ML19256B783
| ML19256B783 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 07/26/1979 |
| From: | Helfman S, Sidell G, Thomas Taylor, Vollmer R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 7908290238 | |
| Download: ML19256B783 (53) | |
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THE P!CSIZENT'S CO2tiISSICIT CN ACCIEENT AT TEGE MIII ISIA2TD O
IN THE MATTER OF:
TESTDDNY CF RICHARD VOLD2R
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t PLACE: Bethesda, Maryland DATE:
Thursday, July 26, 1979 1 - 51 PAGES:
1907 180 Columbia Reporting Company OFFICI AL REPORTERS 300 S.VENTH STREET. S.W.
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_C O_. N_ T _E N
.T. S WITNESS DIRECT CROSS REDIRECT RECROSS i
l Richard H. Vollmer 3
49 E _X H _I _B _I T_ _S.
DEPOSITION EXHIBIT NO.
FOR IDENTIFICATION 1
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i 1907 181 i
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l PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND
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Deposition of:
j RICHARD VOLLER j _______________x Hearing Room 542 Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7920 Norfolk Avenue Bethesda, Maryland i
Thursday, July 26, 1979 i
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The above-entitled Matter convened for hearing, 2
E pursuant 'o notice, at 1:25 p.m.
t 2
E PRESENT:
5 ms On behalf of the President's Commission on Accident ag at Three Mile Island:
U BY:
STAN M. HELFMAN, Esquire Associate Chief Counsel i
and BY:
GARY M. SIDELL, Esquire Associate Chief Counsel 2100 M Street, Northwest Nashington, D.
C.
20037 Theodore Taylor, Member of President's Commission l
Fobert English, Member of President's Commission l
On behalf of the Witness; BY:
MARK.E. CHOPKO, Esquire BY:
MARIANE MOE, Esquire U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of the General Counsel
i 2 -3
[,
i 9
_P _R O _C E _E _D _I N_ _G _S MR. ~ IFMAN:
On the record.
Would you please raise your right hand?
l Thereupon, RICHARD H. VOLDIER was called as a witness, and after having been first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION N
BY MR. HELFMAN:
ez j
Q Would you please state your full name for the record?
O a.
A Richard Henry Vollmer.
g 5
g Q
Have you ever had your deposition taken before?
3 8
A Yes.
Q I think I would like to briefly go through some of the characteristics of a deposition so you are aware of what we are doing today.
The testimony you are about to give will be sworn landwillhavethesameforceandeffectifthetestimonyhad i
been givan in a court of law.
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The testimony will be reduced to a transcript by the court reporter, and you will be provided with a copy and
' afforded the opportunity to make any changes which you feel are necessary.
However, you should be aware that we would l
4
(
have the opportunity to comment on any changes that you make.
Should the changes you make be substantial, it could reflect l adversely on your credibility.
So it is important that you ask for clarifications of any questions that you are asked which you do not fully understand before you answer them.
I For the benefit of the court reporter, it is necessary d
I that audible answers be given, since the court reporter can' t I
frecordgestures,nodsofthehead,andsoforth.
8 Since the court report can't take down two people e
talking at once, you should allow me to finish.my. question eo b
before you begin your answer, even if you anticipate what my e
~
E question is going to be.
And I will try to remember not to 22 y
ask questions until you have completed your answer.
Do you have any questions?
A No.
That is fine.
Q Did you bring a resume with you?
A No, I didn't.
i Q
Nere you asked to?
I A
Not that I recall.
I I can make one available.
i907 184
-Q Do you have one that is already made up?
A I believe-so. My secretary has one.
O Shall we request your secretary to obtain a copy l
l l
5 till 1
I i
lnow?
I A
Fine.
l Off the record.
i MR. HELFMAN :
1 (Whereupon, a discussion was held of f the. record.)
i MR. HELFMAN:
Back on the record.
i' BY MR. HELFMAN:
O While we are waiting for your resume, perhaps you should state for the record what your title is at the NRC landbrieflydescribewhatyourdutiesare.
ezp A
My current title is Director, TMI Support Task e
O
,S Group,,and also Acting Assistant Director of the Systematic E
Evaluation Program.
sa y
My duties, in relation to Three Mile Island, are
! the technical and management responsibilities for the flicensingeffortthatinvolvesmonitoringthecurrentThree Mile Island operations; review and the preparation of j
evaluation reports of plant activities by Metropolitan Edison; i
and that also includes Three Mile Island 1 at the current l
l etme.
i907 185 The Systematic Evaluation Program, which is the l
other part of my responsibility, is a carry-over from my previous position, and basically is a comprehensive review of the older operating plants for safety.
i
l 6
t l
l Q
What was your title at the time of the Three Mile
!IslandincidentinMarchofthisyear?
j A
My title at that time was Assistant Director for Systems and Projects, and that included the Reactor Systems l
l branches, Blant Systems Branch, and several project branches, including the Systematic Evaluation Program.
Q Would you describe your background as basically being an engineering background or a physics background?
6 A
I am a physicist, and have roughly, from 1952 to u
O y
1965 or so, engaged primary in physics activities.
Since c
y 1965 my a,ctivities have been more in the safety arena and
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m y
more perhaps broadened into an engineering aspect.
2 h
Q Did you become involved in the NRC participation u
in the Three Mile Island incident of March of this year?
A Yes, I became involved at roughly 8t15 on March 29th, when I was called into Mr. Stello's office, who was in communication with the incident center.
We were receiving i
I the first reports of the accident.
907 i86 Q
Mr. Stello was here in Bethesda at this time?
A Mr. Stello was right down the hall in the opposite corner from me.
I worked directly for Mr. Stello at that time.
Following that, I spent the day with my staff here in these quarters trying to review and understand.' the l
l
.=
7 i
I situation that was going on at the time.
MR. HEIEMAN:
Off the record.
(Whereupon, a discussion was held off the record.)
l MR.HELFMAN :
Back on the record.
i BY MR. EELFMAN:
I Q
On March 29th, when you were working in your offices with your staff, what were your responsibilities?
A The responsibilities at that time were primary response to queries from the people at the incident center; doe and again trying to understand and piece together the z
E 2
information that we were receiving primary from the incident
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center, as well as calls from Babcock and Wilcox.
