Text

Eia Supporting Renewal of License SNM-1168.Vendor Environ Rept,Section 5, Environ Effects of Accidents Encl
	ML19257B507
Person / Time
Site:	BWX Technologies, 07001201
Issue date:	02/26/1976
From:	; NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS)
To:	;
Shared Package
ML19257B499	List: ML19257B498; ML19257B504; ML19257B507;
References
	NR-FM-005, NR-FM-5, NUDOCS 8001160443
	Download: ML19257B507 (74)
	v • d • e

_

NR-FM-005 ENVIRONMENTAL IM/ACT APPRAISAL c

BAECOCK & WILCOX COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR FUEL FABRICATION PLANT LYNCHBURG, VIRGINIA DOCKET NO. 70-1201 RELATED TO RENEWAL OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS LICENSE NO. SNM-1168 PREPARED BY DIVISION OF FUEL CTCLE AND MATERIAL SAFETY U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 4

,, h 1753 145 (gp\\}D

i ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT APPRAISAL OF THE BABCOCK AND WILCOI COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR PUEL FABRICATION PLANT LYNCHBURG, VIRGINIA TABLE OF CONTENTS P,, age, I. Introduction.....................................................

1 II. Description of the Proposed Act1on............................... 1 III. Description of Site Environment..................................

2 A.

Site Location...............................................

2 B.

Population..................................................

2 C.

Land Use and Impact.........................................

6 IV. Environmental Impacts of the Proposed Action....................

10 A.

Operation Process..........................................

10 B.

Control of Effluents.......................................

11 1.

Air Effluents.........................................

11 2.

Liquid Effluents......................................

15 3.

S o lid WS S t e s.......................................... 19 C.

Environmental Concentrations...............................

19 1.

Radio lo gical.......................................... 19 2.

Non-radiological......................................

21 V.

Environmen tal Monito rin g........................................ 2 2 A.

Preoperational Monitoring Program.......................... 22 B.

Operational Monitoring Program.............................

25 1.

Air Monitoring Program................................

25 2.

Water Monitoring Program..............................

25 C.

Soil and Vegetation........................................

34 VI. Impac t o f Ac cident.............................................. 34 VII. Basis for Conclusion for Negative Declaration................... 38 1753 146

l if LIST OF TABLES

f. age, 1.

Estimated Population Distribution Within 50 Miles of Plant....... 8 2.

Agricultural Activities in Csg bell and Amherst Counties.........

9 3.

Marf== Annual Release of Uranium............................... 13 4.

Comparison of Water Quality of CNFP Liquid Waste Recention Tank Effluent and Virginia Water Quality Standards..............

17 5.

Ground Level Uranium Concentrations in Air at the Location of Mmw== Impact..................................................

20 6.

Emis sion of Non-Radioactive Ef fluents from S tack................ 22 7.

Freoperational Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program for CNFP (prior to 9/1/70)......................................

23 8.

Preoperational Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program for CNFP (after 9/1/70).........................................

24 9.

Results of Vegetation Sample Analysis...........................

28

10. Results of Soil Sample Analysis.................................

29

11. Results of River Silt Sample Analysis..........,................ 30

12. Results of Water Sample Analysis................................ 31-33 13.

Proposed Operational Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program of CNFP.................................................

36 1753 147

111 LIST OF FIGURES P, age _

1.

Points of Interest in the Vicinity of the CNFP...................

3 2.

Babcock and Wilcox Property and Surrounding Topography...........

4 3.

The Relation of the CNFP to Major Virginia Population Canters....

5 4.

1972, 1980, and 1985 Population by Compass Sector for Areas Within a 5-Mile Radius of CNFP...................................

7 5.

Int erior Layou t o f CNFP......................................... 12 6.

Flow Disgram of Air Handling System.............................

14 7.

Flow Chart of Contam hated Water Disposal System................

16 8.

Radiological Environmental Sample Collection Area (After 9/01/75.........................................................

26 9.

Radiological Environmental Sample Collection Area (Prior to 9/01/75)........................................................

27

10. Radiological and Ecological Environmental Sample Collection Ar e a (Pr op o s ed )................................................. 3 5 1753 148

ENVIRO 190DrTAL IMPACT APPRAISAL BABCOCK & WILC01 COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR PUEL FABRICATION PLANT LYNCH 3URG, VIRGINIA i

DOCKET NO. 70-1201 I.

Introduction By letter dated October 2, 1974, Babcock & Wilcox Company requested renewal of their license No. SNM-1168, covering the Conumercial Nuclear Fuel Fabrication Plant at Lynchburg, Virginia. In connection with the application for license renewal, the applicant submitted ah environmental report on April 30, 1975.

In connection with such license renewals 10 CFR Part 51 requires that an environmental impact assessment be performed to determine whether an environmental impact statement or a negative declaration will be prepared. The results of the evaluation of the the information submitted by the applicant are presented in the following paper.

The facility is an operating plant and has been in existence for 5 years. The actual effluent releases have been monitored and are well known. This evaluation has addressed the most significant environmental indices. These relate to land use, demography, control of effluents, environmental monitoring and accident potential.

II.

Description of the Proposed Action The proposed action for which this environmental impact appraisal is performed is the routine renewal of the Commercial Nuclear Fuel Plant operating license to provide for continuing operation over the next 5 years.

1753 149

. Babcock & Wilcox Company has a Cosumarcial Nuclear Fabrication Plant located on a bend of the James River about 4 or 5 miles east of the outskirts of Lynchburg, Virginia. Uranium oxide nuclear fuel has been made at this site since 1969.

III. Description of Site Environment A.

Sita Location The Commercial Nuclear Fabrication Plant (CNYP) is located on a $25 acre site at Lynchburg, Virginia, as shown in Figure 1.

This 525 acre site also comprises of the Naval Nuclear Fuel Development (NNFD) and the Lynchburg Research Center (LRC) owned by Babcock & Wilcox. The site can be reached from Highways 460 or 609 to State Route 726.

(See Figure 1.)

Figures 2 and 3 show the surrounding topography and the nearby major population centers from the site.

B.

Population Population census estimation by the Central Virginia Planning District Commission in 1972 indicated that about 18,000 persons were living within a 5-mile radius of the site. However, because of the unfavorable terrain, most of these people reside over 3 miles from the site and only about 40 people reside within 1 mile of the plant. The relation of the site to major Virginia population centers is shown in Figure 3.

The population within 5 miles from the site can be classified into 3 general categories:

(1) the Lynchburg urban area, (2) the Lynchburg suburban area, and (3) the 1753 150

. eld'Tlk em n\\

S.!\\

.1 n

e.yg

.s Y

CLG R.R.

,,~~

F-

~}

E jar 1ES Rivt2 CA;4Al ! 3(. r' $

s,

\\

I. '. '

s s

LRC C A'tAL

/

726 ilNEMILI 1mru CRIDGC f

1*

s n'N 408CRf50N

.Y,,

FAMILf C E'* E T E R Y e. ;, 'O q

c

.,d.,.

AUINS OF 4ANSION t..

~'

?

a

47. ATN05

I II L

# I W '

M4W R.R.

w 9 GUARRt 609 m

,[gh;f ARCHER CRCLK Sh i n i f *;t,uu; R t.

1:tAyrR cqtga TO RICHMOND N

1 MILE O

1 MILE 1753 151 i

i SCALE IN HILES I

BABCOCK & WILCOX COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR FUEL PLANT Points of Interest in the v

Vicinity of the CNFP LYNCHBURG. VIRGINIA ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT Figure 1

(

h

/

' (C

[~

\\

.T

/

s

\\

~

p43(.;;'N yd y gfg h.,C

-s q A.

Gy.,

J, p

y

\\

raivait

+

c %.e x ] $ <

8 h, y 3' 4[) ';t.). ll{*';j;[. 4%[g..;k.

q_

7g(

+

5

=

',s

~

j i

T

, -j,

\\

-l. @

g

.g

1. -

. i.'.

ya

]

Q

' f-h % $ ; ~~ {a.( ' ?

/

(,, f g

'{, -

\\.

V D

D'

~ '

k Qr C

ppl

,~

Y h.

(

sa j _

o e,

1 HILE O

1 HILE I

SCALE IN HILES 3

BABCOCK & WILCOX COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR FUEL PLANT Babcock & Wilcox Property b

and Surrounding Topography P

LYNCHBUHG. VIRGINIA ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT iFigure 2

(

f i.

- se.

ese c

a e

sa l.-

\\

13 I

vi r.

8 L ARLINGIONilM.254 A. JAMf 5 RIVER 0

50 ad

2. AlfXAhDRIAltl%93al S.00wPA51uRI Rivlt 1 IR10(SICK 58URG (14.4306 C. JACK 50N RIVig SCAlilN MilI5

4. u we0R w asilia.lm

o. Am4R5 C0univan,om i ROANOKE(92.1154 E. stDf 0RD COUNTY (26.F2m i MARilN'VIL11 tit.6536 F. CAMPalLL COUNTY 443.'3198 F. DANVIL11644 391)

G. APPOMATIOX COUNTY 19. ISO L *.YNCHBURG (54.004

9. SiAunionin.50e m wAvuS50R0 ele.ron

[wumut$ in PAREND45E5 II ARE 1970 Cth5U5 0At4}

IL CHARLOII15 VILLI 1R8804 tri

12. RICimono i249.6m U

11 h0Rf0lK 007.9516 P

BABCOCK & WILCOX COMMERCIAL The Relation of the CNFP to i

NUCLEAR FUEL PLANT Hajor Virginia Population Centers l

LYNCHBUHG. VIRGINI A l

l ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT Figure 3 I

i

. rural area. Based on the studies by the central Virginia Planning District Commission, Figure 4 provides the population growth within 5 miles radius i

of site. Population distribution out to 50 miles from the site is shown in Table 1.

C.

Land Use and Impact The land use in the general area is dominated by farming and forestry.

The Amherst and Campbell counties are relatively important agriculture areas. Table 2 sinmarizes the agricultural activities in Campbell and Amherst Counties. However, because of the unfavorable terrain, the 5-m11e study area contributes relatively little to total production. Field surveys showed mainly small acreage plots under cultivation within the 5-mile study area.

Local industry within 5-mile radius indicate the Naval Nuclear Fuel Development and Lynchburg Research Center (LRC) which are adjacent to the CNFP and also owned by Babcock & Wilcox Company. About 3/4 mile from the plant is the Lynchburg Foundry for light machinery components of iron and steel. Other major industries located 4-5 miles W and WSW of site include a shoe manufacturer, two pharmaceutical facilities, pulp and paper processors, and a number of warehouse facilities. However, the most significant industries in the general area are near or in Lynchburg, outside the 5-mile radius of the plant site.

The construction of the plant and other facilities on the 525 acre site has altered the natural landscape in the general area. However, the adverse impact on agriculture and terrestrial life in the 5-m11e study area is small in the context of the larger general area.

(The agricultural sectors in 1753 154

l

- N NNW NNE I:{

l s

./

3 jf E.

-. m8 f.

M NWli

/" $

g NE fjfg

,[ Si S

\\

W d u sa.

s anna -

o

/

~\\ ~

\\

N

~

te k

s NW

\\

& i.

s a ' ' ',' G[i,,W,., ; ; a ~

ENE o:SONMElGHrs

\\

~

f N

Tg

\\

sus

a. /

j u

z *

s.

N\\

/,!

4 tg,,.;.

i l'.

,y 3

s.. i.4 7 i.

