ML19256B792
| ML19256B792 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 08/03/1979 |
| From: | Helfman S, Mazetis G Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19256B793 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 7908310002 | |
| Download: ML19256B792 (100) | |
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON TIIE ACCIDENT AT q
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9 DEPOSITION OF:
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CNITED STATES OF AMERICA 9
2 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON T!!E ACCIDENT AT T!!REE MILE ISLAND 3
4 5
6 DEPOSITION OF:
GERALD ROBERT MAZETIS 7
8 9
10 11 Rocm 1132 New Phillips Building 12 79 20 Norfolk Avenue Bethesda, Maryland 13 Augtst 3, 1979 14 9:48 o' clock a.m.
15 16 APPEARANCES:
17 On Behalf of the Commission:
Is ;
STAN IIELFMAN, ESQ.
I 19 j Associate Chief Counsel l
2100 M Street, N.W.
20 Washington, D.C.
20037 l
On Behalf of the NRC:
21 22 PAT DIXON, ESO.
Office of General Counsel 23 1717 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
24 i
1909 109 25 :
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- _X _H _I _B _I T_ _S E
9 NUMBER DESCRIPTION IDENTIFIED 3
1 Resume of Gerald Robert Ma:etis 5
4 2
Manetis trip report of 9/30/79 26 5
PB-I Site Visit for Abnormal Occurrence 6
3 May 18, 1979 letter from L.
- Roe, 32 Toledo Eidson, to Robert Reid, DOR, 3
entitled, " September 24, 1977 Event Review" 9
10 4
Memorandum dated October 20, 1977 46 from D. Ross, DOR, to K. Seyfrit, I6E, 33 re DB-I Abnormal Occurrence of 9/24/77 12 5
Ma:etis Notes of March 28-30, 1979 75 13 On-Site at TMI-II 14 6
May 21, 1979 memorandum from Manetis 76 g
to D. Crutchfield, Program Support Staff, NRR, with attached Record of 16 Actions, March 23-April 1, 1979 17 13 19 Exhibits are attached to this depcsition.
.;g 21 1909 110 22 23 l
l 24 Deposition consists of pages 1 through 33 l
l plus enclosures.
25 :i I
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_P _R _0 C _E _E _D _I _N _G _S 2
WHEREUPON, 3
GERALD ROBERT MA:ETIS 4
was sworn by Stan Helfman, Esquire, and was examined and 5
testified as follows:
6 DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. HELFMAN:
8 Q
Would you please state your full name for the record?
9 A
Gerald Robert Ma:etis.
10 Q
How do you spell Manetis?
11 A
M-a-:-e-t-i-s.
12 Q
Have you ever had your deposition taken before?
t.
13 A
No.
14 Q
Let me explain to you some of the characteristics of 15 the deposition we're going to do today.
Obviously, your 14 testimony is sworn, and as a result, even though it is given 1;
in the relative informality of an office in the NRC building, I
i is it will have the same solemnity and force as though it were 19 sworn testimony given in a Court of Law.
20 At the conclusion of the deposition, the court 21 i reporter will reduce your testimony to transcript form and in 22 the course of events you will be provided with a copy of the 23 transcript and given an opportunity to review it and to make 24 any changes that you deen are necessary.
I909 1i1 25 A
Good.
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Q You should be aware, however, that we have the 2
opportunity to comment on any changes that you make and if they 3
are, substantial, it could adversely affect your credibility.
4 Therefore, it is important for you to try to be as accurate 5
as possible today.
6 For the same reason, it's also important that you 7
ask for cl rification of any question that you don't fully 8
understand before you attempt to answer it.
For the benefit 9
of the court reporter, it's necessary to give audible responses 10 I see she is using a recording device rather than a stenographic device.
In any event, it would be helpful if you would allow 12 me to complete my questions before you attempt to answer even 13 if you know where my question is going, and I'll try to wait 14 until you complete an answer before I ask my next question.
It 15 is difficult for the tape machine to pick up two voices at the 16 same time and for her to then separate it out.
17 It's our practice at the conclusion of a ceposition IS to recess it rather than terminate it.
And that is in the 19 event we have further questions to ask of you, we simply 20 reconvene the deposition and continue.
21 Do you have any questions about any of the fo re go ing ?
1 22 A
No.
23 Q
You were asked to bring a resume with you.
Did cou 24 do so?
1909 112 25 A
Yes, I did.
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1 Q
May I have that, please?
2 I would like to have this resume marked as the first 3
exhibit to the deposition.
4 (WHEREUPON, the document referrec I
5 to was marked as Exhibit 1 to 6
the Deposition.)
7 Q
Does this resume accurately reflect vour educational, 8
professional, and employment background?
9 A
Yes, it does.
10 Q
An appropriate place to begin would be your title 11 with the NRC and a general brief description of your duties.
12 A
My title is Section Leader, Section A in the 13 Reactor Systems Branch.
My duties are the first line super-14 visor to a group of engineers in Reactor Systems, approximate 1'.
15 five or six engineers.
16 Q
Are you an engineer yourself
17,
A Yes, I'm an engineer.
And my particular responsi-18 bilities focus around the reactor systems consisting of ECCS 19i and RHR, residual heat removal systems, and Chapter 15 in the l
20 Safety Analysis Reports which are transients and accidents.
21 The responsibilities in particular are to more or less coordi-22l nate the reviews of these areas with the other engiacers in 23l the branch.
Their assignments are to each utility applicant I
I 24 l for a license whether it is construction permit or an operating i
1 25 license.
And engineer is assigned to the plant and is asked i
ll3 Acme Reporting Company 4
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to review these areas.
That could be 50 or 60 percent of an 2
engineer's assignment.
3 My other responsibilities include areas of generic 4
safety concerns that are outgrowths of either specific license 5
reviews or outgrowths of perhaps ACRS reviews or whatever the 6
source.
If they are identified as generic issues, I'm involved 7
with my section in reviewing the issues following and coordi-3 nating the resolution.
9 Q
Do you occupy essentially the same position that is to occupied by Sandy Isreal?
11 A
Yes.
Was occupied.
Under the current organization 12 in the staff, we're temporarily assigned the details to take 13 care of issues and safety concerns that are outgrowths of the i
14 Three Mile Island event, and as such, the assignments are 15 different.
Now, if we revert back to the previous organization, 16 right, he's got the other section.
There's Section A and 17 Section B-I've got Section A.
15 Q
It's anticipated that the present assignments are 19 temporary and that you will actually revert?
20 '
A Yes.
Right now I'm working for him instead of as cv Joac t'.
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22 Q
Could you describe how a construction permit applica-23l. tion.ge t s into your hands or eventually into the hands of one I
1909 114 24!
of the engineers on your team?
25 A
Yes.
It's fairly similar, whether it's a CP or OL I
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1 at my level.
The schedules are worked out by project manage-h 2
ment with applicants.
There's a lot of work to be done before 3
I get it.
Once the schedules involving meetings with licensees 4
by project managers setting up and planning the schedules for 3
review of safety analysis reports, this is a PSAR, the licensec e
the applicant, rather, submits the PSAR on the agreed-on schedule and the schedule will have already been laid out 3
describing when Reactor Systems, and for that matter, each 9
branch in NRC, would initiate and finish his review.
to So, when the safety analysis report is submitted, we 11 are expecting it because these schedules are laid out in w'at n
12 is called the blue book.
13 Once physically the FSAR or PSAR comes in-- for a CP 14 it would be PSAR--I make the assignment to the engineer, 15 depending on the workload at the time.
is ;
Q Does the CP application or the OL application come i-directly to you from Project Management, or does it come is through --
ig A
It comes through the secretary.
It comes directly to the branch chief and he assigns it to whichever section --
41 Q
Would that be Mr. Novak?
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i909 115 22 A
Right.
23 Q
It comes directly into the branch to Mr. Novak 24 rather than joing to Mr. Denton and down to Mr. Tedesco and t
23 then to Mr. Novak and then to someone on your team through vouh l
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A The physical box of SAR comes from the reception, 2
Document Receiving Room, directly to Novak as far as I know.
3 It doesn't find it's way to different people.
4 Q
What materials do you receive in addition to the 5
Do you receive inspection reports 6
from ISE, for example?
7 A
No.
As far as I'm concerned, for the CP or an OL, the 8
PSAR or FSAR is where it starts.
That's the only thing we get.
9 Just to clarify the last response, there may have been before 10 we receive the PSAR or FSAR some, I'll call it legwork per-11 formed by the project manager involving our branch.
For 12 example, in the process of meeting with the applicant over a 13 period of months in anticipation of submitting the safety 14 analysis report--this is the project manager's job--he will 15 try :o, and sometimes working through the technical branches 16 like curs, he'll try to work with the applicant to pull 17 together what's the ongoing activity in the Commission.
If 18 there are recent requirements, recent standards, he pulls these 19 together in a package form and talks and submits it to the 20 applicant.
So a lot of times there is that kind of legwork.
21 It could even involve ISE' I don't know.
Probably the best 22 story on that procedure could be taken from Project Management.
23 Q
What essentially does the engineer on your team do 24 when he receives the PSAR or the FSAR?
i909 116 i
25 A
Right.
He's responsible for the technical review of Acme Reporting Company n
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particular sections in the SAR, and he follows more recently, 2! being the past four or five years, we've got the Standard a
Review Plan, he follows the general guidelines offered in the 4
Standard Review Plan in terms of what r eas he is to look at 5
and the acceptance criteria for each of the areas, chapters, e
sections.
7 Q
Is he basically reviewing the SAR for compliance, s
or does he use the SAR as the benchmark against which he mea-9 sures something other than that for compliance?
What is he to doing?
11 A
Well, he's trying to make a determination, he's try-12 ing to make a finding.
The bottom line is he is to sit down la at the end of his review and write his safety evaluation for Phnd 14 that 9 an,
.?ormaly, the procedure, as long as I've been here, 4
13 six or seven years it has always turned out this way, there is are concerns at the end of a review that are open iter.s.
He's 1;
not finished talking to the applicant.
The applicant is either is continuing some work on some areas that he's asked them to do.
19 ; Just enough time hasn't gone by or the applicant has disagreed i! with that as a safety concern and wants some more talk, dialog.
np Q
Is your engineer reviewing the adequacy of the SAR 22 or is he comparing what the applicant is doing, vis-a-vis, the i909 117 a
SAa?
I 24 A
He's doing both, really.
There's a process that I
25 started I guess six-seven years age called the acceptance 4
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review where that's all he really does.
He doesn't look at it 2
technically, necessarily, when it first comes in.
He has a 3
period of time--several days--to take a quick look at the PSAR, 4
FSAR to see if, in fact, he's got something to review.
If 5
they've left out a chapter or section or it looks pretty bad, 6
he'll make a note of it, working through his management and 7
Project Manager, and the bottom line is say we're not going to 8
initiate our review until we get something worthwhile review-9 ing.
So there is that opportunity to review the SAR for 10 adequacy.
11 Q
Who provides the SAR?
When ycu refer to the 12 applicant, who is that?
13 A
Well, it would be the utility.
It would not be 14 the vendor, for example, manufacturer.
15 Q
Does the utility actually prepare the SAR?
Is that 16 normal practice?
17 A
It depends on the section in the FSAR, PSAR.
For 13 example, there 's Chapter 14 is a section on pre-operational 3
tests and stuff like that which the vendor, the manufacturer 20 of the NSSS, the nuclear steam supply system, wouldn't really 21 have all that in fo rmat io n.
It would be more related to the 22 utility's function.
So maybe he would be more involved in 1909 118 l
23 pulling that one together.
l 24 Whereas the sections like ECCS and the analytical 25 support in the Chapter 15, transients and accidents, he relies I,
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1 solely on his vendor, the canufacturer, for all those calcula-2 tions.
The way it works, speaking from having worked with 3
General Electric as a manufacturer for several years, the 4
vendor would receive requests from the utility, and they have 5
their own schedules on pulling together an FSAR or PSAR.
6 They'd pull together what their experience has shown that the 7
staff has required and would work through the utility, and the 8
utility would hopefully look at the information and agree 9
with the information.
If he doesn't, he'd work with his 10 vendor to get it changed.
And then the utility would submit 11 the information, would represent the owner of the information.
12 Q
Who is held responsible in this process for compli-13 ance with reg guides,for example, and with the requirements 14 that you compare the application to?
Is it the utility or 15 the party that supplies the information, the party that 16 actually supplies the information to you?
17 A
- Utility, l
isl Q
The utility is held responsible even though the I
19 i information may come directly from a vendor with the utility 1909 119 20 acting as a mere conduit?
j 21 A
It's not always clear, I admit.
It depends on the 22 topic, because there may be instances, for exanple, there 23 " might be a regulation specifically on the design of ECCS.
A 24,
utilit:. would rely mostly on the vendor to defend and support 25 his design.
So while we're working with the utility to answer Acme Reporting Company
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I to a question on adequacy on the criteria: it's really relying 2
mostly on the vendor.
But we always, as well as I recall, 3
always hold the utility responsible.
