ML19256F417
| ML19256F417 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07000754 |
| Issue date: | 12/13/1979 |
| From: | Mulkin R, Rose D LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY |
| To: | Rouse L NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| References | |
| WX-8-2616, NUDOCS 7912190113 | |
| Download: ML19256F417 (78) | |
Text
y-h.
- "%chy Universityof California LOS ALAMOS SCIENTIFIC LABORATORY Post Office Box 1663 Los Alamos.New Mexico 87545 in repiy refer to:
WX-8-2616 December 13, 1978 uad stop:
928 Mr. L. C. Rouse, Acting Branch Chief Fuel Reprocessing and Recycle Branch Division of Fuel Cycle and Material Safety US Nuclear Regulatory Comission Washington, DC 20555
Dear Mr. Rouse:
The enclosed notes reflect the analyses of a range of postulated accident scenarios developed for the General Electric (GE) Vallecitos Nuclear Center (VNC) by the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory (LASL) staff. Our assumptions, philosophy, and logic are discussed and explained.
These notes will provide the back-up for the preparation of those portions of Chapter 7 of the GE Safety Evaluation Report for which LASL was responsible.
(E a. ! - f._
Donald G. Rose Ray M ikin DGR/RM:kmt Enc: As cited above Cys:
J. B. Martin, Acting Branch Chief, Fuel Cycle, NMSS, NRC w/ enc W. Burkhardt, Fuel Cycle, NMSS, NRC, w/ enc R. N. Thorr./7. J. Hirons, ADW, MS 100, w/o enc A. D. McGuire, SP0, MS 120, w/o enc M. L. Brooks /L. W. Hantel, WX-DO, MS 686, w/ enc R. F. Taschek, ADR, MS 102, w/o enc W. G. Davey, Q-DO, MS 561, w/o enc W. A. Bradley, WX-8, MS 928, w/eac H. A. Lindberg, WX-8, MS 928, w/ enc A. M. Valentine, H-1, MS 401, w/ enc W. J. Maraman, CMB-ll, MS 505, w/ enc 150-5 (2), MS 150, w/ enc jgjg }J}
File 7912190
..,~,.a-,,-,-.,
m /l.3
,y
.a GENERAL ELECTRIC VALLECITOS NUCLEAR CENTER ACCIDENT SCENARIO NOTES In these notes we address a range of postulated accident scenarios. At one end of the spectrum are very realistic accidents that probably will occur during the life time of the plant. These accidents are analyzed assuming that administrative procedures are followed and all or most of the engineered safety features such as fire suppression, filtration, and filter protection operate as designed. No doubt the estimated releases from these postulated accidents will prove to be trivial. At the other end of the spectrum are accidents that we de not expect to occur.
But based on the energy sources in the facility, the dispersible plutonium (Pu)* avai'able, and the effectiveness of barriers separating them, they could occur. The emphasis at this end of the spectrum is on the effectiveness of engineered safety features and on how rrc.ch we depend on the proper operation of these safety systems. The analyses of these accidents indicate how well the lines of defense for that facility would act to mitigate the consequences of a serious accident should it cccur.
The first line of defense and control consists of administrative controls, gloveboxes, and remote operations. We show that even if the first line of control fails, there is a second line of defense, or maybe a third or fourth, that are effective in mitigating the consequences of an accident so that the releases are still within acceptable limits.
In part, the analyses herein must consider the reliability of other lines of control.
38 239
- Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) Pu is 0.05%
Pu, 86.6%
Pu, 11.8% 240 241 242 This will be the reference Pu Pu, 1.3%
Pu, 3.25%
Pu.
mix in this paper.
_1 1619 276
,q.,
GE limits the presence of flamable materials in the operating areas of the laboratories by standard procedures.
However, the flammable loading can-not be reduced below a certain minimum, which seems to be between 10 000 and 50 000 BTU /ft2* for facilities similar to VilC.2 We cannot estimate exact-ly the flammable loading that will exist at the time of an accident. For our 2
scenarios we have assumed that fire loading is the minimum, 10 000 BTU /ft.
To do an accident analysis of a fire or explosion with any accuracy, one needs to know the exact amount of Pu present and available for suspension at the location of the accident, the exact particle size of the Pu suspended, how much of the Pu suspended by the accident will get to the final filters, how much will get through the final filters, and whether the Pu is soluble or insoluble in alveolar fluid after going through the fire or explosion. We cannot know all this. The amount of Pu present and available for suspension in the laboratories varies widely with time. The amount of material dis-persed by a fire has been studied by Mishima in this country and by 4
5 Stewart abroad. Selby surmarized the results of these studies and has suggested appropriate initial concentrations of suspended Pu for use in accident analyses. He considers that a reasonable maximum air loading of 3
particles 10 m and smaller would be 100 mg of Pu per cubic meter (mg/m ),
In the case of a 1-h fire and assuming natural convection as the dispersal mechanism, the fractions of plutonium present and made airborne are 0.0005 for Pu0 and 0.002 for Pu(fiO )4 For forced airflow less than 2
3 50 cm/s the fraction made airborne is 0.005.
In our scer.arios we have t
Terminology related to fire loading suct as pounds of combustibles, BTU /lb, and temperatures in 0F will not be converted to metric units in these notes.
}bl9 assumed that the amount of Pu present is the amount reported by GE as b.
in the gloveboxes during routine operations.7 Not all the Pu present in the gloveboxes will be available to be suspended; some will be stored in steel cans or otherwise contained. For our analyses, we have assumed that most of the Pu is available during an accident. However, a broad license such as will be in force at the GE plant will allow all the Pu in a glovebox to be out and available.
If this should be the case when an accident occurs, the consequences could be greater than those we have estimated.
Similarly, an accurate computation of the amount of Pu that would be sus-pended and that arrives to challenge the first stage of High Efficiency Par-ticulate Air (HEPA) filtration depends upon many inestimable factors. We did not spent time on long computations of these transport percentages; wa looked at the general probMm and decided to use a constant 75% for large volumes such as rooms and 100% for small volumes such as gloveboxes. A short description of our reasoning is presented in App. B.
Dose commitments from Pu are dependent upon whether the Pu that enters the body is in a soluble or insoluble form.
Some experiments show that Pu0, usually considered insoluble, may in some cases be soluble in 2
alveolar fluid. At the same time there are reasons to believe that soluble forms of Pu, such as Pu(NO )4, may be change.i to insoluble forms upon 3
evaporation of solutions or heating of nitrate crystals.
Thus we have reached no conclusion about the real solubility of a Pi, compound involved in an accident. We have assumed that in an accident Pu as Pu0 remains 2
insoluble and Pu as Pu(NO )4 remains soluble. We have :onservatively 3
assumed that the Pu involved in the postulated accidenti at VNC is soluble Pu(NO )4 The effects of solubility on calculated dose :ommitment as 3
well as the method used to calculate doses her~eiit are discussed in App. C.
} () } 9 2 We traced through a series of event trees to determine where there is the potential for an accident to occur in the Gmneral Electric (GE) Vallecitos Nuclear Center (VNC) facilities.
A description of this procedure app 1 fed to gloveboxes for Pu operations is presented in HE0L-TME-76-98.1The proce-dure provides a methodical review of plant operations and results in a large number of scenarios. These are grouped, and an analysis of the worst case in each group is presented. Hundreds of possibilities were checked; most were discarded. Those analyzed here ceter the gamut from those probable accidents of minor consequence to the more improbable aufdents of major consequence.
In accordance with the guidance from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff, we tried to make realistic estimates of the consequences from the scenarios. We attempted to estimate a consequence that is somewhere within the range of possible consequences. We especially tried not to pile conservative estimate upon conservative estimate until the consequence arrived at had little or no connection with reality.
Because we cannot define exactly what takes place during an accident, our estimates are not intended to be precise. Furthermore, we cannot assess how imprecise they may be.
Instead we have tried to qualitatively estimate how much conservatism is built into a given scenario.
The only types of accidents that have the capability of causing a serious release to the atmosphere from a plant are criticality, fire, and explosion.
The criticality accident was treated and documented in a previous letter, so these notes address only fire and explosion.
Fire and explosions can cause the release of Pu to the atmosphere only in locations where flammable material, Pu in suspendable and respirable form, and a source of ignition exist. For the purpose of accident analysis, we assume that ignition sources do exist, and we study those scenarios that can occur where flammable material and Fu are present.
~*~
1619 279
2 The presence or absence of a stage of HEPA filtration can make a differ-ence of as much as a factor of 2000 in the estimated amount of Pu that can be released from the plant from a postulated accident.
There is no requirement that the HEPA filters at the gloveboxes be tested; there is a requirement that both stages of final HEPA filtration be shown to be 99.95% effectual by 00P testing. We have assumed that under accident con-ditions the glovebox and intermediate HEPA filters have a transmission factor of 0.05, and the final filters have a f actor of 0.0005.
Where we believe that there is a chance that the HEPA filters might plug, we will show that the release from the room in which a fire has occurred will be the same as the release with ineffective HEPA filtration.
However, a par-tion of the release will go to other parts of the plant rather than entirely to ti,e outside.
Descriptions of the ventilation systems are given in App. D.
0 Experience has shown that sprinkler systems have a failure rate of 1-10%; consequently, it is credible, in the f;RC definition of the word, that a fire could start and that the sprinkler system would not operate.
In the unlikely event of sprinkler failure during an off-shift time coupled with a
" normal" amount of Pu available in the gloveboxes, a relatively large amount of Pu could be made airborne. The rationale for selecting a 1-h fire is shown by the sequence of events described below.
Time Event t=0 Fire starts.
t = 5 min Alarm sounds on guard station.
t = 10 min Guard locates fire and attempts to extinguish it unsuccessfully.
t = 15 min Guard calls GE fire official.
t = 25 min GE official and two fire brigade persons arrive.
t = 30 min Brigade attempts unsuccessfully to extinguish with CO -
2 t = 35 min Brigade goes for the site fire truck.
t = 45 min Fire truck arrives at Building 102.
t = 55 min Brigade begins applying water to fire.
t = 60 min Fire is extinguished with water.
1619 280
~5-
Up to this point we have described the basis for the assumptions we will make about fires in the scenarios to follow.
Certain assumptions are also needed to carry out the explosion scenarios. The basic assumption that will be made is that a given explosion fills the space around it with more Pu than the air can hold. This results in a saturated air loading. Following the 5
3 approach of Selby, this maximum air loading is taken to be 100 mg/m,
The possible explosions such as a resin column, a peroxide reaction, or a solvent explosion generally release enough energy to disperse several tens of grams of Pu and destroy the glovebox, but f ail to damage building walls or confinement barriers.9,10 1619 28I t
I
b a
o Case A.1 Small Fire in Room of Advanced Fuels Laboratory ( AFL) lle postulate that a fire starts in accumulated trash such as wipes, gloves, and cartons that are in the room operating area awaiting disposal.
This material has been in contact with Pu in the gloveboxes and is contaminated at a level of 0.1 g Pu per kg material, which corresponds to nonrecoverable waste. The fire is detected and extinguished before the automatic sprinklers activate.
Because the fire is extinguished quickly, we estima?2 that about i kg of combustible material (trash) will burn before the fire is put out.
The Pu-dispersing force in this case will be the fire-caused natural convection through the burning material.
A.l.1 Basic Assumptions 1 kg of contaminated material burns before the fire is extinguished.
The contamination level is 0.1 g Pu per kg of material.
All the Pu involved is in a soluble fonn, such as Pu(NO )4' 3
The fraction of Pu involved and made airborne is 0.002.
The efficiency of HEPA filters is taken to be 955 for untested stages (local filters) and 99.955 for DOP tested stages.
The fraction of material made airborne that challenges the first filter is 0.75.
A.l.2 Release Calculation 0.l t""
= 0.1 9 Pu involved = 1 kg of material x kg of aterial
-4 Amount made airborne = 0.1 g x 0.002 = 2 x 10 9 Challenge to room filter = 0.75 x 2 x 10 9 = 1.5 x 10-49
-4
-4
-6 Challenge to final filter = 0.05 x 1.5 x 10 g = 7. 5 x 10 g
-6 Release to environment = 0.0005 x 7.5 x 10 9 = 3.8 x 10-g 1619 282 A.1.3 Mitigating Circumstances and Factors of Conservatism In this case full credit is given for engineered safety features. This includes an intemediate HEPA filter in the room, a final HEPA filter in Building 102A, a fire detection system, and the availability of fire extinguishers.
This case is realistic with no known factors of conservatism.
A.l.4 Failure of Encineered Safety Features The postulated fire is too small to be expected to compromise the engineered safety features.
Case A.2 Small Fire in Room of AFL - Sprinklers Activate We postulate the same initial conuitions as in Case A.1 above and extend the scenario as follows.
The fire continues to burn until the sprinklers activate and put it out. He assume that 20 kg of material will burn before the sprinkler turns cn, and another 10 kg will burn as the fire is being doused.