,l '\\ -d i

E 2

ma a

i N ^ 'g 3

I,k l

1 A' YNCHB RG

- i

\\

) t

u\\

h d/

N\\

h 7,7 % -k at a~

5 i

tW,4p.r -

g % a 2 n

i

~

i s.s s

TwouAs e

as 121 ESE in TERRACE 5

5

,jn

n.,'4 rz

~*

s y

\\

/

\\

N r-R i

e

/

e ne\\

1 SW '$ p,

/

g

'\\

g / SE h$ '

f/

l

~*

Q 1

$x SSW '

f

_..e x

SSE

/

S Poculation Totals by Year and Radius 411e 1972 POPULATION PREDICTIONS 8Y YEAR: _1980_

Radius Mile lear 1

2 3

4 5

1985 1972 44 420 1600 7c81 8625 17 1980 60 500 1820 7980 M20 1985 so s20 1950 8560 9240 BABCOCK & WILCOX COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR FUEL PLANT 1972,1980, and 1985 Population

+

by Compass Sector for Areas LYNCHBURG, VIRGINIA Within a 5-Mile Radius of CNFP ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT Figure 4

a Table 1 Estimated Population Distribution Within 50 Miles of Plant (1970 census Data)

Population in Indicated Hilage Segment Sector 0-5 5-10 10-15 15-20 20-30 30-40 40-50 0-50 N

298 1530 480 620 1450 4850 14350 23578 NNE 106 1280 1600 730 2200 4550 4300 14766

}

NE 91 1080 470 600 1920 3370 5050 12581 ENE 62 560 560 420 1730 5440 7010 15782 E

108 280 530 780 820 2500 2950 7968 ESE 200 890 2450 940 2400 15300 2830 25010 SE 494 440 1440 440 2300 3630 4030 12774 SSE 239 2100 1400 1000 3530 3890 5760 17919 d

229 1400 1400 1600 3200 4880 17230 29939 m

SSW 120 100 2200 2940 9820 10350 10190 35720 SW 425 2200 4400 6240 9800 4300 5160 32525 WSW 2676 19700 3200 500 4970 320 42320 73686 W

W 7783 17500 1500 2440 3950 4590 44100 81863 U

UNW 1598 1120 1070 1070 3920 b260 3500 18538

]

NW 1185 2400 1080 280 10400 2260 1200 18805 C.%,

NNW 1184 2880 960 1380 1830 4700 2780 15714 Totals 16798 55460 24740 21980 64240 81190 172760 437168 h

. TABLE 2 Agricultural Activities in Campbell and Amherst Counties i

Typical 1973 values Item Campbell Co.(*}

Amherst Co.(b)

Crops Wheat 4,000 acres 400 acres Corn 4,700 2,500 Hay 11,560 8,000 Barley 1,400 Soybeans 1,800 Flue-cured tobacco 1,410 Fire-cured tobacco 560 Sorghum 1,500 5ther 4,000 3,100 1,200 Apples 30 0 Peaches Livestock Hogs 4,000 head Sheep 200 200 head Dairy Cows 2,100 650 Other Cattle 19,000 13,850 Timber Harvest Sof twood saw timber 4,598,000 bd f t 1,763,000 bd ft Hardwood saw timber 8,158,000 5,653,000 Softwood 31,538 cords 21,953 cords Hardwood 27,090 15,893 Forest Area Private 226,047 acres 147,000 acres 53,000 National forest

(* Campbell County data from Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Services Office and Country Forester Amherst County data from Virginia Extension Service Office and County Agent i753 157

~.

. Amherst and Campbell cover an area of about 271,000 acres. 525 acres represent 0.019% of the total area.) Significant portions of the site remain suitable for plants and wildlife. There is no observable land r

erosion due to operation.

IV.

Environmental Impacts of the Proposed Action A.

Operation Process as powder or The plant receives its raw material in the form of UO2 pellets; the powder is pressed into pellets and loaded into zircalloy cladding material for ultimate fabrication into fuel assemblies for use in commercial power reactors. At the present time, there is no chemical processing and the only radioactive material involved is slightly enriched uranium containing a maximum 4.05 percent uranium-235, the remainder being uranium-238. The main steps of the manufacturing process are:

Powder B1 -d % -A weighed amount of uranium dioxide powder is processed through a blender and then run through a granulator to produce a free flowing powder for subsequent use in the pellet pressing operation.

Pellet Pressing-The free flowing uranium dioxide powder is pressed to the desired " green" density and geometrical shape.

PelJet Sintering-Green pressed pellets are placed on trays in pre-paration for sintering to final density. Pellets are sintered in a pure hydrogen or 75% H and 25% N atmosphere at about 1700*C. Lubri-2 cant additives are removed from the pellets during sincering.

Pellet Grinding-Following sintering, pellets undergo centerless grinding to final dimensions.

1753 158

.n.

Pellet Loading--Fuel pelle,ts are received from the pelletizing line or from a vendor and are fabricated by inserting a measured column 9

of pellets into the zircalloy tubing along with other rod intervals.

One end cap is already in place. The final cap is velded immediately after rod loading.

Fuel Rod Reorocessing--The fuel rods are cycled through a number of final production and quality control steps, including drying, ultra-sonic testing, pressurization with helium, cleaning, radioactive evaluation, and finally helium leak testing.

Fuel Bundle Assembly--Completed fuel rods and completed fuel bundle hardware, consisting of end fittings and the fuel rod holding cage, are brought together in the assembly room. The fuel rods are inserted into the rod holdings cage and the end fitting is attached to the end of the fuel bundle assembly. The completed fuel assembly is cleaned, inspected, packaged into an approved shipping container and shipped to the utility's reactor site.

Figure 5 shows an interior layout of the plant.

B.

Control of Effluents 1.

Air Effluents Exhaust air from the plant consists of two streams, (a) air exhausted directly from hoods, process equipment, glove boxes (b) general air as necessary to maintain comfort and negative pressure within the plant.

Air streams which could be contaminated with radioactive materials (uranium oxide particles ) are prefiltered, then double 1753 159

Itr fq/

16 Ir-i 1

\\

3 5

6

(

/

\\\\l8 20l19 18 j7,y i

21

/

4 9

Il l

e 22

.0 (6

l u.'DY u

yj ri 25 7 f

15 ' r j

h

~

/

0 100 200 300 400 500 PLANT NORTH i

i i

i SCALE IN FEET 1 - Contaminated Wasta 13 - Office Storage Shed 14 - Office 2 - Maintenance Support Area 15 - Guard House 3 - Contaminated Area Change Room 16 - Garage 4 - Fuel Rod FabMcation 17 - Air Cearessor 5 - Parts Cleaning 18 - Machine Shop 6 - Alpha Count Room 19 - Grid ManufactuMng 7 - Fuel Rod Storage 20 - Recefving 8 - Plant Maintenance Shops 21 - Pelletizing 9 - Camponent FabMcation 22 - Pellet Loading 10 - Assembly FabMcation 23 - Annonia Dissociator 11 - Fuel Assembly Storage 24 - Gravel Roadway 12 - Laboratory 25 - Blacktop Roadway 26 - Vent from Controlled Area a

BABCOCK & WILCOX COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR FUEL PLANT

+

InteHor Layout of CNFP LYNCHSURG. VIRGINIA ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT

. Figure 5 1753 160

. absolute filtered by HEPA units with a min 4="= collection efficiency of 99.95% for 0.3 micron particules. Although a number of stacks exhaust to the atmosphere from the CNFP, only one exhausts an area in i

which potential radiological contamination of the air stream presents a possible environmental impact. This stack exhausts the controlled area, including the pelletizing and pellet loading operations.

Figure 6 sunusarizes the air effluent handling system of the plant operation.

Past records of plant operation indicate that the annual average discharge of gaseous effluent measured in the stack serving the con-trolled area has been about 2.5 x 10 m1, and the largest release of uranium in gaseous effluents amounted to 5.97uC. This amount is not expected to be exceeded in future operation; however, for con-servative estination, the maximum annual releases of uranium istopes (assuming 4% enriched of uranium-235) is listed in Table 3.

Table 3 Maximen Annual Release of Uranium Isotope Release Rate (Ci/yr)

Concentration at Stack ("C!al)

MPC (ue/ml)

-6

-12 U-234 4.9 x 10 2.0 x 10" 4 x 10

-7

-14

-12 U-235 2.1 x 10 8.4 x 10 4 x 10

-8

-15

-12 U-236 4.0 x 10 1.6 x 10 4 x 10

-1'

~1

~

U-238 7.9 x 10 3.2 x 10 5 x 10 1753 161

. a i

EFFLUENT JL SAMPLE POINT (s8000 CFM)

CUAL FILTRATION HEPA p-------

l PRE-FILTER PRE-FILTER l

p p

1 CONTROL INTERLOCK 5 l TO ASSIST IN BALANCING FURNACES ROOM AIR lAIRFLOWSANDTO SAMPLE POINT PICKUP PROVIDE METHOD FOR l

RECIRCULATING SYSTEM CONSERVING WARM AIR ROOM AIR DUAL RETURN 4 HEPA l

s15.000 CFM [

g JL J

JL JL 74E-FILTER PRE-FILTER PRE-FILTER JL JL JL PROCESS PROCESS ROOM AIR H0005 GLOVE 80XES PICxup AND EQUIPMENT 1753 162 BABCOCK & WILCOX COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR FUEL PLANT Flow Diagrra of Air Handling System LYNCHBURG. VIRGINIA ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT Figure 6

. The results in Table 3 indicate that the maximum concentrations of uranium at the stack are below maximum permissible concentrations (MPC) as specified in Appendix B, Table II of 10 CFR 20.

The concentrations offsite will be further diluted well below maximum permissible concentrations.

2.

Liquid Effluents There are three separate liquid effluents streams leaving the plant area. The major one is the effluent from the retention tanks which contain all discharges of chemicals and uranium. The other two streams are the fire pond discharge, which contains runoff from storms as well as plant cooling water, and the created sanitary effluent.

All controlled area vastes except sanitary wastes drcin to one of two 1000-gallon liquid waste retention tank. The liquid in the tanks is analyzed for gross alpha count and pH is adjusted to the range 6.5 to 8.5 by the addition of soda ash to the tank prior to discharge into the James River. If uranium content were to exceed limits stated in 10 CFR 20, Appendix 3 Table 2, the content would be diluted before disposal. The average flow during full production is estimated at 2000 gallons per week. A flow chart of the contaminated water disposal system is shown in Figure 7.

Comparison of the water quality of the liquid waste retention tank effluent and Virginia water quality standards is shown in Table 4.

It is noticed that the concentration of fluoride, the maximum concen-trations of chromium, iron and dissolved solids exceed the regulatory 1753 163

(

{

l CL,EANING LABORATORY DE10tIIER DE E ON T AillI4A T I ON

g REGENERATION (PIRIODIC)

DRAINS DRAINS I

1 r 1 r 4200 GAL /WK 3 r q r 3 7 2000 GAL /Wr 1 P OVERFLOW 1 f AIR AGITATION LIQUID L19UID STANDPIPE WASTE WASTE R m NTION a

(SAMP 0 10R /

5 TO RELEA5E)y k

j LIQUID WASIE SUHP j

100,000 GAL /YR m

TO WET N

WE A Tile R (AVERAGES LESS TilAN 10 PERCENT tn STREAM HPC FOR 235U AND 238U) u C'

s BABCOCK & WILCOX COMMERCIAL Flow Chart of Contaminated NUCLEAR FUEL PLANT Water Disposal System LYNCHBURG. VIRGINI A ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT Figure 7

. Table 4 Comparison of Water Quality of CNFP Liquid Waste Retention Tank Effluent and Virginia Water Quality Standards Background

CNFP Effluent River Conc.