4 Q
Does it appear to you that in this particular 5
arrangement, where the technical information is upplied by 6
the vendor and then transmitted to you through the utility and 7
then you deal with the utility and hold the utility responsible 8
for that information, that the party that's held responsible 9
is the party least likely to have the technical competence to 10 deal with the issue?
11 A
What was the first part of the question?
I heard 12 the last part but I didn't hear the first part.
13 Q
Could we have the question read back, please?
14 (The question was read back.)
15 Q
I will rephrase the question.
I gather from what 16 you've said that when it comes to technical matters concerning 17 equipment in the plant, such as the ECCS, the vendor has the is i technical knowledge to answer the questions that may be posed 19 by your branch rather than the utility.
The vendor prepares 20 the response and it's routed to you through the utility, the 21 utility acting basically as a conduit.
Then you deal with the 22 utility on that question.
i909 120 23 A
Yes.
24 Q
Does it appear to vou that in this transaction, in 25 this type of an interaction, that the party least capable of A. cme Reporting Company l
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I responding is the party which is held responsible?
2 A
Yes.
However, I know, based on my experience, for 3
every utility I worked with, it's always, if there is a 4
technical issue or safety concern, that we're always working 5
with the vendor, too, with the utility.
I can't remember any 6
particular situation where we relied solely on the utility's response on a safety concern, that we didn't know that he s
was working with his vendor.
9 Also, I wouldn't really downgrade too much the 10 capability of the utility, because my experience is, at least 11 with the engineers I've worked with, they are pretty know-12 ledgeable engineers, and it's not unusual for a utility to 13 bounce a safety problem or a response to a safety concern back 14 at the vendor because perhaps the vendor didn't get the story 15 across well enough.
16 But, I'm talking generalities, I'm sure there might 17 be a utility out there, there are probably different degrees is of knowledge of utilities.
19 Q
I imagine it would depend on the size of the utility 20 and its previous experience with nuclear reactors?
21 l A
Yes.
Yes, that's true.
i909 121 22 Q
Would it seem to you to be a more reasonable approach l 23 to deal directly with the vendor and to nuld the vendor 24 responsible for those pieces of equipment and that technical 25 knowledge which is peculiar to the vendor?
Neuld that seem Acme Reporting Company l
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I like a more direct approach to you?
2 A
That, I guess my personal opinion is yes, except fo r 3
one problem, and that is the utility is the one that is going 4
to be operating the plant, and while I think probably it 5
might work faster to go directly to the vendor --
6 MR. DIXON:
Off the record, please, for one second.
7 (WHEREUPON, a discussion was held off the record.)
8 MR. HELFMAN:
Back on the record.
9 BY MR. HELFMAN:
10 Q
If an engineer on your staff has questions or prob-11 lens with an SAR, how does he deal with the utility?
12 A
I guess it depends on the issue.
The normal proce-13 dure is to make an assignment of a case, the utility SAR, to u
the engineer.
And there are milestones in the review process.
Is He's given -- His first milestone is to review, I'm assuming 16 the acceptance review has passed by which he spend a few days I;
and took a quick look and made sure all the information was is there.
19 Q
And has decided thr.
there was enough there to do a 20 review?
21 A
Right.
Now he initiates his review.
By the way, as 22 I indicated before, if there wasn't enough information, we 23 would request to the utility through the Projects people the 24 additional information.
1909 122 25 Q
Are there further contacts that the engineers on l
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I your staff have with the utility through the Project Management 2
Division, or do you deal --
3 A
Normally through the project manager.
4 Q
Do your people also deal directly with the utility 5
or directly with the vendor?
6 A
Not normally, no, but there occasions when we do.
7 It depends on the stage of the licensing process.
For example, s
if it's, say, a couple of days before an ACRS meeting and we 9
wanted to clarify a point, there would be no time for a docu-10 mented exchange.
Depending on the issue, but the first attempt 11 would be to get with the project manager, call up the 12 applicant, and discuss it on the phon.e.
13 Or, myself, I usually call the project manager and 14 give him the option.
I say I want to talk to the licensee, 15 the applicant, about this area, and I could call him myself if 16 you want.
If he wants to be involved, it's up to him.
17 Q
When questions are posed in that fashion and an le answer is provided over the phone, is there any documentation 19 that goes into the file concerning the questions posed and 20 the answers received?
21 A
Sometimes' it depends on the issue, If it is just 22 a simple clarification of a point --
23 Q
There might be no record of that conversation?
x.
1909 123 A
,ight.
I 25 Q
You indicate in your resume that you have been l
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responsible for the review of various safety systems of 2
Davis-Besse Unit I.
Were you a section leader at the time that 3
Davis-Besse I was up for review or were you an engineer on a 4
team?
5 A
I was an engineer.
6 Q
On a team?
7 A
Yes.
8 Q
Do you recall whether that was the CP applicatioi.
9 or the OL?
10 A
OL.
11 Q
Do you recall whether your responsibility for the 12 Davis-Besse Unit I applicaton was before you are or after 13 the September 24, 1977 transient at Davis-Besse?
14 A
Before.
15 Q
And was it in your hands during the time of that 16 transient as well, or had you completed the OL review?
17 A
It was complete.
Right.
When the OL -- They don't i
18 'loperateuntil they leave our hands, and we turn it over to DOR.
19l Q
Had Davis-Besse I been turned over to DOR at the 1
4 20 time of the September 1977 transient, to the best of your 21 recollection?
22 A
I don't recall.
The project manager would have that 23 answer.
I assume it was, if it was operating.
1909 124 l
24j Q
And it was otit of your hands?
25 A
It was out of my hands as a reviewer.
I was a l
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1 section leader at the time.
The review was a couple years 2
before that, the actual operating license review.
3 Q
Was that review undertaken before the SRP went into 4
effect?
5 A
My recollection is yes.
The review was around
'74, 6
during that approximate time period, and I think the Standard 7
Review Plans came out in
'75<,
that's my recollection.
S Q
Normally, when an OL application has been reviewed, 9
has been completed by you or someone on your staff, does that to end your connection with that particular plant?
11 A
As it turns out, normally, no, because there are 12 usually loose ends.
There's a kind of a turnover period where i
13 the review is complete but there may have been some loose ends 14 technically; for example, conditions on the operating license 15 could exist where as the engineer may be the one most familiar 16 with the technical issue.
So if that's a carry-over, I might IT stick with that technical issue until that's resolved.
16 Q
Even after the plant was turned over to DOR?
19 A
Yes.
20 Q
And at the time the plant is turned over to DOR, the 21 plant has received its operating license?
22 A
Normally, yes.
23 Q
Can you think of any instances in which DOR accepted 24 a plant that had not received an operating license?
25 A
To tell you the truth I'm not really up on the 1909
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specific procedure of projects while I was -- I can't answer 2
that question.
3 Q
How is the decision made to authorize the giving 4
of an operator's license while open items remain?
5 A
How is -- Repeat the question, please?
6 Q
How is the decision made to grant an operating 7
license to a plant despite the existence of open items?
8 A
I can't really answer that question because the big 9
picture on open items really rests with the coordinators 10 which are the projects people.
I'm responsible for, in the 11 branch, review of particular areas like ECCS, technical areas.
12 If there's an open area, the normal procedure is to pursue the 13 open area until the item is resolved.
That's the normal 14 procedure.
15 There may be -- Unfortunately, I can't think of a 16 specific.
There may be an item which carried over that the 17 decision is made by upper management to resolve it after they is,
go into operation.
i 19 ^
Q Who would make that decision?
20 A
I can't say.
It would start with the engineer first 21 and probably go up the line.
l 22 Q
The initial recommendation would go from the entineet i
on your team, for example?
1909 126 23 24 A
Right.
25 Q
And then would you be in a position to either concur l
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1 or disagree?
2 A
Yes.
I would suspect, in my judgment, it would be 3
an item that came up and had been under discussion for months 4
and maybe there are some areas that could be analytical, could 5
be something, enough time hasn't gone by to solve the problem, 6
and the decision could be made that we've reached the point 7
where, let's say, all the items are resolved except this one.
8 And a decision would have to be made whether we think it's 9
enough of a safety problem or is it a safety problem, is it to just a clarification or confirmation of something, to hold up 11 the operating license.
12 Q
What interests are served by granting an operating 13 license prior to the closing of all open items?
14 A
I can't answer that question.
My personal opinion 15 is if it's not a safety concern then the interests of the con-16 sumers, they get the power out to the consumer quicker.
1; Q
Do the engineers on your team review non-safety 18 items, non-safety related iems?
19 A
Yes.
They may be reviewing a system.
It may be a 20 safety system where perhaps they know the answer to the ques-21 tion.
They have no safety concern but maybe additional docu-l 22 mentation is needed in a certain area.
I'm having 23 trouble finding a specific.
Ne're respensible, it's true, I
l 24 for safety matters, but the hundreds of questions that are l
25 asked on any given case or utility application, not all of l
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Acme Reporting Company 1909 127
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them are directly, as it turns out, safety problems.
In facc, 2
most of them are not.
3 Q
Most of them are not safety problems, but they con-4 cern safety related equipment or safety related systems?
5 A
Right.
6 Q
With respect to the Davis-Besse Unit I plant, did 7
you have any involvement with that plant after you had com-S pleted your review of the OL application?
9 A
My recollection is there were several areas that to we followed up on Davis-Besse subsequent to the operating 11 license and I'm having trouble recalling all of them.
12 Q
Let me try to pin it down to the area of my specific 13 concern.
14 A
Okay.
15 Q
Did you have any direct involvement in the 16 September 24, 1977 transient?
17 A
Yes.
18 Q
What was your involvement and how did you get 19 involved?
20 A
Okay.
About a week after the event, I was asked to l 21 take part in a trip out to Davis-Besse to gather some informa-22 tion on what facts were, what existing facts in the event and 23 discussions with the licensee.
24 Q
Who requested your going out there for investigative 25 purposes?
1909 128 l
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1 A
I don't recall who the individual -- My assumption 2
right now is it was my immediate supervisor, Tom Novak, prob-3 ably originating from Roger Matson, the Director.
4 Q
Isn't it normally the function of ISE to do on-site 5
investigations of transients?
6 A
Yes.
That's my understanding, yes.
7 Q
Was ISE actively involved in investigating this 3
transient as far as you know?
9 A
Yes.
10 Q
Do you have any idea why Mr. Novak or his superior 11 would have requested an independent investigation by you?
12 A
I think that term " investigation" is a little strong.
13 I think, in my opinion as to why we went out there is because 14 we didn't have enough information and we had a lot of questions 15 about what took place.
We were having discussion, not me 16 personally, but there were discussions taking place with I5E 17 who had some information, and I think, my opinion is, Roger 15 just wanted to get straight scoop from one of his people, one 19 of his staff members.
20 Q
Is it your impression that the feeling was that 15E 21 was not doing an adequate investigation of the transient?
22l A
No. No.
I can't put myself in Matson's mind, but i
23 I just assume he wanted -- He didn't know how it was going to 24 turn out in terms of our involvement at the time, and probably 25 wanted to get started out with the best information he could i909 129 l
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get.
2 Q
If my understanding is correct, Davis-Besse received 3
its operating license prior to the Septembe; 197-transient?
4 A
That's my assumption; they were operating.
5 Q
What possible involvement could your branch have with 6
a reactor that had already received both its CP and OL?
7 A
I can't answer the question.
Ask Roger Matson.
8 Ne're interested -- We work with DOR closely.
In fact, a lot 9
of those engineers, when the reorganization took place, are 10 my peers and we work together and we have interchanges 11 frequently.
It could have been a manpower decision, too.
12 Roger knew I was the engineer that was familiar with Davis-13 Besse.
It just so happened I was probably one of the few guys 14 in his staff that had as much experience on 36W plants as I 15 have.
And he probably thought to himself it wouldn't hurt.
16 Q
What did you prepare as a result of your investiga-17 tion?
Did you prepare an investigation report or anything of i
IS that sort?
19 A
Like I say, it wasn't really an investigation.
I i
20 '
just went out there with the idea of learning what the event 21 was so that I could fill in any blanks that management had, 22 and I took with myself several other engineers and spent the 1
23 -
day at Davis-Besse with the licensee, and came back.
And to I
24 answer your direct question -- Before I answer vour question, I
i 25 I should say that I don't really remember directly, it was long Acme Reporting Company 1909 130
\\
c.
~..
23 s
I enough ago where I don't remember specifically any particular 2
events that took place that week.
But I did review my notes 3
and the statements are what I am assuming from my notes.
4 Q
Let me ask you a further question.
Do you recall who 5
it was that you took with you to Davis-Besse?
6 A
Based on my notes, I took with me the project manager 7
for Davis-Besse.
8 Q
Who was that?
9 A
Leon Engle.
I'll look at my notes now.
I took 10 an engineer by the name of Andy S:ukiewic:; an engineer by the 11 name of Vince Long; and an engineer by the name of J. Rajan.
12 Okay.
That was on September 30, 1977, which was on a Friday.