In this case, full credit is given for the intemediate HEPA filter in the room because it is afforded some protection by the sprinkler system.
A.2.1 Basic Assumptions 30 kg of contaminated combustible material is available to be burned.
Same as Case A.1 A.2.2 Release Calculation 0.1 g f pit.tonium = 3 g Pu involved = 30 kg of material x kg of material Amount made airborne = 3 g x 0.002 = 6 x 10-3g Challenge to room filter = 0.75 x 6 x 10-39 =.4.5 x 10-3g Challenge to final filter = 0.05 x 4.5 x 10-39 = 2.3 x 10-49 Release to Environment = 0.0005 x 2.3 x 10-4g = 1.1 x 10-7g 1619 283
A.2.3 Mitigating Circumstances and Factors of Conservatism In this case full credit has been given for engineered safety featuras including the room intermediate HEPA filter, the final HEPA filter, and the automatic sprinkler system.
The accumulation of 30 kg of contaminated combustible material in the room, left unatt nded, is not likely, but it is possible. An example might be the cleanup of a spill of nitrate feed to the conversion-coprecipitation-calcining (COPRECAL) line that would generate contaminated clothing, shoe covers, combustible wipes, and brown paper collected in plastic bags. A subsequent event would cause the personnel working on this clean-up operation to be called away. Based on a review of incidents reported at VNC and our experience with similar facilities, we would expect such a clean-up operation to occur ence every one to ten years.
A.2.4 Failure of Engineered Safety Features The sprinkler system is assumed to function properly.
The local HEPA filter received full credit, though it may be subjected to attack by hot gases (combustion products) for a brief time.
The temperature of the gases can be approximated as follows. The heat added to the exhaust air produces a temperature rise, aT, given by heat release (BTU)
T=
3 3
F) exhaust flow (ft / min) pCp(BTU /ft 5
6.5 x 10 BTU /10 trin
= 290 F
=
3 3 -g 1.16 x 104 o
ft / min x 0.0193 BTU /ft If the room temperature is assumed to be 70 F, then the temperature would te 360 F.
From this value, little can be determined about
-9 1619 284
the probable survival of the filter. The temperature spike may be higher than this calculated temperature, but it will persist for only a short time.
Because of this indeterminacy, failure of this filter is postulated in the next case.
The final filters will be subjected to much lower temperatures.
This is due to the dilution of the AFL airflow in 3
the total airflow. Because the total flow is 64 000 ft / min 3
compared to 11600 ft / min for the AFL, the temperature rise will be reduced by a factor of 5-1/2. The temperature rise in this case is 50 F.
Thus, the final filters should be in no danger from the heat of the fire.
Case A.3 Small Fire in Room of AFL - Room Filters Burn All considerations for this case are the same as for Case A.2 above except that we show the effect of assuming that the room filters burn and fail altogether.
Release Calculation Pu involved = 3 g Amount made airborne = 3 g x 0.002 = 6 x 10-3g Challenge to final filter = 0.75 x 6 x 10-3g = 4.5 x 10-3g Release to environment = 0.0005 x 4.5 x 10-39 = 2.2 x 10-6g Case A.4 Fire in Room cf AFL - Sprinklers Fail This case is the same as Cases A.1, A.2, and A.3 except that we recognize the possibility that the sprinkler system could fail to operate.
This is an unlikely event but not impossible. We assume that if the sprinkler system fails, the fire will burn for 1 h.
Unless we assume that the gloveboxes themselves become involved, the Pu released will be limited by the contaminated combustibles present. 1619 285
Probably this loading would go no higher than 500 kg. Because of sprinkler failure, the intermediate (room) filter would be in danger of burning. We have assumed that it does.
A.4.1 Basic Assumotions 500 kg of contaminated material burns before the fire is extinguished.
The contamination level is 0.1 g Pu per kg of material.
All the pu involved is in a soluble form such as Pu(t10 )4' 3
The fraction of the pu involved and made airborne is 0.002.
The efficiency of the final HEPA filter is taken to be 99.95'4.
The fraction of the material made airborne that challenges the filter is 0.75.
The room filter burns and passes everything that challenges it.
The fire burns for 1 h.
All heat generated by the fire goes into heating the exhaust air.
A.4.2 Release Calculation Pu involved = 500 kg material x a!eral 9
x Amount made airborne = 0.002 x 50 g = 0.1 g Challenge to final filter = 0.75 x 0.1 g = 0.075 g Release to environment = 0.0005 x 0.075 g = 3.8 x 10-5 g
A.4.3 Mitigatina Circumstances and Factors of Conservatism The postulated 1-h room fire in AFL is an unlikely event for several reasons.
First, the recor.1 for sprinkler systems such as the one installed here is quite good, the failure rate being of the order of 1 in 100. Second, there are fire detectors in the laboratories and a fire truck onsite to deal with such emergencies.
Third, it is not likely that as much as 50 g of Pu would be outside 1619 286
-n-
the gloveboxes and involved with combustible material.
- Finally, there is a good chance that the intermediate (room) filter would plug with soot and operate with reduced flow rather than burning.
A.4.4 Failure of Engineered Safety Features Ue have postulated failure of the sprinkler system, a 1-in-100 chance.
Failure of the intermediate (room) filter can be assumed because it will be subjected to temperatures of about 1000 F during the fire.
We do not assume failure of the final HEPA filter because dilution will keep the temperature low and because water spray cooling of the exhaust air is provided.
The temperature at the final filter can be approximated as follows.
The heat added to the room air produced an exhaust temperature increase, AT, given by 1.1 x 10 BTU /60 min AT _
= 150 F 4
3 3
6.4 x 10 ft / min x 0.0193 BTU /ft _op Taking room temperature to be 70 F and ignoring heat losses in transit from AFL to Building 102A, the average temperature at the filters would be 220 F.
This is well below the temperature rating of the filter (750 F).
Case A.5 Fire in Room of AFL - Sprinklers Fail, Filter Plugs This is an extension of Case A.4.
Because of the remarkable efficiency of HEPA filters, a " dirty" fire that produces heavy smoke and soot may well cause reduced flow through the filter as a result of plugging.
Two effects must then be considered.
First, the exhaust flow through the HEPA filter is restricted, reducing releases ay that route.
- Second, 1619 287
_i2_
the volumetr% (/pansion of the room air coupled with the restricted exhaust flow can tsult in " blow back" or releases back through the outside air intake.
In this case we estimate the releases based on the assumption that plugging reduces the flow to 10% of the normal in 15 min.
Further details are discussed in Sec. A.5.4.
A.5.1 Basic Assumotions Same as for Case A.4 except that the intermediate filter plugs instead of burning,and the heat from the fire goes into heating the room as well as the exhaust air.
The intermediate (room) filter passes full flow for 15 min of the 1-h fire, then passes reduced flow (10%) for the remaining 45 min.
The volumetric expansion of the room air will result in a net volume three times the original volume.
The efficiency of the inlet filters will be 90%.
A.5.2 Release Calculation 0.1 y Pu Pu involved = 500 kg material x kg material = 50 g Amount made airborne = 0.002 x 50 g = 0.1 g Challenge to final filter = 0.75 x 0.05 x 1/4 x 0.1 g = 9.4 x 10-4 g
Challenge to inlet filter = 0.75 x 1/4 x 3/4 x 0.1 g = 1.4 x 10-2 g
Release to environment = (0.0005 x 9.4 x 10-4) + (0.1 x 1.4 x 10-2)
= 1.4 x 10-3g A.S.3 fliticatina Circumstances and Factors of Conservatism There are no factors of conservatism in addition to those discussed for Case A.4.
The room filter will more likely 1619 288 plug than burn out.
In the case of plugging, the scenario above is about as realistic as we can make it.
Because the intermediate (room) filter is located near the ceiling of the AFL, the filter might first plug, then burn. The releases then would be somewhere between Case A.4 and A.S.
A.S.4 Failure of Enoineered Safety Features Plugging a filter diminishes the effectiveness of the ventilation system for confining radioactive materials.
The exhaust flow is reduced at the same time that expanding gas is being produced in the ventilated space.
In AFL, the nomal ventilation rate should produce 20 air changes per hour.
This is adequate to exhaust any gas produced by the fire and maintain the proper direction of air flow.
For reduced exhaust flow, the volume is too great and a portion of the flow will go back through the inlet.
lle have assumed that the average temperature that the air in the room will reach is 1100 F.
This would produce a volumetric 3
460 + 1100 F expansion of V = 35 000 ft x 460 + 68 F 3
3
= 35 000 ft x 2.95 = 103 000 ft,
3 3
The excess volume will be 68 400 ft.
Of this, 52 200 ft will be 3
removed by the exhaust even with reduced flow, leaving 16 200 ft to be forcad out the inlet. Therefore, the fraction forced out the inlet is 1/4.
The ai r -. -
tieners have inlet filters. !!e have taken the efficiency of these filters to be 90i;.
Case A.6 Fire in a Glovebox in AFL Small fires can occur in gloveboxes without posing a serious threat to either the operator or the public.
Such fires are quickly extinguished 1619 289 by the operator with little consequence other than the mess to be cleaned up.
This scenario shows the results of such a fire using the same basic assumptions as were used in Case A.l.
The con tamination level of materials in the glovebox is taken to be 10 times higher than that in the room.
A.6.1 Basic Assumptions 1 kg of contaminated material burns before the fire is put out.
The contamination level is 1 g of Pu per kg of material.
All the plutonium involved is in the soluble fonn.
The fraction of plutonium involved and made airborne is 0.002.
The efficiency of HEPA filters is taken to be 955 for untested stages (local filters) and 99.955 for DOP tested stages.
All of the material made airborne challenges the local filter.
A.6.2 '.elease Calculation g Pu
- 1 9 Pu involved = 1 kg material x g
eml Amount made airborne = 1 g x 0.002 = 0.002 g Challenge to room filter = 0.05 x 0.002 = lx10-4 g
Challenge to final filter = 0.05 x 1 x 10-4 = 5x10-6 Release to environment = 0.0005 x 5 x 10-6 = 2.5 x 10-9g A.6.3 Mitiaating C"rcumstances and Factors of Conservatism In this case full credit has been given for engineered safety features including the glovebox HEPA filter, the intennediate (room) HEPA filter, the final HEPA filter, the ventilation system, and the fire detection and alarm system. This is a realistic scenario with no intentional factors of conservatism. 1619 290
A.6.4 Failure of Engineered Safety Features All engineered safety features have been assumed to function as designed in this scenario.
Case A.7 Fire in Glovebox in AFL If the fire postulated in Case A.1 were not discovered and extinguished quickly, it could burn until the water sprinkler system activated.
In this time period, we estimate that 20 kg of material could burn.
Another 10 kg could burn as the fire is being put out. Such a fire would burn out the gicvebox HEPA filter but probably not the intermediate (room)
HEPA filter.
The fire would burn through the gloves and plastic windows allowing the sprinkler water to cool the glovebox and douse the fire, but we have assumed no other room involvement.
A.7.1 Basic Assumptions Same as Case A.6 above except that 30 kg of material burns.
The automatic sprinkler system extinguishes the fire.
A.7.2 Release Calculation Pu involved = 30 kg material x 30 g kg ate ial Amount made airborne = 0.002 x 30 g = 0.05 g Challenge to room filter = 0.06 g Challenge to final filter = 0.05 x 0.06 g = 3x10-3 g
Release to environment = 0.0005 x 3 x 10-3 = 1.5x10-6 A.7.3 Mitiaatina Circumstances and Factors of Conservatism Thirty kg (65 lbs) of plutonium contaminated material will not likely accumulate in a glovebox. however, this could happen as a result of a cleanup operation in the glovebox and a breakdown of administrative controls.
1619 29I A.7.4 Failure of Engineered Safety Features For this case only a failure of the glovebox HEPA filter has been postulated.
The intermediate (room) filter would probably survive the elevated temperature produced by the short-duration fire as discussed in Case A.2.
Case A.8 Fire in Glovebox in AFL Recognizing that there is a great deal more Pu in the gloveboxes than is accounted for by the 30 g involved in the fire postulated in Case A.7, we extend the scenario to involve the entire 30 kg that could be in the COPRECAL and waste recovery gloveboxes.
All of the descriptive scenario is the same, but the quantity of material involved has increased by a factor of 1000.
In this case we recognize the fact that the experimental data relating Pu involved to amount made airborne pertain to a 1-h fire.
In previous scenarios we have taken the full fraction of the amount of plutonium involved because we assumed that the Pu was intimately mixed with the combustible material that burned completely.
This time we take only the fraction that would be made airborne in a 5-min fire.