Daily 1973 1973 b

Parameter Ave.

Max.

Ave.

Max.

Regulatory Limit pH 6.6 7.9 8.5 6.0 - 8.5 BOD (5 day) mg/L NA 10 8t 16t Not Defined Fluoride mg/1 8.3 45.8 1.7 Chromium mg/L 0.03 0.3 0.05 Nickel mg/L 0.06 0.1 Iron (total) mg/1 1.56 15.4 0.3 (tasco)

Silver mg/L 0.01 0.015 0.05 Uranyl ion (as total)

<0.1 5

Surfactants ag/l 5.3 Zirconium ug/L 0.006 0.01 Chloride mg/l 25 250 Total Phosphate ag/1-P NA 12.5

<0.1

<0.1 Alkalinity (total)

(mg/1) 0.00 0.00 Cadmium mg/l

<0.025 ppm Hardness (total) mg/1 191 275 Total Dissolved Solids (mg/1) 573 922 500 Suspended Solids NA 0.01 24t 38t Temperature Ambient 56.3 78 Total Solids 148 204 Total-N NA 596 NO -N 395 594 3

" Commonwealth of Virginia, State Water Control Board, Richmond, VA.

Data en file.

bCommonwealth of Virginia, Water Quality Standards, effective July 20, 1970.

(These standards apply to raw water intake for public or municipal water supplies.)

" Waste Load Allocation in the Upper James River," VMI Research Laboratories, Inc.,

December 1973. Data for September only.

1753 165

. limits. However, the volumes of chemical effluents discharged to the James River are approximately 2000 gallons per week which is small compared to the river flow of 440 cfs. The chemicals will be diluted to be within limits at about 40 feet downstream from site. Therefore, only a small area of mixing zones is required to satisfy the State water quality regulations. In addition, the spplicant plans to eliminate the discharge of fluoride into James River entirely.

At the present, the State is in the process of issuing a NPDES permit for that vaste discharge.

The NPDES permit, when issued by the State Water Control Board, will establish discharge limitations and present a schedule of compliance for any parameter which does not presently meet effluent limitations. According to current State correspondence, the iron concentration reported as 1.56 mg/l is below the 2 mg/l limitation used by EPA. Nitrates are limited to 10 mg/l only at a raw water intaka poiness accordingly, due to the small 2000-gallon per week flow, and the location of Babcock and Wilcox discharge (about 130 river miles upstream from Richmond where James River water is drawn for domestic use), nitrates will not be limited. Hexavaient Chromium will be placed under a schedule of compliance reduced to acceptable limits by June 30, 1977.

Sanitary wastes from the plant are created in a 1,200,000 gallon biological stabilization lagoon. There is no noticeable odor asso-ciated with the pond. The treatment lagoon is certified by the State of Virginia Water Pollution Control Board for a design population of 300 people per 8-hour shift and the total plant population is 155.

1753 166

. The discharge of vacer from the fire pond consists of runoff from the parking lot, general paved plant areas, the plant roof and coolant water from the sanitizing furnaces and drying ovens drain. This effluent does not contain any contaminant; its characteristics when released cannot be differentiated from those of the incoming process water.

3.

Solid Wastes Since there is no burial on site, coutmainated solid vastes are disposed of by a licensed NRC contractor. Other uncontaminated solid vastes are disposed of at the Lynchburg Sanitary Landfill.

C.

Environmental Concentrations 1.

Radiological Calculations were made for airborne radioactive affluents released from the plant stack at a distance where naximum offsite ground level concentration occurs. The point is estimated to be at the property line adjoining Route 726 about 800 ft East Southeast in the prevailing vind direction. The annual x/Q at this location is 3

~

estimated to be 9.0 x 10 sec/m. The uranium concentration in air at this location is shown in Table 5.

The calculated concentrations of uranium in air are insignificant as compared to MPC's.

1753 167

. Table 5 Cround Level Uranium Concentrations in Air at the Location of Maxistna Impact Uranium Isotopes Concentration MPC (ue/al)

(ue/al)

-17 U-234 1.4 x 10 4 x 10-12 U-235 6.0 x 10-19 4 x 10-12 U-236 1.1 x 10~19 4 x 10-12

-1

-12 U-238 2.3 x 10 5 x 10 The dose to lung for a person from insoluble uranium from

~3 continuous inhalation would be 5.3 x 10 mres/yr at the property line.

(The annual average whole-body dose from natural radiation in the Stats of Virginia is about 125 mrem /yr).(') Besides the CNFP, the applicant operates two additional facilities adjacent to the CNFP: the Naval Nuclear Fuels Division (NNFD), which processes SNM for naval *:se, and the Lynchburg Rasearch Center (LRC). Locations of these facilities are shown in Figure 1.

The naval facility is much larger than the CNFP and the volume of its radioactive air

Estimates of Ionizing Radiation Doses in the United States, ORP/CSD 72-1, August, 1972.

1753 168

. effluent is about 70 times that of the CNFP. Based on the results in Table 5, the cumulative impact on radiological effluent from other facilities is expected to be small even if one increases the radioactivity concentration by a factor of 70 in Table 5.

The environ-mental impact created by the NNFD and the LRC will be discussed separately under the review of their license renewal.

For liquid radiological effluent, Table 4 shows that the maximum uranyl ion concentration from the liquid waste tank is less chan 0.1 mg/1; this is well below the State's water quality standard (5 mg/1). Therefore, population exposures from intake through drinking water at about 130 river miles downstream from the plant are expected to be insignificant since the concentration of uranium will be further diluted.

2.

Non-Radiological The quantities of non-radioactive matarials being released to the environment from the major source in the plant are summarized in Table 6.

The amount of chemicals released is small. Even under most conservative meteorological conditions, i.e., with a X/Q = 10 sec/m at the property line, the==v4==

concentrations of these chemicals are within the State's air quality standards.

1753 169

9 Table 6 Emission of Non-Radioactive Effluents from Stacks Effluent Emission Rate Acetone 1.8 lbs/ hour Trichloroethylene 2.2 lbs/ hour NH 1.5 lbs/ year 3

N,H 6000 lbs/ year 2

2 NO Negligible As to liquid effluents discharged into James River, the applicant is getting a water discharge ( NPDES ) permit from the State of Virginia. In addition, the applicant plans to eliminate the discharge of fluoride entirely and will reduce Hexavalent Chromium to acceptable State limits as described in Section IV-B-2.

The nearest population which draws on James River water for domestic use is the City of Richmond, Virginia, located about 130 river miles downstream from the plant, where the concentrations of the chemicals will be further diluted to well below States limits. There-fore, such releases of non-radioactive materials is not expected to have significant impact on the environment.

V.

Environments '_ Monitoring A.

Preoperational Monitoring Program Prior to the operation of the plant. a detailed monitoring program was implemented to gain information on background radiological character-istics of the site. Air sample, surface water samples, soil and vegetation samples were taken at various locatio _. c > the site. Table 7 and 8 1753 170

TABI.E 7 I

Freoperational RaJ1ological Environmental Honitoring Frogram for CNFF (prior to 9/1/70)

Sampling Number Collection Sample Type of Sample Instru-Minimum Detectable Hedium of Stations Frequency Slee M le Tyge Analysta Freparation mentation Level g

-IG Surface Water 4

Variable 11 1 Crab Cross beta Chemically ashed Im background 8.0 x 10 C1/m1 g

Hunthly to Gross alpha and dried in a proportional 2.4 x 10 pC1/m1 l

Quarterly Atomic planchet counter.

I absorption Spectrometer 1

(uranium)

Air Particulates 3

Hanthly 9600 t Air particu-Crose alpha Mone Im background 2.5 x 10'I' pC1/mi lates, 8 hre fluorometry proportional once/ month (uranium) counter.

Soi!

13 Variable 1 kg Crab Cross alpha 1.eached, wet Im background 9.0 x 10, pC1/g (dry)

[

n>nthly to Cross beta ashed, dried proportional 3.0 x 10 pC1/g (dry)

W Quarterly (uranium) in a planchet counter.

a Comma Ca(L1)

%3 x 10, pC1/g (dry)

Spectrometry Vegetation Il Variable 11 kg Crab Cross alpha Ashed, dissolved.

Im background 6 x 10' dpm/s Hos hly to (uranium II, and dried Proportional Qsarterly in a planchet counter.

U1 U

y 8

)"

yr d

l"

(

m g

/

e 1

1 C"

l p

C" mbl p

uae I

mt v I

f s

'0 0 ice

[

e neL 00 00 r

it 11 11 11 m

Me ax xx xs D

40 5 0,.

00 0

1 28 28 93 4

o o

o r

- rl

- rl e

n k pa.

k pa.

kpa.

d o

c nr c

nr c

nr a

ui adoe ad oe adoe e

rt b nit bnit b nit R

t a ut n ut n ut n st wor u woru woru D

an oroo oroo oroo L

l e L gpc L gpc L gpc T

m dt t es n

eih o

a wrc i

d et ent

,d na l a hi e r

d&l pr s

h u

e p

ma ad c oy hd ap en h a cea e

S e t ia

- c ah n

r erl 4 e esn o

P Wdp 2d Lai N

l) a a

a a0 h

h h

t7 p

p p

n/

e1 f is l

l l

a a

a g

m/

os n

n9 y

s e

s i

o el s

s s

d rr pa o

o o

a ie yn r

r r

e vt TA C

C C

R nf E a(

l aP cF 8

i N

gC E

o L

l r e

r B

oo l e e

A if pp b

t b

T J

my a

l a

D am aT r

i r

1 R a S

C F

C T

r l gao nr oP i

t g an rier e

t po l e ot pr 0

g ei mt 1

0 k

rn aS 6

F o S

1 9

I 5

H ny h

oc y

t y

y in l

n l

l t e r

y o

r r

cu e

l m

e e

eq t

he/

t t

l e r

t re r

r l r a

nh c a

a oF u

o n

u u

C Q

H8 o Q

Q sn ro ei b t ma 4

3 6

2 ut NS f

o n

s o

e i

t t

r a

a e

l i

t u

d a

c a

W i

R g

t nm e

r t

i u l i c

a n

a P

e pd f

l i

ma r

r l

b S

S A

TU N

1 aH u

i o

m L

25 -

sumarize the preoperational environmental program and Figures 8 and 9 show the locations where samples wera takan. Results of the analyses are summarized in Tables 9-12.

B.

Operations 1 Monitoring Program 1.

Air Monitoring Program The radiological monitoring of the environment in the vicinity of the plant has been carried out before and since the beginning of the operation. Air particulates are collected monthly at locations shown in Figure 10 and analyzed for gross alpha activity. The e

results of gross alpha analysis since the operation have consistently indicated concentration less than the minimn= detectable level of 10-14 pCi/mi which is well below MPC values.

2.

Water Monitoring Program Prior to the issuance of the NPDES permit in which the applicant's required water monitoring program will be specified and during this interim period, it is recommended that the applicant will conduct the following measurement of the concentrations monthly in the liquid affluent prior to its discharge to the river:

ph Fluoride Dissolved iron Suspended Jolids Hexavalent chromium Sulfate Cadmium Phosphate (organic and total)

Nickel 1753 173

. A c,

TO asaw&L NUCL&aA 4

V fuGL FACILITits g

1

^iN

=.==a cos A

(

h

\\

s s

\\

l l

l

\\

wm stsctamat 1 if aTemfica f**ss'

\\

smicano svarem y""*G'.