13 Q
Within the week of the accident?
14 A
The 24th was the accident, so this was six days 15 later.
16 Q
I see that you are referring to a book of notes.
IT May I please see your book of notes?
's A
Yes.
19 Q
It starts on this page entitled, " Davis-Besse I 20 Site Visit"?
21 A
Right.
22 Q
How far along does it go?
23 A
It goes to the end of this page.
24 Q
On the basis of your notes, do you recall preparing 05 a trip report on the Davis-3 esse I incident?
1 Acme Reporting Company l
1
la s
1 A
Yes.
I prepared a trip report.
I don't recall when.
2
.N!y assumption is over the weekend, using my notes.
3 Q
Did you bring a copy of that with vou?
4 A
Yes, I did.
ape 2-A 5
Q This page, does this refer to the Davis-Besse 1 6
incident, or is a note of some other' 7
A That's some other subject.
8 Q
On the third page of your notes in your notebook 9
you indicate that on September 2 there was an event similar 10 to the one you are investigating.
Do you recall in what 11 respects that transient was similar to the one you were 12 investigating?
13 A
No, I don't.
I'm sorry.
But according to my notes 14 it looks like the same event, being a feadwater malfunction.
15 But this time both auxiliary feedwater pumps started all right.
16 In other words, they didn't have the one train of the auxiliary 17 feedwater system failing.
15 I Q
Did you attempt to examine any LER's on that?
19 Or would there have been an LER on that transient?
20 A
There -- I can't answer that question.
But my 21 assumption is there was an LER and I don't recall that I did
.,, i look at any LER's.
23 Q
Would it be possible for you to obtain for us the LER on the September 2 transient?
]gQg ) 24 I 25 A I could look for it, yes. Acme Reporting Company
25 I Q Let's see; maybe if I provide you with a piece of O 2 paper as I have a request you can jot them down. 3 A Sure. 4 Q Do you think it would be possible to arrange to have 5 someone look for that during the course of the deposition? 6 A Yes, I can do that. I Q Let's go off the record while that's being done. 3 (WHEREUPON, the proceedings paused.) 9 MR. HELEMAN: The record should re flect that 10 Mr. Manetis has made arrangements to nave that LER brought to 11 us during the course of the deposition. 12 BY MR. HELFMAN: 13 Q During the break, did you not also make a Xerox copy 14 of the person notes that you kept of your visit to Davis-Besse 15 I on September 30, 1977? 16 A Yes, I did. And also I don't know that an LER does II exist on the September 2 event. I'm assuming that there is 18 one. 19I Q We'll find out one way or the other, ao A Yes. 21 Q Is this the Xerox copy of the personal notes that i 22 you kept of the meeting -- excuse me -- of your investigation, i .,.3 using that word loosely, of the Davis-Besse I transient? y-A Right. These are the notes I took while I was at a 25l meeting with the licensee on September 30, and toward the last 1909 133 Acme Reporting Company . w. ~,,.
26 s I couple pages are what I think are a summation of notes I took, 2 maybe on the airplane. It doesn't look like I took these two 3 pages at the meeting. 4 Q We would like to have this set notes -- On the first 5 page contains the date, September 30, 1977, and the title, 6 " Davis-Besse I Site Visit for Abnormal Occurrence", marked 7 as Exhibit 2. s (WHEREUPON, the document referred 9 +o was marked as Exhibit 2 to the 10 Deposition.) 11 Q We should note for the record that the trip report, 12 a copy of which you have also provided us, which has your name 13 in the upper righthand corner on the first page, the title, 14 " Trip Report Davis-Besse I Abnormal Occurrence 9/24/77" has 15 already been marked as an exhibit to the Denny Ross deposition. 16 Let me call your attention to page 6 of the trip 17 report that you prepared. In the first full paragraph, you've IS stated. "The operator secured ECCS, turned off HPI pumps at 19 4-1/2 minutes after his manual scram (he observed a restoratiort 20l and increasing pressuriting level)." 21'l I note that in your personal notes at the end where 22 you've made a list of some 17 points concerning the transient 23 but I don't see this concern specifically addressed--perhaps 24 you can find it--in the 16 or 17 points, and pqi.g t to 25l me? Acme Reporting Company
~ 27 1 A I don't see it either. 2 Q In your mind was operator turning off HPI pumps a 3 significant contributor to this transient or significant point? 4 A A contributor to the transient, no, I don't think so. 5 But it was an area that, according to my notes which I looked 6 at prior to this meeting, that I had apparently in my own mind 7 made a note to follow-up on in terms of thinking more about it 8 myself or highlighting to whoever would follow up on the 9 concerns that came out of the abnormal occurrence. 10 Q To whom did you provide, if anyone, a copy of the 11 trip report that you prepared? 12 A Well, let's say once again, Stan, my memory is pretty 13 dim on the details and my assumption is that I sent the 14 original to Roger Matson, and I assume I sent copies to Denny 15 Ross and Tom Novak. My notes don't indicate who I sent it to. 16 However, I did not write the notes for myself. IT Q You wrote them with the intent of distributing to 18 someone? 19 A I assume I was asked to do it, to jot down my thoughts, Nl and that's what I did, i 21 Q Do you recall the reason that the operator turned i 22 off the ECC at 4-1/2 minutes after his manual scram? i 23 A I don't recall specifically, but according to my 24l notes and from what I've learned later, he did it observing 1909 133 25! pressuri:er level. Acme Reporting Company
28 1 Q At the time that he observed, according to your notes 2 increasing pressuri:er level--again, I'm re ferring to page 6 3 of your trip report--he had not yet discovered that the PORV 4 had stuck open; is that correct? 5 A It looks that way. I don't recall specifically. 6 Yes, it was around 15 minutes that he closed PORV, and it 7 looks like he secured HPI around five minutes, four or five 8 minutes. 9 Q Nould it appear to you that. increasing pressuriner 10 level indication at the same time that the PORV was stuck 11 open could have provided the operator with misleading informa-12 tion about the coolant level in trae core? 13 A Yes. 14 Q Did that connection occur to you at the time you 15 were looking into the Davis-Besse transient as the reason that 16 HPI was terminated despite the stuck open PORV' 17 A Once again, I don't specifically recall, I can just 18I look at av notes. And I had it in my mind as an area to l l 19I pursue, but I just don't remember. l 20 Q In your personal notes which you made of the meeting l 21 on September 30, point number 16 you.'ve indicated as " adequacy 22 of info to operators regarding 1/2-trips." 23 A Right. 24 Q What was your concern in that regard--operator 25 training? i l l Acme Reporting Company l
29 1 A Once again, I don't recall specifically, but based 2 on my notes I'd say that that referred to indication available 3 to the operators as to what was going on with regard to their 4 system in Davis-Besse which call safety features -- excuse me - 5 steam and feedwater rupture control system, which is a safety 6 System. It's a control system and it's supposed to detect 7 and actuate for steam line breaks, feedwater line breaks S certain safety systems. And it either re fers to that or refers 9 to reactor trips. But my assumption it was the steam and 10 feedwater rupture control system. 11 Q Would that control system cause a reactor trip? 12 A I don't think so. That's my recollection. 13 Q You specifically indicate here that you are concerned 14 with the adequacy of info to operators regarding half trips. 15 A It must be the feedwater rupture control system, 16 because that is what initiated the event. Apparently they got IT a spurious half trip and it further resulted in a full trip 18 and loss of feedwater. 19 Q Do you recall whether the operator at the time the 20 PORV was stuck open had an indicator in the control room that 21 he could look at to see whether it was open or closed? 22 A I don't recall. But I later learned apparently that 23 he had some indication but it wasn't a direct indication of 24jl PORV position. It was later one of the design changes that 25 they did themselves. i909 137 Acme Reporting Company
30 1 Q Is it your understanding that a direct indicator of 9 2 PORY position was installed as a result of this transient or 3 following this transient? 4 A Yes, a more positive indication of PORY position 5 was installed as a result of this transient, according to the 6 licensee. That's why I knew it. 7 Q Do you recall whether that was a solenoid command 8 indicator or whether it was an actual position indicator' 9 A My recollection it was an actual. It used to be 10 solenoid, and it was changed to a position indication of the 11 pilot operated stem, which is one step removed from the actual 12 valve. That's my recollection. 13 Q Do vou recall how long after the transient that 14 indicator was installed? 15 A I'm sorry; I don't. 16 Q Would it have been before the end of 1977? 17 A Possibly. ISE, as maybe you know, were the ones is that were following up on those areas. 19 Q Where did you hear that a direct position indicator 1 20 at the stem had been installed at Davis-Besse' Do you recall?i i i 21 A Yes. When we were requiring it a month ago, two 22 months ago, on all B5W reactors and we reviewed Davis-Besse I 23 and saw that they had it. 24 - Q Is there some documentation to that effect that you I I 25l could provide us? A report, a memorandum, anything? 1909 138 i Acme Reporting Company l
31 s 1 A There's the -- I'm trying to think of the best piece 2 of information. I believe we discussed it in the staff safety 3 evaluation of Davis-Besse which allowed them to start back up 4 recently. I could get a copy of that. 5 Q Could you arrange for that while the deposition is 6 ongoing? 7 A Yes, I could do that now. 8 Q Let's go off the record while those arrangements 9 are being made. 10 (WHEREUPON, the deposition paused for above action.) 11 BY MR. HELFMAN: 12 Q Mr. Manetis, have you been able to find any docu-13 mentation with respect to the indicator that was put on the 14 PORV following the Davis-Besse I incident of September 1977' 15 A Yes. I have a letter from the licensee, Toledo i 16 Edison, dated May 18, 1979 where recently during our evaluation 17 of the B5W reactors they indicated the status of the PORV 15 indication. 19 Q This is a document which bears the date May 18, 1979, 20 It is directed to Robert N. Reid, Chief of Operating Reactors i 21 I Branch No. 4, Division of Operating Reactors. It is signed 22 'cy Lowell E. Roe, Vice President of Facilities Development of 23 ' Toledo Edison. That letter covers a two-page document l i 24 entitled, " September 24, 1977 Event Review." Ne'd like to 25 have this marked as Exhibit 3 to the Deposition. l 1909 139 Acme R e p o r h.ng Company i
3 1 (WilEREUPON, the document re fe rred 2 to was marked as Exhibit 3 to 3 the Deposition.) 4 Q On page 3 of the Exhibit 3, or the second page of .5 the event review, at the end of the first paragraph, it states: 6 " Indication on the mechanical linkage of the pilot valve for the PORV was added to provide the operator better 8 status of the position of the PORV (Facility Change Request 9 77-351)." 10 Would I be correct in concluding that indication on 11 nechanical linkage as compared to indication of command to 12 the solenoid is a direct or more direct indicator of PORV 13 position? I' A Yes. 15 Q Do you know whether this indication on the PORV 16 mechanical linkage was added at Davis-Besse I prior to the 17 transient at T>11-II of Starch of this year? Is ! A Yes, it was. I i i 19 Q Do you know the approximate date when that was addedt 20 A Sorry, I do not. It would be subsequent to the l time I went up to the ;ite that week of the event, but there 21 l 22i was no follow-up. I didn't really follow it, so I don't l 21 l recall. I could probab1;. call the applicant and find out. i l 24 Q Could you do that? I 25 i A Yes. I i 1 l Acme P,e p o r tin g Company
33 1 Q Could you do that before the deposition is complated? 2 A Sure. 3 Q Could you do that now? 4 A Yes. Q Let's go off the record while that is done. o 6 (WHEREUPON, the deposition paused for above action.) 7 BY MR. HELFMAN: 8 Q I understand you've made arrangements to obtain the 9 information. 10 A Yes. Hopefully, within the
- 2. ext half-hour I will 11 have some information.
12 Q All right. Would you agree that the Davis-Besse 13 scenarie of September 1977 predicted in many ways the TMI-II 14 transient of March cf this year? 15 A I don't kn. if predicted is the right word. It 13 was similar in several ways to the TMI-II accident, similar in 17 that the initiating event involved feedwater system.
- However, is there were major dissimilarities that resulted in the event 19,
being much less severe. I 20 Q Such as the plant not operating as high a capacity 21 as TMI-II, for example? 22 A That plus another one would be aux feed came on on jgQg }4] 23 one train. 24 Q The first page of the event review prcvided by j 25 Toledo Edison, which has been marked as Exhibit No. 3 to this l Acme Reporting Company
34 I deposition, the following is stated in the second paragraph 2 regarding similarity between the Davis-Besse September 1977 3 transient and TMI: 4 "This event was similar to the TMI incident in that 5 the event was initiated by a loss of feedwater resulting in a 6 reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure surge which epened the 7 power operated relief valve (PORV). The PORV failed open, S causing loss of coolant and coolant pressure with some voiding 3 in the RCS, and a subsequent increase in indicated pressurizer 10 leve. (characteristic of a leak in the top of the pressurizer). 11 As at TMI, the operators initially failed to recognize the oper 12 PORY and when pressurizer level started increasing as voids 13 developed in the RCS, the operators shut off the high pressure 14 injection pump." 15 Would you agree that this is an accurage evaluacion 16 of the similarities between the Davis-Besse I transient and 17 the TMI transient of March of this year? 15l A Yes. i 19 l Q Let me read to you at this time -- 20 A If I may amplify the last, i 21 Q Please go ahead. 1909 142 22 A That's an accurate depiction of some of the f 23 similarities, but again there were differences that may be, 24 l I don't know, in their write-up they may discuss them, I I 25j dirrerences inclucing one I just mentioned, that the aux feed 4 i 1 I Acme Reporting Company i i n 4 2, m.