A. 8.1 Basic Assumptions Same as Case A.7 above except that 30 kg of plutonium is involved in the fire.
A_. 8. 2 Release Calculation Pu involved = 30 kg Amount made airborne = 0.005 x 1/12 x 30 kg = 12.5 g Challenge to room filter = 12.5 g Challenge to final filter = 0.05 x 12.5 = 0.625 g Release to environment = 0.0005 x 0.625 = 3.1 x 10-4 g
16 9 292
-17
A.8.3 Miticating Circumstances and Factors of Conservatism This scenario is extremely conservative because of the amount of Pu assumed to be involved in the fire.
This amount is probably high by three orders of magnitude.
A.8.4 Failure of Enoineered Safety Features The same comments apply here as were given in Case A.7 above.
Case A.9 Fire in Glovebox in AFL - Sprinkler System Fails The previous scenario leads to the highest releases we could postulate without assuming failure of the sprinkler system.
In this case we assume that the sprinkler system does fail for some reason such as a closed valve and that a 1-h fire results. As before we assume that the fire occurs in the area of COPRECAL glovebox.
Components of the gloveboxes such as gloves and plastic windows would be involved and burn, as would the contents of the gloveboxes.
An external source of combustible material would also be necessary to keep all of the Pu in the glovebox involved in the fire for a period of 1 h.
Such an external source could be accumulated trash, or wood, plastic, or oil brought in for some special purpose.
The amount of Pu involved in the fire is assumed to be 30 kg.
A.9.1 Release Calculation Pu involved = 30 kg Amount made airborne = 0.005 x 30 kg = 150 g Challenge to final filter = 0.75 x 150 g = 112 g Release to environment = 0.0005 x 112 g = 0.056 g lbl9 2h3 A.9.2 Mitigating Circumstances and Factors of Conservatism This is an extreme scenario because of the combination of circumstances that must exist for the releases to be so great.
The sprinkler system must be inoperable at a time when no operators are in the building, a fire must start in an unusually large amount of combustible material, and 30 kg of Pu must be in contact with the burning material.
The chances of the sprinkler system failing are about one in a hundred.
The Pu is generally in steel containers or process equipment and not in contact with combustible materials.
As a result, the actual Pu available for dispersal by the fire is probably a factor of 100 to 1000 times lower than the 30 kg postulated. We assume that both the glovebox HEPA filters and the room intermediate filters burn out.
A.9.3 Failure of Engineered Safety Features All HEPA filters except the final have been assumed to fail completely.
The sprinkler system was assumed to fail.
The emergency fire brigade has been assumed to be ineffective. The only system that has been assumed to work is the final HEPA fil tration.
There is no reason to postulate failure of the final HEPA filter as a result of the fire, and to postulate an unrelated failure would be unreasonable.
The average temperature to which the final HEPA filter might be subjected can be approximated as follows.
The floor area in the room of AFL containing the nitrate,-conversion glovebox is about 1619 294
2 2
2000 ft. A combustible loading of 10 000 BTU /ft can be postulated as a reasonable combustible loading.
If this entire area burned in the course of a 1-h fire, the total heat released would 7
be 2 x 10 BTU.
If all of the heat releases went into heating the exhausting air the temperature rise, aT, would be 7
2 x 10 BTU /60 min
= 270 F ft / minx 0.0193 3TU/f t3, og
- 6.4x104 3
Assuming the air started out at 70 F, the temperature could rise to 340 F.
Heat losses in the ducting over to the filter building (102A) and protection by a water spray cooling system assure that the actual temperature at the filter will not exceed the filter rating (750 F).
Case A.10 Explosion in a Glovebox in AFL Without being specific about the details, we have assumed that an explosion occurs in either the nitrate conversion glovebox or the scrap recovery glovebox.
The chemical reactions that take place in these boxes are well controlled and generally present little hazard.
However, the possibility of an energetic chemical reaction involving a Pu solution exists.
3 In this case we assume that the entire room volume (s300m )
where these boxes are located is loaded to the maximun extent 3
physically possible.
Because this limit is 100 mg/m, the total 4
airborne plutonium amounts to 3x10 mg or 30 g.
Because these boxes are located near the ventilation duct carrying exhaust air from the AFL, we also assune that this duct is breached, allowing unfiltered air to enter the ventilation system. The operations in 1619 295 the AFL do not involve chemicals, the reactions of which would release sufficient energy to breach the concrete walls.
A.10.1 Basic Assumptions An explosion occurs that is energetic enough to completely fill the room with plutonium aerosol.
The limitation on air loading by Pu aerosol in the 3
respirable range is 100 mg/m,
All local and room HEPA filters are compromised by the explosion.
Release Calculation Pu involved = up to 30 kg Amount made airborne = 30 g Challenge to final filter = 0.75 x 30 g = 22.5 g
-2 Release to environment = 0.0005 x 22.5 g = 1.1 x 10 A.10.2 flitigating Circumstances and Factors of Conservatism The entire room will not likely be filled to a maximum loading.
Probably a loading equivalent to 103 of that postulated would be more reasonable.
Further, the damage of the ventilation duct or the intermediate (room) HEPA filter is not likely. These considerations alone would reduce the estimated releases by a factor of 200.
A.10.3 Failure of Engineered Safety Features Other than failure of the intermediate (room) HEPA filter, all engineered safety features have been assumed to function properly.
Case A.ll itechanical Disruption Explosions are not the only way Pu could be made airborne.
For example, a compressed gas bottle could rupture in such a way i619 296 that the escaping gas disperses Pu, or a piece of equipment such as a blender could fly apart, dispersing its contents. However, the air loading limits mentioned in Case A.10 would still hold and the releases would be no greater than those given in Case A.10.
Case B.1 Fire in Room of Plutonium Analytical Laboratory (PAL)
Small fires in the PAL would have the same consequence as those in the AFL because local filtration, sprinkler system, and connection to the Building 102A final HEPA filters are the same.
The only real difference is in the amount of Pu at risk, and that is 100 times less in the PAL than in the AFL.
B.1.1 Basic Assumptions 30 kg of contaminated combustible material is available to be burned.
The contamination level is 0.1 g Pu per kg of material.
All the Pu involved is in soluble form, such as Pu(NO )4*
3 The fraction of Pu involved and made airborne is 0.002.
The fraction of the Pu made airborne that enters the ventilation system is 0.75.
The efficiency of HEPA filters is taken to be 95% for untested stages (local and room filters) and 99.95.5 for 00P tested stages (final filters).
The sprinkler system extinguishes the fire.
All local and room HEPA filters are compromised by the fire.
. 1619 297
B.1.2 Release Calculation 0.1 q Pu Pu involved = 30 kg material x kg material = 3 g Amount made airborne = 0.002 x 3 g = 0.006 g Challenge to final filter = 0.75 x 0.006 g = 4.5 x 10-3 g
Release to environment = 0.0005 x 4.5 x 10-3 g = 2.2 x 10-6 g B.l.3 Mitigating Circumstances and Factors of Conservatism The sprinkler system is installed so that it provides cooling for the ductwork and the intermediate (room) fil te r.
Therefore it is not too likely that the room HEPA filter will be compromised as was postulated.
B.1.4 Failure of Engineered Safety Features All local filters have been assumed to fail. The sprinkler system and the final filters are assumed to function properly.
The same arguments about the exhausting air temperatures seen by each filter apply in this case as were applicable for the AFL.
Case B.2 Fire in Room of PAL - Sprinklers Fail This extends the scenario in Case B.1 by assuming that the sprinkler fails and a 1-h fire results. All of the comments in Case A.9 mgarding the failure of the sprinkler system, the fire brigade, the room HEPA filter, and the final HEPA filter apply to the PAL as well.
The PAL is limited to a maximum of 300 g of Pu, and we would expect somewhat less than this to be available for dispersal by a fire.
We only calculate releases here because the discussion under Case A.9 applies here as well.
}b 9
293.
B.2.1 Release Calculation Pu involved = 300 g Amount made airborne = 0.002 x 300 g = 0.6 g Challenge to final filter = 0.75 x 0.6 g = 0.45 g Release to environment = 0.0005 x 0.45 g = 2.2 x 10-4 g Case B.3 Explosion in PAL Various chemical reagents and solvents are used and stored in the PAL. Several of these could be involved in an explosive energy release.
In this case we postulate that acetone in use for cleaning a glovebox is ignited by a nearby piece of equipment and the explosion initiates several other smaller explosions.
In this way most of the 300 g permitted in PAL is involved in the explosion.
The amount of Pu suspended is limited by the maximum concentration that the room air can support.
The 3
room volume of the PAL is about 150 m. llith a maximum 3
concentration of 100 mg/m, this volume limits the total amount that can be suspended to 15 g.
The force of the explosion probably i:culd r.ot be great enough to damage the intemediate (room) HEPA filter.
B.3.i Basic Assumptions An explosion occurs that is energetic enough to completely fill the room with Pu aerosol.
The limitation on air loading by Pu aerosol in the 3
respirable range is 100 mg/m,
The explosion destroys all local (hood and glovebox) filters, but the intermediate (room) filter remains operable. 1619 299
B.3.2 Release Calculation Pu involved = up to 300 g Amount made airborne = 15 g Challenge to intermediate filter = 0.75 x 15 g = 11.3 g Challenge to final filter = 0.05 x 11.3 g = 0.56 g Release to environment = 0.0005 x 0.56 g = 2.8 x 10-4 B.3.3 Mitigating Circumstances and Factors of Conservatism The entire room would not likely be filled to the saturation limits for the air.
However, the room is relatively small and free of partitions, and the right sequence of explosions could fill a large fraction of the room.
The assumptions of local filter compromise and intermediate filter integrity are probably realistic.
B.3.4 Failure of Engineered Safety Features Only the failure of the local HEPA filters has been assumed.
We have estimated that the energy released from complete decomposition of a typical laboratory amount of acetone (150 ml) is equivalent to that released from 1 kg of Trit.
Such an energy release near the center of the room would not breach the building walls and probably would not damage the HEPA filter located near the ceiling at one end of the lab.
Case C.1 Design Basis Accident in the Radioactive Materials Laboratory (RML)
The RML is not very interesting in terms of accidental releases of Pu or other special nuclear material (SilM) because the quantitities of SNM are low relative to the AFL. A CO -protected 2
intermediate bank of HEPA filters that is physically separated (in 1619 300 the basement) from the ventilated spaces also adds an additional protective feature.
The Environmental Infonnation Report submitted by GE already addresses the release of fission products from a major fire involving the dissolver tank.
The assumptions made by GE are, in our opinion, quite conservative.
Therefore, we can reasonably borrow these numbers for this assessment.
C.1.1 Basic Assumptions A large fire results from solvent spill and burning of manipulator components.
The dissolver integrity is violated by the h c9.
133 The entire inventory of 6500 Ci of Xe and 3000 Ci of 131 I is released to the cell atmosphere.
No credit is taken for HEPA filtration.
The charcoal absorbers are 99.55 effective in removing iodine.
No credit is taken for plate-out or deposition of iodine in the cell or the exhaust ducting.
C.l.2 Release Calculation Material involved = 3000 Ci (131 ) and 6500 Ci (133Xe)
I Amount made airborne = 3000 Ci (131 ) and 6500 Ci (133Xe)
I Challenge to charcoal bed = 3000 Ci (131 ) and 6500 Ci (133Xe) 1 Release to the environment = 0.005 x 3000 Ci (131 ) and 6500 Ci (133Xe) 1
= 15 Ci (131 ) and 6500 Ci (133Xe)
I C.l.3 Mitigatina Circumstances and Factors of Conservatism Maximum dissolver inventories were used.
No credit was taken for several potential iodine removal mechanisms.
1619 301 C.1.4 Failure of Engineered Safety Features The engineered safety features have been assumed to function according to their design.
Case D.1 Fire in Lab of Building 103 - Sprinklers Fail Building 102 has only limited quantities of Pu or other special nuclear material (SNM). The Operations that use these materials consist of analytical chemistry, sample preparation, calibration, and test specimen fabrication.
GE estimates that no more than 10 g would be in the building at any one time.
Furthe rmore,
Building 103 is not in the SNM security area so that use of large quantities of SNM are not likely in the future.
The individual labs in Building 103 look very much like the PAL.
Combustible loadings and chemical and solvent loadings are quite high. Open flames and other initiating means are apparent.
But the material at risk is quite low (s10 g).
As with the AFL and the PAL, hoods and gloveboxes have local HEPA filters, individual labs have intermediate HEPA filters, and there is a stage of final HEPA filters for the total building exhaust.
Because the filtration is the same, there is no point in analyzing trash fires and fires that will be put out by the sprinkler system--
the results will be exactly the same.
The releases from a large fire would be somewhat less because there is less material at risk.
D.1.1 Basic Assumptions A large fire breaks aut when no one is in the building.
The sprinkler system fails.
The entire building inventory is in the lao that burns, and the Pu is in the soluble form.
1619 302
_y_
The fire destroys the local and intennediate (room)
HEPA filters.
The fire-caused natural convection is the dispersing force.