],,,

cHto,m,,o

~,,

g, eusono Ladoom

\\

O O

3.

A h

-"*%g

,,,, r noo.;

4

%*g%y

(

I g

/

I i

[

'l 0

500 1000 I

t i

SCALE IN FEET A - SOIL H - WATER S - SOIL I - AIR PARTICULATES C - SOIL J - AIR PARTICULATES D - SOIL K-AIR PARTICULATES E - WATER AND SOIL L - TLD F -WATER AND Soll M-TLD G - WATER 1753 174 7

i BABCOCK & WILCOX COMMERCIAL Radiological v

NUCLEAR FUEL PLANT Environmental Sample Collection Area LYNCH 8URG. VIRGINIA ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT Figure 8

. = _:

c.,

TO.88AWAL NUCL&AA g.

4

.. L. _.

x

\\

o 1

\\

1 s

lc) 1 H

r

\\

,u_

s

..y N-

=i,c==o.r*'

sewaa.

.,o Ladoo.

eamamo, LOT

\\

p T I

3, G

/

,o o,

......,m n, 4eo -

84 -

[" ' g%*g N(

I f % y= i

- r b

p r

O 500 1000 I

I I

SCALE IN FEET 8

A - SOIL & VEGETATION l -SOIL & VEGETATION S -SOIL & VEGETATION J -SOIL VEGETATION AND WATER C -SOIL & VEGETATION K -SOlt & VEGETATION D-SOIL & VEGETATION L - WATER E - W/.TER M-WATER F -SOIL N-SOIL & VEGETATION O-SOIL & VEGETATION

-SOIL & VEGETATION P - SOlt & VEGETATION 1753 175 I

BABCOCK & WILCOX COMMERCIAL Radiological s.,

NUCLEAR FUEL PLANT Environmental Sample Collection Area LYNCH 8URG. VIRGINIA or to WM ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT Figure 9

e TABI.E 9 Results of Vegetation Sample Analysis Station (Gross Alpha. dpm/g)

(Total Uranium. pg/g) 1 1

1 I

8 April 69 25 April 69 30 June 69 7 August 69 22 May 70 i

H 0.029 1 0.015 0.12 1 0.15 0.11 1 0.13 0.21 1 0.14

<0.05 I

0.45 1 0.22 0.19 1 0.14

<0.0025 0.17 1 0.13

<0.05 J

0.27 1 0.19 0.20 1 0.15 0.21 1 0.18 0.13 1 0.13

<0.05 K

0.029 1 0.015 0.19 1 0.14 4.4 1 0.4 0.39 1 0.14

<0.05 N

0.27 1 0.19 0.06 1 0.13

<0.0025 0.42 1 0.14

<0.05 0

0.39 1 0.21 0.06 1 0.13 0.15 1 0.14 0.54 1 0.16

<0.05 P

0.39 1 0.21 0.42 1 0.20

<0.0025 0.24 1 0.12

<0.05 Eil First Quarter, 1970 First Quarter, 1970 Fourth Quarter, 1969 s

Alpha. pC1/g Beta. pCi/g Camma. pCi/g East of Site (downwind) 2.5 4.6

<1 West of Site (upwind) 0.3 3.9

<1 N

Ln U

ITsacerlab 2Eberline Instrument Corporation

}

TABLE 10 Results of Soll Sample Analyste Station (Cross Algha, dpm/a)

(Total Uranium. pa/a)

(Cross Alpha, dep/a)

I I

2 2

8 Apr 69 25 Apr 69 30 June 69 7 Aun 69 22 May 70 2 Sep 70 Dec 70 y,,,g2,,, yg2 2

y,, 73 Nov 72 21 Feb 73 Jun 73 24 Oct 73 A

0.4510.20 1.210.3 0.8110.26 0.7210.18

<0.05

<5

<5 2.6 0.55 1.26 2.7 0.4910.02 2.0 8

0.9610.30 0.6510.18 1.210.3 1.010.2

<0.05

<5

<5 4.5 0.79 0.34 0.59 1.010.1 2.1 C

!.Sto.4 0.8610.22 1.410.3 0.45 0.12

<0.05

<5

7 0.63 1.14 0.73 0.7410.03 1.8 0

0.8710.26 0.7210.24 0.5710.23 1.110.3

<0.05 45

<5

.,8 0.57 1.14 0.62 0.9610.04 2.3 E

<5

<5 2.2 0.16 0.00 0.42 0.1510.01 12 F

0.25 0.4710.18

<0.125

<0.25

<0.05

<5

<5 2.4 0.46 2.68 0.82 0.0010.03 1.6 C

0.5710.22 0.2910.14 1.110.3

<0.05 g;

M 0.6310.22 1.010.2 1.210.3 0.6610.22

<0.05 e

I 0.8720.26 0.5010.18 0.7510.25 0.4710.19

<0.05 J

2.010.4 1.510.3 8.810.7 1.8so.3

<0.05 E

0.5710.22 0.8310.22 0.3910.21

<01.25

<0.05 g--

M 0.2710.17

<0.25 0.2710.19 0.6810.18

<0.05 O

!.110.2 1.210.3 0.9910.28

<0.05 P

40.25 0.3610.22 0.51 0.18 0.3610.17

<0.05

-s N1 Tracertab O

2Eber!!ae Instrument Corp.

g 'Controle for Environmental Pollution. Inc.

N

. TABLE 11 Results of River Silt Sample Analysis (pCi/g) i Eberline Instrument Corporation Distance Below l

B&W (miles)

Co Cs Alpha Beta Fourth Quarter - 1969 1/2 2

1 5.5 0.5

<1 22

<0.5 1.6 Above B&W

<0.5 2

First Quarter 1970 1/2 1.5 1.3 1

2.6 6

<0.5 1

0.4 0.4 12

<0.5 1

0.4 0.3

)f hb b

TABLE 12.

Results of Water Sample Analysis (PC1/1) i Eberline Instrannent Corporation River Water Rain Water Date Above

Below(

Alpha Beta Alpha Beta Alpha Beta Oct-Nov 69 17 56 Oct 69 3

90 Dec 69 b

6 40 Jan 70 4

11 t

Feb 70 3

6 3

8 Har 70 11 18 3

34 3

45 (a) Above B&W process water intake (b) Approximately 100 yards below CNFP discharge point N

Ln U

Table 12 (Continued) Results of Water Sample Analysis (Gross Alpha, dpm/1)

Sampling Station Data E

F G

H J

L M

V R*

8 Apr 69 (1) 0.6 5.4 11

7. 8 25 Apr 69 (1) 1 5

7

<0.25 30 Jun 69 (1)

<0.25 360 130 480 Jun 69 (2) 0.613.0 5.413.8 1115 78142 Jul 69 (2) 113 513 713

<0.25 l

1 7 Aug 69 (1)

<0.25 230 21 5.0 Sept 69 (2)

<0.25 360130 130140 480160 a

Nov 69 (2)

<0.25 230110 2114 5.012.4 un i

(pg/1 Total Uranium) e 22 May 70 (1)

<5

<5 2 Sept 70 (1)

<5 6

<5

<5 Dec 70 (1) 6

<5

<5 Jun 71 (1) 11 7

<5

<5 (Unknown) 71 (1) 0.6 0.93 3.4 0.be 78 86 j

72 s

85 N

Jun 72 (1) 3.4 2.6 5.1 6.7 Ln u

Nov 72 (1) 0.31 0.10 0.49 0.34 CD

Table 12 (Continued)

Sampling Station Date E

F G

II J

L H

V R

(dpm/t Total Uranium) 21 Feb 73 (3) 011 011 011 011 Jun 73 (3) 6.610.3 1411 8.910.4 012 24 Oct 73 (3) 012 212 012 1215 10 May 74 (1) 015.1 015.1 015.1 5.915.9 Samples from retention tanks (not a normal sampling station)

(1) Eberline Instrument Corp.

8 U

(2) Tracerlab I

(3) Controls for Environmental Pollution. Inc.

LJ1 W

CO

6

, Similar analyses should be made on samples collected monthly from the river both upstream and downstream from the planc.

(Sampling Stations I, J and K in Figure 10) The locations of the sampling stations for radiological measurements are shown in Figures 10 and 11.

C.

Soil and Vegetation Soil and vegetation samples are taken at various locations shova in Figure 10.

Soil samples in a quantity necessary to satisfy analytical requirements will be collected to a depth of 1/4" within a known area and obvious foreign matter will be removed. Vegetation samples are taken from one or two dominant species in a known area.

Samples will be collected quarterly and analyzed for gross alpha activity and for total uranium content when the need arises. A summary of the overall monitoring program proposed by the applicant is shown in Table 13.

VI.

Impact of Accident The Cotanission has issued guidelines for the consideration of accidents in the NEPA reviews of nuclear power reactors. No guidance equivalent to that provided fut rcactors is presently available for UO uel fabrication 2

plants. However, using the reactor accident classification and an Ameri-can Nuclear Standards Institute Standard (ANSI N46-4) covering siting and design of mixed oxide fuel plant as guidance the applicant's consultant has classified potential fuel fabricator plant accidents according to four categories.

1753 182

v.,,

ro..wat ssucte a.

,*g evu e.auen N %

......-a A

(

nm,

\\.

\\

s

~

l E

I w.w.v..w*

414C1.ICat

(

,,,1,,,

'\\

tit *aHON>&ha$

s c-c s ta tio- -- - ;

,,,,,,,g,,,..

g' sunoma Lac 4"E j ' M 'J'j,_<

s. y.

io a s m

'%anoer n=i e

cq g

h.'

i i

i 0

500 1000 l

f f

' SCALE IN FEET '

A-SOIL, AIR, VEGETATION, TLD I. -WATER, SEDIMENT 8-SOIL, VEGETATION, TLD J-SEDIlENT, WATER c-AIR, TLD K-WATER, SEDI!ENT D-WATER E - WATER F-SOIL, AIR, VEGETATION, TLD G-SOIL, SEDI!ENT 1753 183 H-SOIL 8 VEGETATION BABCOCK & WILCOX COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR FUEL PLANT Radiological & Ecological Environmental Sample Collection Areas LYNCHBunG. VIRGINIA Revised: 12/17/75 ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT FIGURE 10

a e

g w-

/So

.i do I

'f table 11.

Proposed Operational Radiological Environmental Munitoring Prograia for CNFP t

Minimum Typical Minimus Samp1 tug Number Collection Sample Sample Type of Sample Instru-Detectable Medium of Statione Frequency fregaration mentation 1evel Slee

_Tym Analyalma Surface Water 5.a Quarterly Ia crab Tutal Uranium Standard 1.uw background Alpha RaJio-Vendor proportional 2 93/4 metric ProcmJure counter I

Air Particulates 1

Hunthly 4000 t Filter Cross Alpha None Low background 2.5a10*I4 pC1/m1 8 hrs proportional 8.Os10-14 pC1/e1 j

once/ month counter Soi!