2 3
We were not involved in direct communications with 8
the plant, of course, at that time, because those lines were all tied up with the incident center.
Around 7:00 or so that evening, I communicated with Mr. Stello, and we decided it would be good to send a
! team up to the site.
And I selected six other people --
1 I
ltwosystemspeople, two electrical and instrumentation people, and two radiation specialists -- and we made arrangements to leave early the next morning.
1907 187 Q
In fact, this team that you assembled, went to the site on the 30th?
.=
8 l
A Cn the 29th, Thursday, the 29th.
We left roughly at 8:00 o' clock, and were at the site somewhere around 11:30 in the morning.
Q So you accompanied them?
i.
l A
Yes.
Q When you were here in your offices with.your staff, l what types of questions were you responsible for trying to get answers to?
Were you concerned, for example, with 8
the condition of the core, with radiation emissions?
What c2g l was your primary focus?
5 b
A My primary focus was systems oriented.
We were e
iJ 4
f.tryingtoestablishwaysinwhichthelicenseecould E2 3
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! establish conditions that would allow him to start the v
reactor coolant pumps, for example.
We did have some problems that we were working on that were associated with radioactivity releases, trying to relate some of the radiation levelsrmeasured off.. site ~ to what might actually~been. released:att the plant.
Most of I
! these calculations, if you will, were done rather roughly, i
on the spur of the moment.
But, again, we were trying to respond primary to questions from the incident center.
O And you were trying to provide informat} % o h M,
in Bethesda?
I l
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9 l
A Yes.
i
~
Q Do you have off site radiation readings as early as
! the 29th of March?
I A
Yes, we did.
As a matter of fact, when I arrived on the 29th, a i part of my staff immediately checked in with the inspection i
I j and enforcement team that was on the site to try to understand i
i
' what measurements they were making at the time, and what g
the levels that they were seeing off site. And the general e
y consensus at that time was that the off site levels were eog certainly indicative that there were re~1eas~es from the e
<s facility of a substantial nature, but not of an imminent threat s
l to the public health and safety.
That was at least our o
i u
judgment.
Q Do you recall what the readings.were' that, yoe. were i getting.at that time?
A Some of the higher readings were 2 to 10 MR, again depending on location and how close into the plant they were j taken.
But my best recollection, and I have not gone back and looked at the records of the readings, that even at the near in locations, near in,off site locations, the maximum readings were on the order of 10 MR.
t 1907 189 i
Q Were you getting readings beyond the plant perimeter?
i l
l 10 l
i A
Oh, yes.
Many of the readings that I am discussing here were those taken beyond the plant perimeter,although i there were also measurements taken on the island, itself. But i
I was more concerned with down wind readings that might be indicative of public exposure.
Q Did you have metallurgical information at that time indicative of wind directions and so forth, velocity?
l A
Yes.
The inspection, enforcement team that did the 8
survey were in communication with capital City Airport.
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We did have communications with the control room, both O
~ - - - -
Unit 1 and Unit 2 control rooms, so the wind direction was l
known.
3 I
Generally, the survey teams were concentrating on C
down wind directions, although there wasn't much wind that i
, day.
It was very, very still.
Q With respect to the emergency procedures that you were attempting to devise, was this being done in your i
! offices without the benefit of Met-Ed's construction plans or plant designs?
A We had the safety analysis report; we had the licensee's description and design; and we had people that were pretty knowledgeable about the system.
1907 190 But, as I recall, we did lack some of the real i
f 11 I
i detailed type of information, such as the PNID, which would have provided us with much better knowledge of specific actions that can be taken to try to establish a pressure in the reactor systems that might be able to start the pumps and i
l things of that nature.
O Were you provided with such more details plans when iyou arrived at the site?
A When we arrived at the site we did not have that 8
information, as I recall, until perhaps Saturday or Sunday, ez; when we received some of the more detailed process eo S
instrumentation descriptions.
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When we arrived at the site we just sort of carried s
3o along with what we had.
Q Was this information requested upon your arrival from Met-Ed?
A When I arrived at the site, we were able to use the Met-Ed information, and I don't recall exactly when we requeste the additional detailed information from them.
We were using their information, which, for our purposes, was fairly satisfactory.
i907 19i And the reason it was, let me point out, that when
[ I got on site, the communications that existed between my I
l group and the plant site, or Bethesda, were,very limited.
l 12 l
9 i
Because what few phones were available at the observation center, where we spent most of our time, or at the moetel,
!where I had set up a meeting room, it was not easy to
! communicate, certainly, with the control room.
And when I
, was on the site, I had to go to Middletown to make a phone call back to my office, because the phone communications there were so much.
There were so few open, so tied up,
! that ccmmunications were not too good.
The people back in N
Bethesda kn'ew much more at that time than we did, even though ozp we were there.
eo Q
Despite satisfactory communications, you felt
~
{m you had sufficient information from Met-Ed to do your 3o calculations?
u A
I would say the communications were unsatisfactory.
But we did get information from Met-Ed.
The Met-Ed people were using the observation center as their information headquarters, and I think we were kept fully informed of what l was going on.
1907 192 The questions we asked, we were given responsible answers to.
I think, during Thursday, however, the core conditions and so on appeared to be fairly stable.
That I was before some of the Friday morning releases that occurred, that was before we really knew the significance of the hydrogen l
l
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13 i
all the information that we needed was lbubble.
And again, l made available to us.
Our primary mission.at that point in time was
! directed toward looking back at what had happened, and trying i
to establish that we wouldn't get into another bad situation i
in the next few days, and we tried to look forward to what the future might bring, in terms of core conditions and so on.
Q Are you saying inadequate or insufficient communications from the control room did not deprive you d
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of information which you needed to deal with the problems A=
9 at hand?
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I think for the focus that we were taking at that 2
3 time, we had enough information, because we had current 8
information.
We did not have the staff to make a broad -- to even l undertake a broad evaluation:what happened.
We were just ij trying to p iece together the sequence, the scenario what happened so we could better understand what might happen in the next few days or the next few weeks.
And to that extent, the information that was made available to us was sufficient.
If I were trying to do any type of detailed evaluation, or if I had been up there Wednesday -morning
' and was trying to understand what was going on in the core,
.1907;.193 i
14 O
in those early hours, the information would have been totally insufficient.
We would have needed somebody in the control l room,orsemebodywith good access to a broad spectrum i
l of data.