D.l.2 Release Calculation Pu involved = 10 g Amount made airborne = 0.002 x 10 g = 0.02 g Challenge to final filter = 0.75 x 0.02 g = 0.015 g Release to environment = 0.0005 x 0.015 = 7.5 x 10-0g D.l.3 Miticating Circumstances and Factors of Conservatism The amount of Pu postulated as being involved in burning combustible material is probably high, but it represents a
" worst case" as we understand the Pu inventories. We would expect the Pu actually involved to be 100 to 1000 times less.
The probability is low that the sprinkler system would fail.
We would not expect this situation to develop more than one percent of the time.
D.l.4 Failure of Engineered Safety Features The sprinkler system has been assumed to fail -- c low probability event.
All local filters have been assumed to fail because of the fi re.
If the sprinkler fails, we can reasonably postulate failure of these filters either by burning or by plugging. We have not postulated failure of the final HEPA filters. This will be discussed below.
From a given lab, the dilution ratio for exhausting air is 40:1 before the air reaches the main duct leading to the final HEPA filters.
Therefore, one would expect only a 190 F temperatu. e 1619 303 even for 2000 F air entering the system.
If one postulates a heat release rate of 200 000 BTU / min and considers that heat to be carried by the exhaust air, the temperature rise, AT, of the total exhaust is given by 200 000 BTU / min AT( F) =
= 250 F 3
41000 ft / min x 0.0193 BTU /ft
- F The temperature of air reaching the filters might reach 320 F.
However, the air must pass through several hundred feet of ducting before reaching the filters, and heat losses would lower this number somewhat (50-150 F). As a result of these semiquantitative arguments, we conclude that it is not likely that the final HEPA filters would be endangered by any realistic fire that could occur in Building 103.
Even if the final filter were to fail for some unspecified reason, the release would still be less (0.015 g) than that already calculated for a major fire in the AFL (0.056 g).
If the intermediate (room) HEPA filter should plug as a result of heavy smoke or soot, the room could pressurize forcing contamination to other parts of the building. The response of the ventilation system to a plugged filter is not easily analyzed in any detail.
But qualitatively we can see that there are only two feasible paths for the contamination to follow.
The first is out through the doors to the corridor and from there into adjacent labs.
Because all labs have intennediate (room) HEPA filters, this results in building internal contamination but no increase in the release to the envircnment over the case in which the filter did not 1619 304 plug but remained operable. The second path is back through the supply air ducting to adjacent labs.
The consequences would be the same.
Case D.2 Explosion in Building 103 We were unable to find any operation in which large quantities of Pu could be involved in an explosion in this facility. A fire as described above is the only thing that could involve a sizeable fraction of the building inventory.
Certainly the contents of the labs are such that small explosions could occur.
In this case we have assumed that 10% of what we think is the upper limit of the Pu that could be in the building is involved in an explosion.
Because the volumes of the labs are large, all Pu involved can be suspended.
D.2.1 Basic Assumptions Ten percent of the building inventory is involved in an explosion.
The explosion damages the local and room HEPA filters.
The Pu involved is all in the soluble form.
D.2.2 Release Calculation Pu involved = 0.1 x 10 g = 1 g Amount made airborne = 1 g Challenge to final filter = 0.75 x 1 g = 0.75 g Release to environment = 0.0005 x 0.75 g = 3.8 x 10-4 g
D.2.3 flitigating Circumstances and Factors of Conservatism This case is conservative in that an entire gram of plutonium is assumed to become airborne and the local filters are assumed to be destroyed.
!!ost operations in Building 103 use 1619 305
only milligram or microgram-quantities of plutonium.
Therefore an explosion in a given operation would involve much less than 1 gram. Although it is possible that a given explosion will occur near one of the room filters, chances are that it will not.
The remainder of the scenario is realistic.
D.2.4 Failure of Engineered Safety Features We have assumed proper operation of the ventilation system and the final HEPA filters.
Only the local and intermediate (room)
HEPA filters are assumed not to function.
Certainly there is enough energy available in several possible explosions to breach the ventilation ducting, but the chances of the explosion occurring in just the right place are small.
Case E.1 Building 400 High Bay Area Operations in Building 400 involve chemical processing of low enriched uranium.
Quantities are limited by the safe batch 235 size.
A nominal 1 kg of U would be involved in a " safe batch."
All exhaust air is passed through two stages of HEPA filters, one in the room itself, and a final stage outside the building on a separate concrete pad.
Because of certain similarities and certain differences between Building 400 and the AFL discussed above, we have compared hazards rather than review in detail as was done for the AFL.
The ventilation systems are very similar.
Each has a HEPA filter provided for the room exhaust, and each 'ias a stage of final HEPA filters for the whole building.
In termi of weight, the amount 1619 306
235 of U in Building 400 is about 10 times less than the amount of 235 239Pu in the AFL.
Because the specific activity of 0 is 1000 times 239 less than that of Pu and the dose commitment per curie intake is 235 somewhat less for 0, we have concluded that Building 400 is not a significant hazard in comparison to the AFL.
1619 207 APPENDIX A Excerpts From Group CMB-11
" Final Safety Analysis Report for the Plutonium Handling Facility, TA-55" May, 1978 1619 j08
^-
VI.
ACCIDEhT ANALYSES 6.1 Introduction.
A thorough safety analyses of the facility is g ven in the proper sec-tions of this report.
In this chapter, an analyses of some credible accidents with potential serious consequences will be given. These verge on the incred-ible, for if the risk were great, the operation or procedure would be changed to reduce that risk. The operating philosophy at Los Alamos has always been not to do a job unless it can be done safely.
In most cases, a series of gross errors and/or equipment failures must occur before a potential accident becomes a reality. These errors and fail-ures are highly imaginative; however, without them, this section could not be created.
Operational accidents and those caused by natural phenomena, including those that result in serious fires, explosions or criticality incidents, will be discussed.
The analysis of the postulated events takes account of the special considerations including redundancy designed into certain critical items of the facility.
Critical items are defined as those items whose failure could permit an insult to the environment.
At present, the following items are designated as critical *
(a) The process building shell.
(b) The central control room.
(c) The ventilation system and its pt41ective features th at are essential to prevent the release of radioactive material to the ervironnent.
(1) Emergency water sprinklers in plenu=s.
(d) Uninterruptible power supply.
(e) Emergency generator building.
(f) Air monitoring sampling for exhaust veatilation system.
(g) Data-logging systems.
(h) Certain emergency lighting.
VI-1 1619
- 09
6.2 Postulated Accidents.
6.2.1 Fires. A general classification of fire includes:
Class A - (Cellulose Material) wood, textile, paper Class B - (Organic Liquids) oil, gasoline, paint, grease Class C - (Electrical Equip =ent) generators, trans-formers, switchgear Class D - (Metal) magnesium, plutonium, powdered aluminum, titanium, zinc, sodium, potassium, zirconium The largest potential fires appear to be in Class A and B combust-ibles. Every effort has been made to eliminate these Class A and B combust-ibles, and where that is not possible, to minimize them.
Electrical equipment such as generators, transformers and switchgear are placed in ;'one 3 or outside the process building to minimize fire hazard to contaminated areas. Equipment requiring cooling vacar will contain safety interlocks to prevent damage, and standard circuit-breaking equipment will prevent overloads.
Finely divided plutonium is pyrophoric, but in mas,sive for= it does not burn rapidly under laboratory conditions.
Class D " plutonium" fires can bc minimized in an argon atmosphere.
The best extinguishing agents for plutoniu= fires are magnesium oxide (MgC) and graphite powders. Since either graphite or Mg0 powders in acco=atic suppression system quantities would involve massive clean-up, manual extin-guishment appears to be best for plutonium fires. Craphite vill be used in machinery areas, and MgG in nonmachinery areas.
Natural gas is restricted to the utility building and would not be involved in a fire in the processing area.
Fla==able, corrosive, and inert gases are stored outside the process building.
6.2.1.1 Fires Originating in Zone 1.
Fires in gloveboxes or conveyors will be restricted by automatic fire stops installed in the d::p boxes and in some cases by areas inerted by argon.
Several fires, ranging in complexity and severity, can be postulated in Zone 1.
A plutonium fire, either turnings or a part, in a glovebox wculd not release energy rapidly enough to burn through a metal glovebox floor or damage the main HEPA filters. Such a fire, if isolated, would not cause a serious problem.
VI-2 1619 310
There are no combustible materials in the conveyor systems con-struction except gloves. Because the air flow is from the conveyor into the glovebox train, and because a fire stop would autematically close to isolate a glovebox line if a fire occurred in the box, there is very little possibility of a fire traveling through a conveyor to another glovebox train. Bolted-in plates are provided at intervals in the conveyor as fire stops.
If the plutonium fire spreads to combustible materials (such as gloves, plastics, etc.) a burn-through or rupture of the gloves can occur.
Inward air flow of 150 feet per minute would probably contain the bulk of the.
contamination in the box. The fire would not spread, and the maximum credible glovebox fire would be less than the largest postulated fire described in Section 6.2.1.3.
6.2.1.2 Fires Originating in Zone 2.
The Zone 2 area has the greatest potential for fires with serious consequences since a fire in this zone is likely to envelope Zone 1 as well.
For the several Zone 2 fires which could be postulated for this facility, it is assumed that the fire will be ventilation-controlled. A study of the existing fuel loads in various laboratories in the TA-21 facility indicates that the average combus tible loading is relatively low.
The most severely loaded laboratories contained an average of 3.7 pounds per square foot of combustible contents, having an average heat potential of approxi=ately 30,000 BTU per square foot. The metal fabrication areas contained average cembustible contents of 1.4 pound per square foot, with an average heat potential of about 11,000 BTU per square foot. The new facility is designed to provide for more spatial separation of processes as well as room for future expansion of operations. The above average values will be even lower in the new facility.
It is recognized that
" spot" values of combustible leading could easily be considerably above these -
values, perhaps as high as 10 pounds per square foot, with heat potentials of up to 80,000 BTU per square foot. Hewever, such te=porary increases are not expected to increase the fire severity beyond one hour and should be con-trolled by the actuation of the automatic sprinkler system.
It is recognized that the DOE criteria for plutonium facilities in DOEM 6301 requires the consideration and postulation of fires on the basis of inoperative sprinkler syste=s (except those designed as " critical" systems) 1619 3II VI-3
and no fire department response or other manual attempts at fire control.
Although at Los Alamos the simultaneous occurrence of both of these situations is considered extremely unlikely, and the sprinkler system is designed to meet all the requirements of a " critical" system, they have been addressed in the postulated fires and they may serve to stress to management the i=portance of maintaining these essential servicas in top condition.
The DOE criteria require that the design of a plutonium facility should preclude the possibility of a fire extending beyond the outer walls, thus releasing radioactive contaminants along with the products of combustion to the outside environment. The purpose of the fire hazard analysis is tnus to determine the likeihood of a fire compromising the building containment integrity. For the purposes of the analysis, ignition sources are assumed to be present in a=ple number and strength so that a fire is credible.
It is also assumed that there is enough fuel present and suitably disposed that a spreading fire is possible.
The fire ha:ard analysis was approached from two possible view-points. The first is in terms of the i= pact of the fire upon life-safety and property damage, both within the building and beyond. For this facility, one of the prime concerns is the spread of radioactive contaminants beyond the building, resulting in exposure to the public beyond the limitations pre-scribed by DCE standards. The second approach is in ter=s of fire effects upon the building, equipment, and the research programs being conducted, anc considers the total heat generation, maximum te=peratures attained, maxi =u=
area involved in the fire, and the extension of heat, products of co=bustion, and radioactive contaminants beyond the room of origin.
There are two maximum credible fires postulated for this facility.
One involves the largest room in the plutonium-239 handling area and was selected because of the concentration of values which would be subject to fire and products from a fire of al=ost any size. The other is in a plutonium-23S handling area and addresses specifically the release of radioactive conta=i-nants associated with this material of high specific activity.
Considering the established average fuel loading of the largesc plutonium-239 handling room (Room No. 319) of 1.4 pounds per square foot as roughly doubled to a value of three pounds per square foot, and un:.f orml;.
VI-4 1619 312
distributed, it is expected that the maximum fire in this compartment would not exceed 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. The DOE design criteria specify a minimum of 2-hour fire-resistive construction throughout the building, but particularly in the outer shell. to contain any radioactive contamination. The damage by heat and smoke products (including some possible radioactive contamination) may extend to the space between the roof and the nonfire-rated ceiling, to adjacent roo=s through noniatching doors and openings in the walls above and below the ceiling, into the corridor through the fire doors, and through the ventilation systems. However, the low fuel loading is expected to eliminate the possibility of actual fire spread beyond the room barriers.
Assuming the failure of both automatic and manual suppression actions, the passive contain=ent system, i.e.,
the room walls, floor, and roof, should remain intact during the period of a fully developed fire.