35 I started up, one train of aux feed. The power level was differ-2 ent, you just mentioned. Operator responded faster to close 3 the PORY. Reactor coolant pumps were left on, another differ-4 ence. Another difference was they did get containment isola-5 tion so that there wasn't radioactivity pumped outside of the 6 building. There may have been other, but they are some I 7 recall. 9 So it is not that it was one for one type of thing. 9 There were differences. 10 Q All right. Allow me to read to you a portion of 11 Chairman Hendrie's identification of what he consiaered to be 12 six main factors that caused an increase to the severity of 13 the accident at Three Mile Island. This is part of a state-14 ment he gave on April 10, 1979. I'm referring to a document 15 which has already been marked as Exhibit 2 to the Sandy Isreal 16 deposition. On page 10, under the,ubheading " Conclusion" it l~ reads: 19 "The staff has identified six main factors that 19 caused an increase to the severity of the accident as follows:" l 20l Paragraph 2 on page 10 reads-21l "The presurrizer electronatic relief valve which 22, opened during the initial pressure surge failed to close when I i I the pressuri:er decreased below the actuation level. This i 23, I 24 failure was not recognized and the relief line closed for some; I 25 time." 909 143 l A c rno Reporting Company i
36 1 Paragraph 3 on page 11 reads: 2 "Following rapid depressurization of the pressurizer, 3 the pressurizer level indication may have led to erroneous 4 inferences of high level in the reactor coolant system. The 5 pressuriner level indication apparently led the operators to e prematurely terminate high pressure injection flow even though 7 substantial voids existed in the reactor coolant system." 8 In your opinion, are the similarities that are 9 described in the event review and which you avert to in your 10 trip report concerning misleading information provided to the 11 operator by pressurizer level indication and the operator 12 then terminating HP1 based on that information basically pre-13 dict er describe the two factors that Chairman Hendrie has 14 concluded were among the main factors that contributed to thc 15 TMI-II event? 16 A
- Yes, 17 Q
Let me show you a document which bears the title, is i " Loop Seals and Pressuri er Surge 1.ine," with date January 10, l 19 197S, the signature of Thomas M. Novak, Chief of the Reactor i 20 ' Systems Branch, and which has already been marked as an 21 exhibit to the Sandy Isreal Deposition. Have you see this 22 document before? Want me to show it to you? 23 i A Yes, I have. i 24 Q Do you recall whether you saw this document for the 2 25 first time prior to the TMI-II incident? t Acme Reporting Comp}Onh 4 l I
37 1 A Dimly, yes, I recall. ~ Q What is a review reminder? 3 A For a variety of reasons during the process of 4 reviews of plants questions come up that I may have in my own 5 mind, maybe the birth of the question or maybe the branch 6 chief or maybe even an engineer, and to insure that follow-up 7 takes place rather than going around to each of the engineers 8 and saying do this, do this, do this, it's just a handy means 9 of putting forth thoughts on follow-up needed in certain areas. 10 This is an example of one such meno that Sandy and Tom 11 apparently thought we should be pursuing during our reviews. 12 Q Would this January 10, 197S memorandum be a review 13 reminder? 14 A I would characteri:e it as a review reminder, yes. 15 Yes, a good characterization. 16 Q Was this distributed to the members of the Reactor 17 Systems Branch? Is A I don't recall specifically but it was addressed to 19 them, so I assume yes, it was. 20 Q What would an engineer on your staff do with a 21 review reminder' 22 A If he's in the process of a review of a plant, he 23 would use that review reminder, in particular any recommenda-l tiens which came from the reminder, to follow-up inquiries 24 25 with the licensee or the applicant, really. 1909 145 Acme Reporting Company
38 1 Q Let me refer you to a number of statements made in 2 the January 10, 1978 memorandum. In paragraph one, beginning 3 with the fifth line down, it reads: 4 "Under upset conditions (such as prolonged relief 5 valve opening) and accidents where significant voids are 6 formed in the primary system it may be possible to end up with 7 a two-phase mixture in the pressurizer that is not at the 8 highest temperature in the primary system. Under these circum-9 stances, additional loss of primary system inventory or 10 shrinkage in the primary system may not be indicated by 11 pressuri:er level. This situation has already occurred at 12 Davis-Bes3e I when a relief valve stuck open." 13 Then in paragraph three: 14 "Although the safety analyses do not require termina-15 tion of the makeup system, operators would control makeup flow 16 based on the pressurizer level as part of their normal proce-17 dures. As a result, under certain conditions where the 18 pressuriner could behave as a manometer, the operator could 19 erroneously shut off makeup flow when significant void occurs 20 elsewhere in the system or loss of inventory is continuing." 21 In your opinion, does the memorandum of January 10, 22 197S likewise predict the concerns that were addressed by l i i 23 Chairman Henrie in his April 10 statement followingtheTMI-IIl i 21 incident regarding misicading information to the operator as 25 to core coolant level based on pressuri:er level and errencous i Acme Reporting Company 1909 146 t ~ .2 .u .n
39 I termination of HPI based on that information by the operator? 2 A With hindsight, I guess the answer would have to be 3 positive, and that is yes. However, you've got to also under-4 stand that there was no particular emphasis, putting myself in 5 the place of the engine'er at the time, and engineer reviewing 6 the plant, there was no particular emphasis of Chairman 7 Hentdrie 's war-ds or these words you j us t read, so that this con-S cern or recommendation or reminder was amongst an engineer's 9 mind along with the hundred or so things that he had follow-up 10 with if he was reviewing a case. 11 First of all, the review reminder may or may not be 12 appropriate to what he was doing at the time. So if that's 13 the case, depending on the engineer, he would either file it 14 for future reference, or if he was working on the case he would 15 p ro b ab 1:. include it in his current file. 16 Q All right, somewhat apart from the question of what 17 would be -- excuse me, how a reviewer might have reacted to i i this memorandum, it is accurate that the portions of the 18 19 memorandum which I've read to you do predict the concerns 20 i addressed by Chairman Hendrie, as does the event review pro-21 vided by Toledo Edison as did the trip report that you preparea 22 after visiting the site? 23l A They relate to the same scenario, all related to i909 147 l 24! pressuri er level indication. l 25 lj Q As possibly an inaccurater of core coolant level? l Acme Reporting Company l I 1
40 1 A Yes. 2 Q Do you recall if you provided Mr. Israel with a copy 3 of your trip report? 4 A I don't recall, but my assumption is no. 5 Q What is the concern that underlies the concern that 6 an operator may erroneously terminate HPI despite the existenc( 7 of voids or substantial loss of coolant based on misleading 8 information as to core coolant level? 9 A What is the concern? 10 Q Yes. 11 A The concern is that he would prematurely secure the 12 cooling system when it was actually needed elsewhere in the 13 system to keep the core cool. I Q What is the concern that HPI would be terminated 14 15 when HPI is needed in the primary system? 16 A Well, the function of the system is to replace the 17 coolant being lost through a break or PORV ::"ing or wherever 16 in the system. So it supplants that cooling that is being 19 lost. 20 Q What is the significance of the operator failing to 21 -- excuse me -- of the operator terminating HPI when coolant 22 is needed in the system? 23 A The significance is if you don't replace the coolant 24 that is being lost, the function of the coolant is to keep 25 the fuel cool, and the fuel will go through a thermal 1909 148 ,i j Acme Reporting Company d
41 lfctrrstbr/f 1 excursion -eg-ee-t-mm. It would increase beyond its capabili-2 ties if enough coolant was lost. Ultimately, that's the 3 concern. 4 Q And the result of such a loss of coolant and increase 5 in temperature would be what? 6 A Ultimately fuel perforation or fuel danage, whatever 7 you want to call it. 8 Q Core uncovering? 9 A Core uncovering, yes. 10 Q Is that the basic concern that underlies the dis-11 cussion in the event review as provided by Toledo Edison, 12 your discussion concerning premature termina tion of HPI by the 13 operator in your trip report, and the discussion concerning 14 erroneous termination of HPI based on misleading information 15 as to core coolant level addressed in the Novak memorandum is of January 10, 197S? 17 A Yes, except at the time of my memorandum I don't is recall in particular what was in my mind, but obviously I 19 wrote it down thinking -- I would assume there was a question 20 in my mind is this the right thing to do. So, yes, that's 21 the ultimate concern--keeping the core cool. i 22 Q Did you prepare a review reminder for the people on I I i 23 ! vour team based on what you discovered when you went to i jgQ9 }49 24 Davis-Besse? 25 A No, because it wasn't clear that I discovered i l j Acme Reporting Company
42 I anything. Excuse me. 2 Q Ne will have to go off the record for a moment. 3 (Off the record.) 4 Q Is it your impression that it was already understood 5 that operators would receive misleading information as to core 6 coolant level, pressuriner level indication where voids or 7 substantial loss of coolant was occuring from the core? 8 A Would you repeat the first part of the question? 9 Is it my impression that what? 10 Q That this information was aircady known to NRC and 11 reviewers on your staff? 12 A At that time of the '77 event? 13 Q Yes. 14 A No. If I understood the question right, no. 15 Q Nould you like to have the question reread? 16 ; A Maybe if I can paraphrase it. 17 i Q Please do. l 13 l A As I understood the question, you were asking if ed 19 anyone on the staff knew that this v,4+ represent +ag misleading 20 information to the operator, and the answer is no, to m, I 21 knowledge. 22 Q Nould this information that you discovered at i 23! Davis-Besse I that while the PORV remained open and there was ; i i I I 24 j a continuing loss of coolant the pressuri:er level indication ! 25 increased or went high, and based on that indication, the j i909 150 Acme R e p o r h.ng Company l
- u n a...
43 I operator terminated the HPI, would that in your mind have been 2 new information that was previously unknown to NRC or people 3 on your staff? 4 A I can't say, speak for everybody else, but based on 3 my notes for the minutes of that meeting, I jotted it down, 6 so obviously I wasn't aware of it. So I guess others weren't aware of it, yes. 3 Q Would such an scenario have been an appropriate topic 9 for a review reminder? to A With hindsight, definitely. And it may have eventu-11 ally resulted in several review reminders if we had continued 12 into an investigation, what I'll call an investigation. That 13 is my assumption. But at the time the 10 or 15 areas which l 14 needed follow-up that I made notes of, it wasn't obvious that 15 they were safety problems. It was just they bothered me at is the time and I felt that somebody should look into it. 1; Q Did you suggest to anyone to look into this problem l 1s concerning misicading information provided by pressurize" to level indication? 20 A No. The only area related that might be interpreted I et as suggesting that is my trip report indicating the connection 22 I to the operator's response for the Davis-3 esse event, that l 23 that is one of the ccncerns that should be followed up on. 24, And the meeting that Monday which was -- let's see, Friday l 23l was the 30th, so it would have been the folicwige ,90 onf"51 I l Acme Reporting Company
44 1 Q Which meeting are you referring to? 2 A My report. Friday I was at Davis-Besse and when I 3 got back I reported to Roger Matson. 4 Q Who was at the meeting besides you and Roger Matson? 5 A Let me go back a little bit. Again, I was asked to 6 go with these other engineers as what I'll term fact finding, ~ we were some technical people that we were to report back, we 8 were to all try and understand the event. And so with that 9 in mind, Monday when we got back we had this meeting and, from 10 my recollection--unfortunately, I couldn't find in my notes 11 who was there--out Roger Matson, Leon Engle, the project 12 manager, Karl. Seyf rit, <*ah one of the manage rs in ISE. 13 Q How does he spell his name? 14 A s-e-y-f-r-e-i-t I believe. Let me think. Others 15 that may have been there were Israel, Novak, Ross, I assume 16 one or more of them were there. I don't really remember 17 anybody else. i ilil Anyway, during that meeting I essentially went over 19 my trip report orally, going over each of the items, the 20ll i bottom line, everybody trying to understand what the event was, i 21 ! and we thought we understcod it. We, I as s ume, discussed the same i 22. things in my trip report as to areas that should be looked l l l 23l into. And at the end of the meeting I dimly recall the deci-l 24 sion; there was some discussion on who would start the l l 25 investigation, and it was decided that ISE would handle the tong 1C7 Acme Reporting Company l
45 I investigation. And let's see -- 2 1 Was ISE represented at this meeting by anyone? 3 A Karl Seyfrit is the supervisor making the decisions. 4 I can't remember his title at the time. It was director of 5 something. I would assume he was Matson's level. 6 My recollect.on is that he requested that he take 7 the ball from there. 8 Q Was he provided with a copy of your handwritten 9 trip report? 10 A No, he wasn't to my knowledge, not by me.