5 Annually 1 kg crab Total Uranium StanJard Low background 600 DPH/kg Alpha Radio-Vendor proportional 200 kg/kg metric ProceJure counter Ambient BaJiation 4

Quarterly TLD Reading None TI.D Reader s10 arem a

j Sediment 4

Quarterly I kg Crab Total Uranium Standard Low backgrounJ 600 DPH/kg Alpha RaJio-Vendor proportional 200 pg/kg metric Procedure counter

[

Vegetation 4

Semi-annually 1 kg Crab Total Uranium Standard Low background 6 DPH/kg i

Alpha RaJ10-VenJor proportional 2 kg/kg g

N metric Procedure counter i

Large Animal U

(Hammal Preferred)aa 1

Semi annually 500 g Crab Croom Alpha StanJard Low background 30 DPH/kg Total Uranium Vendor proportional 10 p /kg Alpha B4J10-Procedure counter C

metric s

A aNOTE: When use of sewage lagoon is terminatcJ, the number of surface water samp!.s will be reduceJ to 4.

se Fish to be cultected if one of the sammals of choice not available during sampling period within 1000' of plant.

In thle case, it in felt that fish collected near the ef fluent outfall would provide more meaningful data.

a *.

, 1.

Incidents involving ventilation system failures, loss of electrical power and 00 powder spill but not resulting in a release 2

to the environment.

2.

Small environmental releases resulting from such incidents as 9

fire in a waste storage shed.

3.

Mav4 um credible accidents such as a major fire in pelletizing area, explosion, earthquake, tornado, criticality and transportation accidents.

4.

Very remote hypothetical accidents ( = Reactor Class 9).

With this classification, the applicant calculated that a highly improbable maximum credible accident (due to criticality) causing maximum impact could result in a first year whole body dose of approximately 16 man-rem for the population within 50-mile radius from the site. The postulated criticality events assume multiple excursion involving 4 x 10 ' fissions extending over a 24-hour interval (see details in applicant's environmental report). This estimation is conservative as compared to a summary of a similar nuclear criticality evaluation (with a resultant l

yield of 5 x 10 fission) as reported in p. E-21 of the Environmental Survey of the Uranium Fuel Cycle, '4 ASH-1248, published by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, April 1974. The annual whole body dose to this same population from background radiation would be approximately 4.4 x 10 man-rem. Therefore, even under conservative estimation, the population dose in such a postulated accidene is only 0.036 % of natural backs roana.

1753 185

,~

s ~< VII. Basis for Conclusion for Negative Declaration The low-enrichment uranium dioxide processed in the Commercial Nuclear Fabrication Plant, Babcock & Wilcox Co. is a material of com-paratively low radiological risk. The fact that essentially no chemical operations are performed simplifies the control and monitoring of effluents. The CNFP's systems for controlling plant effluents are adequate to reduce the radioactivity to levels well below maximum permissible concentrations. Environmental monitoring is performed in a manner which provides adequate information to show any high releases or environmental concentrations of radioactivity or other noxious effluents. Data from the environmental monitoring program as well as from operating controls on effluent releases show no significant pollution of the environment with radioactivity, noxious gases, liquid or solids.

Inspection records from the NRC's Regional Office of Inspection and Enforcement show that the applicant follows closely the radiation safety requirements and other operating controls imposed by the Commission's rules and regulations. For non-radiological effluent discharge, the Air and Water Control Boards indicate, through telephone conversation and correspondence, that they are satisfied with the applicant's performance.

In connection with the renewal of the CNFP's license, the staff concludes that an environmental impact statement is not required under NRC regulations in 10 CFR 51.5(b) nor under CEQ guidelines in 40 CFR 1500.6.

As shown in this appraisal the environmental effects of continued plant operation are insignificant. As provided in 10 CFR 51.Sc(1), a negative declaration is being prepared in accordance with the requirement of 10 CFR 51.7.

1753 186

t 5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF ACCIDENTS An analysis of the CNFP facility and processes was con-ducted to identify the potential environmental impact of postulated conceivable accidents.

In summary, the maximum impact from any of the postulated accidents on the population within a 50 mile radius was determined to result from the criticality accident.

It was calculated that this highly improbable accident could result in a first year whole body dose of approximately 16 man-rem.

The annual whole body dose to this same population from natural background radia-4 tion would be approximately 4.4 x 10 m-m.

The dose to an individual at the site boundary- (250 meters) from the accident was calculated to be 200 mrem whole body and 15 rem to the thyroid based on a postulated 1/2 hour exposure.

At the nearest residence, 1/2 mile away (800 meters),

the individual dose for a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> exposure was calculated tio be 3.3 rem whole body and 19 rem thyroid.

These values may be compared to the accident doses for establishing exclusion areas, given in 10 CFR 100.11, of 25 rem whole body and 300 rem to the thyroid.

Consequently, the postulated maximum credible accident would produce doses significantly less than the design doses specified in 10 CFR 100 for reactors.

1753 187

/

0 If 5-0-1 h(t 11

- ~...

i 5.1 SELECTION OF ACCIDENTS AND CONDITIONS FOR ANALYSIS The accident analysis, including the evaluation of offsite impact, of the CNFP is based on conservative assumptions.

The results should be considered as upper limits of the consequences if the postulated accident were actually to occur.

In general, the consequences of accidents in low enrichment UO fuel manu-2 facturing facilities are many orders of magnitude below the impact of potential accidents in other types of nuclear facilities.

This is due mainly to the low radiological toxi-city of natural and slightly enriched uranium and the highly insoluble nature of uranium dioxide.

Accident prevention in the CNFP is accomplished through the application of engineered safety features in conjunction with strict adherence to specified administrative controls.

The accidents selected for analysis in this report, therefore, are conceivable but unlikely due to the engineered and administrative controls employed at the CNFP.

5.1.1 Classification of Accidents The AEC has categori=ed possible nuclear reactor acci-dents, ranking specific accidents approximately in the order of their. potential severity.

Independent evaluations and fault tree analyses have indicated that the probability of an accident's occurrence is, roughly, inversely proportional to its severity.1 This is consistent with the objectives of nuclear facility designers.

No guidance equivalent to that provided for reactors is presently available for UO fuel fabrication plants.

An 2

American Nuclear Standards Institute Standard (ANSI N46-4) covering siting and design of mixed oxide fuel plants is available in draft.

This standard would establish conditions 1753 188 5-1-1

b I

for design basis accidents (DBA) to be used in the siting and design analysis of new plants.

In the case of the CNFP, however, the plant is already built and accident conditions should be postulated on the basis of actual plant characteris-tics, using the ANSI standard and AEC reactor accident classi-fication as guidance.

Four classes of accidents were chosen as representative of those that could occur at the CNFP.1'1 These are outlined in Table 5.1-1.

Each of the accidents is presanted in detail in subsequent subsections.

Where appropriate, the following topics are discussed for each accident:

Possible causes and their probability of occurrence Engineered safety features provided Nature and amount of radioactive effluent released to the environment Effects of dilution in the environment Transport and effects to the general population and the maximum individual Time (scale) sequence of the postulated accident and of possible adverse effects 5.1.2 Fire and Exolosion Hazard Potential at CNFP Operation of the facility can result in various inadver-tent occurrences with potential radiological consequences to the local population.

Considered in this section are two types of accidents which could result in airborne releases (fires and explosions) and the effluent quantities that may become airborne under the postulated conditions.

5.1.2.1 Uranium and Process Characteristics The principal material used in the CNFP process is dry uranium dioxide powder in various forms.

Small quantities of U O may be formed in dry scrap recovery processes.

Metal 3g and soluble forms (except the small quantities of U 03 8 p wder 1753 189 5-1-2

c mentioned) are not utilized in any portion of the facility.

Thus, the principal hazard from the airborne release of uranium from this facility is the inhalation of solid particulate material.

The potential airborne hazard of the uranium dioxide decreases as the material is processed due to increasing size of the particles, hardness and encapsulation.

The significant changes in form with processing are:

e As received, uranium dioxide is a dry powder with a Mass Median Diameter * (MMD) in the range of 0.75 to 1.0 pm.

The density of uranium dioxide is approximately 10.5 g/cm.

Therefore, the material has a Mass Median Aerodynamic Diameter **(MMAD) in the range of 1. 6 to 2.2. um.

After blending and slugging (Figures 3.2-2 and 3.2-3),

the compressed cakes are granulated and the granules are sized.

Fines are returned to the slugging press.

The presence of oversized granules indicates operational malfunction.

The granules are hard, compressed particles of uranium dioxide much larger than 10 pm Equivalent Aerodynamic Diameter *** (EAD).

Granules of uranium dioxide are compressed into pellets in the pellet press.

Considerable force would be needed to cause fragmentation of the highly compressed pellets.

Although pellets can be' made airborne, they are suffi-ciently large to preclude being transported a significant distance from the point of release.

Half the mass of the material is associated with particles of the stated diameter or smaller.

The diameter of a spherical particle of unit density which represents the mass median of the particles.

EAD is the diameter of a unit density sphere with the same settling velocity as the particle in question, of whatever shape (if crudely spherical) and density.

1753 190 5-1-3

" Green" pellets from the pellet press are heated at high temperatures in a reducing atmosphere to a final density.

After sintering, the ceramic-like pellets require strong forces for fragmentation.

After grinding and inspection, the pellets are loaded into prepared zircalloy tubes and the open end is sealed by welding.

Once encapsulated, the ceramic-like uranium dioxide pellet is shielded from most industrial-type accident conditions.

The size of particles which can be transported downwind depends upon a variety of parameters:

wind speed, turbulence, particle density, stability.

The diffusion formula used in this study considers that only particles 10 pm EAD or less can be transported significant distances downwind.3 Particles of 10 um EAD can be inhaled but do not penetrate to the deep lung."

Thus, considering particles of 10 pm EAD or less to be an inhalation hazard is conservative.

Significant quantities of powders in this size range are found only in the pelletizing area (Figure 3.2-1).

Within the pelletizing area the material is found in powder storage (15,000 kg UO ), the blender (3500 kg) and recycled waste 2

(2000 kg CO2+U0) (Table 5.1-2).

These would be locations 38 of prime concern from an airborne release viewpoint.

5.1.2.2 Fire Loading of the Facility various combustible and flammable materials are routinely found in the CNFP, as described below.

Uranium dioxide powder in sealed plastic bags is received and stored in compressed cardboard containers.

Paper and wood fiberboard have ignition temperatures in the range of 400 to 450*F an.d corrugated cardboard has a heat of combustion of 5970 BTU /lb. s 1753 191 5-1-4 m..--

Uranium dioxide is packed in fiberpak cartons and sealed e

in plastic bags.

Most plastic =aterials can burn, although some are difficult to ignite.s Polyvinyl chloride produces hydrogen chloride gas during combustion. s Poly-ethylene ignites r3adily and melts and drips as it burns.s Lubricants (oils and greases) are used in varying amounts e

La. areas of the facility where electric motors are located, where parts are machined, and to reduce friction on metal surfaces.

Generally the quantities are small except when used as a lubricant / coolant in machining parts.

Functional lubricants are formulated to withstand high temperatures.

Their flash points (temperature required to generate a sufficient quantity of vapor to result in a flammable mixture over the material) vary with composition.

The heats of combustion of straight chain hydrocarbons are in the range of 18,000 to 20,000 BTU /lb.s Hydrogen-nitrogen gas mixtures are used as cover gas in the sintering-furnace.

Hydrogen gas is flammable when mixed with air in the range of 4 to 96 percent.

Measur-able burning velocities are not given for concentrations of less than approximately 12 percent hydrogen in air, indicating that explosions are unlikely at lesser concen-trations.'