Because of the several openings in the ceiling for lighting, ventilation ducts, and public address system speakers, it has been assumed that smoke and other products of ce=bustion will migrace into the ceiling space.
The doors to adjacent rooms are free-swinging to allow for proper balance of room pressure differentials by the Zone 2 ventilation system.
These doors are normally closed. The corridor doors are fitted wi:h UL listed hardware and were constructed to be rated fire doors.
(a?,Mitizating Conditions.
Several features of Zone 2 construction in addition to those already mentioned are designed to mitigate the conse-quences of a fire.
(1) Sprinklers providing densities corresponding to N7?A Ordinary Ha:ard, Group 2 standards, have been installed beneath the false ceiling.
(2) The ventilation system will continue to operate for a:
least 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> in case of a fire. Ducts and dampers taking air from the ce=-
partment are fabricated of welded carbon steel that has excellent physical properties at elevated temperatures. The filter plenu= itself is fabricated of steel plate. The ducts returning cool filtered air to the compartment are of galvanized steel.
VI-5 1619 313
" DESIGN BASIS FIRE" W
0:
Im g
D l-
<C fy 0.8Tm g
ct
'e GROWTil
~~ PERIOD PERIOD OF FULLY DEVELOPED FIRE-F: DECAY PERIOD W
~
F--
- ~ ~
//
's
's's SPRINKLER e
x
'0PER0Tl0N v
T s
o 0
t r
o TIME t
Fig. />.2-1 Typical Temperature Illstory of Compartment Fire Gases
400 1
1 I
I 300 c
2
.O l--
<I 200 O
Ltj(r E
10 0 I
I I
I O
2 4
6 8
10 2
FUEL LOADING (Ib/f t )
'(WOOD EQUIVALENT)
Fig. 6,2-2 Fi-e Du:ation as a Functien of Fuci Leadine 619 315 VI-7
8 I
i i
l I
i 1
8
-m D
i m
=
N E=
.c u
e E
cd o
.5 N
in r-v
~
Q N.
7 4
i w
n x
9 s
3 e
o s
o!
m
-.J E
Lt t
s CC
=
=.
o<
=
a 1
T 7
u
}
c s
i O
o o
o o
o o
o o
o D
o D
o D
a m
(do) 3Bn1VB3dW313813 30V83AV 1619 3I n-a
t l
l l
8 N
O 3
N e
N O
n a
5 T
)
N.
9 b
5
^
c' c
3 4
o e
tu E
CY g
e3 1
0-O a
J E
u.
tx
.Z E,
o <[
3 E
~
E 2
E O
E 7
N l
l l
l o
e o
o o
o O
O o
o t-O O
O O
i:
N
.O._
ca v
(4 a /nla) xn 13 IV3H 3Al103dd3 U
VI-9 1619
-17 3
It should be noted that ducts recirculating air must pass through the fire wall separating the Zone 2 laboratory from the machinery space where the filter plenums are located.
In order to meet the criteria requiring that the ventilation system be capable of operating during a fire, no fire dampers are installed in the exhaust duct at the firewall. This is an engineering deviation from the hTPA Fire Code. However, fire dampers are previded to shut off the flow of makeup air to Zone 2 in the event of a fire.
During a fire in Zone 1 or Zone 2, the smoke-laden air would travel through steel ducts tc the inlet of the filter plenums where it wou'd strike an impingement plate that distributes the air across the filter ft:e.
Temperature sensors downstream in the ventilation ducts would actuate sprays in the appropriate filter plenums.
Instrumentation has also been provided in each Zone 2 recirculation unit and each bleed-off unit to obtain temperatures for the Data Logger in the control rocm.
In an emergency, the control room operator would be able to select and actuate sprays in the plenums. i s could be done locally.
The spray would reduce the temperature of the air stream, both by vaporization of the water and by sensible heat transfer.
The cooled gases would then pass through a mesh-type ecmbination demister and roughing filter to remove entrained water and the bulk of the large particles so as to =ini-mise loading the EPA filters.
A second cool down spray is located downstream from the mist eliminator. A manually-operated emergency spray is installed at this point for additional cooling in the event that the primary spray fails to cool the gas.
In Zone 2 two banks of replaceable EPA filters are located af ter the spray, which would clean the air prior to its return to the compart=ent or transfer to the outside. Bleed-off air passes through an additional air handling unit with the same nu=ber of EPA filters and fire suppression capability.
It should be emphasized that each compart=ent has its own ventilation system to preclude cross contamination.
The glovebox ventilation system (Zone 1) is designed to suppress fires within the glovebox plenums in much the same =anner as the Zone 2 plenums.
In order to contain the high te=peratures that may be encountered, all process ventilation ducts have been fabricated of stainless steel.
1619 318 VI-10
(3) Filter Damage.
Because the Zone 1 ventilation system is designed with 100 per cent redundancy, the alternate system would auto-matically be activated if filter plugging or rupture occurred.
If the alter-nate system failed, the exhaust valve would be closed and the fire would be fought without Zone 1 ventilation. No release to the atmosphere would be anticipated.
If one train of filters in the Zone 2 system failed, the other (nominal 50 per cent) unit would continue to operate at approximately 60 per cent of the design rate.
If both units failed, the redundant exhaust bleed-off units would maintain adequate filter and fire fighting capability by pulling air through the supply ducts with the option of manually closing the exhaust valve to that section of the ventilation system. No release to the atmosphere above permissible levels would be anticipated.
The ventilation systems are de igned, however, to prevent plugging or failure under any conditions. The redundancy, fire screen, i=pingement plates, auto =atic and manual water spray cooling, and the roughing filter all protect the HEPA filters. The filters should not be damaged even in the maximum credible incidents.
(4) The combustible loading in the new plutonium facility is limited to 40,000 BTU per square foot (approximate composition 5 pounds per square foot and 8,000 BTU per pound or equivalent) in all areas except those containing hydrogenous shielding. The hydrogenous shielding includes so=e Plexiglas G, having an ignition point above 700 F, but could increase the combustible loading by 60,000 BTU per square foot if a fire lasted long enough to ignite it.
Hydrogenous shielding is only used in the smaller rooms.
The sprinkler system is designed to handle this combustible loading.
(5) Air in the main corridors and stairvells is drawn directly from outside to provide an exit route free of toxic combustion gases.
- 6. 2.1 J The Largest Postulated Fire A fire in the largest room (6,500 square feet) in the facility potentially results in maximum property loss and water requirements.
This room is in an area that handles plutonium-239 only. The fire could be initiated by spontaneous or static ignition of rags or cellulose. The organics present would increase the size of the fire and it would engulf and overheat gloveboxes, burn out gloves, and VI-11 1619 M 9
ignite the distilled organic contents of the boxes. The fire and radioactive materials would be spread to the room and could eventually encompass one-third of the room.
It will be assumed that one-tenth of the room affected by such a fire would be destroyed and one-half would sustain light damage, one glovebox would be one-half destroyed, and three surrounding gloveboxes would be one-fourth destroyed. The entire room would contain high conta=ination. Total loss, including contamination cleanup, would be less than one million dollars.
This fire would generate less heat than an equivalent ASTM E-119 fire. The average combustible loading in this room will be assumed to be 25,000 3TU per square foot. The total heat release in this fire would be 7,625,000 BTU.
(Gloveboxes, 100 square feet x 1/2 burned + 300 square feet x 1/4 burned = 125 x 25,000 = 3,125,000; room, 1,800 x 1/10 x 25,000 =
4,500,000). The average and maxi =u= release depend on the burning rate. A curve provided by Factory Mutual, Septe=ber, 1972 (see Fig. 6.2-5) indicates that the maximum heat release rate would occur approxi=ately eight minutes after the fire started, provided no sprinklers were used. The maximum heat release rate would not exceed 260,000 BTU per minute.
(a) Water Recuirement to Fight the Largest Postulated Fire. Fighting this fire would require the maxi =um a=ount of water from the fire-water system.
(1) Serinklers, Hoses and Ventilation Sorinklers.
Sprinklers would be operating at total hydraulic capacity of 375 gallons per minute for 45 minutes (375 x 45 = 16,875) to use 16,875 gallons of water.
Four 1.5 inch hoses at 100 gallons per minute each would be ini-ciated af ter 15 minutes and used for 30 minutes (100 x 4 x 30 = 12,000) to use 12,000 gallons. The ventilation spray system would run 60 minutes at a maximum of 134 gallons per =inute (134 x 60 = 8,040) using 8,040 gallons.
ne ventilation spray includes coverage of 168 square feet of filter by an auto matic spray and an equal area by a manual spray. The total water used would be 36,915 gallons, and the peak flow (sprinklers, 375 ; hoses, 400 ; and venti-lation, 134) would be 909 gallons per minute.
At the maximum water flow rate of 909 gallons per minute, the water can cool the air at the rate of 7,600 BTU per degree te=perature rise.
'f it is assumed that the maximum release rate is 260,000 STU per minute, and that the inlet water is at 70 F, a temperature increase of 34 at equilibrium VI-12 1619 20
- ou g elung; -jo-dwe.! 6uilleo o
o o
o o
o o o o
o o
o o
c O
N o
N o
NOo 1
i i
i l
IiiIl C
m N
-9 g
$k.$NEk e
- = e a e *=,
I0 g
~
.E CD _=a CD a' CD o' C -
c>
- c. O c) o.O o D.a
/
u c +o-
/n oD Oo m o c) m
.=
o u o, j o g $
/
g o
,E, o'N._N N._i n'N 2
/
3 5
CD i
- c. 92 w
c.
/
.E g
/
E.
cn E
n+
c.)
<[ g CD N o N 3
/
m g
=
a> -
c) A c> rD x
/
_c
,s 2
> '.E
/
~3 CD
~
E s a s' o o m.
a88 s
's O
.5 i
e c00 uo g
g g
a a
2 e
=
o c
e C
=
,_ o s
~c
=
o.
o o
o m
s 20 m
E a
e
~
< ';cir s
co F-l a> m o
m
>0 t
b 8
BS
\\
2 oe
- ex c
O
.9 k
x -@
- e
- m
-5
- N y
.s ir5i 8.
i i
i i
i ii a
O o
o o
o ooo w
o o
o C
o o to --
in a
N
[',j c/.:no] OC;Oj X 'UjuJ/D.l '
gg VI-13
four filters in series with 90 per cent recirculation. Two of these filters are in the bleed-off system. The calculated release would be 0.47 curies by 0.001 x (0.002) x 0.1 = 3.76 x 10-curies. The Zone 1 exhaust in the plutonium-239 area passes through three filters in series with 100 per cent of the air exhausted that leads to a release of 0.47 curies x 0.001 x (0.002)
= 1.88 x 10 curies.
Table 6.2-1 lists the 50 year dose coc:mitment to the lung, bone, and
~
liver from ingestion of plutonium as a result of the relcne of 1.9 x 10 pCi of plutonium from the worst case accident described above.
Ingestion of plutonium (via inhalation) is the only significant pathway of plutonium exposure from an accident of this sort.
Table 6.2-1 Radiation Dose Received During the Maxi =um Release 50-Year Dose Cec =itment (rem)
Location Lung Bone Liver
-0 Royal Crest Trailer Court 8.3 x 10 3.7 x 10-2.4 x 10~
-8
-8 Los Alamos Townsite 2.6 x 10 1.2 x 10" 7.5 x 10 Atmospheric diffusion of the material released from the building was assu=ed to be as shown in the curves in Fig. 6.2-6.
These curves were derived as the maxi =um envelopes of nor=alized exposure estimates for all atmospheric stability conditions using the curves presented by Turner (D. B. Turner, Workbook of At=ospheric Dispersion Esti=ates, Public Health Service Publication No. 999AP26, U. S. Department of REW (1969) and according to the proceduras recom= ended in AEC Safety Guide 3 (1970). Windspeed was taken to,
be 1 m/sec, and release height at ground level.
Inhalation dose calculations were based on the ICRP Lung Model ("The Metabolism of Compounds of Plutonium and other Actinides," ICRP Publicatien 19, Pergamon Press, New York (1972)). This model was adapted into a computer code used for these calculations. These calculations are considered to apply to an individual located at a point on the boundary of the exclusion area about the facility.
(Exclusion aree as used here is privately owned and VI-15 1619 22
l l
l 6 0
-2 go h=Om h=20m r
[E Id h = 50 m
,a C
-5 10
/
-6 10 jo#
8 io i
i ii s iil i
i i i iiiil i
i;i,iii 10 10*
10" X[
2 DOWNWIND DISTANCE (m)
Fig. 6. 2-6 Worst Case Envelopes for ';ormalized Exposure from Pos:ula:cd Short Term Accidental Release at Three Heights. h.
D is integrated exposure (mass s.m-3). Q' is total release (mass). u is wind velocity (m s-1).
1619 323 VI-16
occupied land adjacent to the nearest Laboratory boundaries).