- However, 11 there was a follow-up brief memo to Carl by Denny highlighting 12 some areas that he recommended to look at.
13 Q Do you happen to have a copy of that memo with you? 14 A Yes. 15 Q I note for the record that you've handed me a 16 one-page document dated October 20, 1977 signed by D. F. 17 Ross, Jr., Assistant Director for Reactor Safety, Divison of 18 Systems Safety. The subject is: Davis-Besse I abnormal 19 occurrence 9/24/77, and this letter or memorandum begins 20 with "Some areas of interest to us chat are appropriate to 21 the TE formal report are:" And number 2, the last sentence f 22 of that paragraph, reads' "The operator's decision to secure i 23 IIPI flow based on pressuri er level indication should be 24 explained." This is addressed to Karl V. Seyfrit, S-e-y-f-r- -t 1 25 Assistant Director, Division of Reactor Operat on Inspe t io n,I:E. l Acme Reporting Company 6
40 1 Is this the same Karl Seyfrit that you referred to? Apparently 2 he spells his name -i-t. 3 A Yes. I misspelled his name. 4 Q I'd like to have this marked as the next exhibit to 5 the Deposition; I believe this is Exhibit 4. 6 (WHEREUPOS, the document referred 7 to was marked as Exhibit 4 to 8 the Deposition.) 9 Q In your opinion, is this concern regarding the 10 operator's decision to secure HPI flow based on pressuricer 11 level indication a generic concern? 12 A Sure. 13 Q Insofar as you can recall, there were no instructions 14 given to the engineers on your staf f or review reminders sent 15 to them from the time you conducted your fact finding mission 16 to Davis Besse I and the time the Novak memorandum of 17 January 10, 1978 was distributed? 15 A Yes, that's correct. However, you asked my opinion i 19 with hindsight at the time. I don't know what my opinion was', 2') it was too far back, but I assume because I didn't do it, I 21 didn't yet consider it a generic concern. So it was a concern 22 that it bothered me along with the rest of the concerns that needed thinking. 1909 154 23 24 Q Apparently you stressed it at the meeting sufficiently i 25 that it became one of the succific areas of interest which i 1 Acme Reporting Co rnp any I .2 4:....,
47 1 Mr. Ross called to the attention of Mr. Seyfrit in his 2 memorandum. 3 A Yes. 4 Q Are you aware what, if anything, ISE did with 5 respect to these concerns subsequent to the meeting and this 6 memorandum of October 20? A No, I'm not. 8 -Q In the normal course of events, if ISE were to 9 discover a generic problem or a concern with a particular 10 plant which your branch had indicated an interest, is there 11 some type of communication between 15E? Would they issue a 12 fo rmal report to you which would be taken into account by 13 your reviewers? 14 A There is a procedure but you're asking the wrong 15 person. There are memoranda -- There is a system set up to 16 communicate back and forth formally. Yes, we do talk 17 informally at lot. I'm just not familiar with the criteria is for the procedure. 19 Q Do you recall any such communication with I5E l 2n ' following the meeting to which we've referred and the issuance 21 of this October 20, 1977 memorandum prior to TMI-II incident 22 of March of this year? 23l A No, I don't recall, but that's not unusual, because I 24 I was not working on that any more. There may have 'ocen i i I 25 memoranda written and somebody else took care of it.9 15e 190 3 Acme Reporting Company i l
48 1 Q In the January 10, 197S memorandum which was signed 2 by Thomas Novak there is a reference in the lower lefthand 3 corner, " Contact Sandy Israel, NRR." What, to your under-4 standing, does that contact indicate as to the authorship of 5 the memorandum, if anything? 6 A It means -- normally, it means that is who worked 7 on drafting the memorandum. 8 Q At or about the time this memorandum was distributed 9 to RSB members, did you have occasion to discuss the memorandun 10 with either Mr. Novak or Mr. Israel? 11 A Not to my recollection, but I might have and I just 12 forget. 13 Q In the last paragraph of the memorandum it states: Il "It is recommended that the bases for the design requirement 15 be studied carefully for all CP reviews with the object of 16 determining if the loop seal can be eliminated. For OL 17 reviews, procedures should be reviewed to insure adequate ISl information before the operator terminates makeup flow." i 19 l With respect to the second sentence, what steps would 20l you or the engineers on your staff do to insure adquatm informd-21 tion before the operator terminates makeup flow' 22 A Understanding that our involvement in procedures, I t 23 per se, has always been vague and we're not responsible fo r 24 reviewing emergency procedures, that rests with ISE, mostly l 25 our connection with procedures is with the utilities, as I 1909 156 i Acme Reporting Company 0l a w.c. - I
49 I think over the past years, has 'ocen t o either get commitments 2 that they would put something in a pr>cedure or get a clarifi-3 cation that they had put it in the procedure, or get maybe a 4 paraphrase of a procedure. But normally--maybe there had 5 been exceptions, but I don't remember any -- normally we have 6 not requested officially procedures to review before Three 7 Mile Island. 8 So if an engineer saw that, he would be following 9 up with--as far as the OL is concerned, if it was an OL-- 10 before they got their operating license, he would make sure 11 that that concern had been either confirmation obtained from 12 the licensee, or the applicant, rather, or perhaps it wouldn't 13 be incredible to, if there was an ISE guy at the site, to 14 discuss it with the ISE person. Maybe he would look at the 15 procedures. l 16 Or sometimes we've asked just for an informal 17 telecopy of the procedure to take a look at it. That's what 18 he would do. 19 Q Nould you consider this suggestion to be one that 20 would concern both operating reactors as well as reactors 21 that were seeking operator licenses? 22 A Yes. 23 Q If this concern scere related solely to you and the l 24 engineers on your staff, would Lhis concern be applied to 25 operating reactors? '900 157 i l Acme Reporting Compony I va ,un<,
50 1 A If they knew about it, I assume yes. 2 Q The people on your staff could apply this concern to 3 operating reactors? 4 A Ch, no. We normally don't work on operating reactors 5 That's DOR. 6 ^ So as far as you and the people on your staff are concerned, this recommendation would relate solely to reactors 8 that had not yet received their operating license? 9 A Yes. However, I have to add one thing just occurred 10 to me that there is a progran called SEP, abbreviation--I 11 forget what the abbreviation is, even. But it's a DOR program 12 which is a re-review of operating reactors with a follow-up 13 on new standards that have come out since they went into 14 operation or current safety concerns that need followed up. 15 And sometimes our engineers help DOR with that 16 activity. So it's possible that an engineer, each of the 17 engineers got this memo, would have taken care or would, in is relationship to the SEP program, have occurred to him to 19 follow through with it. the SEP program basically the program of bac'D-20 Q Is 1909 IS 21 fitting the SRP to operating reactors? 22 A Yes, that's part of it. Not only the standard i 23 I review plan; regulatory guides, new branch positions. l l i 24 Q Do you know if the Novak memorandum has actually 25 been applied in the review of a plant by anyone on your staff l l Acme Reporting Company l i
31 1 since it was promulgated in January 1973? 2 A Other than the plants the past two or three months, 3 all the B5W plants, and continuing with all the other PWR's 4 I know of none. There was one plant, as it turned out, in ny 5 branch, one B5W plant that it would have applied to. I have 6 no recollection of specifics on the plant. 7 Q Do you re. call the plant? 8 A Midland. 9 Q Who on your staff was responsible for reviewing the 10 Midland application? 11 A Scott Newberry. 12 Q Was that plant at a CP stage or an OL stage? 13 A OL. 14 Q Do you recall whether or not he applied the concerns 15 of this memorandum at the OL review of the Midland plant? 16 A I do not recall. I do have a dim recollection that 17 I might have, when it came out, mentioned it to make sure he B saw it, but I couldn't swear to it. I mean I couldn't state i 19 i for sure that that's the case. I, 1 20 l Q Prior to the TMI-II transient of March of this year, l l hat l 21 w stages had the Midland review gone through? Had they gone I909 i59 22 through the first question stage? 23 ' A At what point in time now? 24 Q Prior to TMI-II incident of March of this year. 25 A My recollection, t h e:. had gone through the Q-1 and i l I Acme Reporting Company i I 2 c.....
52 1 Q-2 stage, and we were at the point where we had a variety of 2 loose ends, open items, that needed following up with the 3 applicant, and we were documenting these in the form of a 4 draft evaluation of the plant. That was the stage. 5 Q Nould it surprise you to learn that Scott Newberry 6 did not address these concerns, the concerns addressed in the January 10, 1978 memorandum, in his review of the Midland S plant operating license? 9 A No. 10 Q It would not surprise you? 11 A No. 12 Q Why is that? 13 A Well, because first of all, I take a look at the 14 bottom line, and you're talking about Midland specifically? 15 Q Yes. 16 A The bottom 'ine is to pursue it as far as actual 17 design modifications, implications of design modifications, is with CP's. It's not obvious to me right now that we had 19 i really gotten as far in the project as the applicant having operatingprocedures,havingwrittenoperatingproceduresyet.] 20 i andjuspgq3gij(j@idei 21 So, it could be that he had looked at it 22 for when he reached that point. l l 23 Q Once a plant has received its CP and is at the OL 24 review stage, if you or a member of your team become aware of 25 a design modification, is it then too late to pose questions I f Acmo Reporting Company
53 s I to the applicant regarding design change requirements? 2 A No. 3 Q So your comment concerning operating procedures 4 relates to the second sentence in thefinal paragraph of the 5 January 10, 1973 memorandum. Is that correct? 6 A Yes, that's correct. 7 Q With respect to the first sentence of the final 8 paragraph which relates to design requirements, would you have 9 expected Mr. Newberry to have posed inquiries to the utility 10 concerning that, in light of this review reminder? 11 A No. 12 Q Why is that? 13 A Because it recommends the opposite and that is he 14 was reviewing an operating license and it suggested that the 15 issue was only appropriate fu-CP reviews. 16 Q In your mind, is it appropriate to limit design 1 concern to CP review despite the fact that design concerns can is be raised with the applicant during OL review? 19 A No, certainly not. It depends on the issue. Often 20 issues, safety issues come up where a deci. ion has to be made 21 as to, let's assume, on a safety issue that engineering aad 22 management have decided that the action has to be taken, a 23 design modification. A decision is made on the policy level 24 as to who to backfit--backfit is the wrong word--who to 25 implement this required design modification depending on the 1 l Acme Reporting Company 1909 161 1 I 2 '. 2 929 4446
54 I safety concern itself, on the degree of the safety concern in 2 particular. And that decision is usually, if it's a design 3 modification, 3's been a recent system set up several r. 4 years ago that we'd abbreviate the RRRC, t he ratchet committee, 5 which is led by the directors. And when the potential for 6 backfit occurs, then routinely they weigh those, the cost and 7 benefit. S Q How would a potential ratchet concern be brought to 9 their attention? 10 A I guess it depends on the issue again. Usually 11 there's a lot of discu~ssion and dialog within the staff from 12 engineers first line supervision and on up before it gets to 13 the Regulatory Requirements Review Committee. The recommenda-14 tion usually goes on up the line. 15 If it's a resolution that can't be made within the 16 branch itself, maybe it's a costly item, for example, and the 17 concerns are everyone agrees that there are safety concerns, le! then the recommendation is made by the branch chief to the 19 system director on up the line. 20 Q Would a member of your staff or you reasonably 21 assume, since this memorandum of January 10, 1973 was signed l 22 by Mr. Novak, that a determination had been made that the RRRC'd 23 design concerns were not to be ratcheted and were concerns to 1909 162 ', 4 be directed solely to CP reviews? 25l A Yes. That's my opinion. I I l l Acme Reporting Company l
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55 1 Q Is it your present view that that was a correct 2 limitation on design review or do you think it should have 3 been also applied to operator licensing review? 4 A That's my interpretation of the memo. Looking at 5 it now, it looks to me like it was intended to limit the 6 backfitter ratchet design modifications to the construction permit reviews, yes. 8 Q To your present thinking, is that an appropriate 9 limitation of this concern? 10 A h'ith hindsight, no. Of course, if I could amplify. 11 Q Certainly. 12 A Given an OL at that time, in looking at the OL 13 recommendation, the last sentence in the memo, that still 14 would have been sufficient, in my judgment, for an OL, perhaps 15 even with hindsight, because if there was follow-up across 16 the board on the current effort in terms of operator training, i 17 revisions to operating procedures, that one aspect of the 18l Three. Mile Island accident that may not have occurred and that i 19 was securing the ECCS system, mignt have changed everything. l 'N So I'm assuming in the author's mind and in Tom's 21 mind when they discussed that, that those were those con-22 siderations, i 23 Q Do you know on what data T3!I-II received its 24 operator license? l !909 163 'al A No, I don't. I have no idea. Acme Reporting Company n n.n..
