ML19257A981
| ML19257A981 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 02/16/1978 |
| From: | Baranowsky P Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Tedesco R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| REF-GTECI-A-21, REF-GTECI-EL, REF-GTECI-IS, REF-GTECI-SY, TASK-A-21, TASK-OR NUDOCS 8001140160 | |
| Download: ML19257A981 (3) | |
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ne 1 non MEMORANDUM FOR:
R. L. Tedesco, Assistant Director for Plant Systems, DSS P. W. Baranowsky, A-21 Task Manager, Containment FROM:
Systems Branch, DSS REVISIONS TO TASK ACTION PLAN A-21, " MAIN STEAM LINE
SUBJECT:
BREAK INSIDE CONTAINMENT" After two meetings with members of the Steering Comittee Advisory Group, and af ter discussing the major recocmendations for changes with Gus Lainas, I have prepared a revised Task Action Plan A-21 for your review, comment, and approval.
By copy of this memo I request the same actions from G. Lainas and J. Kudrick. The maior plan changes are identified below.
Delete all tasks regarding the evaluation of reliance on nonsafety 1.
grade components (outside containment) for the mitigation of a The responsibility for completing this work MSLB accident.
has been transferred to Task Action Plan A-22, tentatively titled "Mai,- Steam Line Break - Core and Primary Coolant Boundary Response."
This action was taken to enhance the efficiency by which this puolem will be resolved since similar tasks were originally proposed in both Task Action Plans (A-21 and A-22).
The scope of Analysis Branch participation was reduced considering 2.
the recent realignment of work responsibility between this branch and the Containment Systems Branch. Only the Westinghouse steam generator blowdown code, TRANFLO, remains to be reviewed by AB; the other PWR NSSS vendors have approved methods.
Ur.ier potential problems the case by case application of interim 3.
positions has been identified as an area which could impact this program.
Attached in addition to the revised Task Action Plan is a copy of the Advisory Group's coments which have been addressed.
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Patrick W. Baranowsky', -21 Task Manager Containment Systems Branch Division of Systems Safety cc:
G. Lainas J. Kudrick 1 1 A l-7n0 iI7J JUO File: TAP A-21 8001140
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l ADVISORY GROUP COSNENTS ON A-21 and A-22 A-21 and A-22 INTERFACE COSNENTS:
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General - The principal point of interface between the two
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plans is in the area of credit for Non-Safety Grade Equipment, f hh.
r The general approach to the evaluation of this issue is dif-g [-[ge[gg 4
ferent for the two plans.
(Compare Task 4 on pg. 5 of A-21 l
to Task 1. (a) on pg. 2 of A-22). We feel the approach to l
evaluating credit for non-safety grade equipment should be hg e
cons,istent.
j Information gathered under Task 2 of A-21 regarding reliance
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2.
J on non-safety grade equipment should be utilized or feed into 9:
A-22.
a Don't understand interface statement at bottom of pg.13 of 3.
TAP for A-21.
TAP for A-22 indicates at pg. 3 (Task 2) that certain information 4.
will be obtained for the feedwater system under Task A-21. Th '
TAP for A-21 does not reflect this.
TASK A-21 COSMENTS:
evaluation model is being discussed in the last paragraph u!
1.
What on pg. 3? We don't understand the Itit sentence on pg. 3.
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pg. 4, Task 1 - Are the " interim positions" referred to here-I 1 E5 W -
2.
those in NUREG-0138?
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Pg. 5, Task 3 - The description of this task is not very specific, 3.
Have we not already accepted S/G blowdown which topical reports?
models for containment analyses?
U General Comment above - If this appro;.ch is g
J Pg. 5, Task 4 - Re:
ultimately used then what criteria will be used for acceptibility (
4.
of credit for non-safety grade equipment?
Pg.10, C.(2) - Don't understand the statement regardinR scope of 5.
ICSB involvement in Task 2.
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1745 309 4
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. it Pg.11 - Statement at top of page appears to be within : cope g( 1# p, r
6.
gfrf,4 A-24.
Pg.18, Item 4.C. - Move this to Section 8.0, Potential problems) p 7.
t 8.
Pg. 22 - Summary Schedule - Item 1 - Interim Evaluatiens and Ifso,indicateandreferto)Ipf j,
Positions - are these complete?
documentation.
A-22 COMMENTS 1.
The overall approach to this task, i.e., the reliance on vendor participation, has great potential for delay. How do you, or do you, anticipate vendor cooperation in the resolution of this issue?
Pg.1, Section 2. (a) - This section indicates that radiological 2.
consequences will be based on 10 CFR Part 100.
Primary coolant activity specs are set based on limiting doses at the site boundary to a small fraction of 10 CFR Part 100 limits.
Is there a problem with this difference?
3.
Pg. 2, 2. (b) - Change "A NUREG report discussing the work...etc."
to "A NUREG report presenting the staff's evaluation and con-clusions regarding the issues addressed by this task will be issued."
4.
Pg. 3, Task 2 - This task will request information from PWR vendors. However, equipment addressed here is normally provided by BOP suppliers. Will information be available from PWR vendors?
5.
The interface information at bottom of pg. 3 is too brief and fneomplete. This section should expand in the type of information to be provided to other tasks and should indicate the interface with Task B-17, " Criteria for Safety Related Operator Action" and A-37, " Turbine Missiles."
6.
Section 3.0 - This section should include the Quality Assurance Branch, DPM and Operator Licensing Branch, DPM for evaluations related to quality assurance requirements for secondary system valves and credit for operator actions.
7.
Is the assumption under B-2) of Section 8 consistent with the acceptance criteria on pg. 1, Section 2.(a).
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