For the postulated incident, it has been assumed that the released cicud has passed the individual located on the exclusion area outer boundary within a 2-hour period.
Ten CFR 100 states, "The individual located at any point on the exclusion area boundary for 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> af ter a postulated fission product relea.<e would not receive a total radiation dose to the whole body in excess of 25 rem, or a total radiation of 300 rem to the thyroid from iodine exposures."
An ERDA Commission Staff Paper dated March 17, 1971, concerning
" Proposed Amendments to Part.70" about Pre-Construction Review of Plutonium Processing and Fuel Fabrication Plants, contained the following statement:
"To provide a frame of reference, a bone dose of 150 rem and a lung dos; of 75 rem may be considered to be roughly equivalent, biologically, to Part 100 (10 CFR) doses for whole body (25 rem) and thyroid (300 re=)."
These levels have been reaffirmed in the June, 1972 mini =um criteria.
The bone is the critical organ in this postulated accident. To reach the 50 year dose co==itment of 150 rem to the bone, it would require 4.1 x 0
10 times as much plutonium as has been postulated in this accident.
(24 kg x 4.1 x 100 = 9. 8 x 10 kg. )
6.2.1.4 Postulated Fire in a Plutonium-238. Because plutonium-238 has a higher specific activity than does plutoniu=-239, the radioactivity released due to a fire involving it is analy:ed in this section.
The largest room in which plutonium-238 is used is only 2,327 square feet. The plutonium-238 is in the oxide form and limited to 500 grams in a glovebox line. It will be assumed that the fire would engulf and overheat a glovebox and burn out the gloves.
The 500 grams of plutonium-238 oxide would be spread into the room and glovebox ventilation systems.
Based upon the postulated fire and the assumed airflow rates, a search was made for experimental data to be used as a basis for calculating the amount of plutonium-oxide that would become airborne and be carried into the ventilation system during a fire. No data were found that are the result of actual experiences with fires.
However, DOE Report B L'I.-786 states that during test runs on powder at ambient temperature with an airflow race of 100 centimeters per second, when air was allowed to impact directly on the powder, 60 to 70 per cent of the j ( } C)
} }[4 VI-17
APPENDIX B CHALLENGE TO FILTERS A ventilated space is cleansed of suspended particulate material mainly by two mechanisms, flushing of the air from the room by incoming ventilation flow and settling of the particles. The material flushed from the room is the material that challenges the first stage of HEPA filtration; the amount that settles does not challenge the filter.
To estimate the fraction of material suspended by a fire or explosion that challenges the filter certain facts are required:
the actual particle size distribution of the suspended particles; the type of settling that is happening, settling in still air, stirred settling, or turbulent settling; the dimensions of the room and the ventilation rate; and the settling characteristics of the particles. We cannot know the value of each of these parameters for each accident scenario. We looked at the overall problem and estimated the amount of suspended Pu that would challenge the initial HEPA filter and used that value for all of the scenarios.
A parameter used to estimate the settling characteristics of particles is the settling or Stokes velocity. This may also be reported as the aerodynamic mean diameter, the diameter of a spherical particle having a density of one We cannot that has the same settling velocity as the particle in question.
know exactly the aerodynamic mean diameters of the aerosols suspended in a fire or explosion, but a number of references will allow us to state some generalities.
Pu-containing particles in operating gloveboxes often contain e
large amounts of other minerals.11-13 B-1 1619 :25
Pu-containing aerosols in a Pu0 -containing glovebox during normal 2
e operations appear to have densities that range from 3.5 to 7.3 gm/cm. 14,15 The activity mean aerodynamic diameters of Pu0 -containing 2
e particles suspended in operating gloveboxes are in the range of 1.5 to 5.5 pm.14,16,17 Plutonium-containing particles on air samples after an accidental e
release were sized using autoradiography.
If the particles were presumed to be 100% Pu0, the resulting particle sizes were less 2
than 1 pm.I8 Particles with less than 100% pug 2 would result in greater particle sizes, but the particles were probably 10 pm or less.
Once we know the particulate-settling characteristics, which are epitomized by the settling velocities, estimating the fraction of the particles that will settle out depends upon the settling mechanism that is in operation; still air, stirred settling, or turbulent settling. Room dimensions, ventilation rate, and energy release rates in the room will determine which mechanism is at work.
Our general approach to estimating the amount of particulate Pu that will challenge the filters assumes that the Pu in suspension soon after an accident will be particles with an aerodynamic mean diameter of 10 pm or less.
We feel that the ventilation is slow enough an't that there will be sufficient energy released by a fire or explosion t3 assure us that the settling of the aerosols will fit the stirred settling mechanism.
B-2 16M 326
For a combination of stirred settling of particles and flushing of a room with ventilation air af ter an initial suspension of particles as by an explo-
- sion, tv y
- [,+V y
it c
i 7=e o
3
= particle concentration in room air (mg/m ),
where c
= initial particle concentration in rocm air c g 3
after the explosion (mg/m ),
= settling velocity of particle (m/s),
v3 h
= height of room (m),
3
= ventilation ficw rate (m 73),
v 3
V
= room volume (m ), and t
= time (s).
For a continuous steady source of aerosols in a room that is being continu-ously flushed by ventilation air and in which stirred settling of the particles is taking place, d'
s I
+
t (1-e
)
c=y 7y j
- hj B-3 1619 327
where:
s = aerosol source (mg/s)
At infinite time s
1 c=7 fy
\\
F ' Vl This can be simplified if we notice that the rise time and decay V +fofthismodelforthisfacilitywillbeshortcomparedtoIh.
time So we can consider the aerosol concentration from a fire to be a square wave with a duration of 1 h and the concentration given above.
To compute the fraction of the suspended aerosol that will challenge the final filter, we must integrate c vs t from t = 0 to t = = and compare this with the total amount of aerosol suspended by the accident. Curiously, this calculation yields the same answer for the case of the explosion and for the fire. The result is hvT S=
's
- T S = fraction of Pu suspended that challenges the first where:
stage of the HEPA filter.
161c) 528
The two spaces of particular interest at the.VNC are the AFL and the RML. Approximate calculations of the fraction of material suspended from an explosion or fire that would challenge the first HEPA filter in each of those spaces is given below.
Advanced Fuels Laboratory t
.693 v
1/2 =
S V
V s v
-+V II~ + 7 v
Aerodynamic s
V h
Diameter ( m)
(m/s)
(1/s)
(1/s)
(s)
S_
100
.25
.00556
.0991 6.986
.056 50
.072
.00556
.0325 21.300
.170 20
.012
.00556
.0101 63.900
.556 10
.0030
.00556
.00663 103.700
.332 5
.00078
.00556
.00585 118.400
.950 2
.000128
.00556
.00561 123.600
.991 1
.000035
.00556
.00557 124.340
.998
.5
.000010
.00556
.00556 124.600
.999 Radioactive Materials Laboratory t
.693 y
1/2 _
s v
v Aerodynamic s
viem:ter ( m)
(m/s)
(1/s)
(1/s)
(s) 5 100
.E5
.G025
.06100 11.3
.041 50
.072
.0025
.01940 35.7
.128 20
.012
.0025
.00530 130.3
.472 10
.0030
.0025
.00320 216.3
.780 5
.00078
.0025
.00268 258.3
.933 2
.000128
.0025
.00253 273.9
.988 1
.000035
.0025
.00251 276.3
.996 0.5
.000010
.0025
.00250 275.9
.999 1619
?29 B-5
The ventilation rate, room volume and ceiling height of these two spaces are different, but the fraction of suspended particles that reaches the filters is quite similar. For particles of 10 p m or less, the fraction of material challenging the filter is 0.84 or greater.
We presumed that the particles suspended will be 10 pm or less, but in f act there may be larger particles in the material suspended. Also our computations do not consider agglomeration of particles, condensation of water on the particles, or other effects and so are at best rough approximations.
Therefore, so as not to overstate the amount of material released from the facility, we chose to assume that 75f. of the material suspended from an accident in these spaces will challenge the first HE?A filter.
To put these estimates into perspective, note that if we estimate 75% as reaching the filters and only 35% really gets there, we have made an error of approximately a factor of 2.
If we estimate that there are two filters in the ventilatiori system when in reality one has been burned out, we have made an error of a factor of 2000. Thus the problem of aerosol settling is trivial in terms of precision, but the question of how many filters are operable is of overwhelming importance.
B-6 1619 330
APPEfIDIX C RADIOLOGICAL DOSE CALCULATI0f;S Radiological doses for inhaled actinides were computed using the Task Group Lung Model and other actinide metabolic data as described in ICRP publication 19.
Mean deposition fractions for the lung compartments were obtained from the 20 report by the Task Group on Lung Dynamics An aerosol with an activity median aerodynamic diameter (AMAD) of 1 pm was assumed as stipulated by the flRC. However, such an aerosol may not be representative of releases passing through HEPA filters.
131 The thyroid dose from I inhalation was computed using metabolic data from ICRP publications 2 and 10. The total body submersion dose from a semispherical 133 infinite cloud of Xe was computed in accordance with the methodology of ICRP publication 2.
For insoluble Pu(Pu0 ), the critical organs are the lungs, the liver, and 2
- ~ tiiebone.
For soluble Pu [Pu(fiO )4], tne sitical organs are the liver and the 3
bone.
In each case, the 50-yr dose commitment is reported. That is, for critical organ uptake the dose accumulated over a 50-yr period is computed.
An outline of the dose computation method is given, and actual doses for Tables I and II were computed as follows:
3 Dose (rem) = Release (g) x 106 ( g/g)x Dispersion Factor (s/m )
3 x Breathing Rate (m /s) x Dose Factor gfnaled For example, the dose is computed as follcws:
Dcse (rem) = 9.4 x 10-12 (g) x 106 ( g/g) x 4.3 x 10-3 (s/m ) x 3.47 x 10~4 (m /s) 3 3
-10 x 59.8 rea
= 8.38 x 10 rem pg inhaled This assumes that the receptor is present for the duration of cloud passage C-1 1619 331
I.
Dose Equation The dose to any organ may be calculated by means of the following equation:2I Dose (rem) = 51.2 x E/f4 x Q where !! = organ mass in grams, E = effective energy per disintegration in fleV, and Q = time integral of internal contamination in pCi-day.
For an organ with "n" compartments and simple exponential biological elimination, Q is given by
[-0.693\\
t T
I~'( eff. I n
Q = 1.44 { T Ufb eff iii g
i=1 th where T
= effective half-life of contaminant in i organ cornpartment, eff th U$ = fractional uptake by i organ compartment, f = fraction of contaminant clearing with Teff '
g g
A = specific activity in pCi/pg-mix, and j
t = the exposure time, taken as 50 yrc.
1619
.s32 C-2
II. f!ean Deposition Fractions for_T4Lil Luna Regions 3
A.
A ventilatory state typified by a tidal volume of 750 cm of air at a respiratory frequency of 15 cycles / min is assumed. This is representative of a mild to moderate activity state (s2-4 cal / min energy expenditure).
20 B.
From Fig. 12 from the Task Group on Lung Dynamics Report
, for an 3
aerosol with an AMAD of 1.0 pm and a tidal volume of 750 cm, the following mean depositions are obtained:
Nssopharynx (N-P) - 0.15 Tracheobronchial (T-B) - 0.03 Pulmonary (P) - 0.28
- I I I,.
Dose from Inhalation of 1 uo of Reference Insoluble Plutonium f4ix A.
Lung-Tissue Dose 1.
For a class Y compound, the only significant lung dose compartment is the f = 0.6 pulmonary clearance with a biological half-life of 500 days.22 2.
Because the radiological half-lives of all the radionuclides in the plu hnium mix are much longer than the 500 day biological half-life,
[
T xT g
B Teff "
B' eff " T + T R
B 3.
The lung t ssue weight is 570 9, which includes the bronchial tree, capillary blood, and associated lymph nodes, but does not include pulmonary blood.23 1619 533 C-3
4.
For 1 pg, F
0.693 x 50 yr' Y
l
_, and Q, = Ag(1.44)(500d)(0.28)(0.6)g.-e 6
and Total Lung Tissue Dose = Sb g
- OE Qg = 121 Aj ij Aj Qj Ei Dose Radionuclide (uCi/ug-mix)
(uCi-days)
(MeV)
(rem) 23aPu 2.32 x 10-2 2.81 57 14.39 239Pu 4.67 x 10-2 5.65 53 26.90 240Pu 2.19 x 10 2 2.65 53 12.62 241Pu 2.492 301.5 0.053 1.44 242Pu 5.855 x 10-6 7.1 x 10""
51 3 x 10 3 241Am 0.72 x 10-2 0.87 57 4.45 59.80 Thus the lung tissue dose per pg inhaled is 59.8 rest.
B.
Bone and Liver Dose 22 1.