Q Weren't you attempting to devise emergency procedures based on the condition of the core at that time?
A That really came a little bit later.
Again, we were trying to project, as I said, into
{what might happen in the next few days based on our
-o e
2; understanding at that time.
eo i.
b As I said, our understanding at that time, on e
...e 4
5 Thursday, was they had gotten stable coolant conditions, 2
3 i appeared apparently so, even though there were temperatures o
in the system, and pressures were sometimes difficult to control.
And they had difficult times with the pressurizer and the makeup tank, obviously, because they had a substantial amount of hydrogen gas that was being evolved.
f Sut, I think in-terms of core conditions, they had l
' established ficw, they hed established heat rejection through the "A"
Our main focus at that time was s
9 to try to understand what had happened and whether or not the systems'that had not failed were capable of continuing on safe cool-down of the plant.
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15 l
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We didn't really look retrospectively at conditions that the core had gone through.
We were trying to take the information, factually, as best we knew, from a systems standpoint, and try to understand if we had adequate core-
~.
cooling, and if the decay heat removal system, or things of that nature, would be appropriate to bring into play.
Q And it was unnec ssary to have adequate. communication e
t I from the centrol room in order to piece together this l
information?
,ou E
A The communications with the control room were.through Aeo Met-Ed staff, and the informatien that they had there, w
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and again, -I think, for the purposes we were trying to do, es 3
on Thursday, I would say that that was adequate.
o o
Q Were you attempting to piece together a general
, scenario of what had occurred?
Was that your primary focus I
rather than a specific detailed approach?
A Yes, a general scenario, what systems came into play; and the sequence of the accident, how they contributed j to the accident; if the system could not be relied on for future cool-down or shut down, what additional systems might be necessary to be called on.
Q With an idea to developing procedures for further handling of the plant?
i I
1907 19rb
16 Ih A
Broadly speaking, that is correct.
Q Were you, and your team, responsible for devising such procedures?
i l
A Yes, we were. But the fornal procedural effort i
i i
did not really occur until Friday, when a substantially I
I I
increased staff was brought on.
Mr. Denton came up, and then we 3 split into a' twenty-four hour operation.
One of the major efforts in that twenty-four hour r
6 l operation was to help the licensee in their procedural effort, o
C 1
g both as a monitor of the procedures, and actually, in some eCg cases helping them prepare them.
e
<a Q
By the time Mr. Denton arrived, was it clear to sag l you that there had been core damage?
u A
I'think it was clear, certainly, then.
But even clear on Wednesday, that there had been core damage.,
because of the radiation levels that were reported back from the plant, from the off site environs.
My own personal judgment was, I think, in looking I
back, that we had ruptured a high fraction, or all of.the fuel rods, releasing a great many of the gaseous fis. sign.-products from the fission gas plenum.
I don't think I personally felt that the core damage had been significant, as it obviously i was, until we became aware of the hydrogen, the 190 /9o51t of i
l 17 I
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' hydrogen that had been generated.
l Q
When was t3at?
Was that prior to Mr. Centon's arrival at *.he site?
I i
A I would say no.
4 First of all, we did not knew, until Friday,
- a..
l l containment pressure spike had occurred, which would then obviously be indicative of burning of a substanti&1 lamountofhydrogengas.
And Friday also, it became clear 1
i that because there were so much difficulty in controlling 6u-l
! the pressure in the makeup tank, there must be an awful lot E
l
! of hydrogen gas evolving, because the makeup tank is basically Cs I
- E a degaser, which strips the gas, and you do get your gaseous 3
release.
8 So I guess, until these facts came together, that there was an awful lot of hydrogen generation, would I have concluded that the core damage was as extensive as it was.
'lthough, again, I did feel that substantial fi.rsion process l
l had occurred.
But that could have occurred just by f ailure resulting from either lack of cooling or recovery.
Q Did you reach the conclusion, either on Wednesday or Thursday, there was a great likelihood that the core had 1907 197 become uncovered?
I A
Yes.
And I gue s the conclusion that the core had
l l
18 till I
! been uncovered was clear on Wednesay, on Wednesday morning, i
I guess, when it was also clear that the temperatures in the hot leg above the core were higher than the saturation temperatures of the liquid.
And the only way this can occur i
i is if the staem above ;he core had been super-heated, which
- would mean that the core would have had to be uncovered.
l l
Q Do you recall if anyone else at the incident center reached a sisilar conclusion, and expressed such a d
' conclusion?
Mr. Stello, for example?
v i
C2 A
Mr. Stello certainly did, but I don't know if he
- eog reached that conclusion on Wednesday or when.
I certainly e
~
s know, from people who were there, that he was yelling into the phone that the operator should understand clearly that au the core is uncovered, because the temperatures were too-I
'high.
And, again, I don't really remember when I was made aware of that story.
I Q
Were you involved in briefing Mr. Denton when he t
i
{arrivedatthescene?
907 198 I
l A
Yes, I was the lead.NRC person at the site when Mr. Denton arrived, and I did brief him and g1"e him as up-to-date status as I could, where we stcod as far as the core, and where we stcod, as far as relases were concerned.
O Did you brief hin on the condition of the core?
19 I
I No, I don't think we discussed any specifics of Q
f
! core conditions at that time.
l l
Again, as I said, at that time, I don't -- when he l
! got there, I am just trying to recall if I was aware of the i
pressure spike in the containment.
Certainly he was made i aware, back here, Friday morning, I believe, that that was I
the case.
Q But you were aware by then of the presence of j
super-heated steam?
e A
I was aware of that, yes, Wednesday, early afternoon.
8 b
Q Which indicated to you that.the core had become i
c 4
E uncovered?
33 o
I A
But whether or not the core temperatures had got to o
such a degree as to oxidize large masses or amounts of l circonium, I don't think I personally appreciated that at that
' time.
O In your briefing of Mr.Denton, did you discuss the presence of super-heated steam and the conclusion that the l
! core had been uncovered?
jgQJ
}99 A
No, I felt my briefing *ith:Er.rDenton was'.the factual status of the way things stood at that time...
I know he had been involved in the incident center for the previous I
couple of days.
And my briefing of him at that time was not
20 i
lanythingbutafactualrecitationasbestIknewexactly where things stcod at that moment, and what problems seemed lto exist at that moment.-- the problem of the releases and the problems of being able to maintain the makeup tank t
pressure in a stable condition.