The hi'ghest maximum pressure of 100 psi with a rate of rise of 11,000 psi /sec is found at 35 per-cent hydrogen mixture in air.s Propane gas, which is used for emergency heating, is e

flammable within the range of 2.2 to 9.5 percent in air. 7 A maximum pressure of 96 psi with a pressure rise of 2500 psi /sec results from the explosion of a 5 percent propane mixture in air.s Cotton cloth is used in f.he CNFP in various forms--cheese-e cloth wipes, rags, coveralls, lab coats, shoe covers, etc.

Cotton sheeting ignites at a temperature of 450*F and has a heat of combustion of approximately 7200 BTU /lb. 5 5-1-5 1753 192

)

Various types of plastic which are generally combustible are used in the CNFP (to cover fuel assemblies, as bags, etc.).

Wooden crates in which =irealloy tubing is received and stored are found in several locations in the fuel rod fabrication area.

Wood is combustible, with ignition temperatures ranging from 315 to 507'F, s depending on the size of the specimen, conditions of ignition and type of wood.

Heats of combustion are in the range of 8,000 to 10,000 BTU /lb. s Floor care (waxes) and other combustible housekeeping items are stored in various locations.

In order for combustible / flammable materials to burn, air and a means of igniting the material are required.

Vari-aus existin, and potential sources of ignition are present.

Much of the equipment in use in the CNFP is electrical and has moving parts.

These characteristics present two potential sources for heat generation--short circuits and friction.

Some of the equipment is used for machining metal; hot metal particles and turnings can ignite materials.

Zircalloy, machined in the facility, can be pyrophoric.

Smoking is permitted in certain areas of the CNFP; smolder-ing cigarettes or incompletely extinguished matches can ignite combus tibles.

Oil soaked rags can combust spontaneously. s The furances and ovens are existing sources of ignition.

The flare gas burner for hydrogen exhausted from the sinter-ing furnace and the flame curtain are open flames.

5.1.2.3 Fire Detection and Extincuishment Visual fire detection methods are used in the CNFP; during working hours by the workforce, and on the off-shift and weekends during hourly inspection tours by the security force.

Members of the work force have been trained in 1753 193 5-1-6

emergsney fire fighting techniques and extinguishers and hoses are available at strategic locations throughout the facility.

Emergency fire fighters are available from the nearby NNFD.

Regular fire fighting units are available from Lynchburg (maximum anticipated time of response is 30 minutes) and a volunteer unit is available in Concord.

5.1.3 Maximum Individual In all accidents that were analyzed the maximum individ-ual was assumed to be at the CNFP site boundary on Route.726, ESE of the facility and 250 meters from the release of radio-active material.

e 1753 194 5-1-7 e

TABLE 5.1-1.

Accident Classes Class 1 -

Trivial Incidents - No Releases to Environment Ventilation System Failures e

e Loss of Electrical Power e

UO Powder Spill 2

Class 2 -

Small Environmental Releases Fire in Waste Storage Shed e

Class 3 -

Maximum Credible Accidents Major Fire (Pelletizing Area) e Major Explosion e

Earthquake e

e Tornado Criticality e

Transportation Accidents e

Class 4 -

Very Remote Hypothetical Accidents (I Reactor Class 9) 5-1-8

s

-i e

mrs m

l oi r p 5 b

rpe 3

i fsp 2

s es 0

,U

- r gri se nnd 1

y

- e%

ep io t

5l4 rs gny is 7b-n n

g le

.i2 o

aog ii Rs nn rtg bt r,

rU ir

,ee

,n

,ee se epl e 5 el n%

rp lsb l 3 lbe4 eo bia b3 bag-a pr udr ulU ur,2 li sP l

i lb i

o,p oa%

e e

e

ope, D

sDs sr4 m

m m

ssle nMe ni-a a

a nebl IMr I p2 s

s s

Irab e

g g

g 1

gy k

k k

ar 2

ro 0

0 0

ot 0

0 0

3 t n 0

0 3

e Se v

5 5

g 2

g l

nn 1

3 k

8 k

b II a

s 0

0 T

l 0

0 0

e a

0, e

c i

s 9

g 5

0 s

m sy k

4 2

1 e

er P

il h

co 0

0 F

c ot 0

0 N

o rn 5

0 C

i Pe d

v 5

4 e

a nn h

R II t

n i

2 d

1 e

g g

g s

5 n

n n

n u

o i

i i

E i

z z

z s

L t

i i

e i

l B

a t

t g

t a

A c

e e

t a

e c

T o

l l

l lr l

i L

l l

u eo l

m e

e a

ut e

e P

P V

FS P

hc r

d e

n s

h l

a e

t a

d i

o c

s oge e

l

,& t im r

t rng h

b r

e f

sr e

e Pia s

m esde o

yo d

l sr ile dent hF w

l dso nes w ni s g

P o

e oet ius oira n

P P

RcS FFA PFGW i

ts i

l l

ac a

i 2

2 2

28 m

0 O

O O

O O0 r

e 0

U U

U 3 o

h U

F C

._ s n4

,oN Y 7'*

3

_ - LU

_ sO

5.2 CI_ ASS 1 - TRIVIAL INCIDENTS In addition to the accidents analyzed in this section, a number of smaller scale incidents were reviewed to assure that they would not cause significant environmental impact.

A trivial incident generally has a relatively high probability of occurring, but results in no significant release of radio-active material to the environment.

Such incidents include electrical power outage, loss of water supply, ventilation system mechanical failure, and minor spills within the plant.

No equipment was identified from a plant inspection and a review of facility drawing for which loss of power or water would cause accidental environmental impacts different from those analyzed in other sections.

Mechanical failure of ventilation equipment would still leave HEPA filtration to prevent release to the environment.

Minor powder spills in the plant would be within the containment offered by the HEPA filters and no release to the environment would be expected.

Therefore, additional analyses of these incidents was not conducted.

jJ }97 5-2-1

5.3 CLASS 2 - SMALL ENVIRONMENTAL RELEASE Potdntially contaminated conbustible waste (pap 3r rags, plastic gloves, etc.) is sealed in corrugated cartons and stored in a sheet metal shed approximately 100 feet from ths CN FP. The building is not equipped with a fire detection and extinguisher system. Up to 450 waste cartons containing an average of 5 g of uranium dioxide per carton may be stored in the shed. Loadings as high as 12 g of uranium dioxide have been noted. The cartons and their contents are combustible and could be ignited by a variety of mechanisms: electrical shorts, spontaneous combustion of acid or petroleum product soaked rags, lightning, etc. In the event of a fire during a period of maximum leading of the shed, as much as 6750 lbs of combustibles of an average haat content of 8000 to 9000 BTU /lb could be involved (6 x 10 BTU). Under maximum loading, the cartons are, closely packed with virtually no air space between them. A fire would rapidly become oxygen limited and smolder, thus releasing considerably less energy than is potentially avail-able. Catastrophic loss of the structure should not occur. The exhaust gases would vent through cracks in the structure (around the loose fitting double doors, etc.) and the damage sustained by the building due to heat generated by the fire would be' severe. Experimental data indicata that the airborne release of uranium during the burning of individual sealed and unsealed waste cartons in an enclosure ranges from 0.0052 to 0.05 wt% during the course of the fire. ' The actual quantity released from the enclosure would be less than the experimental results due to the deposition of material on the walls of the enclosure. The rate of burning and exchange of air from the enclosure to the atmosphere could be influenced by wind speed and direction. For the purpose of evaluating this accident, it was assumed 1753 198 5-3-1

that all the material potentially airborne within the enclosure, 0.05 wt%, was released to, the atmosphere. Using an average uranium loading, approximately 1 g of uranium dioxide would be released to the atmosphere; assuming a maximum load, about 3 g would be released. The first year lung dose to the maximum individual would ~3 -3 be 1.2 x 10 rem (1 g release) and 3.1 x 10 ram (3 g release). The first year lung dose to the population within ~3 50 miles would be 2.1 x 10 man-rem (1 g release) and -3 5.0 x 10 man-rem (3 g release). Table 5.3-1 contains a complete listing of doses calculated. ~ 5-3-2 1753 199

TABLE 5.3-1. Dose to Individual at Closest Plant Boundary (250 meters) and to the Population Within 50 Miles From a Fire in the Solid Waste Storage Building Dose Organ of

Time, Individual Dose in Rem Interest Yr 1 g Release 3 q Release Total Body 1

1.5 E-5 3.7 E-5 50 1.6 E-5 4.0 E-5 Bone 1 1.5 E-4 3.7 E 50 2.7 E-4 6.5 E-4 Lungs 1 1.2 E-3 3.1 E-3 50 3.2 E-3 7.8 E-3 Population Dose in Man-Rem Total Body 1 2.5 E-5 6.1 E-5 50 2.7 E-5 6.6 E-5 Bone 1 2.5 E-4 6.1 E-4 50 4.4 E-4 1.1 E-3 Lungs 1 2.1 E-3 5.0 E-3 50 5.2 E-3 1.3 E-2 5-3-3 1753 200

5.4 CLASS 3 - MAXIMUM CREDIBLE ACCIDENTS 5.4.1 Major Fire (Pelletizing Area) Fires in pelletizing areas can be initiated in a variety of ways:

1) by the inadvertent introduction of combustibles into the open flames present, 2) from electrical shorts in circuits throughout the area, or 3) through spontaneous combustion of an oil soaked rag left under other combustible materials.

Assumptions for the postulated fire accident are: The fire occurs during an off-shift after the blender has been loaded. It begins immediately after an inspection tour. It ignices the empty fiberpaks stacked near the powder storage racks. The fire spreads to fiberpaks on the lowest shelves of the powder storage rack, As fire burns through a fiberpak and plastic bag, 25 kg e of uranium dioxide powder spills to the floor. The powder is entrained in air by the turbulence of the falling powder. When empty, the fiberpaks burn more vigorously, igniting fiberpaks on shelves above. All fiberpaks (600) in the powder storage rack burn in the 1.5 hours before fire fighters arrive from Lynchburg. If each fiberpak contains 2 pounds of cardboard, approxi-7 mately 7.2 x 10 BTU would be released during the 1.5 hour fire (80,000 BTU per minute in an airflow of 24,000 cfm or 3 3 to 4 BTU /ft / min). Thus, the fire should not be of sufficient magnitude to cause loss of integrity of the building. The soot generated may cause clogging of the HEPA filters (in both exhaust and recirculation systems) but since the heat load would be low and little oil would be involved, such clogging should not result in loss of filter integrity. 1753 23l 5-4-1 ~

Various methods were considered to calculate the mass of uranium dioxide entrained in the air. If 1 percent of the 7 1.5 x 10 g of powder is assumed to be airborne, the mass 3 concentration would be 149 g/m which exceeds the mass con-centration calculated by forcible injection of a similar powder in air at a rate of 0.341 kg/sec.' An alternate means of calculation is to determine the maximum mass of uranium dioxide per unit volume of air that can reasonably be suspended under these conditions. A high airborne mass concentration is due to either many particles or large particles. ' After a few minutes, many particles would become large particles ti rough agglomera-l 6 tion.18 A value of 10 airborne particles per cubic meter appears reasonable for use in CNFP accident analysis based 12 on measurements of Mgo aerosols and calculations using a s.tirred-settling mode.l* The at::cspheric diffusion transport model assumes that particles greater than 10 um EAD would not be carried significant distances downwind.8 The available data indicate particles larger than 5 um EAD would not pene-trate to the deep lung to any significant degree."

Thus, the aerosol of greatest radiological significance contains the maximum number of particles of the size that can be transported downwind and be deposited in the deep lung if inhaled (Appendix E).