Clearance to the blood 0.01 cf the ti-P uptake with T = 0.01 days B
0.01 of the T-B uptake with T = 0.01 days B
0.05 of the P uptake with T = 500 days B
0.15 of the P uptake clears to the lymph nodes with T = 500 days, of wMch 03 Gen clers to Wod g
with T = 1,000 days.
B Absorption through the G.I. tract is negligible (s10-4).
}bl9 J34 C-4
2.
Systemic blood levels (about 15 years following inhalation):
From U-P:
(0.01) (0.15) = 0.0015 From T-B:
(0.01) (0.03) = 0.0003 From P:
(0.05) (0.28) = 0.0140 From Lymph Nodes:
(0.15)(0.9)(0.28)
= 0.0378 0.0536 In all, 5.36% of that breathed in reaches the blood.
3.
In the blood, 0.45 of the actinide burden may be considered to translocate to the skeleton, and another 0.45 may be considered to translocate to the liver.I9 4.
The biological half-life for actinides in the human skeleton is about 100 yrs, and that for the liver is about 40 yrs 5.
To simplify the calculations, we may assume that complete uptake by the bone and liver takes place at time zero.
The 50-yr dose comitment is then calculated from that time.
6.
For 1 pg:
~
.0.693 x 50 yrs x 355 days /yr' Q = 1.44 T A x 0.0536 x 0.45 x 1-e T,7f 9
eff 9
1 i
6 Dose = 51.2 x{ Qj E, where M = 7000 g for bone g
i=1 and M = 1700 g for liver 1619 5 C-5
Teffj A
Teff Ej Ei Dose Dose j
j
(!4eV)
(i4V)
(rem)
(rem)
Radionuclide
( Ci/ug-mix)
(days)
(days) _
_ (Bone)
(Liver)
(Bone)
(Liver)
(Bone)
(Liver) 23 cpu 2.32 x 10-2 1.73x104 1.01x10 280 57 14.81 9.98 4
239Pu 4.57 x 10 2 3.63x104 1.46x104 270 53 34.21 21.90 240Pu 2.19 x 10-2 3.60x104 1.45x104 270 53 16.02 10.25 241Pu 2.492 4.24x103 3.61x103 14 1
35.68 9.13 4
250 50 4x10-3 2.6x10- 3 4
1.46x10 2r+2Pu 5.865 x 10-6 3.63x10 241Aa 0.72 x 10-2 3.00x104 1.34x104 280 56 5.29 3.45 106.1 54.7 Thus the bone dose per pg inhaled is 106 rem, and that for the liver is 54.7 rem.
~ IVi Dose from Inhalation of 1 ua of Reference Soluble Plutonium flix A.
PU(l10)4 is classified as a class W compound.I9 3
22 B.
Clearance to the blood for a class W compound 0.1 of the N-P uptake with T = 0.01 days, B
0.5 of the T-B uptake with T = 0.01 days, B
0.15 of the P uptake with TB = 50 days,
= 50 days, 0.05 of the P uptake clears to the lymph nodes with TB all of which then clears to the blood with T = 50 days.
B Absorption through the G.I. Tract is negligible (%3x10- 3,;),
C-6 1619 ;36
C.
Systemic blood levels (about 1 yr following inhalation):
0.015 From N-P:
(0.1) (0.15)
=
0.01 5 From T-B:
(0.5)(0.03)
=
0.042 From P:
(0.15)(0.28)
=
From lymph nodes: (0.05) (1.0) (0.28) = 0.014 0.086 In all, 8.6% of that breathed in reaches the blood.
D.
All of the considerations discussed above for computing the bone and liver doses from inhaled insoluble plutonium apply except that ciearance to the blood is 8.6% instead of 5.36%. Thus, the bone and liver doses are simply 8.6/5.36 or 1.6 times those above:
170 rem for bone and 87.5 rem for liver per pg inhaled.
II V.
Dose from Inhalation of 1 uCi of I
131 A.
The I deposition in the thyroid is related to the inhaled activlty by the following equaticn:
Thyroid deposition ( Ci) = Intake (uCi inhaled) x f where f is the fraction reaching the thyroid by inhalation.
a B.
From ICRP publication 2, f = 0.23.
a C.
From ICRP publication 10, the 50-yr dose co. nitment to the u
thyroid from deposition of 1 pCi in thyroid is 5.5 rem.
1619 337 C-7
131 D.
The thyroid dose factor for I is therefore:
5.5 rem pCi-de;:osi ted Dose Factor = 1 Ci deposited a
pCi-inhaled X
- 8"
= 1.265 pC1-inhaled 33 VI. Total Body Submersion Dose From Xe For gamma-ray emitting radionuclides the total body dose rate from an arbitrarily large hemispherical cloud having a concentration, x, of 24 emitters is given by DJ = 0.25 E x (rad /s) where 0 ; is the dose rate (rad /s)
T is the average gamma-ray energy per disintegration (tieV) 3 x is the radionuclide concentration (Ci/m )
25 A.
The value for E is taken from data given in the Table of Isotopes 133 and for Xe the value is 0.0454 MeV.
B.
An example of the use of the above equation is given below for the case in which 6500 Ci are released over a period of one hour.
D = 0.25 x 0.0454 (MeV) x 2.8x10-3 ( )x I
)
0 5.74x10-5(rads /s)
=
The total dose for an individual exposed for a period of one hour is Dose = 0 x time = 5.74x10-5(rads) x 3600 (s) = 0.21 rads C-8 1619 338
133 VII. Skin Submersion Dose From Xe For beta emitting radionuclides the skin dose rate from an infinite cloud 24 having a concentrati,on, X, of emitters is given by D,= 0.23 Yg X(rad /s) where D is the dose rate (rads /s)
I is the average beta energy per disintegration (MeV) g 3
X is the radionuclide concentration (Ci/m ),
25 A.
The value for Y is taken from the data given in the Table of Isotopes g
133 and for Xe the value is 0.135 MeV.
133 B.
The skin dose rate for a release of 6500 Ci of Xe in one hour is D = 0.23 x 0.135 x 2.8x10-3(s )
- 600 ()
3 g
= 1.57x10-4 (rads /s)
The total beta skin dose for an individual exposed for a period of one hour is Dose = gD x time = 1.57x10-4 (# d) x 3600(s)= 0.57 rads s
C.
The total skin dose from betas and gamma-rays is the sum of the total body dose and the beta skin dose, or 0.78 rads.
1619 339 C-9
APPENDIX D VEllTILATION, EMERGENCY POWER, At!D FIRE PROTECTION CilARACTERISTICS Building 102 Advanced Radioactive Fuels Materials Entire Laboratory Laboratory Building Ventilation 3
Exhaust - m /s 5.5 4
30.2 2
Floor Area - m 370 370 2000 Ceiling Height - m 2.7 4.3 Facility Volume - m 1000 1600 6000 Air Changes /hr 20 9
18 1.
Ventilation System llEPA filters at air supply Hot cell air exhausts Building air exhaust is Features and exhaust for each glovebox.
through HEPA filters.
up to roof ducting to 102 Room air exhausts through HEPA Exhaust is to basement Annex input manifold.
filters.
Exhaust is up to for intermediate stage 102 Annex houses a 90 HEPA roof outdoor ducting that joins of IlEPA and charcoal single stage filter system, manifold to 102 Annex final filtration.
Roof which exhausts to a 23 m exhaust system.
ducting joins manifold stack.
to 102 Annex.
m Emergency Power An emergency diesel system Same diesel system as Same diesel system as provides power to all for advanced fuels for advanced fuels laboratory.
essential equipment.
laboratory.
Fire Protection Area is automatic-water-All areas except cells Building is automatic-water-sprinkler-system protected.
are automatic-water-sprinkler-protected through-flanual fire extinguishers are sprinkler-protected.
out except for RML hot cells.
in each room. Gloveboxes are The basement HEPA Roof ventilation ducts are provided with liet-L-X power.
filter bank includes an manual water spray protected.
automatic C02 system and the charcoal filters a water spray.
APPENDIX D VENTILATION, ENERGENCY POWER, AND FIRE PROTECTION CHARACTERISTICS Building 103 Building 105 AFL Cladding Laboratory First Floor Second Floor Total Vault and X-ray Facility Ventilation 3
Exhaust - m /s 8.2 11 19 0.6 2
Floor Area - m 1000 1000 2000 21 0 3
Facility Volume - m 4000 4000 8000 650 Air Changes /hr 7
10 9
3 Ventilation System Air from laboratory hoods and gloveboxes Ventilation exhaust is through HEPA exhausts through local HEPA filters.
filter at x-ray room and out to environs Exhaust air flows out of building through through a roof stack.
ducts to adjacent final filter system structure.
Final filter system consists
?
of a 40-HEPA-single-stage bank and a 14.6 m stack.
Emergency Power An automatic propane emergency power None available.
system is on standby for operation of the ventilation system.
No emergency
-^
cys power is available for alarms, detectors
- }^
and samplers.
)
Fire Protection Building is protected by automatic water All areas are protected by automatic sprinkler system. No fire protection water sprinkler system except vault.
t,y
_ps is provided for ventilation final Vault is a massive concrete structure.
filter system.
APPENDIX D VEtlTILATION, EMERGENCY POWER, AND FIRE PROTECTION CHARACTERISTICS Buildinq 400 Other Special Nuclear Entire High Bay Area Materials Laboratories Building ventilation 3.1 8
3 Exhaust - m /s 1.6 2
44 180 440 Floor Area - m 3
270 680 2300 Facility Volume - m 21 16 13 Air Changes /hr Ventilation exhaust is through HEPA filters at hood outlets to Ventilation System an outdoor structure that contains a 20-HEPA-single-stage filter Features bank and finally out a 13.7-m stack.
{
None available. Administrative controls provide for securing Emergency Power equipment and evacuation of building if necessary.
The liigh Bay area ar.d Special Nuclear Material handling laboratories Fire Protection have automatic water sprinkler systems and manual fire extinguishers.
Rest of building is protected only by manual fire extinguishers.
(4 5
N
References 1
W. L. Delvin, " Procedure For Hazards Analysis of Plutonium Gloveboxes Used in Analytical Chemistry Operations, HEDL-TME report 76-93 (1977).
2.
Group CMB-ll, " Final Safety Analysis Report for the Plutonium Handling Facility, TA-55," LASL internal document, May 1978.
Note:
Excerpts from this reference are found in Appendix A.
3.
J. Mishima, "A Review of Research on Plutonium Releases During Overheating and Fires," General Electric-HAPO report HW-83668 (August 1964).
4.
K. Stewart, "The Particulate Material Formed by the Oxidation of Plutonium," Progress in Nuclear Energy, Series IV, Vol. 5, Pergamon Press (New York, 1963).
5.
J. M. Selby, " Considerations in the Assessment of the Consequences of Effluents from Mixed 0xide Fuel Fabrication Plants," 8.;WL report 1697 (Rev
- 1) (June 1975), Appendix F, pp. F-1--F-17.
6.
Ibid.; Table 16, p. 85.
7.
Applicant's responses to questions.
8.
Myron J. Miller, " Risk Management and Reliability," in the Third International System Safety Conf., Washington, DC, October 17-21, 1977, pp. 539-549.
9.
" Report of Investigation of Serious Incident in Building 71 on June 14, 1957," The Dow Chemical Company Rocky Flats Pl ant report C057-941 (June 28, 1957, declassified August 17,1976).
- 10. Serious Accident Reports, USAEC.
1619 343
- 11. Ronald C. Scripsick, Douglas C. Gray, Marvin I. Tillery, Ronal<f G.
Stafford, and Pablo 0. Romero, " Aerosol Sampling, and Characterization for Hazard Evaluation, July 1,1975 -- September 30, 1976," Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory report LA-5777-PR (April 1977).
- 12. S. Marshall Sanders, Jr., " Compositions of Airborne Plutonium-Bearing Particles from a Plutonium Finishing Plant," E. I. Dupont de Nemours and Co. report DP-1445 (November 1976).
- 13. E. W. Bretthauer, A. J. Cumings, and S. C. Black, " Characterization of Emmisson from a Plutonium-Uranium 0xide Fuel Fabrication Facility - A Test Case," Unpublished Paper, Private Communication. A. J. Cummings, USEPA, Las Vegas, NV 89114.
- 14. G. J. Newton, O. G. Raabe, and S. V. Teague, " Plutonium Aerosols Inside a Safety Enclosure at a Mixed Oxide Reactor Fuel Fabrication Facility,"
Inhalation Toxicology Research Institute Annual Report, 1974-1975, Lovelace Foundation for Medical Education and Research, Albuquerque, NM 87115.
- 15. O. G. Raabe, G. J. Newton, R. C. Smith, C. J. Wilkinson, and S. V. Teague,
" Characterization of Plutonium Aerosols from an Industrial Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility," Inhalation Toxicology Research Institute Annual Report, 1973-1974 (December 1974).
