ML19257A101
| ML19257A101 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs  |
| Issue date: | 11/27/1979 |
| From: | Lundvall A BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | Grier B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| References | |
| IEB-79-17, NUDOCS 8001020100 | |
| Download: ML19257A101 (3) | |
Text
yg
~
- r.
BALTIMORE GAS AN D ELECTRIC COMPANY GAS AN D ELECTRIC B UILDING
~
B ALTI M O R E, M A RY LA N D 21203 November 27, 1979 ARTHUR E. LUNDVALL,JR.
VsCE PetSiDENT Suretv Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Region I U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19h06
Subject:
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Units Nos. 1 & 2, Dockets Nos. 50-317 & 50-318 IE Bulletin No. 79-17 Revision 1 (Pipe Cracks in Staenant Borated Water Systems at PWR Plants)
Reference:
NRC letter dated 10/29/79 from B. H. Grier to A. E. Lundvall, Jr., same subject.
Dear Mr. Grier:
The following information is provided in response to Revision 1 of IE Bulletin 79-17 and supplements our original response of August 24, 1979 to Bulletin 79-17 I.
Per item 1 of the revised Bulletin, the following is a complete list of systems that have the highest degree of likelihood of containing stagnant oxygenated bora;ed water.
(1)
Nuclear Class I Systems A.
Safety Injection System
' Safety injection piping between the isolation valves (System designated CC-4 in FSAR Fig. No. 6-1).
B.
_ Shutdown Coolin>, System Shutdown cooling piping between the isolation valves (System designated CC-lh in FSAR Fig. No. 6-1).
(ii) Nuclear Class II Systems A.
Safety Injection System 1.
Redundant High Pressure Safety Injection Line.
(Line designated CC-6 in FSAR Fig. 6-1).
2.
Safety Injection Line Upstream of second isolation valve from the Reactor Coolant Icop.
(Line designated CC-13 in FSAR Fig. 6-1. )
1665 234 80010%0 \\DD A
Mr. B. H. Grier November 27, 1979 3
High Pressure Safety Injection Line (upstream of flow control station) to Reactor Coolant Loop.
(Line designated DC-1 in FSAR Fig. 6-1.)
h.
Iov Pressure Safety Injection pump discharge (upstream of flow control station) to Reactor Coolant Loop.
(Line designated GC-1 in FSAR Fig. 6-1.)
5 Containment Spray Pump discharge.
(Line designated GC-2 in FSAR Fig. 6-1.)
6.
High Pressure Safety Injection pu=p suction from shutdown Heat Exchanger discharge.
(Line designated GC-3 in FSAR Fig. 6-1.)
7 Reactor Coolant to Lov Pressure Safety Injection Pump suction, Shutdown Cooling.
(Line designated GC-5 in FSAR Fig. 6-1.)
8.
Safety Injection Tank to check valve on tank outlet.
(Line designated GC-9 in FSAR Fig. 6-1.)
9 Engineered Safeguard Pump Suction Piping.
(Line designated HC-3 in FSAR Fig. 6-1.)
10.
Safety Injection Recirculation to Refueling Water Tank.
(Line designated DC-2 in FSAR Fig. 6-1.)
B.
Chemical and Volume Control System 1.
Boric Acid gravity feed line to charging pump suction header.
(Line designated HC-6 and HC-40 in FSAR Fig.
9-3.)
2.
Emergency Boric Acid feed line between MOV 51h and the boric acid feed from the pumps.
(Line desic ated HC-7 in FSAR Fig. 9-3.)
Response to item 1(a) (b) (c) and (d) of the revised Bulletin, was addressed in our letter dated August 24, 1979 II.
A representative number of circumferential velds in stagnant borated water systems of Calvert Cliffs unit no.1 vere ultrasonically inspected during February 1977 and April 1979 refueling outages to comply with the IE Circular 76-06 and the original Bulletin 79-17 We evaluated the velds already examined in light of the sampling criteria established in the revised Bulletin and noted that approximately hirteen percent of total number of welds in stagnant borated water systems identified above, which were examined met the intents of the B111etin. The results of examination on unit no.1 are satisfactory with 20 reportable indication as stated in our letter dated August 2h, 1979 1665 235
s Mr. B. H. Grier November 27, 1979 The examination required per item 2(b) of the revised Bulletin has been completed in Calvert Cliffs unit no. 2 as of November 20, 1979 Approximately twelve percent of total number of circumferential velds, in stagnant borated water systems, selected on the basis of the criteria established in the Bulletin, vere ultrasonically examined. The results of examination are satisfactory with no reportable indication.
III. Item (3) is not applicable.
IV.
Item (h) is not applicable.
In conclusion, we still concur with the finding stated in our August 24, 1979 letter that there is no evidence, based on examination results, of intergranular stress corrosion type cracking in our stainless steel piping velds in the above systems.
Very truly'yours,
%j,/cc. 2 /b w ocv l
\\
/
cc: Office of Inspection and Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Co= mission Washington, D. C.
20555 Attn: Director, Division of Operating Reactors Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Cc= mission Washington, D. C.
20555 Attn:
Mr. R. W. Reid, Chief, Branch #h J. A. Biddison, Esquire G. F. Trowbridge, Esquire Mr. E. L. Conner, Jr - NRC
)665 236 Mr. J. W. Brothers - Bechtel
.