A monodispersed aerosol containing 6 ~ 10 particles 5 pm EAD/m has a mass ccncentration of approxi-mately 6.5 g uranium dioxide per cubic meter. The ventilation and exhaust system is assumed to remain functional and the final two banks of HEPA filters would retain their integrity. No credit is taken for the prefilters (some, but not all, may be lost due to the fire) not the HEPA filters in the recycle loop. Also, no deposition in the 3 ventilation duct was assumed. Thus, 6.5 g UO /m x 3600 m 2 (room volume) = 20 kg. uranium dioxide would challenge the 1753 202 5 2

final HEPA filter banks. A conservative value for total ~4 efficiency of filtration of 99.99 percent (1 x 10 reduction) is assumed for the two stages of HEPA filters. Normally a 99.95 percent efficiency is assumed for the first stage and 99.9 percent for the second stage of an in-place DOP tested 4 filtration system. Therefore, about 2 x 10 g uranium dioxide x 10~4 = 2 g uranium dioxide would be released to the environment as a result of such a fire in the pelletizing area of the CNFP. Individual and population dose calculations performed with this environmental release and the methods explained in Appendix F indicated that the first year lung dose to the ~3 maximum individual would be 2.7 x 10 rem (2 g release). The first year lung dose to the population within 50 miles -3 would be 4.4 x 10 man-ram (2 g release). Table 5.4-1 contains a complete listing of the calculated doses. 5.4.2 Maior Explosion The possibility and consequences of a major explosion in the CNFP should be investigated with respect to the use and handling af several potentially explosive gases and vaporous liquids. Acetone at concentrations of from 3 to 9 percent is explosive. A covered vat containing up to 15 gallons of warm acetone is routinely used in the parts cleaning area (in Figure 3.2-1). A 3 percent mixture can be generated in 0.36 cubic feet of a'ir for each cubic meter of acetone evaporated. If the exhaust rate from the parts cleaning area is 1000 cfm, approximately 2.8 liters per minute must be vaporized to produce an explosive concentration in the exhaust flows. Under these circumstances the entire contents of the vat would be vaporized in 20 minutes. Such large quantities of vapor cannot be generated under present conditiens. Since uranium dioxide is not handled in this area, the consequences of such an explosion are not radio-logically significant. 1753 203 5-4-3

Hydrogen mixed with nitrogen is used as a cover gas in the sintering furnace. Hydrogen gas is explosive in the range 12 to 96 percent concentration in air. ' Two con-centrations of hydrogen are used - pure hydrogen and dissociated ammnnia (75 percent hydrogen - 25 percent nitro-gen). Maximum burning velocities of hydrogen are found for a 70 percent mixture in air' and a maximum pressure of 100 psi is found for a 35 percent mixture in air. s The lower limit of flammability for hydrogen is a 4 percent mixture.

Thus, hydrogen can burn before it explodes.

The presence of open flames in the immediate area of the sintering furnace (exhaust gas burner and flame curtain) would aid in the tendency to burn at lesser concentrations rather than to accumulate to explo-sive concentrations. Combustible gas detectors are located in the ceiling and exhaust line above the sintering furnace. Propane space heaters are used for " emergency" heating in some areas. These heaters are not used in the pelletizing area but the supply headers for the remainder of the facility run along the east and west walls of the area. Minor leaks could exist without noticeable effect on routine operations. Depending upon the location of the leak, the propane would circulate through the room. If the leak occurred during an off-shift or weekend, the propane oder would not be detected. Airflow is frem the center of the area toward the wall and down. Outlets for the exhaust or recycle system are situated over or near equipment or from process enclosures. Thus, gas generated at the walls is directed downward and toward exhaust outlets. It was assumed that enough gas would be available to fill approximately 15 percent of the volume of the room (approximately 15,000 cubic feet) with a 3 percent pro-pane mixture before ignition (approximately the bottom 15 feet of a quarter of the area). The maximum pressure generated by a 3 percent propane-in-air mixture is 74 psi. 5 Therefore an explosion involving 15 percent of the volume would generate a pressure of approximately 11 psi. jJ{} }}4 5-4-4

At such pressures some of the wall panels or roof could be torn away from the frame and the building would lose its integrity. The fiberpak storage containers could be dislodged from the powder storage rack and fall to the floor. For the purposes of this postulation, it is assumed that only fiber-paks on the two upper shelves fall with sufficient velocity to rupture upon impact. Although all the fiberpaks on the other shelves are assumed to be dislodged, the remaining fiberpaks fall 6 feet or less. Each shelf holds 60 fiberpaks, each containing 25 kg of uranium dioxide powder. If 0.1 per-cent of the pcwder is lost due to the forcible ejection of the powder during i= pact and due to the subsequent entrainment by air movement prior to corrective action, 3000 g.of uranium dioxide will be released to the atmosphere as a result of the explosion. Individual and population dose calculations were performed using the above environmental release and the methods described in Appendix F. The first year lung dose to the maximum indi-vidual would be 3.4 rem (3000 g release). The first year lung dose to the population within 50 miles would be 5.3 man-rem (3000 g release). Table 5.4-1 contains a complete listing of the calculated doses., 5.4.3 Earthauake The CNFP is located in an area classified as Zone 2 on the Seismic Risk Map of the United States and corresponds to an intensity of VII on the Modified Mercalli Scale (Section 2.4.2). This intensity has an acceleration range of 0.06 to 0.14 g and implies variable damage to buildings, depending on construction (Section 4.2).13 It is assumed there would'be no loss of integrity of the metal fra=e, sheet-metal-covered CNFP facility, due to the metal's ductility. Shifting and toppling (especially of top-heavy items) could occur. Most of the vessels and containers 1753 205 5-4-5

used in the pelletizing area are constructed of stainless steel and, rupturing of such vessels is not anticipated. Loss of service pipes is also not anticipated. Release of uranium dioxide powder to the pelletizing area and the release of part of the airborne material to the atmosphere could result from the following sequence of events. The 5-ton hoist is assumed to be carrying a heavy piece of equipment at the end of the hoist chain at the instant the earthquake occurs. It is further assumed that the hoist is at the powder storage racks or the force of the quake causes the hoist to slide to them. The pendulum-like motion of the equipment is assumed to dislodge and rupture fiberpaks and puncture a hole in the east wall of the pelletizing area. Since the exhaust fans are bolted in place and final filter banks are housed in a structure coupled to the main facility, the ventilation and exhaust system should remain functional. Thus, a flow of 8000 cfm would be exhausted from the facility. An airflow into the facility of at least 125 feet per minute could be maintained with an accidentally created hole of 64 square feet (8 feet by 8 feet) or less. Some small release to the environment is envisioned due to back diffusion around the edges of the hole. If the maxi-mum airborne concentration of 6.5 g uranium dioxide per cubic meter is accepted (Section 5.4.1) in the 3600 cubic meter pelletizing area, about 20 kg of uranium dioxide could be airborne. Since each fiberpak holds 25 kg of uranium dioxide, only a few fiberpaks need be involved in the acci-dent to attain this airborne concentration. If the release from back diffusion is assumed to be 1 percent (probably a very conservative value), the airborne release to the atmos-phere might be as high as 200 g of uranium dioxide. If loss of exhaust is postulated, the high number of airborne parti-cles would tend to decay and the size of the airborne material 1753 206 5-4-6

would increase by agglomeration. The airborne material would escape from the opening over a time period depending on the forces causing an exchange between the pelletizing area and the atmosphere. It is assumed that remedial action will be instituted within an hour since earthquakes of such magnitude are not assumed to cause serious disruption of services. Under such conditions a release of 10 percent (2 kg) of the airborne uranium dioxide powder is postulated. Individual and population dose calculations were performed using the above environmental releases and the methods explained in Appendix F. The first year lung dose to the -1 maximum individual would be 2.7 x 10 rem (200 g release) and 2.7 rem (2 kg release). The first year lung dose to the -1 population within 50 miles would be 4.4 x 10 man-rem (200 g release) and 4.4 man-rem (2 kg release). Table 5.4-1 contains a complete listing of the calculated doses. 5.4.4 Tornado The CNFP is not designed to withstand the direct impact of a tornado. However, the CNFP is located in a relatively low probability area for tornados in the United States. The probability of a tornado actually striking the site in -4 any given year is estimated to be 3.0 x 10 , with a recurrenc3 interval of 3333 years (see Section 2.6.2). In considering the consequences of a tornado, two cases must be evaluated. One is the maximum hazard to an individual at the site boundary and the other is the i= pact to the population within 50 miles of the facility. To calculate the maximum individual dose the following assumptions were made: Any tornado impacting on the building would destroy the structure and most of the equipment inside. 1753 207 5-4-7

The material contained within the building (in storage or process equipment) consists of approximately 20,000 kg U as uranium dioxide powder, with any other UO in the form of sintered pellets, finished fuel rods 2 or finished fuel assemblies. The average powder particle size is between 0.75 and 1.0 um MMD. After the tornado passes a ground level release is assumed with Pasquill F (fumigation) conditions and translational wind velocity of 1 meter per second (more restrictive than AEC Regulatory Guides). The maximum release concentration is 170 mg per cubic meter (Appendix E). e The release continues for 1 hour. The maximum individual would be at the site boundary on Route 726 ESE of the facility and at a distance of 250 m from a release of radioactive material. For the above conditions -3 the maximum f/Q' is 7.7 x 10 seconds per cubic meter. An individual remaining in this location for 1 hour would be expected to receive a 0.65 rem lung dose during the first year after exposure, with a 50-year dose commitment of 1.6 rem to the lung (Table 5.4-1). The population dose commitment.was calculated using different assumptions than the maximum individual calculation, which tends to maximize the dose to the population within 50 miles of the plant. In this case the postulated tornado

not only destroyed the building and equipment, but drew the entire powder inventory (20,000 kg) up the funnel and dis-persed it uniformly in a 22-1/2* sector, 50 miles long and 300 meters high.