- 16. J. C. Elder, M. Gonzales, and H. J. Ettinger, " Plutonium Aerosol Size Characteristics," Health Physics 27_, 45-53.
- 17. G. J. Newton, Private Communication, Lovelace Inhalation Toxicology Research Institute.
- 18. Ron Scripsick, Private Communication, Group H-5, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory.
1619 344
- 19. International Commission on Radiation Protection, Task Group of Committee 2, "The Metabolism of Compounds of Plutonium and Other Actinides" ICRP Publication H (May 1972).
- 20. International Commission of Radiological Protection, Task Group on Lung Dynamics for Committee 2, " Deposition and Retention Models for Internal Dosimetry of the Human Respiratory Tract," Health Physics 3 (February 1966) p. 173.
- 21. Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection, Report of Committee 2, " Permissible Dose for Internal Radiation," ICRP Publication 2, 1959.
- 22. International Commission on Radiological Protection, Task Group of Committee 2, "The Metabolism of Compounds of Plutonium and Other Actinides" ICPR Publication 3 (May 1972), Table 3.1.
- 23. International Commisison on Radiological Protection, Task Group of Committee 2, " Report of the Task Group on Reference Man," ICRP Publication 23 (October 1974).
- 24. D. H. Slade, " Meteorology and Atomic Energy 1968," USAEC, GP0, Washington, DC.
- 25. C. M. Lederer, J. M. Hollander, and I. Perlman, " Table of Isotopes," 6th edition (John Wiley and Sons, Inc., New York,1967).
1619 M5
t o n 5
3 t
e 9
7 5
m 0
0 e n 0
0 0
1 1
s o) 1 1
1 x
x a
rg x
x x
8 1
2 8
4 e
i(
l v
3 1
e n 3
1 2
R E
4 e
6 4
3 g
0 n
0 0
0 5
1 l
1 1
1 Ae)
Pl x
x x
7 x
a 5
3 5
0 4
n g
ElHa(
i F
7 2
4 0
9 h
C e
)
t 2 t a
4 3
3 e
i e
g dA 0
0 0
0l n
5 1 n eP e) 1 1
1 l
x x
x 7
xi mE l(q 5
5 0
- 4. (
5 rl l
a e
t 1
4 4
0 1
hC n
I O
I RAN n t E
o m
C i
e 5
5 5
5 5
n S
t t
7 7
7 7
7 ev c
s Y
a y
0 0
0 0
0 o
B r
S t
F TN I
E f
E N n
e B R ier 2
2 2
2 2..,,
L O o
n A
I td o 0
0 0
0 0
T V cab 0
0 0
0 0
N a1 r E
r i
0 0
0 0
0 1
F A
OT S
E m d S
u e A
i E
n v) l L
o g
v(
1 0
0 o
E t
0 0
R u n 0
3 3
5 5
l I
P to at e
n Hh i
.m
.m gu
.h
.h so so ss~
ss no no
.o sns ni ni rR rR u
u ner ru ru r
e ug ugn b
b utl b n bnr o
bok i
iu hl hl nn ht htb si si i
1 4
aa i
M sx sx aa i
h i
ra 0
ssr O
ae l0 aes
- 0 rf n 0
rfg t
n 0
aip O
r O
r r
0 t
r 0
t u
R tse R
su R
sl e
R r
s R
t s.
c td rs rt B rb Brp S
L ee L
B ee L
Bel L
Ge L
G e F
Btt F
Git F
Gli F
l s F
l s A
Gaa A
k u A
kf A
gkr A
gk r rv gnn gn k ne k ne E
gei E
kii E
ki m E
it E
it R
knt R
rm R
ro R
0rl R
0rl I
ec I
0p I
0po I
0 pi I
0 pi F
1 ga F
3S5 F
3SR F
5Sf F
5Sf 5
3 4
2 1
A A
A A
A 2 7' C7' e u4c
'.4 t
o n t
e 9
4 m
e n) 0 0
0 6
1 s o9 1
1 1
r(
x x
x 5
1 a
5 i.
0 0
e 5
i l
v n
2 1
3 0
0 e
R E
e 6
g la An) 0 3
Pe 1
n c
x 0
2 5
El
(
2 i
F 2
6 2
Hl 1
a x
1 h
5 3
0 1
2 C
e t
e a
g i
n dA e) eP 4
l g mE 6
5 l(
rl 0
0 5
2 i
a 0
e 1
2 1
2 h
t x
n l
0 1
1 2
C I
n t o
m n
5 5
i e
te t 7
7 v
c s
a y
1 1
1 0
0 o
r S
t F
n e
o n
4' ier 2
2 5
1 tdo 0
0 0
0 0
cab 0
0 0
0 1x air r
i 0
0 4
0 0
l F
A m d u e in v) 4 4
4 o
g 0
0 0
lo 1
1 1
t v(
u 0
x x
x n
l 1
3 3
3 3
I P
,n r
t l
l u a
nt nl r
- u a
i rs io iAb n' '
ap i
ou ol u m.
rs er s
s ohod X
ct oe er t e rt r.sr 0
irs to al ei e
at mk 1
vse B
ew i
nl t E
t dm ma n
rt r
di ous oil V
amno X
de X
er X
cpn X
cai O
roar 0
ep 0
t p O
r O
ff L
to p
o B
tO B
aS B
esu B
e G
i rl m i
F a
E n
E t rb E
t rm n
ao r
V n
V i
V ae V
aeo L
scc O
rl r O
rl o F
nd o O
m a.
O i.
L tke L
tk r A
iaLe r
L mB L
aB c
G aG G
tGt G
int G
in o
r e
t n
u nil nid N
nl
.a S
L nn L
ono L
ri L
rn O
o F
ci F
npf F
npa I
iBl s F
oi A
c t
A t
A iS A
iS S
sGor su gsi l
l O
o se E
e a
L l not E
gno E
k n E
e.ac R
r
.c P
porl R
kr R
rt R
r I
ut I
0uu I
iBo I
iB o X
xiei F
1bi F
3b p F
FGL F
FGl E
Esaf 0
7 8
9 1
6 A
A A
A A
_ m e
(,._*N
e X
3 7
3 t
1 1
o n t
4 6
4 4
3 e
~
1 i
m e n) 0 0
0 0
C 1
1 i
s 1
1 o9 x
x C
0 x
x a r(
6 2
2 8
0 e
i 5
5 l
v 2
2 1
6 e n 5
2 R
E e
X 3
I 3
3 1
1 e
3 g
lAn 0
1 iC a
1 P e)
El g x
5 6
i n
Hl(
1 5
4 5
C 0
i 0
F a
h 1
4 0
0 5
5 1
6 C
I) e e
1 l
X t
e 3 a 3 a
g 3
1 o 3 i
a c l dAeP e) 0 ir i
l 1
Ca C
mE l (q 5
3 x
5 h
rl 5
4 0C 0
a l
e 1
0(
0 h
2 tn 2
4 0
1 0
5 C
3 6
I n t o
m n
i e
t t
5 5
5 5
e c
s 7
7 7
7 v
a y
r S
0 0
0 0
o 1
1 t
F n
e I
',, O o
n 2
2 i er 1
td o 0
0 0
5 cab 0
0 0
0 aMr r
i 0
0 0
0 1
1 F
A e
I X
md 1
3 u e 3
3 in v) 4 1
1 l
o g
0 o
0 0
1 i
i t v(
u x
0 0
C C
n 3
3 3
3 l
P 0
0 I
0 0
0 5
3 6
l e
as s
L s
i r r
F ru re e
l A
eP el dl so rf p
tk ek ds eo N
sh an l n ao v
O it rI li or ld or l e oa I
di i
rp a
so T
w dp t s n
P s
eS sl.
J em t
n ou i
5 o
C co a
os iP dh3 ca s
s2 i
S ro n
r I
or M
im M
n L
ch se -
a D
f O
mo O
ur A
l t yrU O
u P
pi n
d O
ao of e
L l a R
t rt R
so xw r
d c
A ao n
u nh N
e the L
ono L
r O
r L
stt S
C cl I
i l
A ci A
ue I
ti M
eia N
ndo P
t P
bn S
na R
dwi O
e A
ans gsi o.
d H
hao E
k n E
e l
L vm E
eka C
c r
R rt R
rri P
l o R
rnr E
eue I
0uu I
i oa X
oo I
iar MPa F
3bp F
Fff E
Sr F
Fti 1
1 l
3 l.
1 2
1 A
B B
B C
] g,
!t t
o n t
6 4
em e n) 0 0
s o9 1
1 a r(
x x
e 5
8 i
l v
e n 7
3 R
E e
g lAn a P e) 5 n El g 1
5 i
0 7
Hl(
F a
h 0
0 C
e t
e a
g i
n dAeP e) l mE q
5 rl l(
1 5
l a
0 7
e t
hC n
0 0
I n t o
m n
i e
e t
t 5
5 v
c s
7 7
a y
o r
S 0
0 t
F n
e f
o n
ier 2
tdo 0
cab 0
aMr r
i 0
1 F
A md u e in v) olo (g t
v u n l
0 I
P 1
1 n
oss iee sci onr l et 0
pun n
ud 0
xqe is P e 4
ee w
s se do 3r G
nnv 3
0e D
aoo o
el i
vl e 0
1 p L
cb B
r a
r l or 1
s.
a ofu gi n on n
v l
G ndo N
in e
3 nti D
i i
O e
a c
0 iaa L
des I
rth S
1 hf B
l ro S
il t st ial O
f u G
i r
N u
p L
ss D
ee O
bsx P
aes L
url I
te X
re B
Pik S
f n E
r l
f n O
oen
/
ed E
g i
L t a E
hlh R
hr P
%n R
t uc I
0 - p X
0oy I
i ou F
11 s E
1 cb F
E wm 2
~
~
LbV 1
1 J
D D
E
na TABLE II CALCULATED DOSES BY SCEtlARIO 50-Year Dose Release to Scenario Environment Dispersion Factors Commitment to Bone (a)
(s/m3) at Site Boundary (rem)
-7
-9
-3
- 6. 3x10 A.1 3.8x10 Pu(!IO )4 2.8x10 3
-7
-4 1.2x10 5.5x10
-7
-3
-5 A.2 1.1x10 Pu(fl0 )4 2.8x10 1.8x10 3
-4
-6 5.5x10 3.6x10
-6 4
A.3 2.2x10 Pu(fl0 )4 2.8x10 3.8x10 3
-4 7.5x10-5
- 5. 5x10 A.4 3.8x10 Pu(fl0 )4 2.8x10 6.3x10-3
-5
-3 3
-4
-3 5.5x10 1.2x10
-3
-I A.5 1.4x10 Pu(fl0 )4 2.8x10-3 2.3x10 3
-4
-2
- 5. 5x10 4.5x10
-9
-3 4.1x10-7 A.6 2.5x10 Pu(t10 )4 2.8x10 3
-4
-8
- 5. 5x10 8.1x10
-6
-3 2.5x10-4 A.7 1.5x10 Pu(fl0 )4 2.8x10 3
-4
-5 5.5x10 4.9x10
-4
-3 5.1 x10-2 A.8 3.1x10 Pu(!!0 )4 2.8x10 3
-4
-2 5.5x10 1.0x10 A.9 0.056 Pu(i!0 )4 2.8x10 9.2 3
-4 5.5x10 1.8 1619 350
y Release to 50-Year Dose Scenario Environment Dispersion Factors Commitment to Bone (g)
(s/m3) at Site Boundary (rem)
A.10 0.011 Pu(NO )4 2.8x10-3 1.8 3
-4
-I 5.5x10 3.6x10 A.ll 5.6x10-4 Pu(fl0 )4 2.8x10 9.2x10 3
-4
-2 5.5x10 1.8x10
-0
-4 B.1 2.2x10 Pu(fiO )4 2.8x10-3 3.8x10 3
-4
-5 5.5x10 7.5x10
-4
-3 3.8x10-2 B.2 2.2x10 Pu(f40 )4 2.8x10 3
-4
-3 5.5x10 7.5x10
-4
-3 4.6x10-2 B.3 2.8x10 Pu(f40 )4 2.8x10 3
-4
-3
- 5. 5x10 9.1x10 131
-3 C.1 15 Ci I
2.8x10 18.4 (Thyroid dose)
-4 5.5x10 3.6 (Thyroid dose) 133
-3 6500 Ci Xe 2.8x10 0.21 (y dose) 5.5x10 4.1x10-2(Y ' dose)
-4
-3 2.8x10 0.78 (B skin Jose)
-4 5.5x10 0.15 (S skin dose)
-6
-3
-3 D.1 7.5x10 Pu(NO )4 2.8x10 1.2x10 3
-4
-4 5.5x10 2.4x10
-4
-3
-2 D.2 3.8x10 Pu(NO )4 2.8x10 6.3x10 3
-4
-2 5.5x10 1.2x10 1619 351