1 56 1 Q Do you know whether the TMI-II operator license 2 review was ongoing at the time the Novak memorandum of 3 January 10, 197S was distributed to RSB members ^ 4 A I have no idea. 5 Q Do you know if the TMI-II OL review was assigned to 6 your team? 7 A The OL review, the routine OL? 8 Q Yes. 9 A No, it was not. 10 Q Do you know to whose team it was assigned? 11 A Sandy Israel. 12 Q Do you know who on his team was specifically 13 assigned to care for that OL licensing review? 14 A I believe it was Jim Natt. 15 Q During one of our previous breaks you made an effort i 16 t to discover when Toledo Edison put a direct position indicator I 17l on the PORV following the September 24, 1977 transient. Have I f le ' you been able to acquire that in fo rma t ion ? 19 A Yes. The licensee has indicated it was installed 20j in October 1977. I' 21 Q Could you provide for the record the name of the i 22 person you obtained that information from? 23l A Yes. Fred Miller. 1909 164 l 24l Q And who is ne' l l 25l A He's a senior engineer on the staff at Toledo Edison.l g i i Acme Reporting Company l au ....n i
37 1 Q Do you know whether Toledo Edison notified the NRC 2 at the time they made that modification in PORY indication? 3 A I don't know. 4 Q Do you know whether NRC was notified prior to TMI-II 5 regarding that design change? 6 A Not to my knowledge. I don't know. It could have 7 been, though. I wasn't working on that so that would not have 8 called me necessarily. 9 Q Do you know whether that design modification producec 10 a review reminder or any other type of regulation or guide 11 wnich would have been used by the people on your staff in 12 reviewing applications' 13 A The PORV modification? 14 Q Yes. 15 A Not to my knowledge. 16 Q Is the PORV considered to be a safety related piece 17l of equ..pment? li! A No, it is not. I I i 19l Q Normally, do you receive review reminders or reg i 20 guides regarding non-safety related pieces of equipment? 21 A Yes. Especially the past few years where we've been i 22l doing a lit tle recre.vork generically in trying to understand I i 23l the role of non-safety grade equipment in transients and I i 24 l accidents. There may have been a few written on that. I l 1 1 25 remember, I think there was one board notification related to i t '909 ier i A c rne Reporting Company J i 2a .2,....
58 I non-safety grade equipment in general. It could have been, 2 yes, in answer to your question. 3 Q But you don't know? 4 A I don't know if a review reminder was written. 5 I don' t remember anything specific, but I have to say that I 6 assume there were some. 7 Q Would there be any way of finding out now if there 8 were any reminders or notices regarding this' 9 A I'd have to conduct a search of the files which 10 would take probably a couple o f hours. 11 Q Would it be possible for you to do that after the 12 conclusion of the deposition and provide us with a copy of 13 whatever you find? 14 A Sure. If I understand what you are looking for. 15 You say you are looking for a review reminder, the similar 16 type of thing, Novak to branch' 17 Q A review reminder, a reg guide, or any other notifi-15 cation which would have called to the attention of you or the 19 people on your staff the type of position indicator that wouldj i 20 be appropriate. 21l A So. There's no reminder specifically connected th c6b a //br7. 22 to position W he-cee+ty. The only reason I say there may 23l have 'ceen some reminders, I':a talking about non-safety grade j 24 equipment in general. 1909 166 25,- Q Is see, as examples. Acme Reporting Company
59 1 A That was a general concern by the staff over the 2 past couple years. But there is no specific memo to my know-3 ledge that's ever been written particularly connected with 4 the PORV indication. I' Q In the January 10, 1978 memorandum, which was 6 apparently drafted by Sandy Isreal, there is a specific 7 reference to the Davis-Besse I transient when the relief valve 5 stuck open. 9 A Yes. 10 Q Are you aware of any other transients that occurred 11 at Davis-Besse in 1977? 12 A I don't recall any specifically, no, but there was 13 one we just talked about that we noticed in my notes on j 14 September 2. M Q Yes.
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A I don't know any details about it. Apparently, an 17 l LER was not written on it. There were other events, obviously, M' at Davis-Besse that warranted LER reports, but I guess the I 19l closest one to Three Mile Island accident was the September 24 1 i M{ I'm not really familiar with any of them, to tell you the trutE. I 21! Q Are you familiar with the November 197~ transient 22 l a t Davis-Besse I in which there was a loss of pressuri:er 23 level indication off scale low? 1909 167 i l i l 24 ' A I'm familiar, not with the specifics, but I'm l familiar with recently reading the past month or two some j i I Acme Reporting Company l 1 .: u,<,,,
60 I responses by, I believe it was, 35W in testifying to the 2 Presidential Committee. And I believe theie might have been 3 something written to mention that event in some re s p o n s e t, to 4 Bulletins. That is when I think I've run across somebody 5 discussing events like that. I don't know if it is speci-6 fically that one. 7 Q You were not aware of that transient prior to TMI-II" 8 A So, I wasn't. 9 Q Are you aware of the role played by Jesse Ebersole 10 in the promulgation of the January 10, 1978 memorandum? in drafting this memo? 11 A Am I aware that he 12 Q No. In instigating it. 13 A I believe, I think I know how Jesse Ebersole got 14 involved, but at tae time I had no idea he was connected to 13 this memo. I don't recall that he was. 16 Q You discovered this subsequent to TMI-II? 1-A Yes. 15l Q Are you aware of whc Jesse Ebersole is? t 19I A Yes. I 20l Q Who is he? I909 168 l 21 A A member of ACRS. 22 ; Q Are you familiar with a person by the name of l l 23! Carl Michelson? I I i 24! A Recentiv, yes. l l 25 Q Did you know who Carl Michelson was at the time of i Acme Reporting Company
61 I the January 10, 1978 memorandum? 2 A No, I did not. 1 Q Are you familiar with a document which might be 4 called the Michelson Memorandum? 5 A Yes, I an. 6 Q Had you seen or heard of that memorandum prior to 7 the TMI-II transient of this year? 5 A A handwritten version of a concern expressed by 9 ACRS. My recollection, I didn't know who the author was of 10 the handwritten version. In fact, I assumed it was Jesse 11 Ebersole at the time. That's my recollection. But Sandy i 12 Israel, at some point in time, I assume 197~, handed me a cop) 13 of this handwritten document, half-inch document'. 14 Q Do you recall whethar you were provided with a copy 15 of that document prior to the time of the January 10, 197S 16 memorandum? 17 A I think this, the document I just referr.d to, was 18 some time in early 1977 probably. I don't recall exactly 19. when it was. I assume it was before the '7S memorandum. I 20 Q Is it your impression that the Michelsen Memorandum 21 or Michelson Report predi - or described seme of the signifi-22 cant factors which cc.' .d to the TMI-II transient of l l March of this year just as the Lavis-3csse I transient did,and 23 ! i 24 tae Novak memorandum did, anc the trip report which you pre-l 25 pared did, and the October 20, 197~ meno icom Denny Ross to Acme Reporting Company 1909 169 i i
62 1 Karl Seyfrit did? 2 A It covered several of the same areas. I don't really 3 know if predicted is the right word. I think it highlighted i in the same fashion that every question we go out with, for 5 example, we may go out with a hundred questions in reviewing 6 a safety analysis. You could use the same term for each of 7 thosc questions, that they each predict a hundred different s scenarios. 9 But, no, I think it related to the same concern is 10 more right. 11 Q All right. Would it be accurate then to say that on 12 January 10, 1978 when the Novak memorandum was distributed to 13 RSB staff members that you were aware of the pressuricer level 14 indication problem at Davis-Besse I, having conducted a fact 15 finding mission to Davis-Besse I, having prepared a trip reper 16 which laised that concern, and having attended the meeting 1; which resulted in the October 20, 1977 memorandum from Ross is to 3eyfrit, having received the Michelson memorandum which 19 addressed the same concerns, and then having received the i 20; Novak memorandum of January 10, 1978 which addresses the same l I 21 ' concerns? Can you explain why you did not prepare a review I i, 22 reminder or did not go to management and suggest that this is i 23 a problem which seemc to have popped up in a number of I 24 different contexts whi_h ought to be reviewed or discussed? l 25 A I just don't recall my frame of mind at the time of i j A cnte Reporting Company 1909 170 y m
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63 I either the memorandum or when I received from Sandy Israel the 2 handwritten Michelson meno. I'm assuming now that the reason 3 I didn't do more than what I did was because I felt that 4 enough was being done. 5 Q And you' re re ferring to the fact that 16E had 6 assumed responsibility for further investigation of the 7 Davis-Besse I incident? 8 A Yes. Plus engineers were appraised. 9 Q That a review reminder had been sent to your staff 10 people in January by Mr. Novak? 11 A Yes. 12 Q And that your immediate superior, Mr. Novak, was 13 obviously aware of the situation? j 14 A Yes. That's my assumption. But I don't recall 15 specifically. 16 Q Did you or your staff become involved in any way 17 in the Pebble Springs CP application review' 15 A Not with the initial review. By initial review I 19l mean Q-1 and Q-2. My recollection is that we were involved I i 20 i in a what I'll c2 11 bringing up to date -- There was a delay l 21 l period in between the initial staff evaluation and the time l 22 for some reason, the time we went to ACRS. And there was a i 23 ' need for some reason to do some work, and this work resulted l I 24, in an engineer being assigned to Pebble Springs to review the i 25 l plant. And it resulted in an ACRS meeting, as I recall. I Acme Reporting Company ) u..... i
. ~ 64 I don't really remember specifics. 2 In reviewing my notes before coming to this meeting, 3 my files, rather, apparently there was an ACRS meeting where 4 the potential existed for this topic, meaning Jesse Ebersole's 5 concerns to be discussed. 6 Q The concerns were raised at the meeting? 7 A There was a potential for it coming up. It might 5 have, maybe someone mentioned it to us as ACRS wanting to talk 9 about it, or maybe it was on the agenda even. I don't recall. 10 But apparently--and I don't remember specifically--but I did 11 discuss it with Scott Newberry who was the reviewer. And sJere 12 appa r e nt 1;. with Scott and myself wwee+. Tom Novak and Sandy 13 Israel down to address the issue if it did come up, along 14 with several other items that were on the agenda. 15 Q Do you recall whether the ACRS promulgated written 16 questions for the applicant concerning the Pebble Springs i 17 j application? 15 A Yes, there were questions written by ACRS, and i 19! according to my files recently looked at, they responded to 2"j these questions. i 21 Q Did you bring a copy of the questions with you? I i 22{ A No, I didn't. 23 Q Let's go off the record. gg 7 24l (Off the record briefly.) i i 25j Q Do you recall whether you or your branch were j i i I i Acme Reporting Company l .. ~
65 s I provided with a written copy of the questions propounded by 2 the ACRS regarding the Pebble Springs CP consideration? 3 A Yes. 4 Q You were. And at some point thereafter were you 5 provided with a copy of the responses from the applicant? 6 A Yes, right. T Q And did you or someone on your staff review the 8 questions and the responses? 9 A I don't recall specifically. I do know from my 10 record that I looked through the responses quickly, under-11 standing that the responses covered a variety of areas of 12 expertise. I just remembered why I looked through it, was 13 because there was a, these questions were forwarded to branch 14 chiefs, I believe, requesting either participation -- excuse 15 ' me, I ' T, trying to remember -- either participation in pulling 18 together responses or in just notifying them that these 17 areas may be discussed at ACRS. But my recollection is that 18 l that's how we got the questions and that I would assume after i 19l reading them over that I either askee Scott Newberry to 10 0.< l I l 20 at them to follow up or on this particular one I might have l l 21 discussed it with Sandy Israel or Tom Novak. I must have 22 discussed it with then 'oecause they showed up at ACRS, I think. 23l Q Was it the responsibility or voul oranca to transmi 24 l such questions to the applicant, or was that the resconsibility 190'9 1/3 i 25 of some other department? j i l Acme Reporting Company
66 1 A My understanding is that 's one o f the functions of 2 Project Management, that if some concerns come from ACRS, they 3 are normally the buffer, the interface, and would initiate 4 requests to applicants. don't remember in this case how it 5 worked. 6 Q Do you recall whether Project Management transmitted 7 the questions and the responses to you? s A My recollection is they did, but I couldn't be 9 positive. It 's just according to what I just saw in my files 10 the past couple days when I reviewed them. 11 Q All right. For the record, allow me to refer to 12 an NRC document which bears the number NUREG 0560 and the 13 title, " Staff Report on the Generic Assessment of Feedwater 14 Transients and Pressurized Water Reactors Designed by the 15 Babcock G Wilcox Company." Is this the document commonly 16 known as the Tedesco Report? 17 A Yes. IS Q Is the Pebble Springs plant, was that a 35h design? 19 A Yes, it is. 2d Q Allow me to refer you to Appendix W to the Tedesco 21 Report which bears the title, " Portland General Electric 22 i Company Responses to ACRS Questions on Pebble Springs." I 23 call your attention specifically to question number 6. The 24 first question reads: i909 174 l I I I 25j "Does applicant know that time dependent levels will; I Acme Reporting Company 42 .4s
67 1 occur in pressuriner steam generator and reactor vessel after 2 a relatively small primary coolant break which causes coolant a to approach or even partly uncover fuel pins?" 4 And the second question posed in the first para-5 graph is: 6 "What does operator do in respect to interpreting 7 level in pressuriner?" s Does that question appear to concern the same con-9 cerns that are addressed in the Novak/ Israel memorandum of
- o January 1973 and the point that you raised concerning the 11 Davis-Besse transient regarding operator termination of HPI 12 based on misleading pressuri:er level indication?