It was assumed that the resulting air concentration was breathed for 1 hour by the population in 5-4-8 1753 208

the most danaely populated sector (Appendix F, Dose Calcula-tions for Accidental Atmospheric Releases of Radionuclides from the CNFP). From these postulated accident conditions, the first year lung dose to the total population would be 530 man-rem. The 50-year population lung dose commitment would be 1300 man-rem (Table 5.4-1). 5.4.5 Criticality Due to the low fissile content of UO2 p wder handled at the CNFP, criticality with unmoderated (dry) accidental accumulations is not highly credible. For example, the critical mass of 5 gm/cc powder with a hydrogen-to-uranium ratio of 0.6 or less (2 wtt water) would be greater than 100,000 kg.1" Therefore, credible accident conditions leading to a criticality would include the provision of neutron moderating materials. Design of the CNFP is such that significant neutron moderating material is excluded from plant working areas. For instance, water service lines are placed on the outer walls of the building and are covered. Also, many of the processing steps in the CNFP would be safe even if fully moderated and reflected, providing extra con-servatism when procedures and design exclude availability of moderating materials. The minimum volume of fuel / water mixture which will achieve criticality at 4.0 wt% enriched U0 is estimated to 2 be approximately 26 liters.1' Accident conditions must, therefore, provide not only a sufficient amount of fissile material (115 kg U at 4.0 wt%) and water (%26 liters), but also a contained volume of approximately 26 liters to hold such a mixture. The most credible location for such an event is the powder blender, which has more than 26 liters of volume. 5-4-9 1753 209

The accident conditions chosen for analyzing a criticality event should be those which would yield the maximum credible environmental impact. Most effects of a criticality are localized to the plant and its occupants, except for any forma-tion and dispersal of fission products. Therefore, the maxi-mum impact would occur from accidents involving breach of plant air containment. Scenarios involving such a breach and including the previously discussed conditions would be: A tornado generated missile breaches the plant wall, breaking water service lines and twisting them into plant working space. The missile then shears a portion from the top of the loaded blender, admitting water from the broken lines. An earthquake occurs with sufficient force to cause violent swaying of a heavy 1 cad on the overhead crane. The load impacts the building wall (breaching it and water service lines) and caroms back to breach the top of the blender. The probability of these tv.o accident sequences should be considerably less than their initiating events: an earth-quake or a tornado at the plant site. The impact of a criticality event based on such scenarios is presented in Table 5.4-2. This impact was calculated using a criticality event totaling 4 x 10 fissions (details of impact calculation are given in Appendix F). This number of fissions is as high or considerably higher than has been experienced in previous criticality accidents. The total yield conservatively represents the scenario condition that an outside source would remoderate the system after heating has damped the fir 1c criticality by expansion and expulsion of some moderator. It should be possible to shut off water lines to the plant in 0 S-4-10

less than the 24 hours represented by the postulated event. Also, CNFP monitoring instruments'should detect a criticality and alarms should signal an immediate evacuation of the plant, thus reducing the 1/2 hour exposure for an individual at the plant boundary. Environmental impact from the postulated criticality accident should, therefore, be no greater than prssented in Table 5.4-2 and would most likely be considerably less. 5.4.6 Transcortation Accidents Radioactive materials are transported both to and from the CNFP. Materials shipped to the plant consist primarily of uranium dioxide, as powder and, in some cases, as sintered fuel pellets. Shipments from the facility will consist primarily of unirradiated finished fuel assemblies composed of sintered UO2 pellets encased in zirconium alloy tubes. Present plans consider all shipments will be made by truck. All radioactive material shipments are subject to the stringent regulations and requirements of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Transportation. These regulations specify that the shipping packages must be designed to withstand certain specified normal conditions of transport and hypothetical accident conditions without loss of contents, significant loss of shielding, and (in the case of fissile materials) without criticality. The accident-damage test series which the shipping container must withstand without loss of contents or criticality is as follows: 1. a 30-foot drop onto an essentially unyielding surface in the most damaging orientation, followed by 2. a puncture test consisting of a drop from a height of 40 inches onto a 6-inch diameter steel rod, striking the container in its most vulnerable spot, followed by 3. a 1/2-hour fire test at 1475'F, followed by 1753 211 5-4-u ~ www -.

4. submersion in water to a depth of at least 3 feet for at least 8 hours (for fissile material only). While the accident damage test conditions cannot simu-late identically all of the possible conditions which might occur during a transportation accident, they are designed to provide a high degree of assurance that the packaging will withstand the effects of collision, fire, and submersion without leakage of the contents. A recent study by the AEC discusses the probabilities of truck accidents for varying degrees of severity, ranging from -6 minor to extreme.ts These probabilities range from 1.3 x 10 per vehicle mile for minor accidents involving no releases, -14 to 2 x 10 per vehicle mile for extreme accidents. The CNFP is expected to ~ receive 75 shipments of bulk fuel in 1975, from an average distance of 600 milas. This corres-ponds to 45,000 vehicle miles of transport with occurrence -2 probabilities of 6 x 10 per year for minor accidents and -10 9 x 10 per year for extreme accidents. Approximately 43 shipments of finished fuel assemblies are expected in 1975 with an average shipping distance of 520 miles. For the resultant 22,360 vehicle miles, the accident probabilities -10 ~ are 3 x 10 per year for minor accidents and 4.5 x 10 per year for extreme accidents. Combining probabilities -2 for all shipments gives 9 x 10 per year for minor accidents -10 and 13.5 x 10 per year for extreme accidents. Based on regulatory standards and requirements for package design and quality assurance and the results of tests and past experience, these packages are designed to withstand all but the very severe, highly unlikely accidents. The probability of a package being breached is so low that a detailed evaluation was not considered necessary. In addition, the consequences associated with a release of U02 p wder or pellets are quite small and the probability of occurrence is also small; therefore, the risk of impact to the environment is very small. 5-4-12 1753 212

TABLE 5.4-1. Dose to Individual at Closest Plant Boundary (250 meters) and to the Population Within 50 Miles, From the Inhalation of UO Generated by the Maximum Credible Accident $ c Individual Dose in Rem Dose Organ of

Time, 1%

10% Major Interest Yr Earthquake Fire Explosion Tornido Total Body 1 3.2 E-3 3.2 E-2 3.2 E-5 4.1 E-2 7.8 E-3 50 3.5 E-3 3.5 E-2 3.5 E-5 4.5 E-2 8.5 E-3 Bone 1 3.2 E-2 3.2 E-1 3.2 E-4 4.1 E-1 7.8 E-2 50 5.6 E-2 5.6 E-1 5.6 E-4 7.2 E-1 1.4 E-1 Lungs 1 2.7 E-1 2.7 E+0 2.7 E-3 3.4 E+0 6.5 E-1 50 6.7 E-1 6.7 E+0 6.7 E-3 8.6 E+0 1.6 E+0 Population Dose in Man-Rem Total Body 1 5.2 E-3 5.2 E-2 5.2 E-5 6.7 E-2 6.4 E+0 50 5.7 E-3 5.7 E-2 5.7 E-5 7.3 E-2 6.9 E+0 Bone 1 5.3 E-2 5.3 E-1 5.3 E-4 6.4 E-1 6.4 E+1 50 9.3 E-2 9.3 E-1 9.3 E-4 1.2 E+0 1.1 E+2 Lungs 1 4.4 E-1 4.4 E+0 4.4 E-3 5.3 E+0 5.3 E+2 50 1.1 E+0 1.1 E+1 1.1 E-2 1.4 E+1 1.3 E+3 5-4-13 1753 213

TABLE 5-4.2. Doses From Postulated Criticality Accident Inhalation Doses Individual At Plant Boundary 250 m - 1/2 hr exposure 1. Total Body - 0.028 rem 2. Thyroid 15 rem At Nearest Residence 1/2 mile (800 m) - 1 day exposure 1. Total Body - 0.036 rem 2. Thyroid 19 rem Population Dose (within 50 miles) Total Body 0.98 man-rem Thyroid - 460 man-rem External Doses Individual At Plant Boundary 250 m = 1/2 hr exposure 1. Total Body ~ 0.17 rem 2. Skin 6.2 rem At Nearest Residence 1/2 miles - 24 hrs 1. Total Body - 3.3 rem 2. Skin 22 rem Population Dose (within 50 miles) Total Body 15 man-rem Genetic 15 man-rem 1753 214 5-4-14

s. 5.5 VERY REMOTE HYPOTHETICAL ACCIDENTS Accidents in this category are of such a low probability of occurrence, either because of design safeguards or the low frequency of causal events, that a detailed environmental' impact assessment was not attempted. However, they were given some consideration to' make certain that the detailed assessment did not overlook any other significant potential environmental impact. In all such cases the consequences of these postulated accidents would not exceed those of the previously considered criticality or tornado. 5.5.1 Maximum Flood The offects on the CNFP of a large flood would be minimal. The 500 year flood would have a stage of 497 feet, while the floor of the CNFP is at 547 feet and the sewage lagoon is at 504 feet. The Standard Project Flood proposed by the Corps of Engineers would reach to 502 feet, still 2 feet below the sewage lagoon and 45 feet below the CNFP floor.' If a larger flood is postulated, it might flood the sewage lagoon without coming close to the facility. Consequently, the possible effects of flooding at the CNFP are considered to be zero. 5.5.2 Destructive Earthauake An earthquake more destructive than the one described in the previous section might be considered which would cause the release of the total 002 powder inventory rather than a small fraction. If this were the case the consequences might approach those postulated for the tornado, but the probability of occurrence would be much lower. 5.5.3 other Accidents other accidents which might be postulated range from an airplane impact into the facility, with a probable frequency -5 of occurrence per plant year of 10 , to a meteorite strike -10 with a probability of 10 per year. These accidents should 5-5-1 1753 215

not cause environmental or radiological consequences greater than those previously considered since the tornado-initiated accident was postulated to release the entire plant inventory. I 1753 216 5-5-2

n.., REFERENCES FOR SECTION 5.0 1. Selby, J. M., et al., " Considerations in the Assessment of the Consequences of Effluents from Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Plants," prepared for USAEC, Battelle, Paci,fic Northwest Laboratorias, BNWL-1697, UC-41, June 1973. 2. " Applicant's Environmental Report, Mixed Oxide Fuel Plant," Exxon Nuclear (formerly Jersey Nuclear Co.), JN-14 ADD 2, April 1972. 3 Strenge, D. L., E. C. Watson and J. R. Houston, SUBDOSA, A Comeuter Procram for Calculatina Individual External Doses frem Accident Atmospheric Releases of Radionuclides, USAEC Report, Battelle-Northwest, Richland, WA, (in preparation). 4. ICRP Task Group on Lung Dynamics, " Deposition and Retention Models for Internal Dosimetry of the Human Respiratory Tract," Health Physics 12, 173, February 1966. 5. Tyron, George H., Ed., Fire Protection Handbook 12th Edition, National Fire Protection Ass' I1ation, 66 Batterymarch St., Boston, MA, 1962. 6.

Yao, C., J. de Ris, J. N. Baypai and J. L. Buckley, Evaluation of Protection from Explosion Over Pressure in AEC Gloveboxes, FMRC 1621J.1 Factory Mutual Research Corporation, Norwood, MA, 02062, December 1969.

7. Zadetakis, M. G., "Flamability Characteristics of Combustable Gases and vapors," Bulletin 627, Bureau of Mines, Department of Interior, 1965. S.

Mishima, J., and L. C. Schwendiman, Frcetional Airborne Release of Uranium (Representing Plutonium) During the Burning of Contaminated Waste, BNWL-1730, Battelle-Nortnwest, Richland, WA, 99352, April 1973.

9. Unpublished Data, J. Mishima. 10. Rodebush, W. H., " Filtration rf Aerosols," Handbook of Aerosols, USAEC, Washington DC, 1950. 11. Whyhaw-Grey, R., and H. S. Patterson, Smoke, Edward Arnold and Co., London, 1932. 5-5-3 1753 217

8.", f 12. KoontE,R.L.,L. Baurmash, et al., Aerosol Modeling of Hypothetical LMFBR Accidents, AI-AEC-12977, Atomics International, Canoga Park, CA, August 31, 1970. 13. Stevenson, J. H., Engineering and Management Guide to Extreme Load Design of Piping Systems, Equipment, Electrical Conduit and Structures with Particular Application to Nuclear Facilities, Nuclear Structural Systems Association, Inc., Pittsburgh, PA, 15235, 1974. 14. Babcock and Wilcox Co., Commercial Nuclear Fuel Plant, Application for USAEC License SNM-ll68, "Section III-Nuclear Safety Analysis-Pelletizing," Docket 70-1201, August 30, 1974. 15. Environmental Survey of Transoortation of Radioactive Materials to and from Nuclear Power Plants; prepared by the Directorate of Regulatory Standards, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, WASH-1238, December 1972. 1753 218 5-5-4 _}}

ML19257B507

Text

Navigation menu

Search