Q Did you inform him of the presence of the super-I heated steam as a factual matter?
A I don't believe so.
6 Q
or the temperature differential which leads you to u
the conclusion there was super-heated steam?
C I
z i
2 A
No, I didn't.
- c:
5t that time, the reactor coolant pump had been y
2 y
on for a day and-a-half, and adequate ccoling was being u
achieved.
So that particular difference did not e::ist :at the time.
As I said, I attempted to explain to him the situatici of the core, and the core parameters that existed when he got I
there.
t l
l Q
Ead the core become uncovered prior to his arrival, would that have resulted in core damage?
A I don't understand the question.
i907 200 Q
Does uncovery of the core produce core damage?
t k
i A
Not necessarily.
l l
21 l
r Q
Under what circumstances could you have an uncovered core without core damage?
t j
A well, if the core was, if the reactor had been shut Idown for a period of time, for example, a week, and the core ljwas uncovered for 15 minutespor something like that, I l
' wouldn't expect there would be any substantial core damage, maybe none.
There are a given set of circumstances related to 6
- the heat developed in the core, and the length of time it is u
l ec uncovered by which you wouldn't get the core damage.
And E
2 if yon uncover the core earlier in an accient,for a substantial j
period of time, then you would get core damage.
2a i
g So, how long the core is without cooling, how fast u
it will heat up, and what temperatures it will achieve, and ltheoxidizationofthezirconiumgivesyoucoredamage.
O You were aware that TMI-2 had not been shut down for a week prior to this incident?
A Yes.
(Mr. Sidell left the room) 00. English arrived at the depositi O
And given that circumstance, wouldn't core uncovering l
j indicate core damage?
l A
Yes.
I i
l
22 i
i l
i Q
Even if the core was later flooded or cooled, would h
t there not be core damage?
A Yes.
I Q
That would be a fact concerning the condition of i
! the core which existed at the time Mr. Denton arrived.
A Ch, I see what you mean.
Q You do agree?
l A
Yes, I agree..
l g
l I would say I assumed Mr. Denton knew there had o
p
}beencoredamage.
I felt that was a fact that was known by 2
5 I
everybody, since the releases were significant.
t C
When I said I gave him the status as best I could 8
of the plant conditions, I was referring to-systems o
descriptions, flows, temperatures, and so on.
I did not, as I recall, go into any detail what I thought the condition of the core was at that time.
Q Would it be accurate to state that prior to your
- leaving Bethesda, it was commonly understood that there i
was super-heated steam in the core, and that this likely
' indicated some core uncovering?
i907 202 l
A I would say so, yes, to the best of my knowledge, that the people in the incident center did knew that.
Q At the time you received more detailed plans from l
t i,
23 9
Met-Ed, did you have any difficulty devising emergency procedures for reliance on those plans?
A Well, certainly Met-Ed was in control of the
' operation, and we were briefed on what was going on, and what Ithey planned en doing.
I We did not get into the procedural details until l
l Probably Friday night or Saturday, at which time they I
mounted an effort to prepare procedures, contingency and N
emergency procedures, to ecpe with the situation as it e
2 g
existed.
And these procedures, of course, changed sometimes 0
daily, sometimes weekly, because the conditions of the systems j
also changed.
3 0
For example, one of the procedures very early on was ways of getting rid of the hydrogen bubble, as an example Iof a. procedure that originated because of the situation.
O In devising emergency procedures, are you concerned with such mundane operations as turning on pumps, turning off 5""P"?
i907 203 A
Exactly, turning on pumps, every valve, which valve was important to the operations, what position they were in.
Yes, that is why the very details were needed when we got
- into the procedure effort, details that were not needed when i
we were considering the system aspect.
~
t i
24 till l
Q When you refer to details, are you referring to l location of valves and location of switches, location of pipes?
I j
A Location, in the sense of where they are in the l system, but not location where they physically are, although that was important in some cases.
We didn't concern ourselves with which switches had to be turned on the control console.
The plant people needed to provide that type of intelligence.
(Ms. Moe left the room)
N 8
Q Did you find that the plans that were provided you ozp by Met-Ed were fully up to date and accurately reflected eo y
the current design of the plant-and the location of important 3
. pieces of equipment?
35o A
No, there were many occasions when~our input was needed to correct a lack of understanding of the systems as they
, existed, and the equipment, as it existed,for the preparation of these procedures.
f I believe, to clarify and be fair about it, that j the people who may not have been familiar with the plant, I
that specific plant, were called into the procedure writing effort, and they may not have been as knowledgeable about it as the plant operation staff, itself, who were fighting fires,
! so to speak, of their own.
i907 204 i
Q Were you provided with plans, physical plans', like
i 1
25 l
ii blueprints?
Well, there, basically -- basically, blueprints of A
fhowthesystemwasconnectedtogether,wherethevalvesled l ta, where the pumps were located, the length of pipe and.so I
I forth, that was provided.
~
Q By' Met'-Ed?
A Yes.
Q Were those plans or blueprints an accurate I
- representation of the configuration of the plant at the time?
ev i
e 3
A As had been reported by the people on the procedure E
effort, there was ddficiencies,in the blueprints, that they C
j were not up to date, or deficiences--or the terminology, 2
h
,as built, that may have been the original design, or the final-o design, but as changes were made in the field, in the plant,
, they were not necessarily reflected at all times on those blueprints, if you will.
Q Is it a requirement of the NRC that the licensee 6
', keep these plans up to date so as to reflect the changes?
i A
I would say that to comply with the regulatory guide, 1.33, which is the operational quality assurance program, that clearly the licensee should have kept those up to(date
,and reflect actual conditions.
907 205 l
l Q
Did it appear to you then that Met-Ed had violated i
i i
t i
26 i
I l
the guide to which you refer in not keeping their plans up to date?
Would that be an accurate conclusion?
A I would have to assume that since I didn't know l what ' they had in the process --
l t
MR. CHOPKO:
Let me interject one thing.
We are referring to the Red Guide. ' The Red Guide is not requirements.
Off the record.
g l
(Whereupon, a discussion was held off the record.)
e h
MR. HELFMAN:
Back on the record.
e O
BY' MR.HELFMAN :
es a
E Q
With respect to the responsibility for these 2
I o
d emergency procedures, were the procedures devised by NRC u
people, you and your people, team, or were they devised by Met-Ed?
