the basis of these discussions uc believe that the AEC's regulatory activitics are presently organized to attach all of the cajor areas uhich require such regulation.
The cost serious limitation arises from a shortage of ucil trained and abic~ inspectors of technical operations.
This personnel shortage vill limit the ef fcetiveness of inspection of the AEC's own operations in the near future.
o h$
F916 220 e gt" soomo 7od
I I
2 The CAC will continue its revicu of the safety question in the future.
At the present time we offer the follouing co:=cnts and recoc=endations:
(a)
Uc recommend that AEC policy require an absolutely cicar assignment of respcasibility for the safety of each reactor, whether AEC owned or non-AEC ovned.
In this connection uc recor. rend the establish =ent of the profession of Reactor Captain.
The Reactor Captain should be'in absolute charge of a facility, in the same sense as n' ship's captain. Uc believe that the qualifications for a Reactor Captain should be established by the AEC.
He should pass the Reactor Operators' exanination, however, he nust kncu nuch corc than an Operator.
Captains cust demonstrate the thorough understanding of reactors uhich absolute responsibility entails.
Finally, uc do not believe the AEC cust insist on having a Reactor Captain constantly i
on duty in every reactor since there are certain very lou-poucred reactors which are inherently cuch Icss hazardous 3
than other types.
I i
(b) Uc are concerned by Mr. Johnson's report on inhalation hazards in our Ucstern uranium eines. Uc reccanize that the AEC does not control the mines nor deal directly with the mine operators.
Unfortunately the AEC cannot disavou its responsibilitics no catter how indirect the administrative relation may be.
Ue recc: mend that the AEC continue to vork with the mine operators and the regulatory groups in the States to reduce the air contamination Icvels in the urdnium nines to core satisfactory IcVels.
1 1
(c)
Uc believe it would be dcsirable for the AEC f
to be better inforced of reactor safety policies in other countrics.
It has always seemed logical to us that the IAEA is a natural organization for prototing the exchange of such information.
It would seem to us to be appropriate for the U. S. to take the 1cadership in suggesting this role for IAEA.
An inportant collateral benefit to the U.S. frem such an activity vould be to increase the possible psychological inpact to be derived frem the H. S. Savannah by caking core ports availabic to it.
I (d)
Uhile the scientific understanding of the:SL II incident is still incompictc, the facts are sufficiantly cicar to provide a basis for decision concerninn reanam sc,pt inadequacies.
The CAC tructs that the Corrission action in this arca vill be prompt and decisive.
The CAC uill be interested to learn about.these actions in the near future.
O hk'
. e.
4 DELETED I
Respectfully sub 11t t.cd,
ls/ Rcn e
,e K. S. Pitzer l
Chairman I9l'6 222