13 A Yes, it does. 14 Q Now, let me refer you to the next page of Appendix W 15 which relates the response from Portland General Electric 13 Company to question number 6. I will give you an opportunity 1: to look it over and then I will ask you a question or two 19 ; about it. 19 (Mr. Ma:etis looks at document.) 20 ' A This appears to be the same and the question that et I recent1-1 coked at in my file. f l 22l Q And is the response the same? 23 A It appears to be, although I can't verify word for 24 word, but it looks like the same one, yes. 1909 175 l 25l Q The question I have for vou is did the applicant l l i I i Acme Reporting Company
.s 63 I anywhere in the response to question number 6 answer this 2 question: What does operator do in respect to interpreting 3 level in pressurizer? 4 A No. 5 Q Did that fact come to your attention? Were you 6 a.sare of that when you or the members of your team reviewed 7 the question and the response from the applicant? s A I don't recall. It may, may not. I just don't 9 recall. Because I don't recall, I would assume that it just 10 didn't register at the time, but I just don't recall. 11 Q Had it registered at the time, would there have been 12 some procedure that you would have followed to insure that the la applicant did respond to that portion of question number 6? 14 A I would assume we would have called the applicant 15 or requested him to revise his response. 16 Q To the best of your recollection, was that done? It A Not to my recollection, no. Is e Were vou aware of a transient that occurred at i l 19 TMI-II in March of 1978 involving a failed open PORV' In fact,5 20 involving the very same plant and very same PORV involved in I 21 the transient of March of this year
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A I may have become aware recent1v. Not at the time. I 1 i 1 23 ' Q You were not aware at the time? 1909 176 24 A No. i 1 25 Q Were you aware of it prior to the TMI-II transient i l l Acme Reporting Company
69 1 of March of this year? 2 A Not that I recall. I would guess not. 3 Q Are you aware now of some of th_ details of that 4 transient? 5 A Not the details, no. 6 Q Do you know that the PORV failed open on that 7 transient? 3 A I'm trying to separate the transients, 'occause 9 between Davis-Besse transients and Three Mile transients, 10 there were several of them, it seems like I recall discussion: 11 the past two or three v.onths about that transient, but I 12 wasn't involted with it specifically. 13 Q Let me give you my understanding of some of the 14 aspects of that transient and perhaps that will refresh your 15 recollection. 16 A Okay. 17 Q The PORV at TMI-II in March of 1973 was actuated 18l by an absence of electrical current to the PORV. In other i I 19l words, it would 'oe opened by turning off the current. And in j l l I I 20; order for the PORV to remain closed, current had to be flowingi I 1909 177 ', l to the PORV. j j i i 22l In March of 1978 there was a failure in :ne electri-i l 23 I cal system. That failure terminated electrical current flow l I i i 24 I to the PORV and it failed open. The operator was unaware i i 23l that the PORV was open because there was no incicator at all l Acme Reporting Co rnp an y
70 s 1 as to PORV position. Does that ring a bell? 2 A Yes. I remember, not particularly reading any docu-3 mentation or discussing the specifics of the event, but I 4 recall discussions about the event because an outgrowth of 5 that event was follow-up requirement to make sure on other 6 plants that that type of failure mode didn't exist. 7 Q Was that follow-up done prior to the TMI-II transient 8 of Narch of this year or before' 9 A Not to my knowledge. 10 Q It was done before? 11 A No, not to my knowledge, it wasn't done. 12 Q I see. This was post-TMI-II? 13 A The follow-up is recent, the past two months, Right. 14 Q Are you aware that as a result of this transient in 15 March of 1973 a position indicator was put on the PORV at 16 TMI-II? 17 A There were man;. design modifications. Will you say IS that again? As a result of the first March event? 19 Q Yes. 20 A I didn't know, ipe 4-A 21 0 Let me represent to you on the basis of my own under-22 standing of that transient that an indirect PORV position 23 indicator was installed on the TMI-II PCRV following the March 24 3975 transient which was a command signal indicator. In view 25 of what we know about the Davis-3 esse transient of September I l909 i78 Acme Reporting Company I i
71 1 of 1977 which produced the installation of a direct linkage position indicator on the PORV, can you explain why a direct 3 linkage indicator was not installed on the TMI-II PORV follow-4 ing the transient which occurred approximately a year l a t e r 5 A No, I can't. 6 Q Would you have expected that direct position indi-7 cators would have been installed on B5% plants following the 8 Davis-Besse transient in view of the generic implications? 9 A As things tm.:?. out, no. Because apparently there 10 was, for whatever reason, between ISE's investigation and 11 Davis '3ess e 's reporting, Three Mile's evaluating, the emphasis 12 was apparently not great enough in this area to bring it to 13 their attention. That's my assumption. 14 Q Is it also possible that the lack of recognition of 15 a substantial generic concern with the result of the fact that 16l the PCRV was not considered a safety related item? .l A I guess I don't understand the question. M Q Let me take it step by step. The PCRV prior to l B! TMI-II, was that considered a safety related iten? l A No. l 20 l 21 Q In your opinion, would that fact have played a role i 22 in not producing some action on a generic level as a result of 1909 179 23 the Davis-Besse transient? l l A It could have, sure. Normally, non-safety related f 24 25 equipment traditionally had not received the same attention i l Acme Reporting Company
I as a safety system, the failure of a safety system. 2 Q Were you aware prior to TMI-II of what has become 'lemorandum concerning the Davis-Besse I 3 known as the Creswell 4 transient. 5 A I know the name and I know a memorandum was written 6 but right now I j ust can't remember what was in his memorandum. 7 Q Were you made aware of that memorandum prior to the 3 TMI-II transient of March of this vear' 9 A No. 10 Q At the time the TMI-II transient of March of this 11 year was ongoing, were you called to the Incident Response 12 Center? 13 A At what time now; I'm sorry? 14 Q At the time the TMI-:- transient was ongoing. 15 A No, I wasn't called to the Incident Response Center. 16 I was called to Dr. Matson's office and asked to be a member 17 of a team to go down to Three Mile as a fact finding team just i. lil like Davis Besse and gather information. 19l Q Nhen do you recall were you made a member, a part of 20 this team? Was that within the first week of the transient? l 21 A Yes. It was the second da), as I recall. i i l 22 lj Q Would that have been Thursday, March 29? I 23 A Thursday, right. )h 24 Q Who else was part of the team? 25l A Dick Volmer was the team leader. We went down in I i Acme Reporting C oir p o n y j 2:2 .:4 u n
73 I two groups, as I recall. The group I was with was Carl 2 Berlinger, myself, and there was another engineer with us, I 3 can't recall wh^ c us. But other members of the team 4 included Eleanor Adamsca, and there were a couple more engi-5 neers. I can't recall. 6 Q Does the name Bruce Boger ring a bell? 7 A He didn't go with me. I subsequently learned he 8 was there at the same time I was, but I didn't communicate 9 with Bruce. 10 Q What specifically were the duties assigned to you 11 as part of this team? 12 A After we got doen there and Dick Volmer instructed - 13 let me think. Could I look at my notes' 14 Q Certainly. 15 A Thursday afternoon we got down there and spent the 16 first couple hours at the observation center with some 17 senators and listening to a presentation by Jack Herbein. 18 Q Who is Jack Herbein? l 19 A He's on the staff, fairly senior officer. I can't 20 recall his title. i 21 Q NRC staff? 22 A No. I'm sorry. He's Three Mile Island staff. He 23l gave us and the senators a presentation on the scenario.and l 1 24 the status of Three Mile Island. 1909 181 25 Q May I see the notes that vou're referring to? j l l Acme Reporting Company m.
74 1 A Sure. a copy. Is this an 2 Q It appears that you've made 3 extra copy' 4 A No, I gave my original to someone who asked for my 5 notes about a month ago. 6 Q Someone within the NRC? 7 A Yes. 8 Q 'fould it be possible to obtain a copy of these and 9 mark them for the record? 10 A Sure. 11 Q Let's take a break while we do that. 12 (A brief recess taken for stated purpose.) 13 Q You've handed me a Xerox copy of the notes which 14
- ou took at the time you were on site?
15 A Yes. 16 Q It appears to relate to the dates March 28, 1979, IT March 29, 1979, March 30, 1979. Is that accurate' is A Yes. 19 Q Did you leave the site after March 30, 1979? l 20 A No. 21 Q Did you continue to take notes? I see. i l 22l A I'm looking at a summary of my actions as to when l l 23 I returned to Bethesda. I don't think I took an:. notes past l 24 that day. I don't recall any. i909 182 l 25, Q Okay. Let's have them marked as the next exhi~oit inj l Acme Reporting Company l i .:2 2...
75 I order which I think is Exhibit 5, your notes which deal with 2 March 28 through March 30, 1979. 3 (WiiE REUPON, the document referred 4 to was marked as Exhibit 5 to 5 the Deposition.) 6 A The purpose of those notes, I could add, was for 7 myself to understand and be able to look at perhaps a few hours a later the scenario. I went down there with the idea that, 9 similar to Davis-Besse, that I should technically understand 10 the event and be able to report on it. As it turned out, 11 that's not what I did. 12 Q When you say similar to Davls-Besse, was it in your 13 mind that the transient that was occurring was similar to the 14 transient that occurred at Davis-Besse or that your function 15 as a fact finder was similar to the function you performed 16 with respect to Davis-Besse? 17 A Both, I think both. 1S Q You've also handed me a document dated May 21, 1979 19 signed by you and directed to D. Crutchfield, Pro; ram Support l 00 Sta f f of NRR, followed by a two page document entitled, " Record 21 of Actions." Is this basically a summary o f your notes con-22, cerning \\! arch 25 through March 30, 1979 plus your actions from i 3: March 31 through April 1, 1979? 1909 183 24 A Yes. I 25 Q Let's have this marked as the next exhibit in order,! i I t Acme Reporting Company .z u,u.. i
76 1 Exhibit 6. 2 (WHEREUPOS, the document referrec 3 to was marked as Exhibit 6 to 4 the Deposition.) 5 Q In your handwritten notes, Exhibit 5, on the third 6 page at the top you indicate a question: "Where is the leak 7 and why not isolate it?" Then about halfway down the page you 8' indicate: "ECCS stopped at about four minutes when pressuriner 9 level went solid." 10 Did it occur to you at the time you prepared these 11 notes that you were basically repeating the scenario of 12 Davis-Besse I with respect to operator termination of HPI 13 based on pressurizer level indication where in fact there was 14 a leak or voids in the system? 15 A I don't recall when I wrote that specific note that is it occurred to me at that point, but even before I left the 17 brief description I received jarred my memory to the extent 15l that I went and got my Davis-Besse notes and took them with me. 19l Q Were those notes helpful in nandling the TMI-II I T transient? l f 21 A Yes. 1909 184 i Q In what rashion? i 23 A I looked back over my trip report, my handwritten 1 24 trip report, and as the scenario unfolded, as ic was explained i i 25l to me, I compared them back and forth to see the similarities. l 1 l Acme Reporting Ccmpany i a:t u,-n,
77 ~' I Q Were you able to make any suggestions or provide any 2 helpful advice or transmit any useful information to Bethesda 3 on the basis of your comparing the TMI-II transient as it 4 unfolded with your trip notes regarding the Davis-Besse I 5 transient of 1977? 6 A 1 don't recall anything specific, but I did discuss 7 off and on with different individuals that it did look similar, 8 and other individuals brought it to my attention too. So it 9 was a discussion item. 10 Q You also indicate in your notes that the OTSG went 11 dry after approximately one minute. Is that correct? 12 A Yes. 13 Q Is this unusual for a B5W designed plant or is such 14 a fast boil dry of the OTSG common to B5h plants? 15 A As it turns out, it's common. Subsequent calcula-16 tion showed that for the amount of water in the steam genera-17 tors for 35W plants, it is normally only a couple of minutes l IS before they go dry. 19 Q Is there a correlation between the time it takes the 20 OTSG to boil dry and the amount of time the operator has to t 21 react to a transient? 22 A I can't think of one specifically, no. No, to my 23 knowledge, there isn't. It's nct a part o f an:. criteria. i 24 Q Were you involved in the TMI-II transient at the j i i 20 time a decision was made approximately 7-1/2 hours into the I i f i l Acme Reporting Company l m m u,,