A Are you referring to the initial drafts of those procedures?
Q Yes.
A Primarily by Met-Ed, and its consultants, or lehemever they brought on site to do that.
'06 Q
Were the NRC rules to sign off on the procedures before they were implemented?
Did you have an approval capacit A
Yes, we did.
27 I
Q Did you find it was necessary to make or implement l
l many changes that.were proposed' by Met'Ed?
l A
Eow do you characterize many?
Q Substantial, numerous.
i A
I think some procedures needed to be changed in
- what I would characterize as a substantive way, and other procedures only required clarification.
O Did you have to intervene often in those proposed g
- procedures before you would sign off on them?
e A
The process involved, in many cases, a close working
=o relationship.
The initial drafters of the procedures would i
. ')
7 c
a I send these to their technical review staff, and ourselves ua at the same time, and also to their plant operation review aa ccmmittee.
And in many cases, we were common with that I
{ effort, and it was a round table discussion.
l So at that point in time it would be difficult ltocharacterizeitasintervention.
i I think our comments, I
i j as well as their comments, were considered, discussed, and 1
either incorporated or rejected as not-being necessary.
O So NRC then participated in the formulation of the initial plans, procedures?
1907 207 A
In some cases we even helped with the initiaIl plans.
Some of our operating licensing branch people were assisting, l
i 28 I
i because of their detailed knowledge of the plant and the operational knowledge of the control room, were even assisting I
l in the preparation of the procedures.
l l
It wasn't the usual, regulatory operation, wheru they prepared their documents and met all their approvals,
, and then submit it for our review.
Because of the timeliness and the urgency of the situation, it was a step by step review process with them.
6 With respect to the blueprint inaccuracies to which Q
o E.
We have referred, do you recall if any of these inaccuracies Ee impeded or substantially affected the development of emergency o
y procedures?
3 l
A I don't think I can really respond to that.
I am 8
sure the fact that they were not accurate, at least that t
i somebody had-to point out the inaccuracies had made some minor time impact, but whether that was substantial or not, I wasn't close enough to the operation to tell.
Q Can you recall any examination of inaccuracies that required obtaining further information that should have been contained on the blueprint.
i907 208 l
A No, I can't.
I can only respond as I am now, to what
!the pecple on the site reported back to me.
t l
Q Are you familiar with Thomas Novak?
i l
I l
29 I
i l
l A
Yes.
l l
Q Was he on your staff, Reactor Systems Branch?
I A
No.
Tom was, as I recali, brought up primary for --
i let me correct that.
Yes, earlier on he was involved in the procedure operation, yes.
Q Prior to TMI-2 did he report to you?
l A
No.
l Q
But during the TMI incident he did at some point?
8 A
He was on the other shift.
ozp Q
Prior to TMI --
ao A.
He was on Mr. Stello's shift, as a matter of facts:
3 a
j Q
Prior to TMI-2 incident, did you have the opportunity 2a to see the memorandum that was prepared by Sandy Israel and o
signed by Thomas Novak', entitled " Loop Seals in Pressurizer
, Surge Line."
I A
Yes.
1907 209 O
Eave you seen it since?
A I have seen it since, along with a bunch of other stuff, and gave it somewhat a cursory reading, I am afraid.
- I have been more involved in the day to day operations rather
,than looking back in my capacity as TMI-2 Support Director.
I i
Q Do you recall what the memorandum was concerned with?
A As I recall, if it is the memorandum you are referring l
I 30 c.
f to, it was concerned with the likelihood of incorrect pressuriz a
, level instrumentation following certain transients.
i Would it be correct te say that such a scenario l
Q l was part of the events at TMI-2?
l A
That is correct.
MR. CHOPKO:
For the. purpose of this deposition, I would like to identify the memorandum referred to in direct as the memorandum from Tom Novak to RSB members, 8
dated January 10, 1978.
e MR. HELFMAN:
It would be noted for the record z
C 8
i
)
that the memorandum has been marked as Exhibit No. 3 g
to the deposition of Sandy Israel of 7/26/79.
D a
f Off the record.
o (Whereupon a discussion was held off the record.)
MR. HELFMAN:
Back on the record.
We received Mr. Vollmer's resume.
i would like to I
have it marked.as Deposition Exhibit No. 1 to this l
i907 210 l
l deposition.
l (Whereupon, Deposition Exhibit 1 l
was marked for identification.)
BY MR. HELFMAN:
I Q
Does this resume accuracely reflect your educationa.L, professional, employment background?
l
i I
31 A
Yes, it does.
Q Could you please describe for the record your i
understanding of the present condition of the core at lThreeMileIsland?
i A
Well, my present understanding of the core condition would be based on the facts as I know them, which would be a substantial amount of cladding oxidization has taken place in the top half of the reactor core.
8 My fudgment is that the core, its' lf, has not e
c2; under gone a significant slumping or caving in, in the center --
1 1
0 i
y Q
. Mas there been some?
g l
A I suppose so.
But let me go on.
3 i
f 4-for: a number of. reasons.
First of all, our primary coolant samples have not indicated the presence of control rod material, nor have they indicated the presence of a significant snount of fuel, itself.
And so, my only conception of the status of the core is that there has been,
! as I said, a significant amount of cladding oxidization, and l
splitting and spalling of the cladding.
I 907 211 But my own view is, for a large part, the core remains in a fairly upright condition.
The other thing that leads me to believe that, a significant amount of the in-core thermacouples have
32 l been reading with accuracy and reliability since the accident.
So these facts would lead me to conclude that certainly, jthereleaseoffissionproducts,generationcfhydrogen,would i
point to a substantial overall destruction of the d1 adding, l on' a good portion of the core.
But I don't think it has fallen down into a debris pile in the middle.
That is only my own judgment, based on the facts l
l as I see them.
6 O
Have you heard any differing views on that within oe 2
the NRC?
O b
i A
I scanned a counle of memos.
You can look at my C
l l board there and see the inverted cone and the core there.
2 3
g I don't know anybody who has suggested there is a deep u
depression in the core, that it had sunk down.
But, again, I
perhaps I have not seen or heard all of the people who are looking at the problem.
I have not been in contact with scme of the people in the Division of Systems Saf ety,who I think are looking or trying to evaluate what they think the core icoks like now.
Q How often are you updated on the condition of the core?
1907 212 i
A Daily, at least.
When you say " condition of the core", I should
i 33 clarify that:
Condition of the plant parameters.
I don't think anybody is up to date on the condition of the core.
All I can say is we are updated on the temperatures
! and the pressures, activity releases, if there were, things lofthatnature,andtheprogressonconstructionandthe progress on what they are going to do with the contaminated water, things like that.
I i
MR. RELPMANi 'Off the record.
I l
(Whereupon, a discussion was held off the record.)
d e
y MR. EELFMAN:
Back on the record.
e i
1BY MR. HELFMAN:
=
i Q
Are you familiar with -- I am probably going to s3y mispronounce this -- picklesimer's memo of June 20th?
o i
A No.
Q Do you conclude from the analysis of the core samples I
!that control rods are intact?
i A
I don't conclude that they are in the same physical I
il condition that they were, but I do believe that if they had i
melted or melted away or vaporized, that we would have seen something in our primary cooling system regarding the radioactivity from the control rods, themselves.
I guess they are there, somehow.
In what sort of sh' ape, I am not
! sure.
1907 213
34 O
Are the present efforts to maintain the core in its condition, assuming there is some protection from control rods?
l A
No.
The first week of the accident, I can't recall exactly when, we initiated a fairly priority analysis effort to establish at what boron concentration in the reactor coolant, would be necessary to assure core subcriticality if the contro2 rods were absent and the core pellets were to rearrange themselves in a more active configuration.
du E
We established that level,which is 3,000 parts per P
i e
lnillionbaronandcarefullyassuredourselvessincethattime o
E
~
g that the core did have that concentration in it.
We have s
3 l been proceeding on that basis.
8 Q
If you were to have a slump of the pellets to the bottom of the core, would you have sufficient flow to insure boration of this material?
A The boration is dependent on two things:
One is l the level of make up -- that is, the boron level of the makeup level, and in fact, hew much leakage you have from the core, and whether the leakage is in a liquid state or a vapor state.
If your leakage from the reactor through the pressurizer was all in the vapor state, then you would concentrate the boron in the core.
And indeed, there were times during the accident 1907 214
\\
1 l
35 or the aftermath of the accident when we put in lower I
concentration than the 3,000 parts per million, because it
, was clear we were getting too high a concentration in the i
l and we wanted to maintain it around 3,000.
The solubility
- core, i
at these temperatures is far in excess of what the core 1
l actually has, or the coolant has, in terms of boron.
So it is my belief, by the addition of the prescribec, i
amounts of boric acid. in the makeup, and our weekly
, monitoring of the level of baron in the coolant, we can have
{ reasonable assurance that it is distributed around the system.
G c
e o
We have done things to try to convince ourselves, E
i or assunsourselves, that that is indeed the case.
<a I
1 3
Q Is there a possibility that the pellets could' 8
slump to the bottom?
A I imagine that is a possibility, yes, depending on the core description.
I would suspect, if they got into A pile at the bottom, there would be much less than currently.
Q If the pellets were to slump to the bottom enmasse, could there be a flew problem created, which would impede i
or present sufficient boratien of the pellets?
I don't know if I am being clear.
Do you understand the question?
I907 215 A
Yes.
l I
36
[
I j
Well, as long as the moderator -- that is that l 3,000 parts per million.
If you did have an alter-geometry, I
landmostgeometrieswould'belessreactivefromacriticality l standpoint than the one the actual fuel rods are designed l
in, it is my belief, based on the analysis that was done, that the core would remain subcritical in all types of l consideration, if we kept the 3,000 PPM.
Whether there is flow there or not, I don't know I
8 how you would extract the boron out of the water, because ezg the solubility is very high at these temperatures.
If you i
e O
g can somehow filter it out, then I guess you can hypothetize 4.
5 some sort of recriticality situation.
3mf Q
What you are saying, so long as the pile of material i is surrounded by boreted solution, it is unnecessary to have flow of barated material through the pile should there be f
a slump?
1, g Q J 2 ] b A
What I said, as long as the water that is through the system has the baron in it at that level, whether there i
l that the core will remain suberitical.
lisaslumpornot, If somehow you could assume that the water inside the slumped
, mass became unborated, then 7 would hypothesire or you could achieve some condition, periaps recriticality.
But again, I don't know how you extrac' the boron out of the water.
l
l 37 i
i f
Q But in the event of a slump, would you still have l adequate flow to insure that the material in the slump was l
! adecuately borated?
l A
Whatever is in there, is in there.
Whether.you have flow thro gh or not.
Whatever is in there is borated u
i j water.
If you could tell me how the water in there becomes unborated, than I could go on further with your supposition $
C.
I Q
Let me ask it this way:
If there was a slump, it ezp would not prevent flow of borated coolant?
In other words, eo g
there would continue to be borated coolant flow through the 4
g slumped material?
2 A
We have to separate flow from boron.
1907 2[7 Now, the flow through the core right now is about at a rate of about 4 foot a minute.
It takes about a minute i for the water <to.,gora foote Thate.is a pretty low f16w.
If you slump down the core, I am sure that you would impede
, the flow even more.
So you could stop the flow in the core, I
I perhaps, and the water that resides in the core is still there, and is still borated, and that water which exists there would, in my view, maintain the core suberitical.
Q Is it possible that the point could be reached with regard to the borated coolant, that you would begin to get i
38
! percipitate?
A I believe at these temperatures that the percipitate would occur in something like 7-to 8,000 parts per million.
, We have, in reccgnition, however, that baron sometimes l Percipitates when you don't expect it to, we have made an effort to try to hold the boron level at the 3,000 parts per million, rather than let it go higher and higher, because of a potential problem with restricting core flow as well as d
restricting our sample' lines that we take our pressure e
j measurements from, and ovr core ecolant samples frem.
eo i
So, as I indicated before, there were times when e
evaporationi we v
were concentraing some baron.
Q Eave you had any indication of boron percipitate?
A We have, in some cases, have low flow through the sample lines, which may be because of our low pressure and the long length of the sample lines, or it may be because of boron percipitate in the sample lines.
It is not really 1**"
1907 218 I don' t think we have any direct evidence of line clogging at this point in time, or something like that, which would indicate boren percipitate.