7S I transient to rapidly depressurice or blow down the plant? 2 A That was Wednesday? 3 Q Yes. 4 A No. 5 Q Were you aware after you became involved in this 6 transient of a concern that there could be a hydrogen-oxygen reaction within the vessel? 8 A Yes. 9 Q What was the nature cf that concern? 10 A I don't recall specifically. I guess that's not 11 discussed in the notes either. But I do recall continued 12 discussion throughout the days, the early days that first week, 13 Stan, amongst the engineers in my group and when I'd get off 14 watch discussions with Vic Stello and Dick Volmer, Hal Denton. 15 It was a continuing discussion. I don't remember the first 16 time I heard about it. 1: Q At the time you heard about it, had it been con-is cluded that there was a hydrogen void in the vessel? 19 A I don't recall That was a conclusion at some point i 20 in time, but I don't recall when it was. 21 l Q Were you involved in the calcalations that were done j l i 22 j concerning the potentiality of a hydrogen-oxygen explosion? I 23 A .',' o, I wasn't. It's my understanding most of that l I 24 ! was being performed back at the Incident Response Center in I i 25 i Bethesda. 1909 186 I Acme Reporting Company i
79 1 Q Do you recall whether at any time while you were at 2 the site a conclusien had been reached that there was the 3 possibility or the likelihood of such an explosion occurring? 4 A You have to understand that I was kind of buried in 5 the control room and wasn't d i re c t l;. tuned in to what others 6 were doing to assist the licensee. And all news, the news 7 media, I was completely divorced from that. And everything 8 I heard was really when I came back off watch and discussed 9 with Dick or Vic Stello. 10 The only thing that sticks in my mind that I can 11 recall with regard to a hydrogen explosion was either Vic 12 Stello had just finished a conversation over the phone with 13 Ed Case or he was involved in a conversation over the phone 14 with Ed Case, but my impression was he was upset that that 15 was the conclusion already. 16 My recollection is that Vic h_r.n't reached that IT conclusion yet. His people, his staff was doing the calcula-6 M' tions and he wasn't convinced yet. Apparently, Ed--I don't i 19 i xnow who Ed had working for him at the time--out he felt that 20 he should go public with it. l 21 Q Who is Ed Case? 22 : A Ed Case is under Harold Denton, the next senior 23 l person in the staf f. He works directly for liarold Denten. I 24l jgQg }87 believe his title is Deput) Director. i 25! Q What were your responsibilities in the control room? i. l Acme Reporting Company I
30 1 A Similar to ISE who was also there, and that is to 2 advise -- We were in communication with off-site. Across the 3 river was Dick Volmer. We were in communication with Volmer, 4 Stello, that crew. And we were to advise as events occurred, 5 to keep lines of communication on status of the plant. 6 Q Were you responsible for giving advice to the Met Ed people who were in the control room operating the plant? 8 A At the time I was there my only direct communication 9 on advice was through proposed emergency procedures. I became 10 involved in being responsible, in addition as an advisory to 11 Dick Volmer, I became involved in a review of emergency pro-12 cedures which had to be rewritten based on the current condi-13l tion of the plant. And I did on occasion advise the licensee it in regard to their procedures. 15 But in direct communication with the operators, not Ic personally myself, no. 17l Q What were the conditions in the control room at the l 15 time you were there? i I i to ; A I guess it varied. It depends on the time at which I 20 ; you're talking about. I guess in general the operations staff i nj probably had a difficult time initially because there were i l 22l so many people in the control room. Between all the people in i 23 ' their own organization they were concerned and all the people 24 that were in there--agents, consultants, whatever cou want to i call them, 35N, their architect-engineer, and you have ISE and l 25'r i909 188 l Acme Reporting Company j a
S1 I then you have NRC--it did get hectic. Mostly people stayed 2 away from the immediate vicinity of the boards, the control 'oards. 3 c 4 I think the major problem that my reco11ectio.1 that 5 the operators would have is the noise level. Later on, it 6 wasn't too many days that they became -- in fact, we may have 7 had something to do with it -- more disciplined in term 3 of s cutting down the noise level, cutting out the people coming 9 into the room, and generally decreasing the amount of 10 distractions. 11 Q At the time that you were in the control room 12 initially, had it been determined where the leak was, if any, 13 of coolant? 14 A Well, you know the thing was isolated the first day, 15 the PORV was isolated. It was a couple hours. 16 Q Was that done prior to your arrival? 17, A Yes, sure. There was a continuing discussion of a is leak throughout because there was apparently some air.,r 19, unaccounting of some of the conductor mass balance and there j i 20 was unaccounted for amount of inventory. I'd hear discussions l t l l trying to figure out which valve was leaking or somethine 1909 181 likel 21 22 that. l 23 Q Do you recall.;hether the PORV indicator indicated i i 24 that the valve was closed when in fact it was open? I know i 25 i that this was prior to you: arrival. l i Acme Reporting Company t 2 44=assa i
3_ 1 A I don't recall. 2 Q In addition to that indirect indicator that was 3 installed on TMI-II, are there any other indications or 4 indicators that could have been used by the operator to deter-5 mine whether the PORV was actually open or closed? 6 A As I recall, I don't remember what he detected it 7 on, but my recollection is there were some pressures in the 8 quench tank was in the discharge of the PORV. The quench 9 tank pressurized and blew so that would have been an indicatior 10 Q Is there an indicator in the control room concerning 11 quench tank level or pressure? 12 A I believe pressure. 13 Q Do vou know where that indicator is located? 14 A I'm sorry; I don't remember. 15 Q Do you recall seeing that indicator wnile you were 16 in the control room? 17 A I don't recall. 15 Q Do you recall ever walking around to the back of 19 l the control panel while you were there to look for indications 1 i 20 A I recall walking not immediately around the back 21 but in back on the side to look for some indications' i 0%s 190, 22 recall, one of them was containment pressure. i l 23 Q Do you know whether the quench tank incicators are I i 24 located on the back of the control panel at IMI-II" l i 25 A I don't think so. I think they are on the front, buf i i l Acme Reporting Company i m.......
MS / v.f's S3 1 I don't recall specifically. 2 MR. HELFMAN: I have no further questions at this 3 time. Does Counsel for the NRC have questions? 4 MR. PAT DIXON: No questions. 5 MR. HELFMAN: In view of that, we'll recess the 6 Deposition at this time. As I've indicated at the outset, if 7 we have further questions, we will simply reconvene the 3 Deposition. Thank you very much. 9 MR. M.C ETIS: Thank you. 10 (WHEREUP0h, at 1:53 p.m. the Deposition of Gerald 11 Robert Ma:etis recessed.) ig 13 I have read the foregoing 14 pages, 1 through 83, and they 15 are a true and accurate record 16 o f my testimony therein 17l recordeA. 1 13! t 19 l _ GERALD ROBERT MAZETIS i 1 l 20 l Subscribed and sworn to 21 l I l before me this day of l --{ u 1979. 3' I u i, 1909 19I i .,a l Notary Public i . i I Acme Reporting Company i
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u.o 6 CASE TITLE: DEPOSITION OF GERALD ROBERT MAZETIS - R_ vc.o o n..e August 3, 19_/9 nr.. 3 LOCATION: Bethesda, Maryland 9 10 I hereb'/ certify that the proceedings and evidence 11 herein are contained fully and accurately in the notes 12 taken by me at the hearinc-in the above case before the J 13 PRESIDENT'S CC.'O!ISSICN ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND '4 a..d "..a. *'. o- -.e. a _ _. e_ a..d c^._-=_ ."..s". _4 -^# "... e 4 4 e. v. i i 15 : same. I i 16, J t 1.I i 4 13 Date: August 6, 1979 i 19 i i 'O', l l V :: .u. w.4. _3 _7 co- .in_ ^ l .-yv i
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.,, :,. *i t e s O t-Fe: to -at De c'.: e t "o. 50-3'.6 i4ui n3 42 License No. 'iP F-3 Se rial No. 503 ay 13, 1979 Director of ?:uclear ?.eacter ?c3ulation Attentica: .r. Rob:r t N. 7.eid, Chief Operating Re ictors 3 ranch '!o. 4 Divisien of Operating 0.eactors United States Nuclear 4 ulatory Ceraission 3 '4ashington, D. C. 20555
Dear Mr. Reid:
In accordance with Toledo Edisen's letter cf ' day 4, 1979 (Serial No. SCO), a review of the September 24, 1977 event at the D.svis-?es.;e ' uclear ?cwer Statica Unit 1 is attached. Yours very truly, / /// A S ( y& LER:TJM Att2 & r. eat .\\ n.\\ cc: J. ve t.:ig ). Cp.trating Keactara 3 ranch No. 4 ,q 31visicn of Operat!ng Ranctors ,iy U. S. ':uclear Regulatecy Cw..nission g 's'a :hing t c n, D. C. 20555 ,ux (4 \\f e i a i\\ 1909 204 MS. A - ,q c.xs.s(v> u yl s o ss N .1 c s\\ s',u m ..(sNv4 ,1 . s o. a vp,7 go b, (DNN N% 9 N' a s 9as)h /*/\\ ', j< j 7905230,37/ O ...,a--..,.c..--...,.1 -, -... ~ o-m ...-.,.a-n- .~- .= - -.:. =c [> _oL ~ - ~ -. f,/. 1. e s. .i n' o
.q .-~..,,c i .s.. m. t...,, Serial So. 503 "ay 13, D79 Sententer 24.1 1977 D. ant hview A transient with sene similarities to tha Three Mile 'aland (SI) incident of 'Srch 23, 1979 cccurred at 03-1 during the early phases of the testin j, prqrm. A ccuplete description of the Septeurer 24, 1977 event concerning the depressuri-to -eportable zation of the primary system was presented in the supplement Occurr cc NP-32-77-16 dated Nevc ber 14, 1977. This event Jas siallar to the TMI incident in that the e;=nt was initiated by a loss of feccwater resulting in a reactor ccolant system ('4CS) pressure m rge .hich cpened the power cperated relief valve (PCF.V). The PCRV failed ep-n, causing less of coolant and coolant pressure with scre aciding in the RCS, and a subsequent increase in indicated pressurizer level (characteristic of a leak in the top of the pressuriner). As.-.a.t. T.M. I, th e c p e r a t o r s i n.i t.i.a ll. y...f.e..i l.e..d....t.o a recegnize the open.m_ORV cad. when cras_su: 1_.
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F cuveicpec in :nc.e, the eperators..su.t of_f the h i ';h p r e s s_u r..e i.n..j e c t.i..c n...?..c.p o. / . ~ _........ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ';. ' \\j; m l'nlike ~hree Mile Island, hewever, the Davic-3 esse 1 operators recognized the open ?ORY in a relatively y.icrA.f,'ce (apprcxiaately by 21 ninutes R E ~respended prcperly by closing the block valve and s.:.5..se~m an..t iv 2 u..m.a k< a,,m-.. m ~. ~. 5 rg, e.c t.j.1G.S.%. In the D3-1 incident, t.o reactor coolant pumps ;ere tripped to sas -dntain- - ~~ --.e d and one r.eactor coolant-... ~..r ic._c o tunp ce reduce the system hfat. input ~ . ~ ~. .an tuoe,ncident. ,, c e %,An t.h.,r ou.,y,aeu t s rne loss of feedwater as caused by a spuricus trip of the steam and f aec eater rupture centrol systcm (SFRCS) resulting in a loss of feed to one steam generator .:ith a cubsequent full SFRCS trip on icw steam generat ar level. The full SFRCS trip stc; ped normal feed to both generators 7.nd initiated the auxiliary feecwater I (. M ) s.sstem. 30 t.h_t rain s..o f the a_n7_s t a r t e d._.b u t .M_. _nn. e 'e d. i t.s_a s. s. _c.c.i a t.e d ~ The other experienced a malfunctica of the scvernor hich.upt ~. ( s t e. aa 2.e n e r. a t.o r. the auxiliary feedwater pump turbine at a speed insufficient to pump water to its -~ aasociated sterca generator. 33-1, all licensed cperators and the st ation As a result of the incident at f.;,) f uith specf21 att r.tien f.g - ( engineeriag staf f sere given detailed training on the event indi. (tien er to the :ar 's of relying cn pressuriner level inst r.entatica .s 4 ne prhiry systen inventory ;hcn a leak in the t;p of the presi.urizar ex!.ts. d error in racuring high pressure injecticn because of increasing pressuriner 1 tel i indicatica eas aise discassed. Medificaticns to the crer;ency proc 2dures .e re the top de;elc;od. These required the cperatcr to varily that no leak exists at of the pressuricer before the pressuriner level is relied upca, and L;h ;u era injectien ficw is secured. . :e As a direct result of ;he incident, several systea =cdificatians were me. auxiliary f eed ptr:p turbine scvernors care :cdified to prnent sny further bi. Ming { usifanctions. The control rcea annunciat'en of 57RCS trip status w.s ccc:.f m to provide 2dditicnal inf or--atien to t,e cpernors, cese cdificatiens c: de criud Ueportable Occurre.:ce NP-32-77-16 d r.ted % ;er ie r 14, I M 7,. in the a p p.'.c r en t to _n y n 30\\%g\\\\\\ \\ j g WM#g\\ n (i n 9 1909 205 g(tduh Ma:etis Exhibit 3, Page 2 of 3
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