It is difficult - to be i
l 39 lcertainthatwedon'thaveitsomewhere.
t Q
If you were to discovery notably more boron fpercipitate,whatwouldbetheprocedure?
l A
I think if we discovered notable amounts of boron percipitate or thought we were having problems of that nature, t
I we would do two things, or I would suggest doing two things:
One, closing down on the heat rejection in the steam generator, so we raise the average temperature level of the d
i water so the boren becomes more soluble in it; and perhaps we u
i E
would inject, if we thought we were getting a percipitate in Pe the recriticality,we would inject a higher concentration of O
,. _.s g
3 boric acid.
We could operate the core at a mdch higher 3
, temperature than it is now, just by closing out hedt rejection.
O i
I am not sure we can get real hot, because basically the heat generation is so low now. -
you.have a loss, a systems loss-- but I am sure we can get up 100 degrees cr 200 degrees.
Q Would I be correct in assuming the plant is new in a condition that can be referred to as solid?
i l
A That is correct.
O Why was that done?
907 219 A
The plant was made solid for two reasons:
- One, the monitoring of leakage out of the primary system is done
i i
40 t
i by trying to balance -- not balance, but understand where the level in the pressurizer is, and the level in the makeup tank.
iNow, since the pressurizer level instrumentation is no longer available, it was felt that it was important to be sure that
{ the makeup could be at all times known, how much leakage out I
! of the primary system, through valves and pumps, there is I leakage.
The way you have a good handle en that, to make the primary system solid, except at one point, the makeup i
tank, where you have a good level measurement.
,o So if you.
u g
iknow _. if you keep the system solid, from that makeup tank, A
I 5
if you are starting to leak faster than you were, we would
~T E
tnow we are losing two, four-tenths of a gallon per minute.
g es 3
p.
'If something should happen, if it increases, we 8
i
)<culd know it quickly, because we knew the makeup tank level.
The other, reason that we felt it was good to go polid is that the operators did not feel comfortable operating i
fithagasspaceabovetheliquidspace,becausetheydidn't i
qnow where the pre,ssurizer level was.
They were uncomfortable cperating that way.
They felt good with operating at a solid level.
Q Did they feel pressurizer level indication was an inreliable indicator?
1907 220 I
A The reason we went into natural circulation when we
I 41 did, was because the last pressurizer level instrument showed signs of becoming unreliable.
That was the point when we went i
j in and deliberately switched frem coolant pump and went into lnaturalcirculation.
l And that last instrument has long last
[ died.
I Q
What type of instrumentation to you presently have at the plant?
A The instruments that we presently have on the plant 6
are pressure instrumentation and temperature instrumentation.
e y
We have a number of in-core thermocouples,which are still e
Qg reading reliably.
We have pressurizer tempera _ture instrumentat c
and reactor coolant inlet and outlet instrumentation.
We 2oy have that.
And the pressure, as I said, the pressure u
instruments, which were added after the accident.
And
- they are, basically, outside in the auxiliary; building, so they are not expected to fail.
1 l
There 'is an adequate amount of instrumentation Istill existing.
As a matter of fact, theoretically, we could lIat this point in time, if worse got to worse, we could only operate with our in-core thermocouples.
O If you were to have the plant go critical again, what system do you have available to you to control that at the present time?
!907 221
47 I
l i
only the addition of barated water, and increasing A
,the temperature of the system.
i Q
Could you give seme kind of an estimate as to the
! likelihood of such an event, of the plant going critical again iIat this time?
A Well, my own opinion is that.it is a very Icw
, probability because, I believe, that we can maintain the 3,00 PPM boron. And I think the extra safety factor that we 6u have in there is twofold: One, if the core configuration e
E E
changes to a more densified core and less moderation, I think 2
^N that tends -to scme criticality; and secondly, it is my 5
opinion that particularly at the bottom of the core probably 3
8 the control rods are there in some shape, in scme form.
i I think that aJso exists.
O Is there any present indication that there has been actual fuel melting?
i907 222 i
A Well, I think, as I said before, our primary l coolant samples have sh:wn very low amounts of transuranics, i
! in the order of a few parts per_million.
I am not a reactor systems che ist r., but people that I talked to would say m
those valvesowould be indicative of a very low or non-existing melting of the fuel, and would be indicative, since there has lbeenmuchcladding, fail &re of particulation and dusting of
~:
i l
43 l
l pellets.
Q You mentioned earlier that one of your concerns l
i in the present management of the situatianis what to do with t
waste material.
3 i
l Are you including in that the water that has ijspilledintothecontainmentbuilding?
A Yes.
Q Has there been some decision as to what is going to I
d
!be done with that waste?
I e
A As yet, the licensee has not'made his plans or eog proposals known to the Commission on what he is going to do
~ ~.
x with that waste.
23 8
Q Is that primarily the licensee's :esponsibility?
v A
Yes, it is.
i Q
Has there been some discussion within the NRC as to lwhat type of proposal would be approved?
\\
Is that unclear?
l A
Yes.
O Let me ask it this way:
It would be correct to
' assume, would it not, that this waste material would have to i
be transported frem the site to some dump site?
A As solid material, yes; not as liquid however.
I Q
The determination has already been made that it l
l I
4; ill>
t i
would not he transported in a liquid state?
A cur regulations would not allow that'.
O In what state would it be transported?
I
{
A
'Only in the solid state.
Q How would this material be converted. into a solid 4
l state?
I A
It can be converted.
in one of two ways; one, the contaminated water could be put through an evaporator, I
lwhich would give you distilled water out one end, simply 8
g speaking,-and' a concentrated liqueur of high: radioactiveccenten E
5 at the bottom of the evaporator.
This-material could be put b) in solid matrix, cement, for example, and put in a solid 5
form that way.
o" u
Another way of handling it, and the way a current facility has been built at the site to handle the auxiliary building waste, was to put that water through a system of filters and demineralizer, which would capture the
!radioactive material on the filter substance or the resins IIof the demineralizer, which would then be dewatered by vacuum and either shipped in that dry form or further solidified i
by putting them in cement, or something like that.
G I
t Again, the water that is the end product of either i
j process would have to be at a level of radioactivity such i907 224
45 lllk i
i l that it could be disposed of in a way that is yet to be l
l determined.
The reason it is yet to be determined is because Lthe NRC is currently being sued for various things having to do with the water disposal, and we are taking a:. step by step i
approach in trying to meet the needs of the decontamination i
of the facility.
So we are doing an environmental and safety assessrent of cleaning up the water, and then make an d
assessment what to do with the clean water.
It would have to oe 2
meet ours and EPA's requirements when it is cleaned up.
- eC The local citizens are very adamant not having it c
put in the Susquehanna no-matter how clean it is.
sa Q
Is that one of the possible alternatives, to clean 8
u I it up and put it in the Susquehanna River?
A If there hadn' t been an accident, that water would l normally be in the Susquehanna at the type of level that we
, are going to make them clean it up anyway.
But because of
- the concern and the suits and so en, the licensee is going to have to look at alternative ways of getting rid of that lcleanwater--sellittootherfacilities,cruckitaway and dump it in the ocean, whatever, j
Q Earlier you referred to two forms in which the i
radioactive waste could take prior to transporting itoto a l
i907 225
7.'
46 dump site.
You referred to using a vacuum to dewateri=e the
- waste.
l Would that produce a powder,or clay-like material, i
l 1
lor a liquid waste?
i A
It would produce a sort of sand-like material resin, which are dry and would pour out on the table, but not flow, like a liquid.
And the radioactive materials are not r easily detached from that just by pouring it out or opening up the container that they are in.
They are faily well captured e2; by that, eo Q
So by dewaterized, do you mean it would be dry?-
E A
It would be dry, yes.
And the reason for that, you 3
3 would not want to ship the material if it was in liquid form, o
because if there was some sort of accider.t or leak you wouldn't iwant it going out in the transportation process or the burial process.
O The other form that you referred to would produce-l ta radioactive liqueur, and that obviously would be a liquid waste.
A But that, as I indicated, would have to be solidified by mixing it with cement or something for the shipment.
Either way, whatever way it is shipped, would have to be in l
I a solid, liquid-free form.
That is a very strict requirement.
1907 226
a a:
i I
47 I
-Q Are either of these two forms safer in terms of the release of radioactivity into the environment during l
l transportation?
I A
I don't think there is any significant degree l between them.
This material would have to be shipped, in i
addition to being in solid form, would have to be shipped in a type "B" cast, which means it wou.1.d be in a high integrity cast that would be tested to survive significant accidents, g
l fires, things like that, that might occur during the e
l transportation route.
=
i O
g So, I suppose, if you dilluted the materiil~in many
<g tons of concrete and shipped it that way, there are some i
y
- additional margins of cafety, but it is not easy to identify.
v O
Is one of these methods of shipment substantially i
i l less expensive than the other?
l A
Well, I think the more you have to mix the resin material with additional matrix, let's say cement, the more i
volume you create, so the larger the shipments have to be.
l The estimate I gave to the Ccmmission yesterday or the day before was that solidification of the resins would likely double, it is our estimate, the amount of the shipment.
j Q
What magnitude are we talking about?
How many i
1907 227 l truck loads are we talking about?
i I
48 1
I i
A For the water in the auxiliary building now, which is roughly 300,000 gallons, we would anticipate 50 to 100 truck loads or double that, if it was additionally solidified, I
' if you will.
MR. EELFMAN:
Let's go off the record.
(Whereupon, a discussion was held off the record.
MR. HELFMAN:
Back on the record.
BY MR. HELFMAN:
6 Q
There are a couple of additional questions.
The u
C E
first one is this:
Considering the horated water, could the 5j reactor':s fuel take any configuration, either by itself or e
j as a result of recover operations, that could conceivable sag again become critical?
U A
As I indicated, to the best of my knowledge, the core configuration was '. looked -atiin their mosu critical state,
- and the value of baron that would be necessary to maintain subcriticality was established for that state, without control i
rods.
Q And the configurations that were considered were I
the present configuration and a slump?
1907 228 A
No, the configurations considered were putting the rods at a more optimum spacing from a reactivity standpoint, and presuming that the slump could not achieve anything more
i ::
I 49 till j
optimum, than the optimum spacing that you could define from the lastic operation.
i i
MR. HELFMAN:
Off the record.
I i
CWhereupon, a discussion was held off the record.)
MR. EELFMAN:
Back on the record.
l l
Mr. Chopko, from the Office of General Counsel of NRC, do you have any additior:al questions.
l MR. CHOPKO:
I would like to ask one question, O.
noting, for the record, that although I am from the o
j Office of General Counsel, I am designated counsel for P
5 Mr. Vollmer.
b I
s
)
CROSS EXAMINATION
~
E23 BY MR. CHOPKO:
aou Q
Mr. Vollmer, at one point early on in direct examination you were asked if Met-Ed did not comply with a
' regulatory guide concerning keeping its bluepri-ts and other
, plans for the TMI plant in actual conformance with what was I
t j there.
And you noted that thatt.was a violation of the red l guide; is that correct?
A I believe those were the words.
Q First of all, is a red guide a requirement on a 1907 229 licensee?
l A
A red guide is not a regulation; it is a regulatory I
4 < *,* i I
i 50 l
i practice or a regulatory good practice, which the licensee attests that he will comply with when he goes through the licensing process.
Since I don't have direct knowledge if he has
' attested to the specifics of this regulatory guide, or if he has suggested to the staff some other way of meeting that requirement that wasn't precisely in the regulatory guide, each way would be acceptable.
j The word " violation" was not the correct legal ezg terminology to use, but I think if the licensee had adopted eo i
that guide in substance or in principal, he should have c
<s available to plant personnel at least one copy which represents 23 8
the plant system and the electrical systems in there current u
configuration.
t O
Se they were net, for want of a better term, in compliance with the guidance in this particular regulatory guide?
A That would be my judgment.
Q I just wanted to make that one point clear.
Thank you.
MR. HEIEMAN:
No additional questions.
That concludes the deposition.
I should inform you that it is our practice to adjourn the deposition-rather than I
i907 230
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terminate it.
If there is reason to continue it to a future ldate, the present deposition would be simply continued.
l THE WITNESS:
Fine.
t l
l MR. HELFMAN:
That concludes the deposition to date.
(Whereupon, at 3 : 20 p.m., the deposition of RICHARD H. VOLLMER was adourned.)
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